LCD行业-FMEA-AI失效模式和影响分析

FMEAFailureMode&EffectAnalysis失效模式和影响分析 FMEA是一种可靠性设计的方法，FMEA目的在于： 在一个新的产品设计，制造之前，或对目前存在的制造过程进行改变之前，对各种潜在的，与设计或制造过程有关的风险进行评估，分析。 制定预防措施，消除或减少失效模式出现的机会。将风险减少最低水平。 使设计或制造过程文件化。 FMEA强调“事前预防”，而不是“事后补救”。什么是FMEA？失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis 为保证产品的可靠性，发现设计，制造过程中的薄弱环节，并采用工程保证，生产质量保证等措施降低致命故障发生的概率，因此对产品可靠性一般提出如下要求可靠性定量要求：MTBF(MeanTimeBetweenFailure)可靠性定性要求：FMEA(FailureModeandEffectAnalysis)故障模式及影响分析如果产品可靠性要求难于规定定量指标，验证方法，规定定性的可靠性要求和验收准则就更加重要系统可靠性工程与FMEA的关系失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis20世纪50年代，美国格鲁曼公司开发了FMEA，用以飞机制造业的发动机故障防范，取得较好成果60年代早期，美国航空及太空总署(NASA)实施阿波罗登月计划时，在中明确要求实施FMEA。70年代初，美国海军开始使用FMEA.80年代,汽车制造商开始使用FMEA，并要求为其配套的供应商实施FMEA进行产品的可靠性控制，可靠性成本是实施FMEA的主要驱动力.今天，FMEA已经用于所有的工业领域.FMEA的历史及现状失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis*FMEAisnotnew-ithasbeenaroundsincetheearlydaysofthespaceprogram.Infact,anyonewithbackgroundinaerospace,NASA,electronicfabrication,automotiveanddefensecontractingknowsFMEAbecauseitisabasictool.TheSeagatemethodisbasedprimarilyontheFordMotorCompanyapplication.HealthcareandconstructionindustriesarerecentlyusingFMEA.HospitalsareenhancingtraditionalqualitymanagementtoolssuchasSPCwithFMEAandlookingatsuchthingsasadversepatientoutcome,medicationerrorsandrisks,etc.ThiscouldhavehelpedtheDenverairportbaggagehandlingproblems!NASAusedFMEAtoidentifySinglePointFailuresonApolloproject(SPF=noredundancy&lossofmission).Howmanydidtheyfind?420andwethoughtwehadnoproblems!我们认为没有问题*NASAusedFMEAtodetectSINGLEPOINTFAILURESwherefailureofasystemorcomponentwouldcauselossofmission.Inotherwords,thereisnoredundantsystem.IntheApollosystem,FMEAidentifiedapproximately430singlepointfailures.FMEAwasusedtoreducetheriskstoacceptablelevels.EvenNASAdoesn’tthinkofeverything.WoodpeckersdelayedarecentShuttlemissionforseveraldays.Itseemsthatthebirdslikedtheadhesiveontheceramictilesandproceededtopeckaway.Theproblemwasfurthercomplicatedbythefactthatthesewereandendangeredspeciesofwoodpeckersoremovalhadtobedoneunderthewatchfuleyeofenvironmentalists.FMEA的类型SYSTEMDESIGNPROCESS系统FMEA（SystemFMEA）用在早期的概念和设计阶段，用于去分析系统和子系统的可靠性.设计FMEA（DesignFMEA）用于产品投放生产前，分析产品的可靠性过程的FMEA（ProcessFMEA）用在分析制造，装配过程失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis*SystemFMEA[2]:Usedtoanalyzesystemsandsubsystemsintheearlyconceptanddesignstage.Itsgoalistodefineanddemonstrateaproperbalanceamongoperationalcomponents.OutputsofthesystemFMEAcanbeinputstothedesignFMEA.DesignFMEA:Focusesonthedesignstage-systems,subsystems,parts,andcomponents.TheDesignFMEAtechniqueparallelsandformalizesthementaldisciplinesthatanengineernormallygoesthroughinanydesignactivity.ADesignFMEAisconductedearlyinthedesignprocessoncetheinitialdesigninformation(concepts,parameters)isavailable.Itisperformedandupdatediterativelyasthedesignevolvessothattheanalysiscanbeusedtoinfluencethedesignandtoprovidedocumentationoftheeventuallycompleteddesign.Process(Manufacturing)FMEA:focusesontheprocessflow,sequence,steps,workstations,operators,equipment,machines,tooling,gauges,methodsandmaintenance.AprocessFMEAisconductedduringthequalityplanningphasebutbeforethebeginningofproduction.Itidentifiespotentialdeviationsfromspecification,andeliminatesorminimizesthembypreventingordetectingchangesintheprocessvariables.SupplierProcessFMEA:Analyzesthesupplierprocess.ItisidenticaltotheprocessFMEAinthatitlooksatallaspectsofthesupplierprocessandidentifiedpotentialdeviationsfromspecifications.ThisoverviewfocusesonthePROCESSFMEAFMEA的不同阶段的时间界定失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis 开始 完成 系统FMEA 确定系统功能后，选择指定的硬件之前 当项目进入设计阶段 设计FMEA 产品的功能和#设计#已经确定后，在设计完成之前 当发放最终的设计图纸给制造部门时 过程FMEA 产品的最初图纸已经可以使用，但是各种配套设备，工装设计完成之前 产品结束*SystemFMEA[2]:Usedtoanalyzesystemsandsubsystemsintheearlyconceptanddesignstage.Itsgoalistodefineanddemonstrateaproperbalanceamongoperationalcomponents.OutputsofthesystemFMEAcanbeinputstothedesignFMEA.DesignFMEA:Focusesonthedesignstage-systems,subsystems,parts,andcomponents.TheDesignFMEAtechniqueparallelsandformalizesthementaldisciplinesthatanengineernormallygoesthroughinanydesignactivity.ADesignFMEAisconductedearlyinthedesignprocessoncetheinitialdesigninformation(concepts,parameters)isavailable.Itisperformedandupdatediterativelyasthedesignevolvessothattheanalysiscanbeusedtoinfluencethedesignandtoprovidedocumentationoftheeventuallycompleteddesign.Process(Manufacturing)FMEA:focusesontheprocessflow,sequence,steps,workstations,operators,equipment,machines,tooling,gauges,methodsandmaintenance.AprocessFMEAisconductedduringthequalityplanningphasebutbeforethebeginningofproduction.Itidentifiespotentialdeviationsfromspecification,andeliminatesorminimizesthembypreventingordetectingchangesintheprocessvariables.SupplierProcessFMEA:Analyzesthesupplierprocess.ItisidenticaltotheprocessFMEAinthatitlooksatallaspectsofthesupplierprocessandidentifiedpotentialdeviationsfromspecifications.ThisoverviewfocusesonthePROCESSFMEAFMEA的不同阶段的内容失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis 设计FMEA(DesignFMEA) 过程FMEA(ProcessFMEA) 对象 系统.，子系统或零部件 加工工艺过程的每道工序 失效 设计先天不足 制造过程留下的缺陷 人员 设计工程师/设计小组 制造主管/制造多方研究小组 内容 ○对设计要求的评估;○对设计方案的相关权衡;○改进设计和开发试验的优先控制;○公开讨论中推荐和跟踪降低风险的措施;◎对制造和装配要求的最初设计;●考虑与制造计划的生产过程有关的产品设计参数;●最大限度地保证产品能满足顾客的要求和期望;FMEA的好处通过消除失效模式，FMEA可以： 提高产品的可靠性（reliability） 降低产品失效的数目（故障率l) 客户受益UserLifeConstantFailureRateEarlyLifeFailureInstantMortalityWearoutendoflife时间FailureRate产品的寿命分布曲线（浴盆曲线）ProductLifeCycle(BathtubCurve)失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisFMEA的样表FMEA編號:項目名稱:責任部門:編制:型號:關鍵日期:DFMEA日期(編制):(修訂)主要參加人:失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis 工程功能要求事项 潜在的故障形态 故障的潜在性影响 严重度S 分类 故障的潜在性原因/结构 发生度O 现工程管理 探测度D 风险系数PRN 建议措施事项 责任及目标完成预定日 措施结果 采取措施内容 严重度 发生度 控测度 风险系数 产品要执行哪些功能? 在什么情况下，产品无法执行指定的功能? 什么才是引起失效的原因? 失效的影响有多严重? 导致失效的可能原因出现频繁吗? 目前采取（或将要采取）哪些措施去预防或检查措施防止可能的失效? 目前采取的预防或检测方法有效吗? 如果失效，会产生多严重的后果? 应该采取什么样的纠正行动去消除失效原因或提高检查方法从而降低风险? 哪里需要使用试验设计去分析（DOE）? 哪些过程需要何种控制方法，如何监控? 设计符合客户的要求吗?FMEA强调下列指标失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisWhatistheInputWhatcangowrongwiththeInput?WhatistheEffectontheOutputs?WhataretheCauses?HowBad?HowOften?Howcanthisbefound?Howwell?Whatcanbedone?FMEA的思考失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisform ProcessorProductName: Preparedby: Page____of____ Responsible: FMEADate(Orig)______________(Rev)_____________ ProcessStep/Input PotentialFailureMode PotentialFailureEffects SEV PotentialCauses OCC CurrentControls DET RPN ActionsRecommended Resp. ActionsTaken SEV OCC DET RPN Whatistheprocessstep/Inputunderinvestigation?Step/Input InwhatwaysdoestheKeyInputgowrong? WhatistheimpactontheKeyOutputVariables(CustomerRequirements)orinternalrequirements? HowSevereistheeffecttothecusotmer? WhatcausestheKeyInputtogowrong? HowoftendoescauseorFMoccur? Whataretheexistingcontrolsandprocedures(inspectionandtest)thatpreventeiththecauseortheFailureMode?ShouldincludeanSOPnumber. HowwellcanyoudetectcauseorFM? WhataretheactionsforreducingtheoccurranceoftheCause,orimprovingdetection?ShouldhaveactionsonlyonhighRPN'soreasyfixes. WhoseResponsiblefortherecommendedaction? WhatarethecompletedactionstakenwiththerecalculatedRPN?Besuretoincludecompletionmonth/year LoadDMF/DMFLoadAccuracy MischargeofDMF Viscosityoutofspec 7 SOPnotFollowed 5 OperatorCertification/ProcessAudit 5 175 FoolproofthisprocessusinginputfromTQLTeam SZ AutomatedDMFDispenser8/96 7 1 2 14 SteamtoDICY/ScaleAccuracy ScaleNotZeroed MischargeDMF 3 FaultyScale 2 None 9 54 IncludeDailysign-offofScalefuntioninShiftset-upverification. PQ 0 LoadDMF/DMFLoadAccuracy MischargeofDMF Viscosityoutofspec 7 EquipmentFailure 2 MaintenanceProcedure(SOP5821)/VisualCheck 3 42 0 SteamtoDICY/ScaleAccuracy Scale>0 LowDMFCharge 3 WaterinJacket 2 VisualCheckofJacket(SOP5681) 4 24 0 SteamtoDICY/ScaleAccuracy ScaleInaccurate HighDMFCharge 3 TankHangingUp 2 VisualCheck(SOP5681) 4 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0&APage&PProcess/ProductFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)worksheet ProcessStep KeyProcessInput FailureModes-Whatcangowrong? Effects Causes CurrentControls SteamtoDICY ScaleAccuracy Scale>0 LowDMFCharge WaterinJacket VisualCheckofJacket(SOP5681) ScaleInaccurate HighDMFCharge TankHangingUp VisualCheck(SOP5681) ScaleNotZeroed MischargeDMF FaultyScale None LoadDMF DMFLoadAccuracy MischargeofDMF Viscosityoutofspec EquipmentFailure MaintenanceProcedure(SOP5821)/VisualCheck SOPnotFollowed OperatorCertification/ProcessAudit&APage&PFMEAWorksheetSheet3 &APage&PSheet4 &APage&PSheet5 &APage&PSheet6 &APage&PSheet7 &APage&PSheet8 &APage&PSheet9 &APage&PSheet10 &APage&PSheet11 &APage&PSheet12 &APage&PSheet13 &APage&PSheet14 &APage&PSheet15 &APage&PSheet16 &APage&Pform ProcessorProductName: Preparedby: Page____of____ Responsible: FMEADate(Orig)______________(Rev)_____________ ProcessStep/Input PotentialFailureMode PotentialFailureEffects SEV PotentialCauses OCC CurrentControls DET RPN ActionsRecommended Resp. ActionsTaken SEV OCC DET RPN Whatistheprocessstep/Inputunderinvestigation?Step/Input InwhatwaysdoestheKeyInputgowrong? WhatistheimpactontheKeyOutputVariables(CustomerRequirements)orinternalrequirements? HowSevereistheeffecttothecusotmer? WhatcausestheKeyInputtogowrong? HowoftendoescauseorFMoccur? Whataretheexistingcontrolsandprocedures(inspectionandtest)thatpreventeiththecauseortheFailureMode?ShouldincludeanSOPnumber. HowwellcanyoudetectcauseorFM? WhataretheactionsforreducingtheoccurranceoftheCause,orimprovingdetection?ShouldhaveactionsonlyonhighRPN'soreasyfixes. WhoseResponsiblefortherecommendedaction? WhatarethecompletedactionstakenwiththerecalculatedRPN?Besuretoincludecompletionmonth/year 0 0 0 0 SZ AutomatedDMFDispenser8/96 7 1 2 14 0 0 0 0 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0&APage&PProcess/ProductFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)worksheet ProcessStep KeyProcessInput FailureModes-Whatcangowrong? Effects Causes CurrentControls SteamtoDICY ScaleAccuracy Scale>0 LowDMFCharge WaterinJacket VisualCheckofJacket(SOP5681) ScaleInaccurate HighDMFCharge TankHangingUp VisualCheck(SOP5681) ScaleNotZeroed MischargeDMF FaultyScale None LoadDMF DMFLoadAccuracy MischargeofDMF Viscosityoutofspec EquipmentFailure MaintenanceProcedure(SOP5821)/VisualCheck SOPnotFollowed OperatorCertification/ProcessAudit&APage&PFMEAWorksheetSheet3 &APage&PSheet4 &APage&PSheet5 &APage&PSheet6 &APage&PSheet7 &APage&PSheet8 &APage&PSheet9 &APage&PSheet10 &APage&PSheet11 &APage&PSheet12 &APage&PSheet13 &APage&PSheet14 &APage&PSheet15 &APage&PSheet16 &APage&P*FMEA的样式失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisCover DocNo SZ-ENG-WI-0220-002 Title FailureMode&EffectAnalysisFor Rev 03 AlpineBaseMachining(1Disc) Eff.Date 30-Jul-2003 FAILUREMODE&EFFECTANALYSIS Toaddthe"DestroyCut"intoCNCprogramtopreventfortheMotorpadheightdimensionOverMilling. Rev. HistoryRecord Changedby Date 00 InitialReleased Jan.27,2003 01 RevisionChanged(FromRev.CtoRev.D) Apr.26,2003 02 RevisionChanged(FromRev.DtoRev.E) Jun.04,2003 03 Addthe"Destroycut"topreventtheMotorpadovermilling. 30-Jul-2003 DEPARTMENT NAME SIGNATURE DATE ORIGINATOR Jun.04,2003 HR/ADMIN.HOD MAT'L.HOD PRODN.HOD ENG.HOD QA.HODReasonforchange:HistoryRecord:ApprovalList:FMEA PRODUCT:BasePlateMachining-Alpine(1Disc) DocNo:SZ-ENG-WI-0220-002 PROCESSFMEA PROCESS/OPERATION:MachiningSideDrill&Tap(SPM) PAGE: 1 of 17 PARTNUMBER:100256596RevE DRAWINGOFSPECREFERENCE:D0000030882RevE DATE: Jun.03,2003 REV: 02 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN=OxSxD PROCESS POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL DESCRIPTION/ FAILURE EFFECTSOF S CAUSE(S)OF O CURRENT D RPN ACTION CORRECTIVE RESP.& ACTION RESULTING FUNCTION MODE FAILURE FAILURE CONTROLS PRIORITY ACTION DATEDUE TAKEN S O D RPN Machiningonsidearea Threadholeminor Unabletoassemble. 7 Toolwear 2 Toollifecontrolat 2 28 N/A N/A threadhole&C'lock diameter&C'lock Drill=150000holes headdrillhole headholediameter Tap=50000holes outofspec. Insufficientholdingforce 8 Toolnotproperly 2 Leaderwillensurethethread 1 16 N/A N/A formountingonthe setup depthwithinthecontrolspec casting. wheneverchangingoftool 2 Productioninspection 2 32 N/A N/A 1pc/fix/2Hourly 2 IPQCinspection 2 32 N/A N/A Hole:1pc/fix/8Hourly Thread:1pc/fix/2Hourly ThreadHoleposition Unabletoassemble 8 Partnotrest 2 2pneumaticactuatorstopush 2 32 N/A N/A outofspec. component. againsttothe thepartagainsttheDatum DatumB1,B2& pointB1&B2 C 2 1pneumaticactuatorstopush 2 32 N/A N/A thepartagainsttheDatum pointC 2 IPQCinspection 2 32 N/A N/A 1pc/fix/8Hourly PRODUCT:BasePlateMachining-Alpine(1Disc) DocNo:SZ-ENG-WI-0220-002 PROCESSFMEA PROCESS/OPERATION:MachiningSideDrill&Tap(SPM) PAGE 2 of 17 PARTNUMBER:100256596RevE DRAWINGOFSPECREFERENCE:D0000030882RevE DATE: Jun.03,2003 REV: 02 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN=OxSxD PROCESS POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL DESCRIPTION/ FAILURE EFFECTSOF S CAUSE(S)OF O CURRENT D RPN ACTION CORRECTIVE RESP.& ACTION RESULTING FUNCTION MODE FAILURE FAILURE CONTROLS PRIORITY ACTION DATEDUE TAKEN S O D RPN C'lockheaddrillhole Willfailtheadjustment 8 Partnotrest 2 2pneumaticactuatorstopush 2 32 positionoutofspec. functiononalignment. againsttothe thepartagainsttheDatum DatumB1,B2& pointB1,B2 C 2 1pneumaticactuatorstopush 2 32 thepartagainsttheDatum pointC 2 IPQCinspection 2 32 1pc/fix/8HourlyHOLDINGSLIMITEDHOLDINGSLIMITEDHOLDINGSLIMITEDHOLDINGSLIMITEDHOLDINGSLIMITEDHOLDINGSLIMITED*SystemFMEA[2]:Usedtoanalyzesystemsandsubsystemsintheearlyconceptanddesignstage.Itsgoalistodefineanddemonstrateaproperbalanceamongoperationalcomponents.OutputsofthesystemFMEAcanbeinputstothedesignFMEA.DesignFMEA:Focusesonthedesignstage-systems,subsystems,parts,andcomponents.TheDesignFMEAtechniqueparallelsandformalizesthementaldisciplinesthatanengineernormallygoesthroughinanydesignactivity.ADesignFMEAisconductedearlyinthedesignprocessoncetheinitialdesigninformation(concepts,parameters)isavailable.Itisperformedandupdatediterativelyasthedesignevolvessothattheanalysiscanbeusedtoinfluencethedesignandtoprovidedocumentationoftheeventuallycompleteddesign.Process(Manufacturing)FMEA:focusesontheprocessflow,sequence,steps,workstations,operators,equipment,machines,tooling,gauges,methodsandmaintenance.AprocessFMEAisconductedduringthequalityplanningphasebutbeforethebeginningofproduction.Itidentifiespotentialdeviationsfromspecification,andeliminatesorminimizesthembypreventingordetectingchangesintheprocessvariables.SupplierProcessFMEA:Analyzesthesupplierprocess.ItisidenticaltotheprocessFMEAinthatitlooksatallaspectsofthesupplierprocessandidentifiedpotentialdeviationsfromspecifications.ThisoverviewfocusesonthePROCESSFMEA编制FMEA文件的目的：失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis 定性地对产品的可靠性进行分析，预防缺陷 为产品相关部门提供了共享资源; 发现.确定和评价与产品有关的失效及其结果; 评价失效对顾客的潜在影响; 确定失效的起因,找出失效条件的变量,减少失效发生; 编制失效分级表,形成考虑措施的优选体系; 对产品的结构设计或制造过程作预先更改,减少缺陷; 提高发现缺陷的概率;FailureMode 失效模式---在设计或过程中，不能满足要求功能的都是失效模式.Effect 影响---假设发生失效，描述对下到工序或终端客户可能的影响.Severity 严重程度---用一个量化的比例衡量影响的严重程度.10分代表最坏的情况,1分代表极轻微Causes 失效原因---列出导致产品失效的所有可能的原因.Occurrence 发生频率---用一个量化的比例衡量失效发生的频率，10分代表一定会发生，1分代表6sigma的水平，几乎不发生或极少.CurrentControls 目前控制---列出目前用于预防失效的所有的控制方法.Effectiveness 有效性---用一个量化的比例衡量目前所有的控制方法的有效程度.10分代表控制方法无效，几乎无法检测到失效，1分代表检测方法相当有效.失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisFMEA的组成部分*FMEA的工作流程图失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis潜在的失效模式(potentialfailuremode)：失效是指产品无法执行指定的功能可以用工序流程图进行分析，本工序的失效模式可能是下一工序的原因FAILUREMODEEFFECT前一个操作CAUSE下一个操作FMEA的失效模式之间关系失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis*Thisillustratestherelationshipbetweenprocesssteps.PRODUCT:ABCSTXXXXXSUBSYSTEMSSPINDLEMOTORDESIGNFMEADRAWINGORSPECREFERENCE:OklahomaCityPROCESSDESCRIPTIONPOTENTIALPOTENTIALSPOTENTIALOCURRENTERPNFAILUREMODEEFFECTSOFCAUSE(S)OFCONTROLSFUNCTIONFAILUREFAILURESPINDLEROTATESMEDIAATFIXEDRPMNOSPIN,ORDRIVERUNSINREVERSEDRIVEINOPERABLEFAILUREOFFLEXSOLDERJOINTDUETOINSUFFICIENTSTRAINRELIEFRESISTANCEMEASUREMENTATINCOMINGINSPECTIONEFFECTIVENESSOCCURRENCEABCSEVERITYHere’saABCExample失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisFMEA中的影响分析*ThisslideillustratestheprevioustechniqueusingFMEAandadiscdriveexample.Seepage43intheFMEAHandbook.SuccessfulapplicationofFMEAisdependentontheabilitytogettorootcause.Oncetheanalysishasbegun,theremaybeatendencytooversimplify(orovercomplicate)theanalysisandnotprovideusefuldata.Itisimportanttorememberthat:Thedefinitionsoffailuremodes,causes,andeffectsdependonthelevelofanalysisandtheymaybeinterchangeddependingontheleveladdressed.Forexample,afailuremaybeaneffect,andacausemaybeafailuredependingonthelevelofanalysis.Also,asthedesignprogresses,failureeffectsdefinedatalowerlevelmaybecomefailuremodesatahigherlevel,andfailuremodesatlowerlevelsmaybecomecausesathigherlevels.Thisisillustratedwiththenextslide.Thisisaveryimportantconceptandtakestimeandexperiencetomaster.PRODUCT:ABCSTXXXXXSUBSYSTEMSSPINDLEMOTORDESIGNFMEADRAWINGORSPECREFERENCE:OklahomaCityPROCESSDESCRIPTIONPOTENTIALPOTENTIALSPOTENTIALOCURRENTERPNFAILUREMODEEFFECTSOFCAUSE(S)OFCONTROLSFUNCTIONFAILUREFAILURESPINDLEROTATESMEDIAATFIXEDRPMNOSPIN,ORDRIVERUNSINREVERSEDRIVEINOPERABLEFAILUREOFFLEXSOLDERJOINTDUETOINSUFFICIENTSTRAINRELIEFRESISTANCEMEASUREMENTATINCOMINGINSPECTIONEFFECTIVENESSOCCURRENCESEVERITYCausebecomesFailureModeABC失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisFMEA中的影响分析*PRODUCT:ABCSTXXXXXSUBSYSTEMSSPINDLEMOTORDESIGNFMEADRAWINGORSPECREFERENCE:OklahomaCityPROCESSDESCRIPTIONPOTENTIALPOTENTIALSPOTENTIALOCURRENTERPNFAILUREMODEEFFECTSOFCAUSE(S)OFCONTROLSFUNCTIONFAILUREFAILURESPINDLEROTATESMEDIAATFIXEDRPMNOSPIN,ORDRIVERUNSINREVERSEDRIVEINOPERABLEFAILUREOFFLEXSOLDERJOINTDUETOINSUFFICIENTSTRAINRELIEFRESISTANCEMEASUREMENTATINCOMINGINSPECTIONEFFECTIVENESSOCCURRENCESEVERITYFailureModebecomesEffectABC失效模式及影响分析FailureModeandEffectsAnalysisFMEA中的影响分析*PROVIDESADEEPERLEVELOFANALYSISBYASKINGYOUFORTHEDESIGNCAUSESANDVERIFICATIONOFINSUFFICIENTSTRAINRELIEFPRODUCT:ABCSTXXXXXSUBSYSTEMSSPINDLEMOTORDESIGNFMEADRAWINGORSPECREFERENCE:OklahomaCityPROCESSDESCRIPTIONPOTENTIALPOTENTIALSPOTENTIALOCURRENTERPNFAILUREMODEEFFECTSOFCAUSE(S)OFCONTROLSFUNCTIONFAILUREFAILURESPINDLEROTATESMEDIAATFIXEDRPMFAILUREOFFLEXSOLDERJOINTDUETOINSUFFICIENTSTRAINRELIEFNOSPIN,ORDRIVERUNSINREVERSECAUSINGDRIVETOBEINOPERABLEEFFECTIVENESSOCCURRENCESEVERITYWHY?