股票回购：对自由现金流量假说的进一步检验【外文翻译】

股票回购：对自由现金流量假说的进一步检验【外文翻译】 本科() 文 翻 译 外 原文: Stock Repurchases: A Further Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis The free cash flow (overinvestment) hypothesis has been investigated by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and recently by Howe, He and Kao (1992). Using Tobin's Q as a measure of the intensity of overinvestment, Lang and Litzenberger find evidence supporting the free cash flow theory in relation to cash dividends. Their empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that dividend changes by overinvesting firms inform stockholders of the firm's investment policy rather than signaling positive asymmetric information regarding the firm's future profitability. Howe, He and Kao (1992) extend the study of Lang and Litzenberger by examining the free cash flow hypothesis in relation to both tender offers repurchases and specially designed dividends (SDD). Unlike Lang and Litzenberger, however, they find that there is no differential announcement effect for high-Q (value-maximizing) and low-Q (overinvesting) firms in relation to either stock repurchases or SDD. Since cash dividends, SDD, and repurchases represent alternative cash disbursement methods, the conflicting results of Lang and Litzenberger and Howe, He and Kao present an empirical puzzle. To shed light on this puzzle, we partition our sample of firms repurchasing their stock via a self-tender offer into three groups based on the source of the firms' free cash flows. Evidence consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis is found. The article is structured as follows: section 2 describes the methodology for determining the source of the free cash flow (overinvestment) problem and competing explanations. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical results are given in section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5. An alternative test of the signaling theory is presented in the appendix. To clarify the implications of the free cash flow (overinvestment) and signaling theories, denote the value of the firm by V and the invested capital by K. Value maximinization occurs whenever dV/dK = 1. Overinvesting implies that dV/dK < 1. Suppose that a firm ranks its investment projects in terms of profitability, for example, by the expected internal rate of return (IRR). Then dV/dK = 1 implies that at the margin p = R, where p is the firm's cost of capital and R is the expected internal rate of return. Such equilibrium dictates how much of the firm's available resources should be maintained for reinvestment and how much should be distributed to stockholders. Free cash flows are precluded in such equilibrium. Simplicity and without loss of generality, assume a one-period model where the tt10firm invests at and at the firm reinvests and distributes dividends. Consider the following three scenarios: tt01A. At time t (where< t <), the agent possesses positive asymmetric information regarding the firm's future profitability. This asymmetric information can either be regarding the performance of existing capital or new projects which are executed t1at. The manager signals this positive unknown information to stockholders by repurchasing some of the firm's stock (signaling theory). tt01B. During the period< t 表

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