193
Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law:
Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in
Taiwan
Jane Kaufman Winn
This article looks at one component of Taiwan's development experience,
the informal financing techniques used by small businesses, to clarify the inter-
action between the formal Republic of China (ROC) legal system and the net-
work structure of Taiwanese society. The ROC legal system has supported the
economic development process directly by regulating economic activity, and
indirectly by facilitating the networks of relationships that also regulate eco-
nomic activity. The relational structure of traditional, rural Chinese society has
survived in a modified form in modem Taiwan, and this modem form selec-
tively blends elements of the modem legal system, networks of relationships,
and the enforcement services of organized crime. Ideas such as "legal central-
ism" and "legal pluralism" fail to capture the dynamic of the relationship be-
tween the ROC legal system and Taiwanese society, so the idea of "marginaliza-
tion of law" is offered as a better description.
S cholars studying law in developing countries often have
noted differences between the social foundations for law in those
countries and the social foundations for law in economically de-
veloped Western societies. At times these scholars have suggested
that economic development leads to "modern" legal relations
and a correspondingly "modern" role for law. At other times,
scholars have argued that customary and traditional forms of so-
cial order will persist and limit the effectiveness of regulatory sys-
tems modeled on Western law. This article examines the role of
law in one important component of Taiwan's development expe-
rience-the informal financing techniques used by small busi-
Funding for the research presented here was provided by the Harvard Club of the
Republic of China, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Pacific Cultural
Foundation, and Southern Methodist University. Earlier drafts were presented at the East
Asian Legal Studies Institute of Harvard Law School; University of Texas School of Law;
the 1992 Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting; the 1992 Law & Society Associa-
tion Annual Meeting; a conference on culture and development at Academia Sinica,
Taipei, Taiwan; a conference on Chinese law at the University of British Columbia; and a
Workshop on Chinese Capitalism and the Globalization of the Law at the Institute for
Legal Studies of the University of Wisconsin. An earlier version is being published in
Rubinstein (1994); an edited version will appear in Chinese in Taiwan Shehui YenjiuJikan
(Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies). Address correspondence to Jane Kauf-
man Winn, School of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0116.
Law & Society Review, Volume 28, Number 2 (1994)
? 1994 by The Law and Society Association. All rights reserved.
194 Rational Practices and the Marginalization of Law
nesses-in order to determine the nature of the interaction be-
tween law and the network structure of traditional Chinese
society.
In contrast to the predictions of scholars who have drawn a
sharp distinction between modern law and customary social or-
ders in developing (and Western) societies, the evidence pre-
sented here supports the notion that the relational structure of
traditional, rural Chinese society has survived in a modified form
in modern Taiwan and that this modern form blends elements of
the modern legal system into networks of relationships. The legal
system of the Republic of China ("ROC") has supported the eco-
nomic development process not only by directly regulating eco-
nomic activity but also by indirectly facilitating networks of rela-
tionships outside the law that also regulate economic activity.
Further, when small businesses have been unable to rely on the
formal legal system for such indirect support for relational prac-
tices, alternatives, including organized crime, have been called
on to serve a similar function.
Rather than focusing on better known and successful legal
initiatives taken by the ROC government such as legislation dat-
ing back to the early 1960s to stimulate foreign investment in
Taiwan (Gold 1986:77), this study examines routine and wide-
spread economic activities in which the impact of modern legal
institutions is limited or indirect at best: those in the "informal
sector" or "underground economy." "Informal sector" refers to
economic activity deliberately transacted outside the purview of
formal regulation, yet not generally considered criminal.
Although the informal sector has made a significant contribution
to Taiwan's rapid economic development over the past 40 years,
it is as yet poorly understood. To understand informal economic
practices in Taiwan, I first address the interactions among the
formal ROC legal system, the networks of personal connections
which characterize Taiwanese society, and informal substitutes
for legal regulation (e.g., debt collection with the assistance of
organized crime). This analysis is next applied to the informal
financing techniques used by small private firms as just one ex-
ample of the many types of economic activities routinely under-
taken in Taiwan's informal sector (for the methodology for my
research, see appendix 1).
Studying the practices of small and medium-sized businesses
is a crucial step in understanding the origins of Taiwan's "eco-
nomic miracle," because such firms have played a greater role in
Taiwan's economic development than they have in other East
Asian newly industrialized countries (Orrui et al. 1991:368). Until
the mid- to late 1980s, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tai-
wan relied heavily on financial resources from outside the formal
financial system because of a shortage of credit from regulated
sources (Wade 1990:161). While limited access to bank financing
WImn 195
clearly contributed to the growth of Taiwan's informal financial
system, certain features of Taiwanese society also contributed to
that growth, among them the maintenance of networks of per-
sonal connections, the availability of informal surrogates for legal
enforcement, and the marginalization of formal legal institu-
tions.
The findings of this study point to an apparent paradox. The
development of a modern formal legal system may belie the so-
cial realities in Taiwan, obscuring the propensity of legal institu-
tions to foster relational practices rather than displace them. The
very commitment of many legal practitioners and government of-
ficials to the maintenance of a moder legal system based on for-
eign models seems to contribute to the marginalization of mod-
ern formal ROC legal institutions in a manner reminiscent of the
marginalization of formal legal institutions in the traditional Chi-
nese polity (Ch'fi 1961). In addition, the formalism of Taiwan's
transplanted version of the Western legal tradition seems to limit
the law's flexibility in adapting to contemporary Taiwanese social
practices, thereby increasing the dependence of businesses on re-
lational practices outside the law.
The conclusions drawn from this study raise important ques-
tions that link the subject matter of this article with larger themes
in the study of law and development.' First, with regard to gov-
ernment-sponsored development initiatives, one possible infer-
ence from this preliminary study is that relational practices play a
more significant role in development than has previously been
acknowledged. If that is the case, then social and economic re-
sources could be mobilized more effectively by officially acknowl-
edging and even promoting relational practices in the economic
development process in Taiwan and other Asian nations. Second,
the idea of a perpetually marginalized legal system subordinated
to relational practices profoundly conflicts with Western ideas of
legitimacy based on the rule of law. This suggests that to under-
stand societies experiencing rapid economic development and
within which law plays a role very different from the role com-
1 Although there is evidence that relational practices are endemic in Taiwan
(Greenhalgh 1988:224), this article cannot catalog or analyze every significant form of
relational practice in moder Taiwanese society, or even every informal or underground
financial practice. Thus, while the findings of this preliminary study might support con-
jectures concerning the significance of relational practices within government, large-scale
enterprises, or regulated financial institutions, they cannot serve to quantify the degree to
which informal arrangements supplant formal regulation within those institutions. Fur-
thermore, since my focus is on the routine financing of small businesses, I do not address
any of the perhaps better-known recent examples of financial scandals involving large-
scale credit or investment institutions. These include the Cathay scandal in 1985 (Fields
1990:194), the more recent problems involving Hung Yuan and other underground in-
vestment firms (Chen 1992), and the Hualon stock scandal in 1992 (Baum 1992). While
these well-publicized cases of underground or illicit financial practices raise important
questions about the effectiveness of the ROC legal system in regulating financial institu-
tions and the connection between law, organized crime, and relational practices in Tai-
wan, they are beyond the scope of this article.
196 Rational Practices and the Marginalization of Law
monly ascribed to it in Western industrialized nations, we must
reassess such concepts as legitimacy and modernity.
I. Marginalization of Law in Taiwan
A. The Paradox of Modem Legality in Taiwan
While the legal institutions of Taiwan have many modern at-
tributes, that fact alone does not establish that Taiwan has a
"modern" legal system. In order to decide whether or not Taiwan
has a "modern" legal system, two separate issues must be re-
solved: What constitutes a "modern" legal system? And what are
the actual characteristics of the contemporary ROC legal system?
The first issue, determining what constitutes a "modern" legal
system, is at least as problematic as the second, because of the
tendency of scholars from societies with "moder" legal systems
to conflate theoretical or ideological tenets regarding the rule of
law with the actual social practices that constitute legal institu-
tions in their own societies. Certain legal scholars have put forth
the concepts of "legal centralism" and "legal pluralism" (Ga-
lanter 1981; Griffiths 1986) in an effort both to articulate some
unstated assumptions that inform most studies of legal systems
and to bring the analysis of legal systems closer to the actual so-
cial practices that constitute those systems.
While "legal centralism" and "legal pluralism" may be useful
in cutting through some of the obfuscation surrounding the
study of many legal systems, neither of these concepts captures
the interaction in Taiwanese society between formal legal institu-
tions, informal order, and networks of relationships. A satisfac-
tory account of the role played by the legal system in modern
Taiwanese society must simultaneously take account of native
Taiwanese ideas about law and society,2 which have been influ-
enced by both the modern history of Taiwan and traditional Chi-
nese values; the values implicit in Western ideas of modern legal-
ity; and the subtle cultural matrix that determines which ideas
and values predominate under particular circumstances. While
the ROC legal system does not play the dominant, central role
assumed by theories of social organization grounded in the West-
ern liberal democratic, free-market tradition, neither is Taiwan-
ese society characterized by a plurality of well-defined, rule-gov-
erned social organizations that the concept of "legal pluralism"
postulates as the basic form of social organization. The interac-
tion of law and society in Taiwan might more accurately be char-
acterized as the "marginalization of law," a process in which the
ROC legal system plays a significant role in Taiwanese society but
2 Paradoxically, many Taiwanese legal professionals subscribe, or at least claim to
subscribe, to a vision of law based on "legal centralist" ideas.
Wimn 197
is often displaced by a more fundamental source of social organi-
zation-fluid, highly contextual networks of human relation-
ships.
1. Modern Law and the Presumption of Legal Centralism
The modern legal system of the ROC was organized in a se-
ries of steps beginning in the late 1920s.3 Most codes and statutes
enacted during the Republican period (1911-49) on mainland
China took German codes and statutes of the late 19th and early
20th centuries as their models, following the example already set
by Meiji Japan in modernizing and Westernizing its legal system.
Effective implementation of the modern ROC legal system was
severely hindered throughout the Republican period. This was
due to the limited effectiveness of Republican government on
the Mainland during the 1930s, followed by the Sino-Japanese
War from 1937 to 1945 and finally by the Chinese Civil War end-
ing with the defeat of the KMT ("Kuomintang" [see appendix 2]
or Nationalist Party) and withdrawal of the ROC government to
Taiwan in 1949. Since 1949, however, the ROC legal system has
played an increasingly important role in the economic and social
life of Taiwan as the number of legal professionals has increased
and the quality of their training improved and as the quantity
and sophistication of legal doctrines have grown to meet the
needs of a rapidly industrializing society.
Among the most well-known and successful legal initiatives
taken by the ROC government are the Statute for Encourage-
ment of Investment and related changes in tax, land use, and
labor and company laws facilitating direct foreign investment in
Taiwan and export-oriented growth through the establishment of
export-processing zones (Hsu 1985:283). These laws were intro-
duced or amended as part of a broad program of economic re-
forms in the early 1960s. These reforms laid part of the founda-
tion for Taiwan's subsequent "economic miracle" and its
transformation from an underdeveloped agricultural country to
a highly industrialized country. Today, Taiwan's per capita GNP
is equivalent to that of some European countries.4
While the success of these governmental initiatives is well
known, they are not representative of the general role played by
the modern ROC legal system in Taiwanese society. Indeed, fo-
cusing on government led programs that helped nurture Tai-
wan's successful export-oriented industrialization obscures the
role more commonly played by the ROC legal system in regulat-
ing economic activity. Much of Taiwan's industrialization has
3 The Civil Code was enacted in 1929 and the Criminal Code, the Civil Procedure
Code, and the Criminal Procedure Code were enacted in 1935. A draft Constitution was
adopted in 1936 and finally ratified in 1946.
4 According to the 1993 World Almanac, the 1992 per capita GNP of Taiwan was
$7,380, which compares favorably with that of Portugal ($5,580) and Greece ($7,650).
198 Rational Practices and the Marginalization of Law
taken place outside the relatively highly regulated environments
of the export-processing zones and through domestic rather than
foreign investment (Haggard & Chen 1987:93). Thus, the visibil-
ity of such initiatives can easily lead to overestimating the impor-
tance of state-sponsored regulation and underestimating the im-
portance of alternative ordering mechanisms.5
This tendency of some theories of the role of law to empha-
size the importance of state-sponsored regulation has been la-
beled "legal centralism" by scholars trying to devise less-biased
models of the operation of law and legal institutions in society.
Legal centralism designates not so much a theory as an unarticu-
lated premise that underlies most contemporary discussions of
the role of law in society. Legal centralism has variously been de-
scribed as "a picture in which state agencies (and their learning)
occupy the center of legal life and stand in a relation of 'hierar-
chic control' to other, lesser normative orderings such as the
family, the corporation, the business network" (Galanter
1981:17); the idea that "law is and should be the law of the state,
uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and adminis-
tered by a single set of state institutions" (Griffiths 1986:3); or
"the dogma that there exists . . . a dominant normative order,
defined by a general set of rules and principles (the law), ema-
nating from the state, governing all members of society equally
and impersonally, and enforced and applied through the ordi-
nary courts" (Gordon 1985:423).
The idea of legal centralism has often been criticized as an
inaccurate characterization of the role of law even in Western
societies (see, e.g., Ellickson 1991:4; Scott 1992:668; Williamson
1985:20), and its weakness as a concept has long been recognized
from a theoretical, jurisprudential perspective (Dworkin 1979:
62). Nevertheless, the tacit assumption of the normative primacy
of state-sponsored rule systems has proven remarkably resilient in
discussions of the role of law in modern societies (Griffiths
1986). Galanter (1981:20) points out that while empirical studies
of law in modern societies have repeatedly "discovered" the plu-
ralistic, non-state-centered nature of the social order, this has lit-
tle noticeable impact on official accounts of the role of law in
those societies.
2. Legal Pluralism, Legal Marginalism, and Chinese Society
Scholars attempting to avoid the unwarranted assumptions of
the legal centralist perspective have developed the idea of "legal
pluralism." Legal pluralism has been defined as "a state of affairs
5 In a similar vein in his study of labor conditions in small businesses, Shieh
(1990:14) criticizes the dominance of a "statist" approach in existing studies of Taiwan's
development, which overemphasizes the role played by governmental initiatives, often
disregarding the role played by ordinary working people and popular culture.
Wmn 199
in which behavior pursuant to more than one legal order occurs"
(Griffiths 1986:2). According to Griffiths, a narrow interpretation
of legal pluralism would recognize multiple sources of law-like
regulation within a single society while still assuming the primacy
of state-centered law. A radical interpretation of legal pluralism,
however, would deny any hierarchical superiority to state-cen-
tered law. From this perspective, institutions such as schools, hos-
pitals, universities, churches, and businesses may promulgate law-
like norms that merit consideration together with state-spon-
sored legal norms in understanding the order of a modern soci-
ety. When such alternatives to legal regulation are taken into ac-
count, legal pluralism seems to offer a better description of many
contemporary Western societies than does legal centralism (Ga-
lanter & Luban 1993:1401).
However, legal pluralism may not provide an adequate alter-
native to legal centralism for non-Western societies. This is true
for Taiwan, where the social order is anchored in networks of
interpersonal relationships rather than founded on either a cen-
tral, universal, dominant legal order or a plurality of legalistic
orders. Fei Xiaotong (1992:61-63), a Chinese sociologist, devised
two evocative metaphors to contrast the basic social structures of
Chinese and Western societies. Fei described the organization of
Western society