国际经济学题库(英文版)

PartⅠ.Fillintheblankwithsuitablecontent.1.Seventhemesrecurthroughoutthestudyofinternationaleconomics.Thesearethegainsfromtrade,thepatternoftrade,protectionismthebalanceofpayments,exchangeratedetermination,internationalpolicycoordination,internationalcapitalmarket.2.Countriesengageininternationaltradefortwobasicreasons:comparativeadvantageandeconomicsofscale.3.Acountryhasacomparativeadvantageinproducingagoodiftheopportunitycostofproducingthatgoodintermsofothergoodsislowerinthatcountrythanitisinothercountries.4.Laboristheonlyonefactorofproduction.、and、aretheunitlaborrequirementincheeseandwineatHomeandForeign,respectively.IfaLC/aLW<aLC*/aLW*,Homehasacomparativeadvantageincheese./istherelativepriceofcheese,whenaLC/aLW<Pc/Pw<aLC*/aLW*HomeandForeignspecializeinproducingcheeseandwine,respectively.5.Laboristheonlyonefactorofproduction.、and、aretheunitlaborrequirementincheeseandwineatHomeandForeign,respectively.LandL*areHome’sandForeign’slaborforce.If/</</,theworldrelativesupplyofcheeseequals（L/aLC）/(L*/aLW*).Home’sgainsfromindirectlyproducingwinecanbeshownas(1/aLC)(Pc/Pw)－1/aLW6.Inspecificfactorsmodel(QM=QM(K,LM);QF=QF(T,LF);L=LM+LF),ifHomeproducesandtradesmanufacturedgoodsforfood,theoverallcomparisonofthefivechangerateofgoodspriceandfactorprice、、、、insideHomeis.Thatis,therealincomeofcapitalistsincrease,itcanbeshownasEMBEDEquation.3.7.Therearetwomainreasonswhyinternationaltradehasstrongeffectsonthedistributionofincome.First,resourcescan’tmoveimmediatelyorcostlesslyformoneindustrytoanotherSecondIndustriesdifferinthefactorsofproductiontheydemand.8.IntheHeckscher-Ohlinmodel,Comparativeadvantageisinfluencedbytheinteractionbetweenrelativeabundanceandrelativeintensity9.Accordingtostolper-sammelsoneffectiftherelativepriceofagoodrises,therealincomeofthefactorwhichintensivelyusedinthatgoodwillrise,whiletherealincomeoftheotherfactorwillfall.10.Accordingto罗布津斯基效应Rybczynskieffect,atunchangedrelativegoodsprice,ifthesupplyofafactorofproductionincreases,theoutputofthegoodthatareintensiveinthatfactorwillrise,whiletheoutputoftheothergoodwillfall.11.AccordingtoH-O模型H-Oproposition,ownersofacountry’sabundantfactorsgainfromtrade,butownersofacountry’sscarefactorslose.12.Accordingto要素价格均等化命题Factorpriceequalizationproposition,internationaltradeproducesaconvergence（收敛）ofrelativegoodsprices.Thisconvergence,inturns,causestheconvergenceoftherelativefactorprices.Tradeleadstocompleteequalizationoffactorprices.（完整的要素价格均等化）13.Threeassumptions（假设）crucialtothepredictionoffactorpriceequalizationareinrealityuntrue.Theseassumptionsare(1)两个国家都生产两种产品bothcountriesproducebothgoods(2)两国技术相同technologiesarethesame(3)存在贸易壁垒：天然壁垒和人为壁垒Therearebarrierstotrade:naturalbarriersandartificialbarriers.14.“U.S.exportswerelesscapital-intensivethanU.S.imports”isknownas里昂惕夫悖论Leontiefparadox.15.TheRicardianModel,theSpecificFactormodelandtheH-Omodelmaybeviewedasspecialcases（特殊情况）of贸易模型standardtrademodels16.Thestandardtrademodelderives（派生推导）aworldrelativesupplycurve（曲线）fromproductionpossibilitiesandaworldrelativedemandcurvefrompreferences.17.Toexport-biasedgrowth,ifthedecline（下降）ofthewelfarecausedbythedeterioration（恶化）ofthetermsoftradeswapover（交换）theriseofthewelfarecausedbygrowth,thegrowthisimmiserizinggrowth(贫困化增长).18.Someeconomistsarguedthatexport-biasedgrowthbypoornationswouldworsentheirtermoftradesomuchthattheywouldbeworseoffthaniftheyhadnotgrownatall.Thissituationisknownasimmiserizinggrowth(贫困化增长).19.Immiserizinggrowthdemandsstrictconditions,theseconditionsareeconomicgrowthisstronglyexport-biased,thegrowingcountryislargeenoughtoaffecttheworldprice,RSandRDmustbeverysteep.20.Accordingto“梅茨勒悖论Metzleparadox”,tariffsandexportsubsidies（补贴）mighthaveperverse（有害的）effectsoninternalprice.21.Inthemodelof“Monopolistic（垄断）CompetitionandTrade”,firmsofanindividualnationfacethetrade-offbetweeneconomiesofscaleandvarietyofproducts.22.Marshallarguedthattherewerethreemainreasonswhyaclusteroffirms（企业集群）maybemoreefficientthananindividualfirminisolation:specializedsupplies,labormarketpooling,knowledgespillovers(知识溢出)23.Thepatternofintraindustry（产业内）tradeitselfisunpredicted,historyandaccidentdeterminethedetailsofthetradepattern.39.Whenthereisexternaleconomies（外部经济）,thepatternofinternationaltradeisdeterminedbyeconomicsofscaleinteractwithcomparativeadvantage.24.Theindexes（指标）ofintrainindustrytradeofaindustrycanbecalculatedbythestandardformula:25.Interindustrytradeandintrainindustry（产业内）tradearethesourcesofgainsfromtrade.Whencountriesaresimilarintheirrelativefactorsupplies、scaleeconomiesandproductdifferentiationsareimportant,intrainindustrytradeisthedominantsource（主要来源）ofgainsfromtrade,everyonegainsfromtrade.26.Theargumentoftemporary（暂时的）protectionofindustriestoenablethemtogainexperienceisknownas幼稚产业论theinfantindustryargument27.Ifweaddtogetherthegainsandlossesfromatariff,Wefindtheneteffectonnationalwelfarecanbeseparatedintotwoparts:termsoftradegainandefficiencyloss28.Whydocountriesadopttradepoliciessuchastarifforimportquota,whichproducemorecoststhanbenefits?——tradepolitics29.Inthepoliticaleconomyoftradepolicy（贸易政策的政治经济学）,governmentareassumedto（被假定为）maximize政治成功politicalsuccessratherthan国家福利nationalwelfare.30.Deviationsfromfreetradecansometimesincreasenationalwelfare.Theseargumentsincludethetermoftradeargumentforatariffandthedomesticmarketfailureargument31.Accordingto“Specificrule(对症规则)”,domesticmarketfailureshouldbecorrectedbydomesticpoliciesaimeddirectlyattheproblem’ssources.32.Althoughmarketfailuresareprobablycommon,thedomesticmarketfailureargumentagainstfreetradeshouldnotbeappliedtoofreely.Firstdomesticmarketfailureshouldbecorrectedbydomesticpoliciesaimeddirectlyattheproblems’sources;Secondeconomistscannotdiagnosemarketfailurewellenoughtoprescribepolicy.33.Internationaltradeoftenproduceslosersaswellaswinners.Intheactualpoliticsoftradepolicy,incomedistributionisofcrucialimportance.集体行动问题Theproblemofcollectiveactioncanexplainwhypoliciesthatnotonlyseemtoproducemorecoststhanbenefitsbutthatalsoseemtohurtfarmorevotersthemtheycanhelpcannonethelessbeadopted.34.TheWTOincludesfouraspectscontent:GATT1994,GATS,TRIPS,TRIMS35.“Nondiscriminatory”principles（非歧视性原则）includemostfavorednationprincipleandnationaltreatmentprinciple36.Forpreferential（优惠）tradingagreements,suchascustomsunion,countriesmustcedepartoftheirsovereigntytosupranationalentity（必须放弃部分主权的超国家实体）37.Whetheracustomsunion（关税同盟）isdesirable（可取）orundesirabledependsonwhetheritlargelyleadstotradecreationortradediversion.38.Tradepolicyindevelopingcountriesisconcernedwithtwoobjectives（涉及两个目标）:promotingindustrializationandCopingwiththeproblemofthedualeconomy.39.Tradepolicyindevelopingcountriesisconcernedwithtwoobjectives:promotingindustrializationandcopingwiththeproblemsofthedualeconomy.Correspondingly,therearetwomainargumentsfordevelopingcountriestopursuepolicyofimport-substitutingindustrialization.Thetwoargumentsaretheinfantindustryargumenttandmarketfailurejustificationforinfantindustryprotection.40.Sophisticatedproponentsoftheinfantindustryargumenthaveidentifiedtwomarketfailuresasreasonswhyinfantindustryprotectionmaybeagoodidea:TheimperfectcapitalmarketsjustificationandTheappropriabilityargument.PartⅡ.TrueorFalse(trueandfalsearedenotedby“T”and“F”,respectively)1.IfaLW*/aLC*<aLW/aLC,Home’srelativeproductivityincheeseishigher.(T)2.AccordingtotheRicardianmodel,itispreciselybecausetherelativewageisbetweentherelativeproductivitiesthateachcountryendsupwithacostadvantageinonegood.Thegoodforwhich/>/willbeproducedinForeign.(F)3.Itispreciselybecausetherelativewageisbetweentherelativeproductivitiesthateachcountryendsupwithacostadvantageinonegood.(T)4.Long-runconvergence(长期收敛)inproductivity（生产力）produceslong-runconvergenceinwages.(T)5.“Koreanworkersearnonly$2.50anhour;ifweallowKoreatoexportasmuchasitlikestotheUnitedStates,ourworkerswillbeforceddowntothesamelevel.Youcan’timporta$5shirtwithoutimportingthe$2.50wagethatgoeswithit.”(F)6.Thepropositionthattradeisbeneficialisunqualified(不合格).Thatis,thereisnorequirementthatacountrybe“competitive”orthatthetradebe“fair”.(T)7.Freetradeisbeneficialonlyifyourcountryisstrongenoughtostanduptoforeigncompetition.(F)8.Foreigncompetitionisunfairandhurtsothercountrieswhenitisbasedonlowwages.（F）9.Tradeexploitsacountryandmakeitworseoffifitsworkersreceivemuchlowerwagethanworkersinothernations.(F)10.TheRicardianModelpredictsanextremedegree(预测一个极端的程度)ofspecialization(专业化).(T)11.TheRicardianModelneglects(忽略)theeffectsonincomedistribution.(T)12.ThebasicpredictionoftheRicardianmodelhasbeenstronglyconfirmedbyanumberofstudiesoveryears.(T)13.TheRicardianModelpredictsthatcountriestendtoexportthosegoodsinwhichtheirproductivityisrelativehigh.(T)14.Wecanthinkoffactorspecificityasamatteroftime.(T)15.Theopportunitycostofmanufactureintermsoffoodisdenotedby(示)MPLM/MPLF.(F)16.Aequalproportionalchangeinpricehavenorealeffectsontherealwage,realincomeofcapitalownerandlandowner.(T)17.Tradebenefitsthefactorthatisspecifictotheimport-competingsectorsofeachcountrybuthurtsthefactortotheexportsectors,withambiguouseffectsonmobilefactors.(F)18.Itispossibleinprincipleforacountry’sgovernmenttousetaxesandsubsidies(补贴)toredistribute（重新分配）incometogiveeachindividualmoreofbothgoods.(T)19.Althoughinternationaltradehasstrongeffectsonincomedistribution,therearestillpossibleinprincipletomakeeachindividualbetteroff.(T)20.Typically,thosewhogainfromtradeinanyparticularproductareamuchmoreconcentrated,informed,andorganizedgroupthanthosewholose.(F)21.Conflictsofinterest(利益冲突)withinnationsareusuallymoreimportantindeterminingtradepolicythanconflictsofinterestbetweennations.(T)22.Generally,economistsdonotregardtheincomedistributioneffectsoftradeasagoodreasontolimittrade.(T)23.Theformulationoftradepolicy(贸易政策的制定)isakindofpoliticalprocess(政治进程).(T)24.“Theworld’spoorestcountriescan’tfindanythingtoexport.Thereisnoresourcethatisabundant—certainlynotcapitalorland,andinsmallpoornationsnotevenlaborisabundant.”(F)25.WageinequalityinU.S.increasedbetweenthelate1970sandtheearly1990s,economistsattributethechangetothegrowingexportsofmanufacturedgoodsfromNIEs.(T)26.Ifthefactor-proportiontheorywasright,acountrywouldalwaysexportfactorsforwhichtheincomeshareexceededthefactorshare,importfactorsforwhichitwasless.(F)27.TheH-Omodelcanpredictnotonlythedirectionbutthevolumeoftrade(贸易量).(T)28.FactortradeingeneralturnsouttobemuchsmallerthantheH-Omodelpredicts.(T)29.Accordingtoaninfluentialrecentpaper,theH-Omodelcanpredictnotonlythedirectionbutthevolumeoftrade.FactortradeingeneralturnouttobethesameastheH-Omodelpredicts.(F)30.OnlybydroppingtheHeckscher-OhlinassumptionthattechnologiesarethesameacrossthecountriescantheoverallpatternofinternationaltradebewellpredictedbytheH-Omodel.(T)31.Ifacountrywanttomaximizeitsnationalwelfare,theconsumptionpointiswherethehighestisovaluelineistangenttothehighestreachableindifferencecurve.(T)32.Ariseinthetermsoftradeincreasesacountry’swelfare,whileadeclineinthetermsoftradereducesitswelfare.(T)33.Export-biasedgrowthtendstoimprovethegrowingcountry’stermsoftradeattherestoftheworld’sexpense.(F)34.Ifthetwocountriesallocate(分配)theirchangeinspendinginthesameproportions,therewillnotbeatermsoftradeeffect.(T)35.Ifthecountryreceivingatransferspendsahigherproportionofanincreaseincomeonitsexportgoodthanthegiver,atransferraisesworldrelativedemandfortherecipient’sexportgoodandthusimproveitstermsoftrade.(T)36.Atransferworsensthedonor’stermsoftradeifthedonorhasahighermariginalpropensitytospendonitsexportgoodthantherecipient(受体).(T)37.Atransferimprovesthedonor’stermsoftrade,worsensrecipient’stermsoftrade.(F)38.Atransferofincome——sayforeignaid——couldconceivablyleavetherecipientworseoff.(T)39.AtariffimprovesHome’stermsoftradeandworsensForeign’s,whileaHomeexportsubsidyworsensHome’stermsoftradeandimproveForeign’s.(T)40.Wherethereiseconomiesofscale,thereisimperfectlycompetitivemarketstructure.(F)41.Ifintraindustrytradeisthedominantsourceofgainsfromtrade,everyonegainsfromtrade.(T)42.Effectonthedistributionofincomewithincountriesoftenweightmoreheavilyonpolicythantermsoftradeconcerns.(T)43.Theusualmarketstructureinindustriescharacterizedbyinternaleconomiesofscaleismonopolisticcompetition.(F)44.Today,antidumping(反倾销)maybeadeviceofprotectionism.(T)45.Reciprocal(相互)dumpingtendstoincreasethevolumeoftradeingoodsthatarequiteidentical（一致）.(F)46.Itispossiblethatreciprocaldumpingincreasenationalwelfare.(T)47.Strongexternal(外部)economiestendto“lockedin”theexistingpatternsofinterindustrytrade,evenifthepatternsareruncounterto(背道而驰)comparativeadvantage.(T)48.Atradingcountrycanconceivablylosefromtradeispotentiallyjustifyprotectionism.(T)49.Likestaticexternaleconomies,dynamicexternaleconomiescanlockinaninitialadvantageinanindustry.(T)50.Thestratigictradepolicyisrelatedtothemodelof“Monopolisticcompetition,differentiateproductsandintraindustrytrade”.(F)51.Themodel“Oligopoly,homogeneousproductsandintraindustrytrade”isfirstdevelopedbyKrugmanandHelpman.(F)52.Tradeinfactorsisverymuchliketradeingoods,itoccursformuchthesamereasonsandproducessimilarresults.(T)53.Tradeinfactorsisanalternative(替代)totradeingoodsfortheallocationofresources.(T)54.Whenacountryborrows,it’sintertemporalPPFisbiasedtowardQP.(F)55.TherelativepriceoffutureconsumptiongoodsQPis(1+r).(T)56.ThedynamicpathofTNCs’enterforeignmarket：FDI→Export→Licence.(F)57.Tariffsmayhaveverydifferenteffectsondifferentstagesofproductionofagood.(T)58.Nominal(名义)tariffreflectstheeffectiverateofprotection(有效保护率).(F)59.Thecostsandbenefitsanalysisofatariffiscorrectifonlythedirectgainstoproducersandconsumersinagivenmarketaccuratelymeasurethesocialgains.(T)60.Thecostsandbenefitsanalysisofatariffiscorrectifonlyadollar’sworthofbenefitstoeachgroupisthesame.(T)61.AVERisexactlylikeanimportquotawhichthelicenseareassignedtoforeigngovernment.(T)62.VERSaremuchmorecostlythantariffs.(T)63.Localcontentlawshavebeenwidelyusedbydevelopingcountriestryingtoshifttheirmanufacturingfromassemblybackintointermediategoods.(T)64.Apoliticalargumentforfreetradereflectsthefactthatapoliticalcommitmenttofreetrademaybeagoodideainpracticeeventhoughtheremaybebetterpoliciesinprinciple.(T)65.Deviationsfromfreetradecansometimesincreasenationalwelfare.(T)66.Forasufficientlysmalltariffthetermsoftradegainofsmallcountrymustoutweightheefficiencyloss.(F)67.Thedomesticmarketfailureargumentagainstfreetradeisintellectuallyimpeccablebutofdoubtfulusefulness.(F)68.“U.S.farmexportsdon’tjustmeanhigherincomesforfarmers—theymeanhigherincomeforeveryonewhosellgoodsandservicestotheU.S.farmsector”.Thisremarkisapotentialvalidargumentforexportsubsidy.(T)69.Mostdeviationsfromfreetradeareadoptednotbecausetheirbenefitexceedtheircostsbutbecausethepublicfailstounderstandtheirtruecosts.(T)70.Ifthereismarginalsocialcostsratherthanmarginalsocialbenefits,domesticmarketfailurereinforcethecaseforfreetrade.(T)71.TheelectoralcompetitionmodelbelievespoliticalcompetitionwilldrivebothpartiestoproposetariffsclosetotM,thetariffpreferredbythemediumvoter.(T)72.Theproblemofcollectiveactioncanbestbeovercomewhenagroupislargeand/orwellorganized.（F）73.Tradepolicythatproducemorecoststhanbenefits,hurtmoreconsumersthanproducerscan’tbeadopted.(F)74.AsaviolationoftheMFN(“mostfavorednation”)principle,theWTOforbidspreferentialtradingagreementsingeneral,butallowsthemiftheyleadtofreetradebetweentheagreeingcountries.(T)75.Theinfantindustryargumentviolates(违背)theprincipleofcomparativeadvantage(T)76.Importsubstitutingindustrialization(进口替代工业化)violatestheprincipleofcomparativeadvantage.(T)77.“Importquotasoncapital-intensiveindustrialgoodsandsubsidiesfortheimportofcapitalequipmentweremeanttocreatemanufacturingjobsinmanydevelopingcountries.Unfortunately,theyhaveprobablyhelpedcreatetheurbanunemploymentproblem.”(T)78.TheEastAsianMiracleprovedthatindustrializationanddevelopmentmustbebasedonimportsubstitution.(F)79.Itisimpossibleforcountrytomakeitselfworseoffbyjoiningaccustomsunion(联盟).(F)PartⅢ.ChoosetheONLYonecollectanswerineachquestion.1.Animportantinsight（启示）ofinternationaltradetheoryisthatwhencountriesexchangegoodsandservicesonewiththeotheritA.isalwaysbeneficialtobothcountries.B.isusuallybeneficialtobothcountries.C.istypicallybeneficialonlytothelowwagetradepartnercountry.D.istypicallyharmfultothetechnologicallylaggingcountry.E.tendstocreateunemploymentinbothcountries.2.Iftherearelargedisparities（差距）inwagelevelsbetweencountries,thenA.tradeislikelytobeharmfultobothcountries.B.tradeislikelytobeharmfultothecountrywiththehighwages.C.tradeislikelytobeharmfultothecountrywiththelowwages.D.tradeislikelytobeharmfultoneithercountry.E.tradeislikelytohavenoeffectoneithercountry.3.Cost-benefitanalysisofinternationaltrade（成本收益）A.isbasicallyuseless.B.isempiricallyintractable.C.focusesattentiononconflictsofinterestwithincountries.D.focusesattentiononconflictsofinterestsbetweencountries.E.Noneoftheabove.4.AprimaryreasonwhynationsconductinternationaltradeisbecauseofdifferencesinA.historicalperspective.B.location.C.resourceavailabilities.D.tastes.E.incomes.5.Argumentsforfreetradearesometimesdisregarded（忽视）bythepoliticalprocessbecauseA.economiststendtofavorhighlyprotecteddomesticmarkets.B.economistshaveauniversallyaccepteddecisivepoweroverthepoliticaldecisionmechanism.C.maximizingconsumerwelfaremaynotbeachiefpriority（优先）forpoliticians.扩大消费者福利不是最主要的D.thegainsoftradeareofparamountconcerntotypicalconsumers.E.Noneoftheabove.6.Proponents（支持）offreetradeclaimallofthefollowingasadvantagesexcept＿＿A.relativelyhighwagelevelsforalldomesticworkers.B.awiderselectionofproductsforconsumersC.increasedcompetitionforworldproducers.D.theutilizationofthemostefficientproductionprocesses.E.Noneoftheabove.Inordertoknowwhetheracountryhasacomparativeadvantageintheproductionofoneparticularproductweneedinformationonatleast____unitlaborrequirementsA.oneB.twoC.threeDfourEfive7.AcountryengagingintradeaccordingtotheprinciplesofcomparativeadvantagegainsfromtradebecauseitD.isproducingexportsindirectlymoreefficientlythanitcouldalternatively.E.isproducingimportsindirectlymoreefficientlythanitcoulddomestically.F.isproducingexportsusingfewerlaborunits.G.isproducingimportsindirectlyusingfewerlaborunits.H.Noneoftheabove.8.AnationengagingintradeaccordingtotheRicardianmodelwillfinditsconsumptionbundle（消费约束）A.insideitsproductionpossibilitiesfrontier.B.onitsproductionpossibilitiesfrontier.C.outsideitsproductionpossibilitiesfrontier（生产可能性边界）.D.insideitstrade-partner'sproductionpossibilitiesfrontier.E.onitstrade-partner'sproductionpossibilitiesfrontier.9.IfaverysmallcountrytradeswithaverylargecountryaccordingtotheRicardianmodel,thenA.thesmallcountrywillsufferadecreaseineconomicwelfare.B.thelargecountrywillsufferadecreaseineconomicwelfare.C.thesmallcountrywillenjoygainsfromtrade.D.thelargecountrywillenjoygainsfromtrade.E.Noneoftheabove.10.IftheworldtermsoftradeforacountryaresomewherebetweenthedomesticcostratioofHandthatofF,thenA.countryHbutnotcountryFwillgainfromtrade.B.countryHandcountryFwillbothgainfromtrade.C.neithercountryHnorFwillgainfromtrade.D.onlythecountrywhosegovernmentsubsidizesitsexportswillgain.E.Noneoftheabove.11.Ifaproductionpossibilitiesfrontierisbowedout(concavetotheorigin))(上凸，凹面向原点),thenproductionoccursunderconditionsofA.constantopportunitycosts.B.increasingopportunitycosts.C.decreasingopportunitycosts.D.infiniteopportunitycosts.E.Noneoftheabove.12.Iftwocountrieshaveidenticalproductionpossibilityfrontiers,thentradebetweenthemisnotlikelyifA.theirsupplycurvesareidentical.B.theircostfunctionsareidentical.C.theirdemandconditionsidentical.D.theirincomesareidentical.E.Noneoftheabove.13.AssumethatlaboristheonlyfactorofproductionandthatwagesintheUnitedStatesequal$20perhourwhilewagesinJapanare$10perhour.ProductioncostswouldbelowerintheUnitedStatesascomparedtoJapanifA.U.S.laborproductivityequaled