维基泄密-朱利安·阿桑奇

Viewing cable 08BEIJING1141, STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN, If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ​ The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was. ​ The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject. ​ The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section. 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Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 08BEIJING1141 2008-03-26 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing VZCZCXRO4810 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #1141/01 0860948 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 260948Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6066 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN, AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary ------- ¶1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and export control is “remarkable,” MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China’s cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation, Iran and North Korea. “Remarkable” Cooperation ------------------------ ¶3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to China’s security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the United States focused on certain cases, but today’s level of cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues is “remarkable,” Cheng said. For example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two countries see “eye-to-eye.” He referred to multilateral agreements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States. Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference forward within the United Nations framework. Equal Partners -------------- ¶4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a “perception” that the United States counts on China’s support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s, China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join. Currently, however, China is “not welcome,” despite expressing a willingness to join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a “mutual, equal basis.” Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years without “solid evidence,” said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington. Iran ---- ¶5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs and focusing on the diplomatic front. ¶6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three UNSCRs, Iran’s capability to enrich uranium BEIJING 00001141 002 OF 002 continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be “creative” in devising a proposal “attractive” to Iran. The international community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran’s nuclear development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to “refresh” previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new incentives to Iran. ¶7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said. Regarding Iran’s claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003, China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc. China-Iran Energy Cooperation ----------------------------- ¶8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a “misunderstanding” on the part of the United States. China has made clear its need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec is very important to China and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if the company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng’s concerns and said that he would pass this message to Washington. North Korea ----------- ¶9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North Korea’s alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in delving into North Korea’s past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims never existed, Cheng claimed. ¶10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. PICCUTA Viewing cable 09BEIJING1634, CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ​ The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was. ​ The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject. ​ The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section. To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference. Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1634. Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09BEIJING1634 2009-06-17 06:06 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing Appears in these articles: nytimes.com VZCZCXRO0731 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #1634/01 1680645 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 170645Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001634 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2034 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV CH KN KS SUBJECT: CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b/d ). Summary ¶1. (C) In a June 16 luncheon in honor of visiting Hong Kong CG Joe Donovan hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX said that China liked a U.S. proposal described by Ambassador Bosworth here on June 5 to put all issues related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into a package for negotiation. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the United States holds the key to bringing the DPRK back to the negotiation table and suggested that succession concerns in North Korea might be causing Kim Jong-il to escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, perhaps Kim Jong-un, could then step in to ease pressure. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that China experts believe the DPRK has been processing highly enriched uranium but asserted that the program was only in an initial phase. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that ROK envoy to the Six-Party Talks had not offered any new ideas during his June 9 visit to Beijing and that Japan's focus on the abductee issue continued to cause concerns at the MFA. End Summary. Chinese Protests to DPRK Have Had No Effect ------------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) In a June 16 luncheon hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear that the PRC viewed recent provocative actions by the DPRK as having gone too far. He assured the Charge that Chinese officials had expressed Chinese displeasure to North Korean counterparts and had pressed the DPRK to return to the negotiation table. Unfortunately, XXXXXXXXXXXX added, those protests had had "no effect." "The only country that can make progress with the North Koreans is the United States," he maintained. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, although China had assured North Korean leaders that the United States was ready to have bilateral talks with them, the North Koreans had insisted that any message from the United States to the DPRK should be delivered directly, not through China. XXXXXXXXXXXX took this as further evidence that only by having direct talks with the United States would North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks. China Likes a Package Approach ------------------------------ ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that China viewed favorably the USG proposal of putting all facets of a possible Korean Peninsula denuclearization agreement into one package. XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized Chinese and U.S. core interests in a nuclear free Korean Peninsula as "shared." He reminded his hosts that Punggye, the site of the DPRK nuclear test, was near the Chinese border and that any accident there could have had dire consequences for Northeast China. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that China was as concerned as the United States about proliferation from North Korea. The only difference in the China and U.S. positions, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained, was "the United States was the key while China was only in a position to apply a little oil to the lock." Building Trust -------------- ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that building trust between the DPRK and the United States would be difficult. In North Korea's view, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, the destruction of its nuclear capability was an irreversible step while decisions by the United States could be easily reversed. When CGs Donovan and Goldberg both pointed out that trust was a two-way street and that North Korea had not evinced a great deal of it, XXXXXXXXXXXX was evasive. When pressed whether he believed the DPRK had been reprocessing highly enriched uranium (HEU), XXXXXXXXXXXX said yes, adding that Chinese experts believed the enrichment was only in its initial phases and that any DPRK HEU program would not be "very useful." Domestic Concerns in North Korea Influence Talks --------------------------------------------- --- ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that domestic politics in North Korea were in a large way responsible for Pyongyang's recent actions. He was dismissive of DPRK justifications for the nuclear test as a response to the UN Security Council BEIJING 00001634 002 OF 002 Presidential Statement critical of North Korea's April 5 Taepo-Dong 2 launch. "Kim Jong-il was obviously planning the nuclear test at the same time as the missile launch so his justification for the test makes no sense," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the rapid pace of provocative actions in North Korea was due to Kim Jong-il's declining health and might be part of a gambit under which Kim Jong-il would escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, presumably Kim Jong-un, could then step in and ease those tensions. ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that he kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il's death. He said that PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared. ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing new. "The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we've heard them all before," he complained, adding that the ROK government was too close to the situation in North Korea to be objective. Turning to Japan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Japan's obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese expression for an individual who was too weak to make something work, yet strong enough to destroy it. Participants ------------- Charge Dan Piccuta Joe Donovan, U.S. Consul General Hong Kong Robert Goldberg, Consul General Guangzhou Mark Lambert, Regional Unit Chief Jim Brown, interpreter XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX PICCUTA Viewing cable 09BEIJING1761, PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Understanding cables Every cable message consists of three parts: ​ The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was. ​ The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject. ​ The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section. To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference. Discussing cables If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING1761. Help us extend and defend this work Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09BEIJING1761 2009-06-26 07:07 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing Appears in these articles: nytimes.com O 260714Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4839 INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY MOSCOW CIA WASHINGTON DC JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC DIA WASHINGTON DC CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI OSD WASHDC DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC NSC WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001761 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KNNP MOPS EFIN KN KS CH SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR CHINA AND WASHINGTON Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Chinese scholars in recent conversations with PolOff said that Pyongyang's resp