Philosophy 225
Environmental Ethics
Spring 2009
Time: TR 11:00-12:15, Location: NH W183
David Henderson, 1015 Oldfather Hall
Office hours 10:00-11:00 TR
Purpose:
This course begins with a reflective overview of general approaches in
philosophical ethics. The bulk of the class is a survey of approaches in
environmental ethics.
We will consider the central matter of what persons, groups, things, and
systems are properly taken to have fundamental “moral considerability.” This is
to ask what things are properly the focus of one’s the fundamental—
nonderivative—moral enagement. If, for example, one thinks of moral
engagement as a matter or fostering what is morally valuable, then for an entity
to have fundamental “moral considerability” is for there to be states of that entity
that are primary moral goods—that have a nonderivative moral value. (Crudely, a
state with nonderivative value does not owe its value to its making some
contribution to yet some other state that itself is more fundamentally of value.
Compare: going to the doctor may be valuable because it contributes to health.)
Of course, all such talk raises the question of what makes a value a moral value?
Certainly the dominant tradition of western thought and philosophy has
been that persons alone have moral considerability—and that human beings are
the one clear case of persons. (They have been purported to be unique insofar
as they use language, engage in abstract thought, can attain happiness, or
perhaps were created in the image of God.) Thus, humans have traditionally
been taken to be the originary locus of moral concern, with other things being
morally relevant or valuable to the extent that these things benefit or harm
humans, having consequences for their happiness. (Pollution is thought to be
bad, and the thought is commonly that it is so because it affects human health
adversely.)
Now, some have thought that this traditional (anthropocentric) approach
constitutes too restrictive an understanding of what are the proper objects of
moral concern. That is, some have thought that the objects with “moral
considerability”—the originary sources of moral value—are wider than just
humans or persons.
Classical utilitarians insisted that sentience (the capacity to feel) was
enough to give something “moral considerability”—thinking of pleasure,
generically, as the moral good, and of pain as the moral bad. For the utilitarian,
animals are included as objects of moral concern in their own right, and one has
direct moral obligations to animals.
Recently, one finds writers advocating the view that we should recognize a
yet wider class of objects as morally fundamental—things such as living things
generally, or more abstract things such as species, or ecosystems. What kind of
reasons can be given for such proposals, independent of the enrichment of
human life or the enhancement of sentient well-being? Do such proposals make
sense in terms of contemporary science: Darwinian biology? Ecology? What
really are these “objects” that are said to possess inherent moral value and
standing? And exactly what is it to have moral value or standing?
In considering the various options above, we will want to clarify and
compare the more concrete implications of the various positions.
Texts:
Main Text:
• Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence. 3rd ed., S. Armstrong
and R Botzler (eds.) McGraw-Hill (2003)
On Blackboard:
• “The Human Population as an Environmental Problem,” Chapter 5 from
Environmental Science: Earth as a Living Planet, Botkin and Keller.
• Rachachandra Guha, “Radical American Environmentalism and
Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique.”
• Pinker, Steven, “The Moral Instinct,” New York Times, Sunday Magazine,
13, January 2008. Also at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-
t.html?ref=science&pagewanted=all
• Michael Pollan, The Omnivores Dilemma (selection).
• Joseph DesJardins, Environmental Ethics, Chpt. 8.
Evaluation:
There will be 3 papers, each on an assigned topic (in effect 3 takehomes). Each
will be worth 30% of your grade. For the first two papers, there will be a first draft
due date and a second draft due date (this second due date will be one week
after you receive comments back on the first draft). If I see the paper by the first-
draft due date, you will get written comments on the substance of the paper and
an indication of what grade might be expected.
The final 10% of your grade will be a matter of attendance and participation.
Percentage points will be assessed against your grade after the second
absence—one point for each absence.
Schedule:
January 13th
Background Ethical Philosophy
15th
Rachels, (reading 6-7, A&B) and
Overview of Ethics
20th
Rachels, (reading 6-7, A&B) and
PPT overview
22nd
Pinker, The Moral Instinct
(blackboard)
26th 28th
Holmes Rolston (reading 8,
A&B)
Nelson (reading 63, A&B)
3rd
Nova: World in Balance
5th
Nova: World in Balance
10th
Botkin and Keller, Chapter 5 (on
Blackboard) and visit
http://www.myfootprint.org/
12th
Pollan, selection on Blackboard
17th
Murdy (reading 32, A&B)
19th
Gould (reading 33, A&B)
1st Draft Paper 1
24th
Regan (reading 35, A&B)
26th
Singer (reading 36, A&B)
March 3rd
Singer (reading 37, A&B)
5th
Jamieson (reading 38, A&B)
10th
Varner (reading 40, A&B)
12th
Stone (reading 62, A&B)
17th
Spring Break
19th
Spring Break
24th
Leopold (reading 41, A&B)
26th
Leopold (reading 41, A&B)
31st
Callicott (readings 42-43, A&B)
April 2nd
Holmes Rolston (reading 44, A&B)
Devall (reading 45, A&B)
7th
Peterson (reading 9, A&B)
9th
DesJardins Chapter 8 (on Blackboard)
1st Draft Paper 2 due
14th
Guha (Blackboard)
16th
Anderson and Leal (reading 58, A&B)
21st
Sagoff (reading 59, A&B)
23th
Anielski and Soskolne (reading 60,
A&B)
28th
James, Gaston, Balmford
(reading 61, A&B)
30th
TBA
Paper 3 is due at the beginning of the scheduled final exam period:
3:30 PM, Thursday, May 7