【保罗·维尔诺】唯物主义的两张面孔

Pli12(2001),167-173.TheTwoMasksofMaterialism∗PAOLOVIRNO1.Everyonecanforsaketheinquiryintotherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandlife,butthematerialist,forwhomitisapointofhonourtodemonstratethenon-theoreticalgenesisoftheory.Allinall,materialismisnothingifnottheunityofphilosophyandlife.Savethat,asifcursed,italwaysremainsinferiortoitstask.Thematerialistseemsfatedtooscillatebetweentwoequallymarginalroles:theenfantterriblewhomockshiseldersandthevillageidiotwhofromtimetotimeisallowedtospeakuncomfortabletruths.Rebelliousornaive,eitherwayhisstatusisthatofaminority.Themoreheisintheright,thelessconvincingheis.Whythisenduringimpasse?Therearetwomain“charactermasks”whichthematerialistsdonswhenappearinguponthephilosophicalstage:thefirst,aparodicechoofmarxism,makeshimintoasociologistofknowledge;thesecond,morearchaic,assignshimthepartofthesensationist.Bothmasksbetrayacertainslendernessinthecharacter.Inthecaseinwhichthesociologyofknowledgeprevails,thereisamaximalefforttoshedlightuponthesocio-historicalconditioningsofabstractthoughtandtherebytodenyitssupposedpurity.Thisisanirreproachableintention,butitbecomescontradictorywhenitispreciselysocio-historicalconditionswhichinducethedrasticsplitbetweenknowledgeandempiricalexperience.Withincapitalistmodernity,theseparationbetween“theory”and“life”ceasestobethetheorist’svainillusion,constitutinginsteadthematerialresultofmaterialconditions.So∗Thisessaywasoriginallypublishedinthecollection'IlFilosofoinBorghese'(manifestolibri,1992).Wethanktheauthorandthepublisherforallowingustoprintithereintranslation.Pli12(2001)168thatthedenialoftheeffective“autonomy”ofthoughtturnsouttobenothingbutasignofthoroughgoingidealism.Thereisnothinglesshistoricalandmorehyperboreanthanlookingforthedirtylaundrythatliesbehindthecategoriesoftheory.Insodoing,wetaketheirformidablepracticalpowerlyingdown;themorehelplessweare,themorewethinkwehaveitallfiguredout.Thesociologistofknowledgechaseshisowntail,trappedbyanironicparadox;heiswrongpreciselybecauseheisright:intheorytherearenotracesofimmediatevitalpraxispreciselybecausethispraxis,organisedwithinthecapitalistmodeofproduction,hasmadetheoryintoan“independent”force.Insteadofpausingtoreflectontheratherearthycausesofthisindependence,thematerialist-sociologistexorcisesthemwithamockinglaugh.Butthere’sworse:notonlydoesthisfigurefailtograspthestatusofknowledge,healsolosesholdofthevery“society”inwhosenameheclaimstospeak:hefailstonoticetheabstractconnections(“realabstractions”,asMarxcalledthem)thatpervadesocietyandmakeitcohere.Theseareaccountedforwithgreaterrealism,albeitindirectly,preciselybythat“pure”thoughtwhichthesociologistsoughttounmask.Kant’stranscendentalSubject,neverreducibletosingleempiricalsubjects,capturestheimpersonaltruthofexchangerelationsbetterthananyon-siteinquiry.Thereismorehistoryand“life”intheaprioricategoriesoftheCritiqueofPureReasonthaninVoltaireandLaMettrieputtogether.Thegreatestofseparationsisalsothemostconcrete.Inthefigureofanimperturbableandautonomousintellect,theeraofthecommodityandits“theologicalniceties”resonateswithaclarityunknowntothosewhothinktheycancatchitwithafasthand.2.Thoughoutdated,todaythesensationisttendencyinmaterialismstillappearsmoreradicalandpromising.Itsdominantthemeistheshadowthrownbythebodyuntothought,theroleplayedbythesensibleintheabstractionthatwouldliketoeffaceit.AccordingtoAdorno,theprofoundaimofmaterialistsistomakemanifesttoknowledge,intherudestpossibleway,whatitisforcedtoforget,thatis,theimpressionsofpleasureandpainthatneverfailtomarkoutsensoryperception.Thiscurtreminderhasapolemicalfunction:againstalltheprimalscenesofmetaphysics,thematerialistfallsbackonarathertrivialcoupdescène,allofasuddenre-introducingtheimageofabodyinpleasureandpainintotheorderlycorridorsoflogic.HetakesPaoloVirno169advantageoftheembarrassmenthehasthuscausedtosignaltheirrepressiblepoint:norelationshipisconceivablebetweenlogosandethos(thatis,betweenphilosophyandpolitics)unlessonegoestotherootoftherelationshipbetweenlogosandaisthesis(betweentheoryandsensation).Onlyintheconnectionofthoughtwithpleasure(orwithpain)doethicsandpoliticsfindanon-negligiblefoundation.Materialismattainsitsparticulardignitywhenittakestheformofaradicallycriticalprocedure,anintermittentsettlingofaccounts,aprovocativequestioningabouthappiness.Instead,assoonasitpretendstoerectitselfasapositivesystemitseemsdoomedtothemostdiscouragingtheoreticalindigence.Itsleitmotivsarewellknown:thepraiseofimmediateexperience,theassentgiventoinductiveprocedures,acrasstheoryof“reflection”,aconformistadequationtocommonsense.Thisconceptualarsenalremainsatthemarginsofthepathseffectivelystakedoutbymodernscience,whosehypothetico-deductivestylecontradictsordevaluesdirectperception.Butwhatliesbehindthenaïvetéofmaterialismintheepistemologicalfield?Behindsomuchhaplessness,shouldwenotperhapsdiscerntheobliquedefenceofaradicalclaim?WearenotdealingwithHegel’sbutler,lazyandincredulous,whoturnsuphisnosewhenhismasterdemolishes“sensecertainty”,denyingthestatusofrealknowledgetotheassertion“hereandnowIseeatree”.Thematerialist,whoisnobutler,putshisobjectionforward,notbydiscussingfromfirstprincipleswhetherthehere-and-nowconstituteseffectiveknowledge,butbygivingexpressiontotheintolerableobjectiongnawingawayathim:totrulyspeakofsensation,onemustsay“hereandnowIseeatreewithpleasureordispleasure”.Butthisclaimtotheintegralandnon-decomposablecharacterofperceptionhaslittlesuccess,forapredictablereason:itisdevoidofanydevelopmentwhatever.Infact,togobeyondsensationandguaranteethepossessionofauniversalknowledge,itisnecessarytoputpleasureandpainaside,or,morestrongly,toputthemaside,withretroactiveeffect,alreadywithinsensationitself.Anditisthen,butonlybecauseforcedtodosobythefailureofhisowngenuinedemand,thatthematerialistsubscribestothosetheoriesofknowledgewhich,morethanothers,seemtoleaveopensomepossibilityofrestatingthisdemandinthefuture.Induction,“reflection”,orcommonsense,arenotinevitableoptions,butopportunesupportsinordertotakeupagain—ifneededinanindirectormaskedfashion—anon-mutilateddiscourseonbodilysensation.Theacceptanceof“sensecertainty”asthesolidfoundationofknowledgeisonlyaprovisionalpositionofretreat,cunninglyadoptedinordertosafeguardaclaimregardingthecompletenessofsensation.Inbrief:thelesserevil,theleastPli12(2001)170grievousoferrors.Attherootoftheepistemological“naïveté”ofmaterialismliesthehope,whichisanythingbutnaïve,ofmakingthepleasure/paindyadcountevenwithinthemostrarefiedoftheories.Evensensationist-materialism,withitscoupsdescèneanditsembarrassingtruths,remainsamarginalfigure.3.Inordertotakestockofallthedifficultiesincurredbythephilosophicaldefenceofthelifeofthesenses,itisagoodideatounearthFeuerbach,thereviledprotagonistofmodernmaterialism.Hewrites:“Philosophythereforemustnotbeginwithitself,butwithitsantithesis,withnon-philosophy.Thisprinciple,presentwithinusanddifferentfromthought,istheprincipleofsensualism”.Lifeisthegrammaticalsubject,thoughtitspredicate,andnotviceversa.Sensessurpassconcepts:theexperiencesoftheformerneverfullypassintothelatter.Whatisperceivedinthesilenceoftouchremainsindependentfromthespeculativepoweroflanguage.Butcan“sensualism”reallybetakenasanindubitablestartingpoint?ReadingFeuerbach,onehasthestrangeimpressionthatheis,atthesametime,rightandwrong.Right,toinsist,withoutposturing,ontheautonomyofthesensible.Wrong,becausethisautonomyistrulysuchonlyifitisintroducedand,asitwere,legitimisedbythought.Thatthebody,or“life”,canachieveitsproperplaceandemphasisonlyonthebasisofabstractions,orrather,asaresultoftheirwork,thisistheaspectthatwemustthanktheadversariesofmaterialismforputtingintofocus.Hegel,inthefirstandutterlycrucialpagesofthePhenomenologyofSpirit,hadinfactelucidatedthatthesensibleisnotanabsolutedatum,butjustanotherthought:thethoughtofwhatisnotathought,precisely.OnlythatinHegel,asintheentiretyofmetaphysics,fromthefactthatthesensiblepresentsitselfasthoughtitfollowsthatthought,whenappliedtocorporeallife,onlyeverencountersitself.Itisherethatwewitnesstheemergence,preciselythankstotheresistanceofmatter,oftheexperienceofathoughtthatthinksitself.Thesensibleisherenothingmorethanapropellant,orasacrificialingredient,playingitspartintherenewalofthemagiccircleofself-reference.Theimpressionisthesame:rightandwrongatthesametime.Thereisnonethelessanotheranglefromwhich,atleastbywayofhypothesis,theentirequestioncanbeconsideredanew.“Sensualism”,iftakenseriously,isanythingbutanimmediateincipit,apresupposition,orPaoloVirno171atranquilfoundation.Norshoulditbetakeninsteadasaprecariousandbiasedstagewithintheself-referentiallifeofthespirit.Rather,itshouldbeconceivedashappypointofarrivalforthe“labourofconcepts”;astheresultortheapexoftheory;asacomplexgoal,towardwhichconvergequitesophisticatedintellectualperformances.ToparaphraseFeuerbach:philosophymustendnotwithitself,butwithitsantithesis,thelifeofthesenses;and,endingthus,itmustdeposeit,returnittoitself,absolveit.GastonBachelardoncewrote:“Sensuallearningisnolongerapointofdeparture,itisnotevenamereguide:itisanend”.TheFrenchepistemologist,perhapsthesharpestofthemall,wasreferringtoscientificpracticeinlaboratories.Nevertheless,itcanbearguedthathisobservationnowfitscommonexperience,thevariousformsthatthisexperiencetakesinlatemodernity.Inshort,itcanbecomeasortofheraldicmotto,orepigraph,foraninstanceofmaterialismthatdesirestoescapeitsminoritystatus.Itcandosoundertwodifferentbutcomplementaryaspects.Firstofallastheregisteringofahistoricalcondition,ourown,inwhichtherelationshipbetweenknowledgeandlifehasundergoneradicalmutations.Then,asamethodologicalprincipleonthebasisofwhichonecouldonceagainintroduceareflectiononsensualism,i.e.onpleasureandpain.4.Primumphilosophare,deindevivere:thereversalofthistraditionaladagehasbeenfactuallyrealisedbymaturecapitalism,whichhasincultureandabstractknowledgeitsprincipalresources.Notthatphilosophisingisrife:onthecontrary.Thepointinsteadisthateverylivingexperiencepresupposesalotofmaterialisedtheory.Innumerableconceptualconstructions,embodiedinasmanytechniques,procedures,andregulations,orientthegazeandserveasthepremisesofanyoperationwhatsoever.Directperceptionandthemostspontaneousactioncomelast.Thisisthehistoricalsituationthatcomesaboutoncethesplitbetweenhandandmindmanifestsitsirreversibility;whentheautonomyofabstractintellectconditionsandregulatesthesocialproductiveprocess,onthewholeandineveryoneofitssingularaspects.Ifhewantstoremainfaithfultohisowncriticalmotivation,thematerialist-sociologistcannotgolookingfor“vital”residuesinonetheoryoranother,butmustinsteadidentifyanddescribeaspecificformoflifeonthebasisofthetypeofknowledgewhichpermeatesit.Onlyinthisway,besides,willhebeabletolayhishandsonthemoreobviouslyPli12(2001)172“sociological”,ortoutcourtmaterial,aspectsofcontemporaryexperience(beginningwiththeexperienceofwork).Anditispreciselyinthisway,moreover,thathewillfindconfirmationoftheunityof“life”and“philosophy”which,aswe’veseen,isapointofhonourforthematerialist.Donotforgetthoughthatthisconfirmationcanbeobtainedonlyoncepuretheoryisconsideredasamaterialfact.Tellmewhatyouthink,whatculturalconstellationyourelyon,andIwilltellyouhowyouwork,whatrelationshipyouentertainwithsocialhierarchies,whatareyourearthlyinterestsaswellasyourleastreflectivefeelingsandimpulses.Aboutadeofcourse...butanincrediblyseriousone.Naturally,itisherenolongeraquestionofthe“greatthinker”andofhispossiblecompromisewiththehorrorsoftheage.WearenotspeakingaboutHeidegger,butaboutmodernmassintellectualwork.Nevertheless,preciselywhenconcretemodesofexistenceappearasresultsoftheoreticalparadigms,thejudgementpassedonthe“greatthinker”allowsfornoshortcutsorplea-bargains.Itbecomesatoncemorestringentandmoresevere.5.Finally,itisworthone’swhiletoaskwhatopportunitiesareofferedbythereversalofpositionsbetweenknowledgeand“life”tothatothertypicalattitudeofmaterialism,sensationism.Perhapsitispreciselytheterminalplacementofsensibleexperience(i.e.,thefactthatitisprecededandpreparedby“theory”)whichoffersaglimmerofhopefortheresolutionoftheimpassethatblockedthematerialistdemandtoalwaysincludepleasureandpainwithinperception.Aslongasthe“sensedatum”isassumedasthefirststepintherepresentationoftheworld,thatdemand,howeverimpassioned,cannotbutsoundquarrelsomeandimpotent.Inthisinstanceitisindeednecessarytopurgesensationinordertoextractfromitaninformationcapableoffoundingfurtheruniversalassertions.Viceversa,whendirectperceptionisunderstoodasthefurthestedge,orthelastlink,inanentirelydeployedknowledgeprocess,itcanatlastaspiretounconditionedintegrity.Thehistoricalrealityofan“autonomousintellect”warrantsthisassertion:thereisnothingaftersensation,everythingelsecamebefore.Morethantwocenturiesago,inhisTreatiseofSensations,Condillacimaginedastatue“deprivedofeveryspeciesofidea”,whichbeginstoPaoloVirno173know,firstwithonesensealone,smell,thenwithhearingaswell,andthen,gradually,withalltheothers.BymeansofthisexampleCondillacattemptedtoshowwhatispropertoeachsensoryorgan,aswellasthegenesisofintellectualrepresentations.Itisathoughtexperimentthatmeritsrepeatinginthesocietyofthespectacle(alsocalledthe“societyofgeneralisedcommunication”).Albeitwithsomedecisiveamendments.Ontheonehand,itisnecessarytopostulatethatthestatue,priortowhateversensation,isfull“ofeveryspeciesofidea”,thatis,repletewithsociallyeffectiveconceptualschemata.Ontheother,onemustholdthatitsperceptions,loadedwithpleasureorpain,arenotapreludebutanacmeandanaccomplishment.Orrather,theyarealsoaprelude,nottoafurtheranddisinterestedknowledge,buttoapolitics.TranslatedbyAlbertoToscano