印度和巴基斯坦

印度和巴基斯坦 INDIA and PAKISTAN Is Peace Real This Time A Conversation Between Husainand Haqqani Ashley J. Tellis Introduction S ince 1999, when Indian and Pakistani forces briefly fought in the Kargil area of Kashmir, India and Pakistan have experienced extremely strained relations. Tensions got particularly high during 2001–2002, when the two countries deployed a million or more troops along their common border; elements of the two massed forces frequently exchanged artillery fire in Kashmir. The specter of nuclear war haunts any armed conflict between India and Pakistan; India first demonstrated its nuclear capabilities in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998. Even when the two states manage to avoid war, their mutual hostility impedes economic development and gives a reactive cast to their internal politics. Further com- plicating the situation, Pakistan and India are, in different ways, frontline states in the struggle against terrorism. Thus, when Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf met, with little advance notice, at a regional summit in Pakistan in early January 2004, it behooved U.S. policy makers and other informed Americans to take note of this breakthrough and explore whether and how the United States could enhance the chances of further diplomatic progress. In late January 2004, the Carnegie Endowment organized a briefing by Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis on prospects for improved relations between India and Pakistan. Haqqani and Tellis possess unsurpassed expertise on Pakistan and India, respectively. Haqqani, a visiting scholar at the Endowment, had just returned from Pakistan, where he met with government officials and other closely involved participants in the summit meeting. Tellis, an Endowment senior associate, had just returned from a trip to India, where he likewise met with senior officials and others to talk about India- Pakistan relations. In the following discussion, Haqqani and Tellis highlight key issues they raised in their respective visits. Both were particularly interested in assessing whether this latest diplomatic engagement would lead to lasting peace, or simply be another in a long string of disappointments. 3 India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time symbolizes the substantive conclusion of the Q What does the January 2004 India-Pakistan summit crisis—meaning that the root causes, which gen- imply for the prospects of peace in the subcontinent erated that confrontation in the first place, are Husain Haqqani That India and Pakistan are will- now eviscerated—is still unclear. But the fact that ing to talk again is a positive development. The both sides have now committed themselves to a two nuclear-armed neighbors were on the brink wide-ranging dialogue offers a ray of hope It of war less than a year ago. But the thaw in implies the beginning of a process whereby out- relations is just that—a thaw rather than a standing disputes can now be addressed through breakthrough. We have seen similar develop- diplomacy rather than coercion and force. The thaw in relations is just that—a thaw rather than a breakthrough. ments in the past hailed as breakthroughs, only I would like to emphasize three elements to watch them end in breakdowns. here. First, the summit primarily signifies a bilat- India and Pakistan are, once again, eral commitment to a process and is not an approaching the peace process with totally dif- agreement about any particular outcome; hence, ferent objectives. India’s purpose is to seek an one cannot conclude that a resolution of the out- end to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and standing disputes between India and Pakistan is start the process of normalizing relations. India imminent. Second, the two key elements that do has given no indication that it would negotiate appear in the joint statement (the bilateral com- alternative futures for Kashmir, though it has muniqué that followed the January 2004 sum- accepted Kashmir as one of eight matters the mit)—the acceptance that all disputes, including two sides need to address. Pakistan, on the Jammu and Kashmir, ought to be resolved only other hand, has abjured the use of force but through dialogue, and the acknowledgment that would like to link this step to substantive talks terrorism is unacceptable as a means of securing about the future of Kashmir. political aims—are vital to the eventual success The willingness of both sides to start a com- of the process. Third, if both sides consistently posite dialogue has raised hopes that they are abide by these substantive elements, the peace willing to back away from their entrenched process could succeed over time because it positions. But their willingness to talk does not would effectively pave the way for accepting the necessarily signal willingness to compromise on current territorial division of Jammu and what each side considers to be the real issue Kashmir (with some modifications) as the basis requiring resolution. for an enduring political solution. Such a solu- tion would also include, inter alia, increased Ashley J. Tellis This is a far more complex question political autonomy for both sides of the divided than it appears at first sight. At the most obvious state, easier cross-border transit for their respec- level, the summit produced a clear sense of relief tive populations, and a reduction in the military in India because the agreement between Prime presence maintained by India and Pakistan along Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf to the present Line of Control (LOC). resume their bilateral dialogue signaled the In saying all this, I am trying to address formal end to the 2001–2002 crisis. Whether it what I think lies at the heart of the question 4 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis weary of confrontational strategies and was Will this summit indeed be the first step along more than willing to endorse peaceful alterna- the road to lasting peace in South Asia, or is it tives. Indian elites, too, were delighted by the condemned, as other efforts before it, to become turn of events because of the prospect of yet another failed opportunity My short resumed trade and increased commercial inter- answer is that we are unlikely to see major con- course between the two countries. They also rec- flict-resolving breakthroughs anytime soon. The ognize that better intersocietal relations offer the advances, to the degree that those have best opportunity for nurturing those constituen- occurred, pertain primarily to either process or cies in Pakistan that have a stake in peace as principle. While these are no doubt important, opposed to continued confrontation with India. there is still no assurance that these gains will be translated appropriately into negotiating strate- Husain Haqqani There is clearly a feeling of relief gies that yield an agreement that brings about that a peace process is under way even though a lasting peace and stability. Obtaining this goal solution is not immediately in sight. Since 911, will require a lot of hard work and a great deal Pakistanis have felt increasingly embattled and of creativity on both sides. It will also require a isolated. A hard core remains committed to an willingness by Pakistan to compromise on its ideological foreign policy that casts India as a traditional objective of radically altering the ter- permanent enemy. But a significant though ritorial status quo in Jammu and Kashmir. I am small body of opinion in Pakistan recognizes skeptical, however, about Islamabad’s capacity that the economic and military race with India and willingness to change course on this funda- is a losing proposition and that Pakistan’s mental issue at the current juncture. friends such as the United States are fair-weather, and cannot be counted on in the contest with Q How have the people of the subcontinent reacted to the India. In this view, Pakistan must turn its atten- peace initiative tion inward and focus on internal development Ashley J. Tellis The initial reaction—at the popular and self-sufficiency, instead of remaining level—on both sides of the border has been one engaged in military competition. Adherents to of relief and elation relief because the resump- this view further argue that Pakistan cannot tion of the diplomatic process gives both sides a seriously pursue economic development if it We are unlikely to see major conflict-resolving breakthroughs anytime soon. chance to put the acute bitterness of the last sev- continues along the path of militarism and mil- eral years behind them, and elation because the itancy. Sustained economic progress would only peace process finally opened the door to resum- be possible after relations with India were nor- ing transportation links, cross-border trade and malized. These people constitute the peace con- travel, people-to-people ties, and various forms stituency in Pakistan. of cultural exchange. In India, in particular, the But the question in Pakistan is always, “Is peace process was greeted with great enthusiasm there a constituency for peace within the because, after almost two and a half years of Pakistani military” The thinking of civilians is political standoff, the populace had grown seemingly less important in a country where the 5 India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time military calls the shots. There was no Pakistani is the key, and it is always the most difficult civilian constituency for supporting the Sikh institution to analyze. insurgency in India during the 1980s. But I don’t think the Pakistani military wants to Pakistan did it nevertheless. Was there a Pakistani relinquish political control. I don’t think it constituency for supporting the Taliban when it wants to relinquish its position of privilege and ascended to power in Afghanistan or for ending power. And those are issues that haven’t even that support after 911 Pakistan made both deci- been addressed by General Musharraf. There sions anyway because the Pakistani military con- could be momentum in the peace process sidered both strategically important. between India and Pakistan, sufficient for a deal There is now a civilian constituency for between India and Pakistan to come first and peace with India, but I would warn against then create the momentum for domestic and overestimating its influence unless there are internal changes. Egypt has been cited as an some changes taking place in the way Pakistan example. It was argued that once Egypt signed is run. Ideally, if I were advising General its peace treaty with Israel, the changes that had Musharraf, I would say, “Reach out to the peace to come about within Egypt would follow. But constituency and make it yours.” There is a my view is that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, peace constituency, but it is not a constituency absent a change in the military’s preeminence in for Musharraf necessarily. And some of its Egypt, has led to Egypt becoming a stagnant members are actually afraid that if Musharraf nation that lives off strategic rents in the form of and the military succeeded in making a deal U.S. aid. We may not want Pakistan to be a with India, the military would remain in stagnant nation with nuclear weapons. charge with international support. Instead of One of the major unanswered questions of being a military-dominated state under the the India-Pakistan peace process is what to do shadow of a conflict with India, Pakistan with the huge military establishments of both would then be a state dominated by the mili- countries, one of which also controls political tary without active conflict with India. power. If the Pakistani military were not running The Pakistani military would have to con- covert operations against India and if it were vince the peace constituency that peace would not running the country, what would it do How much of Pakistan’s military wants permanent peace That’s difficult to say. also mean some changes in life at home. How Pakistan’s military has traditionally drawn its much of Pakistan’s military wants permanent legitimacy from the fact that it is the defender peace That’s difficult to say. In the past, there of Pakistan against the existential threat from have been moments when the military said India and that it is the institution that will get right now, we want peace, or we want peace for Kashmir for Pakistan. five years, seven years, ten years. General Zia ul If the existential threat from India were Haq (ruled 1977 to 1988) reportedly said he acknowledged as no longer real and the issue of would never let a war take place with India Kashmir were already settled, the Pakistani mil- while he was president and while Pakistan was itary would lose its legitimacy as the arbiter of making a nuclear bomb. The Pakistani military the nation’s destiny. The praetorian ambitions 6 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis of the Pakistani army must be channeled in ating with impunity in Rawalpindi, where the some other direction, if the peace initiative is to general headquarters of the Pakistani army is have a long-term future. located and which is a pretty easy city for the military and the intelligence apparatus to clean up. The jihadis have deep roots in Pakistani Q What has been the international response thus far society. There are several hundred thousand Husain Haqqani The international community has people employed in the “industry of jihad” at a been extremely supportive of dialogue between time when new jobs are not being created in the India and Pakistan. The United States, Europe, Pakistani economy and new investment is not and China have all been encouraging the two coming. There are still people in the military Relief, tinged with great expectation, appears to be the dominant sentiment in the international community. sides to back away from their periodic bluster- and the intelligence apparatus who think that ing and saber rattling and find a solution to conflict with India is a cyclical thing. “We are in their disagreements. a bad cycle,” they think, and for them there has Pakistani supporters of the peace initiative to be a period of possibly three, four, or five argue that now is the time for Pakistan to settle years of waiting before they revert to conflict. its differences with India. Once Afghanistan is The international community has the difficult stabilized, and Al Qaeda is mopped up, the task of converting these cynics to the cause of Americans and their economic and military normal relations with India. assistance will disappear, leaving Pakistan with- out a major ally. China, which had been a reli- Ashley J. Tellis The international response mirrors able supporter against India, has become in many ways the excitement felt by the peoples alarmed at Pakistan’s support for Islamist radi- of India and Pakistan. Relief, tinged with great calism. China is moving toward an understand- expectation, appears to be the dominant senti- ing with India, and, therefore, Pakistan’s ability ment in the international community. In the to depend on it as an ally would diminish over United States in particular, the fear of nuclear time. Pakistan may not be able to secure a rea- conflict between India and Pakistan has been so sonable deal from India in a few years’ time, prominent that any initiative that walks the two when the conventional military gap between the countries away from the nuclear precipice finds two countries would have widened, and the ready endorsement. The fact that a diplomatic economic difference, coupled with major power dialogue between the two South Asian rivals realignments, would make Pakistan’s negotiat- would also enable Islamabad to cooperate more ing position untenable. fully with the United States in bringing Operation But just as there is a growing number of Enduring Freedom to a successful close is an realists in Pakistan, including ostensibly General important factor that cannot be overlooked—it Musharraf, there are others who think the nego- was precisely the reason why the Bush adminis- tiating process is a useful stratagem to buy time tration has been leaning heavily on Musharraf for further showdowns with India. There are to make good on his commitment to end cross- still Kashmiri militant mujahideen groups oper- border infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 7 environment. Parenthetically, I may note, this Q What, in your opinion, led to the peace initiative strategy could succeed only because Musharraf astutely concluded that so long as the United Ashley J. Tellis This may seem like a simple ques- States needed his cooperation for successfully tion, but it cannot be answered briefly. The roots prosecuting military operations in Afghanistan, of the peace initiative—at the Indian end— Washington would never lean hard enough to cannot be appreciated without reference to the compel him to conclusively terminate his cam- 2001–2002 crisis. This crisis, as you will recall, paign of terrorism against India. was precipitated by Pakistan’s continued support Given this outcome, the Vajpayee govern- for cross-border terrorism against India, which, ment was confronted by the need for an alter- after the December 13, 2001, attack on the By early 2003 the Government of India had every reason to be optimistic that its strategy of politely snubbing Pakistan was working. nate strategy for dealing with Pakistan because Indian Parliament, resulted in a major Indian it had, in effect, given up on the option of using military mobilization intended to compel military force to punish Islamabad by the end of Islamabad to end its involvement in terrorism the 2001–2002 crisis. At that point, India, against India once and for all. The 2001–2002 broadly speaking, had two choices One was to crisis ended ambiguously, from an Indian per- begin negotiations with Pakistan more or less spective. Of course, the “hammer and anvil” immediately. This alternative would have strategy of Indian military pressure and U.S. implied meeting Musharraf’s demand for nego- diplomatic intervention produced many gains tiations as a quid pro quo for the cessation of for India. These included forcing Pakistan to terrorism against India. The other choice was to acknowledge complicity in Kashmiri terrorism settle for a cold peace with Islamabad. This and promise a change in course, securing U.S. option had three components a comprehensive acknowledgment of Kashmir as a case of terror- eschewing of contacts with Pakistan, an empha- ism rather than simple insurgency, and strength- sis on internal solutions to the problems in ening the international perception of Pakistan as Jammu and Kashmir, and continued interna- a “near rogue” country that exports terrorism, tional pressure on Pakistan to end its involve- proliferation, and instability. But these gains ment with terrorism. Faced with these alterna- notwithstanding, India did not secure the one tives, Prime Minister Vajpayee could not settle thing its military mobilization was intended to for the first option—beginning negotiations— achieve conclusive termination of Pakistan’s because his government believed that it would involvement in terrorism directed against India. reinforce the wrong lesson in Islamabad “If you On this score, General Musharraf adopted a tac- pursue terrorism effectively, you can secure your tically brilliant strategy of modulating Pakistan’s political goals at will.” Consequently, he chose involvement in terrorism depending on the the second strategy and settled for a cold peace. intensity of international (primarily U.S.) pressure In retrospect, the cold peace alternative has at any given moment—but never quite aban- paid India unforeseen dividends, as the Vajpayee doned terrorism as an instrument of state policy government’s emphasis on internal solutions to despite his own growing recognition that it was the problems in Jammu and Kashmir proved a wasted asset in the post–911 international 8 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis more successful than even the optimists within The All-Party Hurriyat Conference, the political the ruling coalition would have expected in mid- arm of the insurgent movement, which lost con- to-late 2002. In September of that year, India siderable leverage as a result of its decision to organized the freest and fairest election seen in forsake participation in the September 2002 Jammu and Kashmir since the mid-1980s, an elections, finally split at Pakistan’s behest into election that drew a remarkably high voter moderate and hard-line factions. As if in reflec- turnout (45 percent) for such an unstable and tion of this split, the insurgents too began to alienated state and that resulted in the conclusive engage in factional bloodletting. This was a defeat of the ruling National Conference govern- product partly of New Delhi’s increasingly suc- ment, which also happened to be an ally of the cessful ability to play off one group against the Bharatiya Janata Party in the Union Government other, Pakistan’s own efforts to manipulate the in New Delhi. From July 2002, even before the different terrorist groups, and the increasing state elections, Vajpayee encouraged a series of uncertainty among the jihadis about Pakistan’s unofficial and official interlocutors to test the strategic intentions, given its larger geopolitical prospects for a dialogue between the Kashmiri strategy of running with the terrorist hares separatists and the Indian Union Government. while hunting with the American hounds. Although this effort proceeded in fits and starts All in all, by early 2003 the Government of and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, a series India had every reason to be optimistic that its of high-profile intermediaries—Ram Jethmalani strategy of politely snubbing Pakistan was and the Kashmir Committee; Deputy Chairman, working. New Delhi continued to reiterate the Planning Commission K. C. Pant; former position that no dialogue with Islamabad was Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister N. N. possible so long as Pakistan persisted in its sup- Vohra; and finally Deputy Prime Minister L. K. port of terrorism against India. With the change Advani himself—engaged in various exploratory in international attitudes toward terrorism probes intended to foster a reconciliation with post–911, the international community, too, India. Even as these political efforts proceeded, more or less acquiesced to this Indian position. the Indian army successfully accelerated its border However, given Vajpayee’s own personal com- patrol operations, exploiting new technologies, mitment to achieving reconciliation with There is now a civilian constituency for peace with India. better tactics, and increased fencing along the Pakistan, this cold standoff with Islamabad LOC, to intercept and kill more and more ter- could not persist forever. The strong security rorists as they attempted to cross over into interdependence between the two South Asian India. Finally, the Kashmiri insurgency states also required India to resume a dialogue appeared to be consumed by its own internal with Pakistan at some point. Vajpayee clearly crisis. The success and responsiveness of the appreciated this. He wanted to resuscitate the new state government took the edge off the process of achieving normalcy he had left accumulated resentments against New Delhi and incomplete at the India-Pakistan summit in offered the local population the option of politi- Agra in July 2001, but the timing had to be right. cal participation as an alternative to violence. This involved, among other things, complex India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 9 issues of internal Indian politics. In April 2003, Islamabad for the South Asian Association for Vajpayee was in a completely different position Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in January 2004. However, Vajpayee’s decision to domestically relative to his circumstances at attend the summit included no guarantee that he Agra He was unchallenged within his Bharatiya would meet with General Musharraf and agree Janata Party, and he enjoyed a national popu- to a renewed dialogue between India and larity unmatched by that of any rival within or Pakistan. Although Brajesh Mishra preceded the outside the party. He also realized the electoral prime minister to Islamabad by a few days to benefits of peacemaking, since nothing would discuss the terms for such a meeting, the Indian be more appealing to India’s 140 million-strong delegation waited until the summit was well Muslim population in the next general elections under way before it consented to a meeting than a concerted effort to mend fences with between the two leaders. The turning point prob- Pakistan. Accordingly, he felt comfortable ably was the tenor of Pakistani Prime Minister enough to begin making a tentative public over- Jamali’s public remarks, which, reflecting a con- ture to Pakistan, which he inaugurated in a scious Pakistani decision to avoid beating up on major speech to the Kashmiris in Srinagar on India in that forum, appeared to provide the April 18, 2003. This overture, which he had required proof of Islamabad’s willingness to planned unbeknownst to all but a handful of conduct itself responsibly. The all-important close advisers, had the effect of changing in one meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf fell swoop the tone of India’s diplomacy toward occurred the following day, and the joint state- Pakistan. One strong note of continuity persisted ment that followed is now the stuff of history. nonetheless If Pakistan were to secure what it wanted most—a formal dialogue on Kashmir— Husain Haqqani After a fortnight in Pakistan dur- it would have to show in word and deed a will- ing the course of the SAARC summit, I can say ingness to end terrorism against India. that a major factor in bringing the two sides To demonstrate his own seriousness, together was General Musharraf’s realization Vajpayee dispatched his trusted amanuensis, his that supporting Islamist militancy and jihad in Principal Secretary and National Security Kashmir poses a greater threat to him and pos- Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, to meet secretly in India holds most of the cards both on issues of process—to talk or not to talk—and on issues of substance—to give away territory or not. sibly to Pakistan than it does to India. General London with Tariq Aziz, Musharraf’s principal Musharraf had two close calls in the form of secretary and personal friend. The purpose of this attempts on his life just prior to the SAARC conversation was simply to explore what degree summit. The international community and the of realism existed within the Pakistani leadership Indian leadership seem to agree that General with respect to its willingness to meet the condi- Musharraf is a better option on the Pakistani tions required for resuming a bilateral dialogue. side than the Islamist radicals who are threaten- A series of sub-rosa backroom negotiations fol- ing his life. Musharraf’s support for the U.S.-led lowed, bringing things to the point where, after war against terrorism has gained him interna- much public speculation about his intentions, the tional support, and the peace talks are India’s Indian prime minister decided that he would visit 10 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis way of joining the international community on And his realization, coupled with Indian accept- this issue despite its reservations about ance that the realization exists, paved the way Musharraf’s own anti-Indian stance in the past. for the recent peace initiative. By most accounts, Musharraf has had a change of heart about India, transforming from Q What compromises, if any, did each side make to reach hawk to dove, though we cannot be sure that the January agreement such a change of heart is in any way absolute. Husain Haqqani Both sides have made concessions Part of it has to do with the need for self-survival. on form, but we have not yet reached the stage At a time when the jihadis are trying to kill him Pakistan knows it is relatively weaker, so it always looks for negotiating moments. for concessions on substance. The India- and the Americans are worried about Pakistan’s Pakistan joint statement issued in January 2004 involvement in nuclear proliferation to Libya, was different from previous joint statements in North Korea, and Iran, and Musharraf has little one respect. It clearly said that General domestic political support, it serves him well to Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee turn off at least one source of heat. That is prob- that Musharraf “will not permit any territory ably why he chose to cool things with India. But under Pakistan’s control to be used to support Musharraf and his fellow generals have invested terrorism in any manner.” too much in demanding resolution of the We may recall that during the India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute before normalization with summit in Agra in 2001, India had asked for India to now accept normalization without a similar language in the joint statement for that Kashmir settlement right away. meeting, only to be turned down by General We may also have to make a distinction Musharraf. At that time, Pakistan’s refusal to here between General Musharraf the individual acknowledge that Pakistani-controlled terri- and General Musharraf the head of Pakistan’s tory was being used for terrorism against military institution. I know that there is a ten- India was a major, major issue between the dency to think that General Musharraf speaks two countries. The call for a composite dia- for the entire Pakistani elite and especially the logue that addresses all outstanding issues military. But there’s no sign that everyone in between the two countries, included in the Pakistan’s civil-military elite shares Musharraf’s statement announcing the latest peace process, realization of the internal threat from the is a reiteration of the joint declaration made at jihadis. The generals and their backers have, for Lahore in February 1999 during Vajpayee’s years, believed that by stoking the fires of rebel- bus trip to meet then–Pakistani prime minister lion in Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir they Nawaz Sharif. The peace process initiated at can force India to make concessions on the ter- Lahore was interrupted by Pakistan’s military ritorial status quo in that disputed region. Now incursion into Kargil three months later. Musharraf has more or less acknowledged that General Musharraf and the Pakistani military Kashmir is not necessarily going to fall into undertook the Kargil incursion mainly because Pakistan’s lap as a ripe apple from the tree, sim- they were dissatisfied with the terms of the ply as a consequence of sustained jihadi activity. India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 11 India-Pakistan dialogue resulting from the walk away from the SAARC summit without any bilateral agreement, if necessary. In the Lahore process. judgment of Indian policy makers, any agree- So, in a way the current process brings us ment that affirmed the centrality of the Jammu back to where things stood at the time of the and Kashmir dispute while remaining silent on Lahore summit. Musharraf has conceded what Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism against he refused to concede at Agra, but two and a India was one they could happily live without. half years later. India’s major concession this General Musharraf, on the other hand, time has been to schedule official talks on appeared anxious for an agreement, for at least Kashmir simultaneous to, and possibly ahead three reasons First, Pakistan’s international of, other issues. The two sides will hold talks Musharraf has conceded what he refused to concede at Agra. image had suffered a deadly battering in regard covering eight subjects, including trade and eco- to its proliferation record, its continuing entan- nomic cooperation, confidence-building meas- glement with terrorism, and its failure to root ures, terrorism, and Jammu and Kashmir. India out Islamist extremism within its boundaries. has given Musharraf a chance to say that Second, the United States was continuing to Kashmir will be discussed sufficiently early in apply strong pressure on Pakistan with respect the peace process. Pakistanis can construe this to both terminating support for cross-border as an Indian concession, though there is no terrorism against India and redoubling its commitment by India to a resolution of the efforts in the war against Al Qaeda and the Kashmir dispute ahead of other matters. Taliban. Third, the growing desire domestically Another significant development during for a normalized relationship with India, cou- the SAARC summit was Pakistan’s decision to pled with the conspicuous threats to join the South Asia Free Trade Agreement. Musharraf’s own life from the very same This is the first time Pakistan has signed on to extremist forces that Pakistan had bred and nur- something that will force it to open trade with tured over the years, all taken together, India. At present, there’s a lot of smuggling strengthened his incentives to seek an exit from between the two countries but very little offi- the standoff with India. cial trade. Formal bilateral trade could serve as The asymmetry in Indian and Pakistani des- a confidence-building measure in addition to peration for an agreement accordingly produced reducing the mutual demonization that has a joint statement at the SAARC summit that poisoned India-Pakistan ties until now. recorded systematic concessions by Pakistan on virtually every issue of interest to India. Ashley J. Tellis As far as I can tell, India was in the To begin with, the vexed dispute over driver’s seat on this one. Although Vajpayee Jammu and Kashmir is not highlighted as a sin- would have liked nothing better than to resume gularity or as the “core issue” dividing India and the dialogue with Pakistan for a variety of rea- Pakistan. Rather—and in opposition to the long- sons—strategic, electoral, and diplomatic— standing Pakistani position—the relevant por- India’s strength in the bargaining process tion of the joint statement simply affirms that derived from its quite abundant willingness to 12 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis “the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful set- over Musharraf’s previous promises, which, by tlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu affirming that “Pakistani territory” would not and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” be used to support terrorist operations against You will remember that this was the issue on India, allowed Islamabad the loophole of “legiti- which the Agra summit foundered Musharraf mately” exploiting Azad Kashmir for such activ- had demanded that India accept the centrality of ities since the latter is in legal terms not the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir in the con- Pakistani, but only disputed, territory. Yet text of their bilateral relations, which Vajpayee another affirmation of the Indian position is rejected. At Islamabad, the Pakistanis accepted included in the joint statement, Vajpayee’s dec- the Indian position, which made the issuance of laration that “in order to take forward and sus- the joint statement possible. tain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and Further, and again consistent with Indian terrorism must be prevented.” preferences, the joint statement makes no men- On balance, then, it appears as if Pakistan tion of the rights and preferences of “the made most of the concessions required to pro- Kashmiri people” or of their “freedom strug- duce the joint statement. None of the formula- gle.” New Delhi has long asserted that, since tions that destroyed the Agra summit—the cen- the 1947 accession of the former princely state trality of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir, of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union is the proposition that no transformation in India- irrevocable and complete, the Kashmiri people Pakistan relations was possible without per se have no locus standi in legal—though progress on Jammu and Kashmir—appear in not practical—terms as far as resolving the dis- the Islamabad statement. In retrospect, this pute is concerned. Consequently, whenever the should not be surprising because India holds problems relating to Jammu and Kashmir are most of the cards both on issues of process—to referred to in the joint statement, the document talk or not to talk—and on issues of sub- only refers to the two state principals—India stance—to give away territory or not. In con- and Pakistan—as parties to the dispute. trast, Pakistan’s strategy of using terrorism to whittle away India’s advantages has increasingly Finally, the joint statement includes a “per- faced diminishing returns since the global war sonal” assurance from General Musharraf to The fundamental problem between the two sides has still not been engaged Pakistan seeks negotiations to alter the status quo, whereas India accepts negotiations primarily to ratify the same. on terrorism began after 911. Consequently, its Prime Minister Vajpayee that “he will not per- objective of securing territory in Jammu and mit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be Kashmir now controlled by India lies more and used to support terrorism in any manner.” The more beyond reach. personal nature of this pledge was deemed an important element of the peace process insofar as it entailed Musharraf putting his personal Q What is your general assessment of the prospects for reputation and credibility with Vajpayee directly long-term success of the peace initiative on the line. And the particular locution in the Ashley J. Tellis This is a very difficult question to joint statement, “territory under Pakistan’s con- answer satisfactorily. What is obvious right trol,” was judged to be a major improvement India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 13 now is that we have a limited breakthrough of substance. India, in contrast, sought and because Pakistan has accepted India’s principal accepted the Pakistani concessions on process demands on matters of process. Islamabad has principally in order to intimate the limits to also agreed to certain substantive propositions, future compromises that may be forthcoming such as the unacceptability of terrorism as a on matters of substance. In other words, the means of securing political change, but whether fundamental problem between the two sides has these will be implemented completely, or to still not been engaged Pakistan seeks negotia- India’s satisfaction, is anyone’s guess. New tions to alter the status quo, whereas India Delhi, for its part, has consciously not crowed accepts negotiations primarily to ratify the about these Pakistani concessions in order to same. Unless some way can be found to bridge avoid embarrassing Musharraf and weakening this chasm, the long-run prospects for successful his ability to make a definitive deal with India. dispute resolution do not look promising. This much is clear Vajpayee is eager to reach a A successful resolution in this context will conflict-resolving agreement with Musharraf occur only when Islamabad comes around to over Jammu and Kashmir, but not at the cost of accepting the current territorial status quo in a further surrender of Indian territory to Jammu and Kashmir, though some “rationali- Pakistan. Vajpayee also believes that Musharraf zation” of the existing LOC certainly might be may be the best person to make a deal with possible through negotiations. This is because because he represents the most important con- Pakistan does not have the capability to com- stituency in Pakistan, the army; he is a moder- pel India to abandon any territories presently ate, in the context of the Pakistani political under its control in the disputed state. The spectrum; and, although he carries a lot of bag- international community, too, has neither the gage as far as India is concerned (primarily incentive nor the capability to push India in because of his role in the Kargil war), he recog- this direction. Therefore, if Pakistan is to be nizes that his survival, which is increasingly able to claim a modicum of victory at the end linked to his success in reforming Pakistan, is of the current negotiating process—assuming inexorably linked to his ability to reach an that the process itself survives the vicissitudes accommodation with India. of the conflictual bilateral relationship—it will A negotiation carried out on the premise that Islamabad will be able to force on India major territorial changes in Jammu and Kashmir...will come to grief very rapidly. Having said all this, however, I cannot perforce have to adopt a new definition of its escape the feeling that, at the end of the day, the interests in Jammu and Kashmir. A negotiation national strategies of the two sides are in colli- carried out on the premise that Islamabad will sion. The limited agreement that was reached at be able to force on India major territorial Islamabad, which represents only an agreement changes in Jammu and Kashmir, or a funda- to talk about various problems in the bilateral mental transformation in the disputed state’s relationship, was procured because Pakistan existing sovereignty arrangements, will come surrendered on issues of process in order to to grief very rapidly. But a Pakistani willing- begin formal negotiations through which it ness to define anew Pakistan’s interests in hopes to secure Indian concessions on matters Jammu and Kashmir in terms of some alterna- 14 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis tive principle, say, promoting the well-being of willing to give resolution of this dispute the pri- the Kashmiri people, offers greater hope for an ority Pakistan is seeking. So, there is nothing eventual lasting accommodation. At this point, new here, but General Musharraf has to make however, it is simply not obvious that this acknowledgment because, after all, he sab- Musharraf accepts the necessity for such a otaged the Lahore process in the name of redefinition of Pakistani interests—the princi- Kashmir. He has to explain to everybody in pal condition for any conflict-resolving agree- Pakistan and the world, as well as to his col- ment between India and Pakistan. leagues in the army, why he chose to sabotage Politically and economically, the cost of competing with India is weakening Pakistan’s foundations. Husain Haqqani It’s not easy to assess the prospect that option for peace in 1999 but is going for of long-term success without going into what the same thing this time around. He has to say each side might want from the process. it’s new, even if it isn’t new. Musharraf’s view of the third step in the General Musharraf has said that this partic- peace process is very interesting, and this is ular initiative toward India is going to involve where I think things could get bogged down. four steps. The first step is to start negotiating, According to him, the third step would be, in and they’ve started doing that. This is some- the words of a Pakistan government briefing, thing Musharraf and Pakistan needed, to “through a process of elimination to eliminate restore a semblance of regional stability. India’s anything not acceptable to India, Pakistan, and refusal to negotiate with Pakistan without an the Kashmiris.” This would be a very difficult unequivocal commitment to end support for phase, because Musharraf and the Pakistani terrorism was hurting Pakistan’s international military leadership have traditionally failed to standing. Pakistan needed the peace process to appreciate any nuanced or drawn-out process weaken the impression that Islamabad was the of attending to the Kashmir dispute. Through cause of tension. The global focus on terrorism the process of elimination, it is clear that was also eroding any remaining sympathy for what is unacceptable to Pakistan is the status Pakistan’s legal and political claims relating to quo, the de facto division of the former Kashmir, especially those related to old United princely state of Jammu and Kashmir that Nations resolutions seeking a plebiscite in leaves India in control of the Kashmir valley. Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan remains averse to declaring the The second step, according to Musharraf, is cease-fire line or LOC the de jure international to accept the reality that the issue of Kashmir border and saying the dispute has been must be resolved. To me, General Musharraf is resolved. India would probably want that, stretching here because I think the reality that followed by negotiations over ways of creat- Kashmir must be resolved was recognized even ing a more open border, more cross-border in Lahore, and the Lahore declaration clearly links, and more economic links. That has not said that all disputes would be resolved through been acceptable to Pakistan, and my feeling, negotiation, including Kashmir. Of course, rec- on the basis of being in Pakistan recently, is ognizing that we have a dispute over Kashmir that it still isn’t acceptable. that we need to resolve does not mean India is India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 15 And what is unacceptable to India India so it always looks for negotiating moments. But finds the idea of giving up Kashmir totally my view is, and this may be a very subjective unacceptable. As for the Kashmiris, I think that view, that the Pakistan military often misreads what is unacceptable to the Kashmiris is flexible, the times of weakness and strength. For exam- because the Kashmiris don’t have the hard-line ple, I think that the Lahore summit in 1999 was positions on what is unacceptable that India a time of strength for Pakistan. Both India and and Pakistan have. The Kashmiris are willing to Pakistan had just conducted their nuclear tests in look at alternatives. Having self-government 1998. When prime ministers Vajpayee and with greater autonomy than is normally provided Sharif met, Pakistan could have said, “We’re a by the Indian constitution to Indian states is one nuclear power and you’re a nuclear power. Now I think that what is unacceptable to the Kashmiris is flexible. of the alternatives some Kashmiris find accept- that the prospect of conventional war is out, let’s able. But a settlement on the terms of Kashmiri sit down and talk and make sure we resolve our inclusion in India would essentially be a issues.” But the Pakistani military went ahead process between India and the Kashmiris with the unconventional or subconventional war rather than a process involving Pakistan, India, in Kargil and thought that would enhance and the Kashmiris. If India moves too fast Pakistan’s strength. The resort to subconvention- and successfully in negotiations with the al war in the shadow of nuclear deterrence actu- Kashmiris, and the Indians and Kashmiris ally weakened Pakistan’s negotiating hand. come up with something that is acceptable to Right now, Pakistan’s hand is much weaker. both sides, then that is where the Pakistanis And this is where I think the problem will come. might start feeling left out. The greater issue on Because Pakistan is much weaker, India’s will- the Kashmiri end of the equation would be ingness to give will be much less. Why should who speaks for the Kashmiris, with India and they want to change the status quo at a time Pakistan disagreeing over the legitimacy of when Pakistan cannot change the status quo Kashmiri parties they do not like. through any other means And that imbalance The fourth step, according to Musharraf, is may cause certain elements within the Pakistani to go on out of the remaining solutions and to military establishment to say, “This is not right for us. What are we getting out of it We have select the one that is acceptable to all three par- invested fifty-five years and fought several wars, ties. This sounds much easier than it’s going to shed blood and lost lives. Let us buy time be. And the truth of the matter is that it was through protracted talks and wait for a moment tried in the past and failed. Efforts to break the when we can get a better deal.” deadlock on Kashmir were undertaken in the I see that as the next problem now. General 1950s and 1960s, and have been made sporad- Musharraf is also saying that, instead of a ically since then. But these efforts have always sequential process—because India always said been sidetracked. “Stop the terrorism and then we’ll talk,”—he’s The Pakistani military has always wanted to finally persuaded India to accept simultaneity have some kind of a position of strength to nego- “We’ll work on ending the terrorism, you work tiate from. Pakistan knows it is relatively weaker, 16 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis on talking to us about Kashmir, and we go from jihadis, are truly put out of business. Right now there.” But my feeling is, and this is based on fif- they seem to have been put on hold, told by teen days in Pakistan recently, that one thing Pakistani officials to suspend operations with- General Musharraf is not doing is lowering the out actually being decommissioned. India needs expectations of the average Pakistani and the to make Pakistanis feel that it is seriously com- Pakistani military that Pakistan will eventually mitted to the welfare of its neighbor and is not get Kashmir. And we’ve seen in other parts of the just out to humiliate it. world, in the case of the Palestinians, for Let’s talk about the jihadis first. We don’t instance, that injecting a dose of realism—for know how many of them are willing to repent, example, saying that elimination of Israel is not accept a sort of severance pay, and get back into an option—helps negotiations become somewhat normal life. Many of them still want to continue easier, though not necessarily fruitful or final. jihad because they believe in it, and they’d want In Pakistan, the general mood even now is to change the present situation, of even limited still rather gung ho. The hard-liners say, “Since restrictions on their activities, by trying to kill we have nuclear weapons, we can actually force Musharraf again. They could increase terrorism India into making concessions over Kashmir.” at home, maybe kill people other than India, on the other hand, has been concerned Musharraf, and create sufficient pressure within about terrorism, especially in Jammu and Pakistan to change the government’s policy. Kashmir, and if talks with Pakistan can end the Faced with domestic terrorism, there would cer- infiltration of militants into Kashmir from tainly be those who would argue, “Let these Pakistan, that is an Indian success. Once that guys go and fight the Indians instead of explod- success has been attained, India’s leaders might ing bombs in Karachi or Islamabad.” say they need nothing more from this process, The jihadis have another arrow in their and that could lead to a stalemate. quiver. They could actually hit some target in So, while the beginning of the peace process India. And even though the Indians now, I think, is good news, we must remain cautious about its are increasingly convinced that Musharraf is prospects. The outcome of the talks is already serious about curbing the militants this time subject to limitations imposed by the nature of around, there would still be consequences. Even The national strategies of the two sides are in collision. the Pakistani state, the religious sentiment in if Prime Minister Vajpayee is willing to believe some sections of Pakistan, India’s unwillingness that Musharraf no longer has bad intentions to make concessions over Kashmir, and the toward India, there would still be an internal intractable nature of the Kashmir dispute. dynamic in India. Some Indians would continue to react and put pressure on their government and say, “Why are we tolerating this” Q What do you think needs to be done by each side to If the Indians then decided to break off talks make the peace initiative bear full fruit because Musharraf had failed to curb the Husain Haqqani The first thing Pakistan needs to jihadis, his political support and legitimacy at do is make sure that the Islamist militants, the home would shrink further. Two years ago, India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 17 when I left Pakistan, General Musharraf had a the internal dynamic of the Pakistani military and society could influence the extent to which lot more support than he does now. It’s very Pakistan would remain committed to the interesting; two years ago he had a lot less sup- process. General Musharraf will have to deal port in India and in the United States than he with these twin issues to make the talks a suc- does now. But at the present moment, I find a cess. The public discourse in Pakistan would lot more people sympathetic to him in the have to be moved away from “We must get United States and among Indians than there Kashmir to be a nation in the full sense” to a were two years ago. There are Americans and realization of the tight spot Pakistan is in. The Indians who really think that this is a man tak- Pakistani military and people need to be made ing risks, this is a man under threat. But the sit- aware of the fact that Pakistan is gradually los- uation in Pakistan is different. ing its fight with India. Politically and econom- General Musharraf has no significant domes- ically, the cost of competing with India is weak- tic constituencies of support, because he’s not a ening Pakistan’s foundations. Thirty-one per- constituency builder. There are many people who cent of its people now live below the poverty actually agree with him, but they have political line, and even after spending 5 percent of gross reasons for not backing him because he does domestic product on defense, Pakistan cannot nothing for them domestically. As army chief, it match India’s defense spending, which is around may be easier for him to do a deal with India and 2.5 percent of GDP. not be accused of being a traitor. But that hasn’t On India’s part, it is crucial that India come prevented certain people from accusing him of up with something that will make the Pakistanis selling out Pakistan’s interests. In the past, when- feel that they are actually getting a better deal ever a Pakistani ruler, civilian or military, man- than they would have if they weren’t going aged to arrive at a deal with India that did not through with this process. India would have to include any concession for Pakistan on Kashmir, keep its rhetoric on terrorism to a minimum and his domestic standing weakened. The military hold out assurances that it is not only reconciled and its Islamist allies forced changes in govern- to Pakistan’s breaking away from British India ment in the past, through coups or palace coups, in 1947—the partition—but is now truly inter- on the grounds that peace initiatives relating to Pakistan remains wedded to terrorism as an instrument of leverage vis-à-vis India. ested in its neighbor’s well-being. Given the two India amounted to selling out Pakistan’s national nations’ history, that is a tall order. interest. The first Benazir Bhutto government The thorniest issue in India-Pakistan rela- was accused of selling out Pakistani interests tions is Kashmir. Here, the test is to keep the between 1988 and 1990, mainly because of process going while both sides try to bring Bhutto’s supposed rapport with Rajiv Gandhi. about a substantive change in the expectations And the Nawaz Sharif government came under of their people, especially on the Pakistani side. attack for initiating the Lahore process and for a I was six years old when I was told that Kashmir “hasty withdrawal” from Kargil. belonged to Pakistan and that we would get it So, on the one hand, the jihadis could one day. I hope I am a little wiser than the six- undermine the peace process, and on the other, 18 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis year-olds who are being told that today. I think Pakistan has to do immediately is suspend that it will take some time to make that sub- indefinitely its support for terrorist groups infil- stantive change in expectations, and until that trating the LOC and engaging in violence either time comes, we need to go ahead with little in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere in India. steps such as a bus service linking the Indian- This has not happened as yet Although infiltra- and Pakistani-controlled sides of Kashmir. tion across the LOC has been reduced relative There could be open travel across the LOC to to historic norms, the level of violence in facilitate meetings between divided families. Kashmir is still unacceptably high from India’s And then there is something that the Indians point of view. Further, the infrastructure of ter- have not yet been willing to consider—meetings rorism remains intact. Again, although some of Pakistan is gradually losing its fight with India. between political leaders on both sides of the more conspicuous terrorist training camps Kashmir an intra-Kashmir dialogue that would in Pakistani Kashmir have been shut down, buy us some time while a more permanent solu- Indian intelligence has concluded that some of tion to the region’s final status is found. Then these have been relocated, while new facilities the Pakistani leadership would be able to tell the have opened in other locations. The volume of Pakistani people, “The Kashmiris are talking communications traffic across the LOC between among themselves; give them time to come up Pakistan’s intelligence handlers and the terrorist with creative solutions, and then we’ll come up groups, as well as among the terrorist groups with solutions based on the solutions the themselves, has not decreased either. Pakistan’s Kashmiri leadership has come up with.” efforts—on its side of the LOC—to intercept any infiltration efforts carried out by the terrorist Ashley J. Tellis Conclusively resolving the Jammu groups independently have also been marginal, and Kashmir dispute, as opposed to simply leading Indian policy makers to conclude that managing this quarrel, will require involved dis- Musharraf has, at best, only commanded the cussions that will take a long time. It is not jihadis to lie low while he tests India’s intentions something that will be concluded in a matter of at the negotiating table. months; it will very likely take several years. In other words, Pakistan remains wedded to Consequently, there are many things that need terrorism as an instrument of leverage vis-à-vis to be done by both sides both in the short run India. It has attempted to finesse this fact by and in the long run to bring negotiations to a calling the terrorists operating in Jammu and successful conclusion. Kashmir “freedom fighters.” Whether this is Let me start with the short run. The key accurate or not is irrelevant. So long as India challenge facing both sides in the near term is to believes they are terrorists, how Musharraf keep the process of dialogue itself going— treats them will have a critical bearing on despite whatever obstacles may, and probably whether New Delhi remains at the negotiating will, episodically appear. Let me flag two things table. So the very first thing that Pakistan has in this connection that will be required, first, of to demonstrate by spring of this year (when Pakistan. The most important thing that the snows melt in Jammu and Kashmir and India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 19 infiltration becomes easier) is that its renuncia- up with creative strategies that allow Islamabad tion of support for terrorism is in fact a strate- to enjoy some fruits of progress relatively early gic—irreversible—change of course vis-à-vis so as to enable Musharraf to persist with a India and not merely a tactical inflection that strategy of negotiations as opposed to returning can be readily altered should the negotiating to terrorism. These will also give the Pakistani process become difficult for Islamabad. This is leadership political cover to begin the long and a vital precondition for the very survival of the arduous process of conditioning popular expec- dialogue process, not to mention an absolute tations to accept the improbability of major ter- necessity for minimizing the prospect of “cat- ritorial changes in Jammu and Kashmir. Of alytic wars” breaking out as a result of some course—and I emphasize this—all this assumes major terrorist attack in India. that Pakistan appreciates the limits of the possi- The second issue, after the suspension of ble in Jammu and Kashmir. If it does, an Indian support for terrorism, relates to the composite strategy of providing near-term palliatives will dialogue itself. This dialogue encompasses mul- help Islamabad manage any unreasonable tiple issues ranging from peace and security domestic expectations about securing radical problems through resource disputes to cultural change in the disputed state. If it does not, how- exchanges. Almost by definition, the extent and ever, all such Indian gestures will appear only as pace of progress will differ across these issue exercises in prevarication, designed to string areas. This is the key question confronting Pakistan along a course of fruitless negotiation Pakistan here Will it permit negotiations in var- that can only end in unmitigated frustration. ious areas to reach a satisfactory conclusion as While India tests Pakistan’s intentions in this and when possible Or will the progress that regard, there are a variety of things New Delhi can be made in some issue areas be held hostage can do in Jammu and Kashmir because they are to resolving the more difficult problem of good in themselves, because they would help Jammu and Kashmir on terms favorable to reduce the alienation experienced by the Islamabad If Pakistan chooses the former Kashmiris, and because they would address con- course, the prospects for a sustained dialogue cerns that ought to be important to Pakistan. improve sharply; if Pakistan chooses the latter, These include expanding modes of travel across General Musharraf has no significant domestic constituencies of support. the engagement process is likely to have a cor- the LOC; increasing ease of legal transit between uscating but brief life. the divided halves of the state; making stronger In the near term, India too has important efforts at political reconciliation with the moder- responsibilities. The biggest challenge facing ate Hurriyat factions, other moderate sepa- New Delhi is how to keep Islamabad at the ratists, and the Indian Kashmiris as a whole; and negotiating table given that the only feasible exercising tighter control over how Indian mili- final settlement in Jammu and Kashmir favors tary operations affect the civilian populace of the India and not Pakistan. Since the substantive state. But the list can go on and on. As I said, positions held by the two sides on this issue are these initiatives are good for all three reasons I so far apart, the test for India will be to come identified earlier. But they are also critical for 20 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis another purpose If the solution to the Kashmir seeking a rapprochement with India and, there- conundrum finally is to be found only in a rede- by, progressively weaken the choke hold of finition of the terms of the dispute, then to the Islamabad’s military and intelligence services degree that life in Jammu and Kashmir slowly over its political choices. In the near term, this comes closer to normal, Pakistan could feel vin- strategy cannot succeed without the acquies- dicated that its fifty-five years of struggle over cence of General Musharraf and his military the state have not been entirely in vain. Far from cohort. That is why the question of whether serving merely as confidence-building measures, Musharraf possesses “the vision thing” is so these initiatives could therefore become the important. In the longer term, the military may building blocks that enable Pakistan, at some diminish as a factor in Pakistan’s political life— The India-Pakistan peace process will succeed only when New Delhi and Islamabad— and not outsiders—conclude that they must accomplish something of value. point down the line, to declare victory and save though, if I were a betting man, I would say the face over Jammu and Kashmir. odds were against it—but, in any instance, Accordingly, a successful transformation of India has in my judgment few alternatives to the political environment within both the pushing for progress within Jammu and Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas of the Kashmir and in the composite dialogue with state, coupled with progress in other issue areas Pakistan—and then hoping for the best! of the composite dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, could—not will—provide a Q What must the United States do to help the process basis for eventually changing the Pakistani succeed position with respect to the terms of accommo- Ashley J. Tellis I am tempted to say, half in jest, dation with India. Right now, the Jammu and that what the United States should do at the Kashmir dispute is driven entirely by a territo- moment is simply lay off! More seriously, rial definition pertaining to who controls what though, it is important to recognize that the territory. If the terms of discourse can somehow U.S. role in bringing about renewed dialogue be changed to reflect a concern for the condi- between the two sides has been quite modest, tions facing all populations existing within the and I do not think that is necessarily a bad boundaries of the disputed state, the prospects thing. The India-Pakistan peace process will for resolving the dispute become infinitely succeed only when New Delhi and brighter. Whether this transformation in world- Islamabad—and not outsiders—conclude that view finally occurs, of course, will depend prin- they must accomplish something of value. In cipally on the one institution that is central to this context, the United States has an impor- politics in Pakistan the army. Whether the tant but limited role right now, and that con- army will be able to forgo its own interest in sists primarily of using its influence with both sustaining permanent conflict with India, how- sides to ensure that the process of dialogue ever, still remains to be seen. Indian policy simply stays on track, that both India and makers hope that growing intersocietal con- Pakistan persist with their conversation even tacts between the two countries will slowly when the going gets difficult. Obviously, strengthen those constituencies in Pakistan India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 21 Washington has separate and different inter- strengthening Pakistan’s stability over the long term. There are many reasons for this outcome, ests in India and Pakistan—those interests pre- but let me simply flag two important ones here. sumably will be pursued even as the bilateral First, the U.S. government has not been appro- dialogue in the subcontinent proceeds. I hope, priately configured to deal with deep-rooted however, that the Bush administration will structural problems that go beyond the chal- remain mindful of the need to ensure that its lenges of day-to-day diplomacy. Second, initiatives with each side strengthen, not attempting to remedy Pakistan’s structural undermine, the evolving dialogue. deformities would have required the United The biggest challenge here, of course, will States to forgo many important immediate be managing U.S. relations with Islamabad— The key challenge facing both sides in the near term is to keep the process of dialogue itself going... gains, which successive administrations have which are important to the success of Operation been unable to do without increasing the risks Enduring Freedom—in a way that has the fol- either to their own political fortunes or to the lowing three effects American people. If the United States is lucky enough to sur- strengthening Pakistan (which people keep vive its current tightrope walk between India forgetting is not synonymous with strength- and Pakistan without exacerbating their mutual ening the Pakistani military), not weakening security dilemmas, there may be opportunities it further. for a more concerted U.S. involvement in the not undermining U.S. interests in India, South Asian peace process over time. The best which possesses greater geopolitical weight occasion for such intensive involvement would in the subcontinent and is important to a be when Pakistan recognized the limits of stable balance of power in Asia over the possible change in regard to Jammu and Kashmir longer term. and sought assistance in consummating a assisting Pakistan in reconciling itself to the conflict-resolving peace agreement with India. existing geographical reality in Kashmir Even before this point, however, the United rather than hardening its determination to States could play a helpful role by providing overthrow the status quo through contin- ideas and suggestions, but such interventions ued conflict. would be effective only if both sides welcomed them. When both countries show evidence of I am personally quite pessimistic about the policy realism and are beginning to deeply United States’ ability to meet this complex chal- engage each other on the substance of the dis- lenge successfully. As Dennix Kux has demon- pute, and when a breakthrough appears within strated in his marvelous history of U.S.- the realm of possibility—and all this obviously Pakistani relations—The United States and will take a long time—the United States arguably Pakistan 1967–2000 Disenchanted Allies—the could have a critical role to play. At that point, United States and Pakistan have all too often what Washington could do best is to reassure secured their mutual short-term interests to the Islamabad that it is not alone as it makes the neglect of what was really required for 22 Husain Haqqani and Ashley J. Tellis hard choices that will be necessary for the ciently contemporary. Many of the things they attainment of a durable peace. An American are taught and think about, and the issues they willingness to play such a role through diplo- talk about, are different. Economic failure or matic engagement and economic rewards could domestic political problems are not issues that make a difference to the eventual success or concern them as much as pursuit of the abstract failure of the peace process. national interest they have defined for years in terms of rivalry with India. When the Americans say that the Pakistani standard of Husain Haqqani I think that the American role is living must rise or investment must flow so that essentially one of an encourager and a facilita- the people can start having better education and tor, and that’s about it. In fact, I think it suits the health care, this doesn’t appeal to the Pakistani parties to sometimes exaggerate the American generals. The United States could invest some role to explain why they are doing what they are time and energy in helping to change the doing. But the truth of the matter is that the Pakistani military mind-set. Of course, if the Indians and the Pakistanis are quite capable of United States could persuade Indians to start creating crises and occasionally resolving them being a little less questioning of Pakistan’s rai- without American assistance. son d’être, that would help too, but that might The one thing the Americans do is give a be asking too much. But I don’t think it is time sense of security to the Pakistanis, even if it’s yet for a Camp David kind of involvement by temporary. The Pakistanis would feel much the United States. And I don’t think either side weaker when negotiating with India if they did would be willing to accept something like that. not know that Uncle Sam was there and could The United States does not help when it have a positive influence on the other side. So, raises Pakistani expectations resulting from encouragement and facilitation is really what close ties with Washington. The Pakistanis have the United States can do to help the process. some point in saying to the Americans, “If you At some point, however, there would have want nuclear weapons to play a lesser role in to be creative solutions for Kashmir and, for the South Asia, you have to help us have some level Pakistani military, a role other than being the of qualitative parity with India on the conven- large force waiting to secure Kashmir for What Pakistan needs is a strategic shift in its military thinking. tional side.” But a close military relationship Pakistan. But if these creative solutions origi- with the United States always encourages nated from America, they would have to be very Pakistanis to start thinking along the lines of subtly conceived there, and would have to seem continuing competition with India. These days, to have originated in the India-Pakistan region. discussion in Islamabad is once again about Let me just add that the Pakistani military is how to use the American connection to still very much an early-twentieth-century mili- improve the Pakistani air force, in the form of tary. It’s not a twenty-first-century military yet new F-16 fighter aircraft. in its strategic vision. So, its leaders still have Unrealistic expectations of the U.S. alliance Clausewitzian ideas, and their concepts of sov- make any peace process with India ad hoc. ereignty and their political ideas are not suffi- India and Pakistan Is Peace Real This Time 23 What Pakistan needs is a strategic shift in its being an important international player that comes from such praise do nothing to move military’s thinking. Pakistanis need to realize Pakistan’s leaders toward a much-needed reality that theirs is a nation with a relatively small check. But that is definitely an area where U.S. GDP—around US$75 billion in absolute terms policy makers can make a contribution. They and US$295 billion in purchasing price parity. can help Pakistan take stock of its own position, It suffers from massive urban unemployment, instead of making it feel that it is more power- rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per ful or globally important because it has capita income. One-third of the population America’s blessing. lives below the poverty line and another 21 American think tanks and the American percent lives just above it, which results in news media also have a role because they too about half the people of Pakistan being very, can help the Pakistanis get a better idea of real- very poor. The number of people living in ity. At the same time, the Indians need a little poverty is increasing every year in Pakistan, more convincing that Pakistan is not something while it is decreasing in India. What the they can just forget about, and move on, as Pakistanis need to ask themselves is, “Are the some Indians have occasionally said they would victories we have sought in Kashmir and like to do. I think Vajpayee has been very smart Afghanistan worth the suffering we’re putting in recognizing that India’s ambition to be a great ourselves through Will we even be able to win player on the world stage will simply not be our war for pride if we keep going the way realized until this thorn in its side—Pakistan—is we’re going” attended to. The United States can help rein- The constant praise the U.S. government force that realization.