THE WORLD'S
LARGEST LOAN.
T. FISHER UNWFNT, LtJ.,
I, ADELPHX TERRACE, LONDON,
1917.
PRICE ONE FESXY.
Walter Clinton Jackson Library
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Special Collections & Rare Books
World War I Pamphlet Collection
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THE C. H. DORAN COMPANY, NEW YORK,.
Price 5 cents.
THE WORLD'S LARGEST LOAN.
The number of people in the world to whom 1000 mill ion
pounds means anything more than 100 million pounds wai,
before the war, probably small. But just as the difficulties
of commerce in war-time have taught most of us more aboufc
the laws of supply and demand than many a text-book, so tho
immense cost of modern war has made many folk familiar with
financial operations larger than would have been thought
possible not so long ago. Less than twenty years have passed
since the success of the British Government in raising 30 million
pounds by a single loan operation was the wonder of the world's
financial markets. Now, in the year of grace 1917, the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer is able to announce that after two
and a half years of exhausting war 1000 million pounds have
been raised in thirty days, and his hearers can only greet the
news with " loud and prolonged cheers." One might have
expected the sedate gentlemen who compose the Britisa
House of Commons at least to stand on their head?
or dance on their immaculate silk hats. But " loud anl
prolonged cheers " was the limit of the House of Commons'
enthusiasm. It may therefore be well to examine the nature
of the third British War Loan, the largest operation of credit
in the world's history, in order to see whether this enthusiasm
was justified and why even the stolid ranks of the House of
Commons " could scarce forbear to cheer."
THE FIGURES.
First, one may analyse the figure of 1000 million pounds,
which, as announced by Mr. Bonar Law, was, in round
numbers, the total amount subscribed by British investors
during the thirty days for which the application lists to tlie
new loan were open. The figure was made up as follows :
—
Cash applications at Bank of
England £820,000,000
Cash applications at Post Office
.
. 30,000,000
£850,000,000
Cash applications for War Savings
Certificates £20,000,000 20,000,000
Treasury Bills discounted for
application to New Loan 130,000,000 130,000,000
£1,000,000,000
The cash applications for the loan itself, 850 millions, recjuixe
no comment. One can only add that, though payment could be
made by instalments reaching to the end of May, an abnormally
high proportion of the total was paid up in full. As to this point
no precise figures are yet available from an official source, but
the bankers through whose hands the bulk of subscriptions
pass are unanimous in reporting that the amount of this loan
paid up in full on application was higher than they have experi-
enced in any previous loan of importance, British or foreign,
with which they have had to deal. The amount of 20 million
pounds " cash applications for War Savings Certificates,"
though not actually representing subscriptions to the loan, is
made up of the money lent by individuals too poor to subscribe
the minimum amount receivable for the loan itself as a response
to the appeal made to their financial patriotism. These " War
Savings Certificates" are in the form of 15s. 6d. bonds, repayable
in five years at £1, not bearing interest during their currency.
TEEASURY BILLS.
Finally, we see an amount of 130 million pounds for " Treasury
bills discounted for applications to new loan." This perhaps
requires some further explanation. The British Government
had, between the issue of its second and third war loans, been
financing itself by the issue of Treasury bills of three, six, or
twelve months' currency, at a rate of discount of 5 or 5i percent.
The total of these bills outstanding had at one time reached
a very large amount, of an average currency of four months.
W^hen the Government came to issue the new loan it seems
to have said to itself something like this : " We have outstanding
a large amount of short Treasury bills. Most of the holders
thereof are banks, financial houses, or manufacturers who have
bought these bills as a necessity for their business. Some,
however, could manage to lend their money for thirty years, which
is the currency of our new 5 per cent. loan. How can they be
enabled to melt their Treasury bills in order to find money for
the new loan ? The banks whose depositors are withdrawing
their funds in order to subscribe to the loan can hardly be expected
also to buy the bills. Even the discount houses, whose special
busmess it is to buy bills, cannot absorb a very large amount now,
for they too will be losing their deposits for subscriptions to
the loan. Very well. We will arrange ourselves to discount
these bills, which are already our liability at 5 per cent. Thus
those holders who wish to do so will be able to obtain liquid
cash for subscription to the loan and we shall rid ourselves of
obligations to repay money in four months in return for the
obligation to repay in thirty years." This being the way of it,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have felt justified in
including the Treasury bills so discounted with the other new
money. But he evidently, being a business man originally
himself, preferred to have no doubts about the matter, so he
5
returned the proceeds of the loan obtained in this way under
a separate heading.
One more point should be made clear. When the new
loan comes to be dealt in by the Stock Exchange it will be found
to amount in all, not to 1000 million pounds, but to over twice
that amount. The additional 1000 millions or so is made up
of earliev loans which carried the right of conversion into the
new issue. There was something under 900 million pounds of
4J per cent. Loan of 1915, subscribers to which were promised the
right to convert into any succeeding war loan. The bulk
of them naturally did so. In addition, holders of about
230 million pounds of 5 per cent. Exchequer Bonds who also had
this right of conversion exercised it, and in consequence the State
exchanged a short liability for a long one, at no higher rate of
interest. But these conversions have nothing whatever to do
with the " new money " referred to above, being matters of
unqualified right based on earlier contracts. Thus the figure
of 1000 millions of new money can be described without
qualification as the net result of the great loan.
COMPARISONS.
But figures like these, interesting as they are to the present
writer and other practical bankers, are of greater value to the
general public if set out in some sort of proportion to other
loans and to the wealth and population of Great Britain and
other countries. Let us therefore compare the loans issued
by England during the present war.
British War Loans.
Kumber of
Amonnf. Subscribers.
1st War Loan £350,000,000 Not stated
2nd „ „ 616,000,000 1,100,000
3rd „ „ 1,000,000,000 5,289,000
German War Loans.
1st War Loan £224,000,000 ] ,177,000
2nd „ „ 455,000,000 2,691,000
3rd „ „ 608,000,000 3,992,000
4th „ „ 538,000,000 5,279,000
5th „ „ 535,000,000 3,809,000
From these figures we see that each successive British loan
has shown an improvement over its predecessor both in the
amount and in the number of subscribers. The Germans reached
their high-water mark as to amount in their third loan, issued
just after their successes against the Russians in the year 1915.
By including amounts from one shilling upwards their fourth
loan showed a record, for them, in the number of subscribers.
This record, however, was beaten by the British in their third
loan, though the minimum amount that could be subscribed
in that case was not one shilling but fifteen shillings. Moreover,
it should be recalled that the population of Germany is, roughly,
half as large again as that of Great Britain, so that in this respect
also the comparison is more in favour of the British than is shown
by the bare figures given above. In all these calculations the
German mark is taken at the nominal equivalent of twenty to
the pound sterling, but no allowance is made for the fact that
the mark shows in neutral countries (New York for instance)
a depreciation of 21 per cent, compared even with the English
sovereign,' so that one might fairly for purposes of comparison
reduce the figures that relate to Germany to four-fifths of their
nominal amount.
IN RELATION TO WEALTH.
Another way of helping oneself to grasp the meaning of
these huge figures is to compare them with some of those relating
to the wealth of countries involved. The figure of 870 millions
cash contributed to the last British loan represents a little less
than £20 per head of the population—men, women, and
children. Including Treasury bills discounted, it is equal to
£21 per head. The sum of 535 million pounds realised by the
last German war loan is equal to just about £8 per head.
Before the war the British people paid their Government about
200 million pounds a year by way of taxation. During the
current financial year they have paid taxes to the tune of over
500 millions. But, despite this increased burden of taxation,
the British Government has been able in a month to raise
1000 millions by way of loan, or five times the amount of the
taxation raised in a year before the Avar. Another way of
measuring the extent of popular applications for the loan is to
consider them in relation to the deposits of English, Scotch,
and Irish banks. These amounted on January 1st, 1917, to
something like 1670 million pounds. Thus, if we ignore the
Treasury bills discounted to subscribe for the loan and the
amounts subscribed through the post-offices by persons w^ho
presumably kept no banking accounts, the amount of cash
subscribed was equal to one-half the deposits in purely British
banks. One bank, with 174 millions of deposits, lost 82 millions
of them in applications to the war loan. Thus, even if applica-
tions from foreign and colonial banks were substantial, it would
seem, to judge by this example, that not far short of half of the
current and deposit accounts kept by the banks was taken out
to subscribe to the loan in cash. Again, one may compare the
amount subscribed to the loan with the estimated total wealth
of the British nation (as distinguished from the British Govern-
ment) before the war. Estimates of such wealth are matters of
extreme difficulty, and must be taken as estimates and nothing
more. Various independent economists of high standing in
Great Britain, America, and Germany have, however, attempted
euch estimates, and they agree moderately well ariiong
themselves. Fo.'owing their guidance, one feels that the annual
income of the whole British n:ation before the war was about
2500 million pounds. Since then the rise in prices may have
caused an increase perhaps to 3200 millions or so. But, leaving
that aside, it would seem that the amount subscribed to the last
British war loan was equal to 40 per cent, of the total income
of the nation before the war, and at the latest estimate to 30 per
cent, of the aggregate national income at the time of the loan's
issue. And this after GreatBritain had been at war for two and
a half years, and when the Government's direct expend'.ture on
the war had reached the figure of 5| million pounds a day.
One more comparison. Taking the basis of population, tho
United States would have to provide 2000 million pounds by
way of loan to equal Ihe effort justs-made >by the British investor.
]f the United States' existence were threatened as seriously as
are the interests of civilisation in Europe now no doubt the
United States would raise this sum. But American business
men have only to put the question to themselves what they
could in fact accomplish in one effort of this kind, helped on
as they would be by the immense war profits made since 1914,
to appreciate the magnitude of the -effort- just made by Great
Britain and the extent of the success just achieved.
A POPULAR SUCCESS.
Before concluding it may be well to return once more to
the nature of subscriptions to this latest British war loan. It
was shown above that each of the British war loans showed
an improvement on its predecessor in regard to the amount
subscribed and the number of individual subscribers. This
improvement has been in fact, as regards the amount subscribed,
greater than shown in the figures. The 350 millions subscribed
to the first loan included direct applications from the English
banks of 100 million pounds. These same banks contributed
direct 200 to the 600 million pounds realised by the second loan.
Moreover, the figures obtained from this second loan were swollen
by the fact that subscriptions carried with them the right to
convert, at a relatively good price, older irredeemable British
stocks such as Consols. The amount so converted was naturally
not included in the total of 600 millions odd subscribed. But
undoubtedly part of that amount was subscribed by folk who
wanted not so much an investment as a chance of escaping some
of the inevitable depreciation on older irredeemable stocks.
In the case of the new loan neither of these factors operated.
The banks were advised not to subscribe further to long-dated
investments like the new loan, but to keep their funds liquid for
financing the trade of the country after the war, which is their
proper business. The banks did their share, as Mr. Bonar Law,
the Chancellor, said, by inducing their customers to subscribe
and by advancing them, where necessary, sums sufficient to
enable them to anticipate future savings in order to subscribe
8
to tlie loan. Thus it seems fair to describe the loan as a success
not of financiers but of the people and of the genuine investor.
The popular nature of the success obtained by the loan
may indeed seem the most striking thing about it. Before th«
issue bankers were saying that nothing less than 6 per cent,
interest would prove really attractive ; but the loan was issuetl
at 5 per cent. Many of the best financial experts, even the
Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, considered that to obtain
600 million pounds of new money would have been a striking
success. It is now shown how far they fell short of the mark,
and no one is better pleased than they. Moreover, no methods
of compulsion were applied. Even the German method of
paying part of official salaries in war loan was not followed.
The appeal to the investor was made from the platform and tbo
pulpit, but more particularly through the Press. The advertise-
ments allowed no one to forget his financial duty. One note
characterised them all. The attractions of the loan ag an
investment were duly set out, but the main appeal was to the
people's patriotism ; we have seen the result. It is a notorious,
if queer, characteristic of human nature that a man who will
willingly give his life for his country is often reluctant to part
with his money for the same cause. Most investors are men
with others dependent on them, which may perhaps explain
this attitude. If they have any doubts about the security or
object of a loan, no rate of interest, hardly even appeals to
patriotism, will in any country attract a really large sum of
genuine new money. But when men are thoroughly convinced
of the justice of their cause and the security of their country's
credit they do not hold back. The result of the third British
war loan has shown that the British investor is convinced on
both these points. The extent of that conviction may well
be one of the causes of the ease with which England, a belligerent
nation, is able to maintain its credit and the value of its currency
abroad. London, the centre of international finance, would
seem to have no doubts about the ultimate result of the war or
about the moral issues involved in that result. It knows that
the removal of the German menace to the world is as necessary
to the security of peaceful commerce as it is to the highest ideals
of civilisation. This is the faith of the investors of England ;
and they have shown the reality of their belief not by words
alone, but by the result of their latest and greatest financial
effort.