中东石油输出被打断的影响（2012年3月24日，英文）

©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 1 Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. President, PKVerleger LLC and Visiting Fellow, Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics March 24, 2012 Sanctions on Iran should not by themselves have any impact on oil prices because Iran plays a much diminished part today relative to its past position. As can be seen from Table 1, Iran may have net crude exports of approximately two million barrels per day. In addition, Iran probably exports around five hundred thousand barrels per day of natural gas liquids. The oil volumes that sanctions may prevent Iran from exporting can be easily replaced assuming other oil-exporting countries boost production to replace the loss and/or consuming countries re- lease an offsetting amount of oil from strategic stocks. (This is an important assumption that I discuss further below.) OPEC surplus capacity today stands at roughly four million barrels per day according to Energy Intelligence Group estimates. As can be seen from Figure 1, this surplus has declined recently but still exceeds total Iranian exports by a wide margin. The available oil will also satisfy the needs of global refiners. In the past, product and crude oil prices have risen significantly when light sweet crude supplies were disrupted. The price dou- bling in 2008 was caused, for example, by the cutoff of five hundred to seven hundred thousand barrels per day of Nigerian sweet crude output. Prices rose because other producers could not match the quality of these volumes. The 2010 price increase can also be traced in part to lost sweet crude supplies from Libya. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 2 The loss of Iranian crude does not create such problems. Iran produces Middle East sour crude with no unique characteristics. It can be replaced. The lost Iranian exports must, however, be offset to avoid a price increase. In the past, some oil- exporting countries have cut production opportunistically when global markets were tight. Obvi- ously, every producer enjoys increased market power when world crude output is near capacity. Given the very low short-term price elasticities of demand, any nation exporting more than 1.1 million barrels per day can increase revenue by cutting production. This means OPEC members Angola, Iraq, Nigeria, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela all could push prices higher just by offering less oil to buyers. Historically, several of these nations apparently exercised their newfound power, cutting sales just enough to add further upward pressure to prices. Their oil ministry officials seem to under- stand that consuming countries are clueless regarding this ploy. These officials also recognize that their counterparts in consuming nations count barrels rather than watch prices. This focus on quantity means consuming countries will remain ignorant of any exporter shenanigans for weeks if not months, thus enabling the latter nations to boost revenue. Oil buyer representatives, particularly major oil company executives, could tip off the consumers to such producer actions. Many oil firms have a conflict, though, because they also benefit from higher prices. Absent such market manipulations, the sanctions that force Iran to cut exports should have no impact on crude prices. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 3 Oil markets may be affected, however, if Iran attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz. A loss of supply from other Persian Gulf countries would send prices much higher without a strategic stock release. The threat of a Hormuz disruption has dominated policymaking for decades, at least four to be exact. President Nixon spoke of the danger in his first energy messages. His successors all dis- cussed the issue at one time or another. Today, the economic risks associated with a disruption are significantly lower due to preemptive measures and other developments. Three critical factors have eased exposure to cutoff of the Persian Gulf. First, pipelines have been constructed to bypass Hormuz. Second, consuming countries have built strategic reserves. Finally, oil use is beginning to fall rapidly, particularly in the United States. The pipelines have dramatically cut the threat of a Hormuz closure. While seventeen to nineteen million barrels per day of crude flow through the Gulf in peace time, up to six million barrels per day can be diverted to ports elsewhere. By the end of 2012, this figure will rise to eight million barrels per day. As can be seen from Figure 2, the oil volume moving through the strait could drop as low as ten million barrels per day if Iran attempted to interdict supplies. Within two to three years, additional pipelines will be completed that will divert greater volumes. Producing and consuming countries have also developed strategic crude stocks that can be re- leased in a crisis. Last week Saudi oil minister Naimi told a press conference that his government had positioned ten million barrels of strategic reserves in Japan and additional stocks in Rotter- dam to draw on if needed.1 In addition, consuming countries hold 1.5 billion barrels in govern- ment-controlled stocks. These could be released at a rate of fourteen million barrels per day dur- 1 Kate Dourian, “Transcript of Press Conference by Ali Naimi,” Platts on the Net, March 21, 2012. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 4 ing the first month of a crisis, according to Reuters. Reuters also noted that the stock release would include ten million barrels per day of crude and four million barrels per day of product.2 The Reuters report claims this number has been confirmed by IEA officials. Finally, US petroleum consumption is declining rapidly. In the United States, data from the Bu- reau of Economic Analysis suggest gasoline use has been dropping by roughly six percent annu- ally from prior-year levels and the rate of decline is accelerating. The BEA data differ from Department of Energy statistics, which show a lower rate of decrease. Here, I accept the BEA data as gospel because the agency employs qualified statisticians who actually try to measure consumption. DOE, in contrast, makes no such effort. Instead, it backs into its estimate based on industry reports on production and inventory changes combined with “wild-assed guesses” regarding import and export volumes. In our view, the DOE calculations are no better than random numbers. The consumption drop is quickly reducing the US economy’s sensitivity to sharp petroleum price increases or decreases. Strategic reserves should minimize the impact of a major disruption. Presumably a Middle East supply disruption should have no price impact if consuming nations can, in fact, release the volumes reported by Reuters. Edward Morse questioned these numbers, however, noting that the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve was able to deliver only five hundred thousand barrels per day during the June 2011 release even though the theoretical capacity is 4.4 million barrels per day. Morse attributes the ninety-percent shortfall to structural changes: 2 Peg Mackey and Richard Mably, “Exclusive: West Readies Oil Plan in Case of Iran Crisis,” Reuters, January 6, 2011. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 5 The SPR was designed to pull inventory directly into pipeline systems moving oil from the US Gulf Coast inland. Over the last decade, most of the lines have been reversed and the latest data show around less than 800,000 b/d flowing north due to the miracle growth of Canadian oil sands and US shale oil output, the fastest growing oil production in the world. But now logistics require mostly seaborne exports and port congestion impedes tanker loadings at SPR terminals such that the oil cannot be brought out at any more than one seventh of the planned rate into pipelines.3 DOE has taken issue with Morse. Platts reported that the department disputed Morse’s calcula- tion and “is confident that, if needed, it could effectively react to a situation requiring the move- ment of 4.25 million b/d.”4 The Platts report included DOE’s explanation of the 2011 SPR crude release: “This was an intentionally targeted release of light sweet crude to counteract the specific and unique effects of the Libyan situation at the time,” the agency said. “The targeted release and distribution worked as intended.” A disruption that temporarily stopped the Strait of Hormuz oil flow could cut oil supply to the world market, if Morse is correct, even if the IEA ordered members to release oil at maximum rates. The global market could be short as much as two to four million barrels per day for some time. Removal of mines and clearing of obstacles by allied navies might not end the effective blockade if ship owners, worried about attacks, refuse to send vessels into the Gulf. The result would be a sharp price increase. Many authorities doubt this will happen. (One skeptic, Saudi minister Naimi, told a reporter, “I think if you believe Hormuz will be closed, I will sell you the Empire State Building or the 3 Edward Morse, “Cushions to Stem Iran Oil Price Spike are Proving Elusive,” Financial Times, February 27, 2012. 4 Meghan Gordon, “US Defends SPR’s Potential for Quick Response to Oil-Supply Emergencies,” Platts Oilgram News, March 1, 2012. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 6 Egyptian pyramids.”5) In our view, we still need to consider possible consequences. In evaluat- ing this threat, one must examine the supply-and-demand imbalance as well as the added pres- sure from hoarding or risk-averse buying. In past disruptions, Asian buyers have been particularly aggressive when supplies were threat- ened. Japanese buyers, for example, rushed to buy crude following the Shah of Iran’s fall in the late seventies.6 In recent weeks, Financial Times has reported that Thailand, South Africa, India, and China are hastening to build inventories, which FT referred to as hoarding.7 Buyers from these countries would likely move quickly to buy crude should the Hormuz oil flow be disrupted. The Japanese might join them. Given this background, one must worry that a market imbalance of between one and five million barrels per day might develop, depending on the response of IEA countries and other actions tak- en by consuming nations, discussed below. Such a disruption would lead to a supply imbalance of between one and five percent. Given the very low short-term price elasticity of demand for crude oil, estimated here to be around -0.04, one should expect price increases somewhere be- tween twenty-eight and one hundred fifty percent. Prices might spike to double this before set- tling at these levels. Such increases would be consistent with those observed in the 1990 disruption after Iraq invaded Kuwait. To illustrate, I show in Table 2 calculations of a one million barrel per day disruption (Iran) and a five million barrel per day disruption (Persian Gulf). Also shown are the estimates for 1990 made using the -0.04 elasticity. This predicted an eighty-seven percent price increase in 1990. The actual rise came in at around eighty-five percent. 5 Dourian, March 21, 2012. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 7 Should these estimates be believed? While they are consistent with past market behavior during disruptions in 1990 and other episodes, I am skeptical for several reasons. First, such price increase would require banks to fund crude oil buyers with larger and larger letters of credit. Today, a firm buying one million barrels of crude must open a let- ter of credit for $120 million. It is not clear that banks will willingly double credit lines. While Chinese companies will probably be able to obtain credit, firms from other Asian countries will face difficulties. US and European companies will have trouble as well, es- pecially given the fact that many European banks that traditionally financed commodity trade have curtailed or ended their activity. Stephen Cecchetti, head of the Bank for In- ternational Settlements’ Monetary and Economic Department, emphasized the European banks’ inability to increase lending for any reason recently, noting, “Do not expect banks to respond [to the increased liquidity provided by the European Central Bank] by increas- ing their lending.” He then added, “Financial conditions have improved, but they are still strained.”8 Second, one must expect to see many speculators and passive investors forced from fu- tures markets. The cost of carrying a long futures contract will rise several fold at the start of a disruption because margin requirements will increase. Exchanges may require full deposits. Furthermore, if the price increase becomes extreme, the US Commodity Fu- tures Trading Commission might order trading for liquidation only or even halt trading. While such action will outrage many, the current CFTC chairman, Gary Gensler, seems inclined to use any and all of the Commission’s emergency powers. 6 See Philip K. Verleger, Jr., Oil Markets in Turmoil (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1983) for a citation list. 7 Javier Blas, “Fears over Conflict Fuel Hoarding,” Financial Times, March 23, 2012. 8 Jack Ewing, “Report Shows Depth of the Distress in Europe,” The New York Times, March 11, 2012. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 8 Third, some firms that have acquired inventories on a cash-and-carry basis (buying phys- ical oil and selling futures) may have to liquidate stocks because they cannot meet margin requirements. These stock sales will cut the supply-and-demand imbalance and depress prices. For these reasons, any price increase associated with a closed Strait of Hormuz should be small, probably on the order of one-third to one-quarter of the numbers in Table 2. Furthermore, I would expect to see prices drop precipitously once the problem passed. Recall that prices de- clined thirty-three percent in January 1991 when it became clear Iraq could not disrupt markets. Thus, world crude prices could fall to $90 or even $80 per barrel once the world realizes Iran can no longer disrupt the oil flowing through Hormuz. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 9 Tables and Figures Table 1. Rough Estimate of Iranian Petroleum Supply/Demand Balance (Million Barrels per Day) Q1:11 Q2:11 Q3:11 Q4:11 Crude Oil Production Estimated Petroleum Consumption Net Exports 3.63 2.09 1.54 3.65 2.05 1.60 3.53 2.04 1.49 3.55 2.04 1.51 Source: IEA. Table 2. Scenario for Crude Price Rise that Might Follow Temporary Closure of the Strait of Hormuz Absent Release of Sufficient Strategic Stocks vs. 1990 Iraq/Kuwait Experience Disruption of Iranian Exports in 2012 Disruption of Persian Gulf Exports in 2012 Third- Quarter 1990 after Iraq Invades Kuwait Base Oil Demand (Million Barrels per Day, or MBD) Supply Loss after Strategic Reserve Release (MBD) Percentage Loss in Supply Elasticity of Crude Price with respect to Percentage Loss in Supply Predicted Price Increase (Percent) Starting Price (Dollars per Barrel) Predicted Equilibrium Price (Dollars per Barrel) Likely Price Level (Dollars per Barrel) 87 1 1.149 0.04 28.7 126.00 162.21 140.00 87 5 5.l75 0.04 143.7 126.00 307.03 185.00 66 2.3 0.035 0.04 87.121 20.00 37.42 Source: PKVerleger LLC. Impact of a Middle East Oil Export Disruption Philip K. Verleger, Jr. ©2012. PKVerleger LLC. All rights reserved. 10 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Million Barrels per Day Source: PKVerleger LLC. Figure 1 Monthly OPEC Surplus Capacity, 1999-2011 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 5 10 15 20 25 Million Barrels per Day Bypass No Bypass Source: PKVerleger LLC from historical BP data. Figure 2 Crude Oil Volume through the Strait of Hormuz, Actual and Bypass Scenario, 1965-2011 and Projected to 2014