莱德贝特诉固特异轮胎橡胶公司Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co 莱 德贝特诉固特异轮胎橡胶公司 Supreme Court of the United States 最高法院美国 Argued November 27, 2006认为 2006年 11月 27日 Decided May 29, 2007决定 2007年 5月 29日 Full case name 全案名 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 莱德贝特诉固特异轮胎和橡胶公司，公司 Citations引文 Supreme Court No.最高法院号 05–1074 ; 550 US 618 05-1074 ;美国 618 550 Prior history 在此之前的历 史 Judgment for Plaintiff, ( ND Ala. ); rev'd, 421 F.判定原告（ 钕阿拉巴马州 ）; rev'd， 421 号 3d 1169 ( 11th Cir. 2005 ), cert granted, 548 US ___ (2006) 三维 1169（ 11 西尔。2005年 ）， 证批准，548名美国___ （2006） Holding控股 The equal pay for equal work discrimination charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place.在同工同酬的收费期限歧视时会触发一个离散的 非法做法发生。 A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent non-discriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.阿不会发 生新的冲突， 以及新的收费期限不动工后，随后的非歧视性的 行为的发生，这需要从过去的歧视造成的不利影响。 Eleventh Circuit affirmed.第十一巡回肯定。 Court membership法院成员 Chief Justice 终审法院首席法官 John G. Roberts 约翰罗伯茨 Associate Justices 副大法官 John P. Stevens · Antonin Scalia 约翰P.史蒂文 斯 · 安东宁斯卡利亚 Anthony Kennedy · David Souter 安东尼肯尼迪 · 大卫苏特尔 Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg 克拉伦斯 托马斯 · 金斯伯格 Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito 布瑞尔 · 塞缪尔 阿利托 Case opinions案件的意见 Majority多数 Alito, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas阿利托，加入了罗伯茨，斯卡利亚，肯 尼迪，托马 斯 Dissent异 议 Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, Souter, Breyer金 斯伯格，加入了史蒂文斯，苏特， 布雷耶 Laws applied法律适用 Civil Rights Act of 1964 , Equal Pay Act of 1963 1964年 民权法案 ， 1963年同酬法 Superseded by所取代 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 莉莉莱德贝特公平报 酬法 2009年 LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO. (No. 05-1074) 421 F. 3d 1169, affirmed. Syllabus Opinion [Alito] Dissent [Ginsburg] HTML version PDF version HTML version PDF version HTML version PDF version Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 . SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES LEDBETTER v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 05–1074. Argued November 27, 2006—Decided May 29, 2007 During most of the time that petitioner Ledbetter was employed by respondent Goodyear, salaried employees at the plant where she worked were given or denied raises based on performance evaluations. Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March 1998 and a formal EEOC charge in July 1998. After her November 1998 retirement, she filed suit, asserting, among other things, a sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Courtallowed her Title VII pay discrimination claim to proceed to trial. There, Ledbetter alleged that several supervisors had in the past given her poor evaluations because of her sex; that as a result, her pay had not increased as much as it would have if she had been evaluated fairly; that those past pay decisions affected the amount of her pay throughout her employment; and that by the end of her employment, she was earning significantly less than her male colleagues. Goodyear maintained that the evaluations had been nondiscriminatory, but the jury found for Ledbetter, awarding backpay and damages. On appeal, Goodyear contended that the pay discrimination claim was time barred with regard to all pay decisions made before September 26, 1997—180 days before Ledbetter filed her EEOC questionnaire—and that no discriminatory act relating to her pay occurred after that date. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on allegedly discriminatory events that occurred before the last pay decision that affected the employee’s pay during the EEOC charging period, and concluding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Goodyear had acted with discriminatory intent in making the only two pay decisions during that period, denials of raises in 1997 and 1998. Held: Because the later effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an EEOC charge, Ledbetter’s claim is untimely. Pp. 4–24. (a) An individual wishing to bring a Title VII lawsuit must first file an EEOC charge within, as relevant here, 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). In addressing the issue of an EEOC charge’s timeliness, this Court has stressed the need to identify with care the specific employment practice at issue. Ledbetter’s arguments—that the paychecks that she received during the charging period and the 1998 raise denial each violated Title VII and triggered a new EEOC charging period—fail because they would require the Court in effect to jettison the defining element of the disparate-treatment claim on which her Title VII recovery was based, discriminatory intent. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 , Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 , Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 , and National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101 , clearly instruct that the EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. But if an employer engages in a series of separately actionable intentionally discriminatory acts, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed. Ledbetter makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory decisions occurring before that period were not communicated to her. She argues simply that Goodyear’s nondiscriminatory conduct during the charging period gave present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination. Ledbetter should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory employment decision was made and communicated to her. Her attempt to shift forward the intent associated with prior discriminatory acts to the 1998 pay decision is unsound, for it would shift intent away from the act that consummated the discriminatory employment practice to a later act not performed with bias or discriminatory motive, imposing liability in the absence of the requisite intent. Her argument would also distort Title VII’s “integrated, multistep enforcement procedure.” Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355 . The short EEOC filing deadline reflects Congress’ strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary conciliation and cooperation. Id., at 367–368. Nothing in Title VII supports treating the intent element of Ledbetter’s disparate-treatment claim any differently from the employment practice element of the claim. Pp. 4–13. (b) Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (per curiam), which concerned a disparate-treatment pay claim, is entirely consistent with Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan. Bazemore’s rule is that an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure. It is not, as Ledbetter contends, a “paycheck accrual rule” under which each paycheck, even if not accompanied by discriminatory intent, triggers a new EEOC charging period during which the complainant may properly challenge any prior discriminatory conduct that impacted that paycheck’s amount, no matter how long ago the discrimination occurred. Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay system in order to discriminate based on sex or that it later applied this system to her within the charging period with discriminatory animus, Bazemore is of no help to her. Pp. 13–21. (c) Ledbetter’s “paycheck accrual rule” is also not supported by either analogies to the statutory regimes of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the National Labor Relations Act, or policy arguments for giving special treatment to pay claims. Pp. 21–24. 421 F. 3d 1169, affirmed. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. . 莱德贝特诉固特异轮胎和橡胶公司 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 550 US 618 (2007) , is an employment discrimination decision of the Supreme Court of the United States . Justice Alito held for the five-justice majority that employers cannot be sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act over race or gender pay discrimination if the claims are based on decisions made by the employer 180 days ago or more. 莱德贝特诉固 特异轮胎和橡胶公司 ， 美国 618 550（2007年） ，是一种就业歧视的决定， 美国联邦最高法院 。 大法官 阿利托举行的五正义多数雇主可以不起诉是根据第七章民权法案，如果索赔是由 雇主作出的前 180天或以上的 决定为依据对种族或性别工资歧视。 The decision did not prevent plaintiffs from suing under other laws, like the Equal Pay Act, which has a three-year deadline for most sex discrimination claims, [ 1 ] or 42 USC 1981, which has a four-year deadline for suing over race discrimination. [ 2 ]这 一决定并没有阻止其他由原告起诉的法律根据， 如平等报酬法，其中有一个最性别歧视索赔 3年期限的， [1] 1981年或 42南加 州大学，其中有一个多种族起诉期限 4年歧视。 [2] This was a case of statutory rather than constitutional interpretation. 这 是一个法定的，而不是宪法解释的情况。 The plaintiff in this case, Lilly Ledbetter , characterized her situation as one where "disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period."这，原告在这种情况下莉莉莱德贝特 ，其特点效期为 1 她的情况下，“不同的是，在法定支付收到，但结果是期间故意歧视性限制，薪 酬的决定外发生。” In rejecting Ledbetter's appeal, the Supreme Court said that "she could have, and should have, sued" when the pay decisions were made, instead of waiting beyond the 180-day statutory charging period. 莱德贝特在驳回上 诉，最高法院说，“她可以，而且应该，控告”时的薪酬作 出决定，而不是超越了 180天的法定收费期限等。 The Court did leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could sue beyond the 180-day period if she did not, and could not, have discovered the discrimination earlier. [ 3 ] The effect of the Court's holding was reversed by the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009.法院没有离开开放的可能性，原告可以期间 控告超出了 180天，如果她没有，也不可能发现的歧视较早。 [3的控股生效的 法院是逆转 的通过 ] 礼来公司莱德贝特公平薪酬法案在 2009年。 Contents内 容 [hide] • 1 Background of the case 1 背景情况 o 1.1 Statutory provisions at issue 1.1 在法律规定的问题 o 1.2 Lower court proceedings 1.2 下级法院诉讼 o 1.3 Supreme Court precedent 1.3 最高法院的先例 • 2 The Supreme Court's decision 二 ，最高法院的决定 o 2.1 Ginsburg's dissent 2.1 金斯伯格的异议 • 3 Reaction and subsequent legislation 3 反应及随后的立法 • 4 See also 4 参见 • 5 Notes and references 5 注释和参考文献 • 6 External links 6 外部链接 [ edit ] Background of the case [ 编辑 ] 事件 背景 In 1979 Lilly Ledbetter, the plaintiff, began work at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in its Gadsden, Alabama location, a union plant. 1979 年礼来莱德贝特，原告，开始工作固特异轮胎与橡胶公司在其加兹登，阿拉巴马 州的位置，工会工厂。 During her years at the factory as a salaried worker, raises were given and denied based on evaluations and recommendations regarding worker performance, as is typical.在作为一个在她的受薪工人的 工厂里，并否认提出给予评价和建议的基础上对工性能， 是典型的。 All merit increases had to be substantiated by a formal evaluation.所有 的优点增 加了必须由正式的评估证明。 In March 1998, Ledbetter inquired into the possible sexual discrimination of the Goodyear Tire Company . 1998年 3 月，莱德贝特询问了可能的性别歧视固特异轮胎有限公司 。 In July she filed formal charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission .今 年 7月，她提出正式指控与平等就业机会委员会 。 In November 1998, after early retirement, Ledbetter sued claiming pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 . 1998 年 11月，提前退休后，莱德贝特声称起诉的薪酬歧视第七标题下的 1964年民权 法案和1963年同酬法 。 She started with the same pay but by retirement, she was earning $3,727 per month compared to 15 men who earned from $4,286 per month (lowest paid man) to $5,236 per month (highest paid man). [ 4 ] The Supreme Court did not rule on whether this was discrimination, just the statute of limitations to sue.她开始以同样的付出，而是由退休，她的 工资$每月 3,727每比 15名男子谁）赚取每$4286个月（收入最低的男子 5.236 美元每月（收入最高的人）。 [4]最高法院不排除这是否是 歧视，只是时效起诉。 [ edit ] Statutory provisions at issue [ 编辑 规定在发行 ] 法 定 • "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer… to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...." [ 5 ] “这应是一个雇主非法雇用做法...反对任何 个人歧视方面的赔偿，条款，条件，或就业特权，因为这些人的种族，肤 色，宗教，性别或国籍，... 。“ [5] • "A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." [ 6 ] ：“阿部负责本应天之内提出 180涉嫌非法就业后的实 际发生。” [6] • "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation...provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." [ 7 ] “不 得为非法就业的做法，雇主申请不同的补偿...但这些分歧不打算对 比赛结果因为歧视，肤色，宗教，性别或民族的起源。” [ 7] [ edit ] Lower court proceedings [ 编辑 ] 下法院诉讼 The District Court found in favor of Goodyear on the Equal Pay Act claim, because that Act allows pay differences that are based on merit.区 法 院认定，平等报酬法要求，在固特异了赞成票，因为该法案允许付出都是值得的 差异。 The court allowed the Title VII and other claims to proceed to trial. 法 院准许第七章与其他债权进行审判。 Ledbetter claimed that she had been evaluated unfairly because of her gender and therefore had been paid significantly less than her male colleagues.莱德贝特声称她被评估不公平， 因为她的性别，因此支付了显着比她的男同事 少。 Goodyear claimed that their evaluations were non-discriminatory and focused only on worker competence.固特异公司称，他们的评价是非歧视性的，只对工人的能力为重点。 The jury found for Ledbetter and awarded back pay and damages.陪审团发 现莱德 贝特并颁发回工资和赔偿。 Goodyear appealed, arguing that all claims to damages before September 26, 1997 were void due to the statute of limitations placed on discrimination claims.固特异呼吁，认为损害 9 月 26日之前所有声称，1997年作废由于时效的债权放在歧视。 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court's decision stating that Ledbetter could sue only for allegations regarding pay decisions that occurred less than 180 days before her beginning the EEOC process in March 1998.在美国上诉法院为第 十一巡回推翻了下级法院的判决指出莱德贝特可以起诉指控，1998年只支付有 关平 等就业机会委员会的决定过程发生在 3月她开始在不到 180天前。 Ledbetter, as the court ruled, could not sue on decisions that merely affected pay in the 180 day period.莱德贝特，在法院 作出裁决，不能提起 诉讼的决定，仅仅影响工资在 180天的期限。 Furthermore, all decisions made concerning pay in the 180 day period could not be unequivocally linked to her gender.此 外，所有作出的决定在 180天期间有关工资不能明确地与她 的性别。 Ledbetter sought a writ of certiorari , but did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence concerning decisions in the 180 day period. 莱德贝特寻求的令状调取案卷 ，但并没有提出异议的期限在 180天的充分性决 定的有关证据。 The Supreme Court granted the writ and heard the appeal. 最高法院授予令状，并听取了 上诉。 [ edit ] Supreme Court precedent [ 编辑 ] 最高法院先例 In United Airlines v. Evans , 431 US 553 (1977) , Justice Stevens wrote as follows for the Court: "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge...is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences."在美国联合航空公司诉埃文斯 ， 美国 431 553（1977） ，史蒂文斯法官说，法院如下：“这是一种歧视行为没有及时收取 依据仅仅是一 个...不幸的历史事件，这是没有目前。法律后果“ The Court in Ledbetter said that "it would be difficult to speak to the point more directly."法院在该莱德 贝特说，“这将是很难说的更直接一点。” [ edit ] The Supreme Court's decision [ 编辑 ] 最高法院的决定 Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the court.阿利托法官宣读了法院 的意见。 The Court held that according to Title VII, discriminatory intent must occur during the 180-day charging period.法院认为，根据第七章，歧 视性意图必须发生在 180天的收费期 限。 Ledbetter did not claim that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent in the charging period by issuing the checks, nor by denying her a raise in 1998.莱德贝特也没有 指控与固特异在充电期间发出歧视性的意图行事的检查，也未否认她在 1998年 提出。 She argued that the discriminatory behavior occurred long before but still affected her during the 180-day charging period. Prior caselaw , the Court held, established that the actual intentional discrimination must occur within the charging period.她 认为，歧视行为发生的 180天的 收费期限之前很久，但仍然在影响她。 此前案例法 ，法院认定，确定实际的故 意歧视必须发生的收费期限内。 The Court also stated that according to those prior cases, Ledbetter's claim that each check is an act of discrimination is inconsistent with the statute, because there was no evidence of discriminatory intent in the issuing of the checks.法院还 指出，根据这些以前的案件，莱德贝特的说法，每个检查是一种歧视行为与章程 不一致的， 因为那里没有在支票签发歧视意图的证据。 [ edit ] Ginsburg's dissent [ 编辑 ] 金斯伯格的异议 Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent and read it from the bench, a rare practice. [ 8 ] Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, she argued against applying the 180-day limit to pay discrimination, because discrimination often occurs in small increments over large periods of time. 法官金斯 伯格写了异议，并宣读实践它从长椅上，一个罕见的。 [8]由大法官布 雷耶进入史蒂 文斯，苏特，而且，她认为对申请 180天的限制薪酬歧视，因为 歧视往往发生在小的增量比大量的时间期限。 Furthermore, the pay information of fellow workers is typically confidential and unavailable for comparison.此外，同工工资的信息通常是保密的，无法进行比较。 Ginsburg argued that pay discrimination is inherently different from adverse actions, such as termination.金斯伯格认为，薪酬歧视本质上是有害的行动， 如终止不同。 Adverse actions are obvious, but small pay discrepancy is often difficult to recognize until more than 180 days of the pay change. 不良行为是明显的，但小付 的差距往往难以识别，直到超过 180天的薪酬变化。 Ginsburg argued that the broad remedial purpose of the statute was incompatible with the Court's "cramped" interpretation.金斯伯格认为， 广泛的章程补救的目的是与法院的“拥挤”的解释是不相容的。 Her dissent asserted that the employer had been, "Knowingly carrying past pay discrimination forward" during the 180-day charging period, and therefore could be held liable.她异议称，雇主已经“明知携带着过去的薪酬歧视”在 180天的收费期限， 因此可能要负法律责任。 [ edit ] Reaction and subsequent legislation [ 编辑 ] 反应及随后的立法 Main article: Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act主 条目： 莉莉莱德贝特公平薪 酬法案 President Obama signs the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law on January 29, 2009; to his right is the new law's namesake, Lilly Ledbetter .奥 巴马总统签署莉莉莱德贝特公平薪酬法案成为法律，对 2009年 1月 29日，他 的右边是新的法律的同名， 莉莉莱德贝特 。 Ledbetter speaks during the second day of the 2008 Democratic National Convention in Denver , Colorado .莱德贝特谈到在第二天的2008年民主党全 国代表大会在丹佛 ， 科罗拉多州 。 In 2007, several Democratic members of Congress introduced the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act , which revised the law to state that if a present act of discrimination pertains, prior acts outside of the 180-day statute of limitations for pay discrimination can be incorporated into the claim. 2007年，一些民主党国会成员介绍了莉莉莱德贝特公平报酬法 ，修改了该州法 律，如果一本属于歧视行为的，事先的行为之外的限制薪酬歧视 180天的章程可 纳入索赔。 The bill was an issue in the 2008 Presidential election campaign , with Barack Obama supporting the bill, [ 9 ] and John McCain opposed to it. [ 10 ] The plaintiff in th