voxeu可再生能源无法完全取代化石燃料

voxeu可再生能源无法完全取代化石燃料 VoxEU:可再生能源无法完全取代化石燃料 2009-11-12 17:57:20 提要:为应对气候变化问～当前许多国家努力发展以风能和太阳能为主的可再生能源发电。就发电成本而言～理想情况下的风能发电具备竞争力～太阳能发电成本较高～但呈下跌之势,然而～风能和太阳能的间歇性抬高了发电成本。在无需增加成本的情况下～用可再生资源取代部分化石燃料发电具有可行性。然而～利用可再生能源方面的真正阻碍在于～目前还没有电力储存技术,这种情况下～用可再生能源完全取代化石燃料是不可能完成的任务。 (外脑精华?北京)可再生能源能否让全球以合理成本摆脱气候变化问题的困扰,奥巴马总统给出了肯定的回答。他在就职演说中承诺:“将利用太阳能、风能和土壤来驱动汽车和给工厂提供能源。”此外，美国能源部宣称，到2012年和2050年时，可再生能源发电量在美国发电总量中的比例应分别达到10%和25%。其他工业化国家也有类似的目标。这是目标是否具有可行性呢,如果具有可行性，那么，所需付出的成本是多少呢, 不可再生能源发电的基准成本 一家现代化高效燃煤发电厂的发电成本是6至7美分/千瓦时，同燃气发电成本基本相同，而核能发电成本在8至9美分/千瓦时。为了给衡量可再生能源发电成本提供标准，我们需要根据温室气体排放成本来调整化石燃料的发电成本。 煤炭对此尤为敏感，一家大型燃煤发电厂日均耗煤近1万吨，而每消耗一吨煤将产生2至3吨二氧化碳。鉴于一家电厂每年的二氧化碳排放量可达到数百万吨，而二氧化碳排放成本是25美元/吨，我们将燃煤电厂的日均运营成本增加50万美元。难怪环保人士会对煤炭深恶痛绝 25美元/吨的二氧化碳排放成本使得燃煤发电成本上涨了2美分/千瓦时，燃气发电成本上涨近1美分/千瓦时，燃煤和燃气发电总成本因而分别达到8.5美分/千瓦时和7.5美分/千瓦时。此外，美国国家科学院在近期发布的一项报告中预测，由于无视温室气体效应，燃煤发电的额外医疗成本为3.6美分/千瓦时。 风能和太阳能发电成本较高 风力发电成本取决于风力强度和风力可靠性，而风力可靠通过风力涡轮发电机的容量因子来测量。30%的容量因子意味着一台功率为1兆瓦的风力涡轮机年均最高发电量为装机容量的30%。风力发电机的容量因子一般在25%-40%之间。一台容量因子为25%的风力涡轮机必须安装4兆瓦机组来确保平均发电量达到1兆瓦，这无疑将推高风力发电的成本。 而且风能发电还面临传输成本问题，因为具有强风和可靠风源的地点通常同电力消费地区相距甚远，扩建一个电网的成本可以达到200万美元/英里。 如果不算传输成本，在一个理想地区的风能发电成本在6至10美分/千瓦时，如果同纳入温室气体排放成本的燃煤发电成本相比，显然这一成本具有竞争力，甚至同不含温室气体排放成本的燃煤发电成本相比，可能同样 具有竞争力。 太阳能发电的成本更高。太阳能发电可以利用太阳能光伏电池和太阳能热量或聚热技术两种完全不同的。 太阳能光伏电池板是利用硅的光电性能，用太阳光光子敲击硅薄膜产生直流电。通过这种方法发电的成本通常很高，超过了20美分/每千瓦。 但是，今年以来硅薄膜的价格已经下跌了50%，而且目前仍呈下跌势头，这主要是由于中国产能激增。当新建电厂的电池芯片成本下降时，通过太阳能光伏技术发电的成本可能将会降至10美分/每千瓦左右。专家们预计太阳能电池芯片的价格将会继续下降，因而太阳能光伏发电成本有望在未来几年中将至同含有二氧化碳排放成本的燃煤发电成本相当的水平。 太阳热能或聚集型太阳能热发电技术是通过聚集太阳热能来产生蒸汽，从而驱动涡轮机发电，是一种常见的发电方法。这是目前两种太阳能发电技术中成本较低的一种发电技术，发电成本约为12美分/千瓦时。 间歇性可再生能源无法储存 太阳能和风能发电都具有间歇性: 当出现一朵乌云遮住太阳的情况，一家太阳能光伏发电厂的发电量可以在几秒钟中内从50兆瓦降至近乎于零，然后随着天气转晴，发电量迅猛回升。 如果风力减弱，一家风力发电厂的发电量在几个小时内可从100兆瓦将至10兆瓦以下。 这给必须时刻确保电力供应和需求相匹配的电网管理者们带来了麻烦。 他们有两种对策，一是同愿意在出现电力需求超过供应的情况下暂时不予供电的部分客户签署间歇性供电，二是配备可以在很短时间内开启和关闭的发电设施。燃气涡轮发电机因而受到青睐，但有些电网公司将水电作为当可再生能源发电量出现波动时的备用电力资源。 需要确保供需的灵活性给从风能和太阳能发电厂购电的电网公司带来了额外成本。这项成本的规模似乎将随同来自间歇性能源的电力供应所占比重的上升而增长，如果此类能源的电力供应所占比重为30%，成本将达到约3美分/千瓦时。 从间歇性角度分析，太阳能热发电厂要好于风力发电厂和太阳能光伏电厂。太阳能热发电厂可以储存热能而且在日落之后继续发电。太阳能热发电厂可以通过加热一种热能维持物质(目前很流行的是熔盐)来转换和储存热量。据说中国新建的太阳能电站热发电厂可用陶瓷将热能储存数天。 生物燃料是另一种可再生而且无碳的能源。巴西约17%的地面运输燃料是生物燃料，其中主要是用蔗糖提炼的乙醇燃料。同目前稳定在约60-70美元/桶的原油价格相比，生物燃料价格极具竞争力，造成生物燃料产量下降的原因在于其生产需要土地和水资源，而这种资源均非常稀少，而且随着全球人口逼近90亿以及气候变化引发水文循环和农业生产率发生变化，土地和水资源可能将会变得更加稀缺。尽管对这一问题盖棺定论为时尚早，但研究结果开始显示全球的粮食需求和大批使用生物燃料能源的需求不可能同时得到满足。 还有地热、海浪、潮汐、溪水和废物转化能源等其他可再生能源。不过，目前这些能源的规模均不足以满足我们未来20年的能源需求。 是什么促使我们将可再生能源作为解决气候变化问题的一种方法呢,在不大幅增加成本的情况下，我们可以用可再生能源代替部分化石燃料来发电，但我们不能指望用风能和太阳能等具有间歇性的能源来取代大部分化石燃料，除非我们能开发储存技术。如果能够储存能源以及确保间歇性能源发电量的稳定将使得可再生能源的魅力倍增。 如果没有这种存储技术，我们将不得不依赖核能、经二氧化碳捕集和储存工序处理的煤炭等不可再生的洁净能源作为主要发电燃料。恰如上面提到的，核能发电的成本并不比含有二氧化碳排放成本的燃煤发电成本高，虽然利用核能发电肯定有一定的风险。虽然我们知道捕集和储存二氧化碳在试点项目取得了成功，但燃煤发电厂捕集和储存二氧化碳的成本尚不得而知。捕集和储存二氧化碳可能将使燃煤发电的成本超过10美分/千瓦时。 在不扩充电网情况下，用风力发电机组取代目前美国25%的发电机组将至少需要投资2万亿美元，而置换太阳能发电机组的投资成本更高。要在未来15年内实现这一目标每年需要的投资规模将占GDP总量的约1%，这是一个很高但可行的比重。 最起码无论是成本还是资金要求都将不会阻止利用脱碳技术获取电能。利用可再生能源方面遭遇的真正阻碍是我们目前不具备电能储存能力，而且只要我们尚不具备这种能力，我们将不得不使用核能和经二氧化碳捕集和储存工序处理的煤炭等不可再生能源来提供电力。 英文原文:Can renewable energy save the world? Can renewable energy save the world from climate change, and do so at a reasonable cost? This column says we can replace some fossil fuel power with renewable power without a major cost increase, but we cannot hope to replace a major fraction of our fossil power with intermittent power sources such as wind and solar energy unless we can develop energy storage technologies. Can renewable energy save the world from climate change and do so at a reasonable cost? President Obama suggests that it can. In his Inaugural Address, he promised to "... harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories." Along these lines, the US Department of Energy asserts that 10% of US electricity should come from renewable sources by 2012 and 25% by 2025. Other industrial countries have similar goals. Are they feasible, and, if so, at what cost? The baseline cost of non-renewable electricity The cost of electricity from a modern efficient coal power station is: -- Between 6 and 7 cents/kWh, that from natural gas costs about the same; -- Nuclear electricity costs between 8 and 9 cents (Du and Parsons 2009). To provide benchmarks against which to judge renewable sources0, we need to adjust the fossil fuel costs for the costs of greenhouse gases emitted. Coal is particularly sensitive to these, as a large coal-fired power station uses about 10,000 tons of coal per day, each ton generating between 2 and 3 tons of carbon dioxide. At $25 to emit a ton of CO2, we are adding over half a million dollars to the daily operating costs - a consequence of emissions that can run to millions of tons annually per power station. No wonder environmentalists are hostile to coal! -- $25 permits add about 2 cents to the cost of electricity from coal, and about 1 cent to the cost from gas, for total of around 8.5 and 7.5 cents respectively. As an aside, a recent report of the US National Academy of Sciences estimated the external health costs of coal-based electricity, leaving out the greenhouse gas effects, as 3.6 cents/kWh (National Academy 2009). How do renewables compare? The cost of wind power depends on the strength and reliability of the wind, the latter being measured by the wind turbine's capacity factor. A 30% capacity factor means that a wind turbine rated at 1 megawatt maximum capacity will on average over the course of a year produce at 30% of that level. Capacity factors in the range 25 - 40% are typical for wind. At a capacity factor of 25% you have to install 4 megawatts to be sure of getting on average 1 megawatt, which of course boosts the cost of wind power. There is also an issue with transmission costs, as locations with strong and reliable winds are often distant from sources of demand for electricity, and extending a grid can cost in the range of $2 million per mile. -- Leaving aside the transmission costs, wind from a good site can cost in the range of 6 to 10 US cents/kWh, certainly competitive with coal after including the cost of greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps even before. Solar power is more expensive. It comes in two varieties: -- Solar photo voltaic (PV), and -- Solar thermal or concentrated solar power (CSP). Solar photovoltaic panels exploit the photoelectric properties of silicon and generates an electric current as a result of photons of sunlight knocking electrons out of silicon films. Power from this source has typically cost a lot - over 20 cents per kWh. But the price of silicon film has fallen by 50% during 2009 and is still falling, largely as a result of a huge increase in production capacity in China. The cost of electricity from solar photovoltaic technology will probably be in the teens when the new film costs are reflected in new power stations. Experts expect solar film prices to fall even further, so there is some prospect of solar photovoltaic being competitive with coal after allowing for CO2 costs within a few years. Solar thermal or concentrated solar power concentrates the sun's heat to generate steam and drive a turbine, the usual method of generating electricity. This is currently the less costly of the two solar technologies, costing about 12 US cents per kWh. Intermittency problems Solar and wind power in all their forms are intermittent: -- The output of a solar photovoltaic plant can drop from 50 megawatts to close to zero in seconds if a cloud passes over the sun, and then surge up again when the sky is clear. -- The output of a wind power plant can drop from 100 megawatts to 10 or less in a few hours if the wind dies down (see MacKay 2009). This poses problems for grid managers, who have to match the supply of electricity to the demand on a minute-by-minute basis. They have two lines of response - signing interruptible contracts with some of their customers, who agree to be disconnected at short notice if there is an excess demand for power, and constructing generating capacity that can be turned on or off at very short notice. Gas turbines are popular for this purpose, though some grids use hydropower as the swing power source to compensate for variations in the output of renewable sources. The need to build flexibility into demand and supply imposes an additional cost on grids that use wind or solar power. The size of this cost seems to increase with the proportion of the power that comes from intermittent sources; for 30% of power from such sources, the cost could be about 3 US cents/kWh. Concentrated solar power is preferable to wind and solar photovoltaic from an intermittency perspective. Concentrated solar power stations can store heat and continue to produce electricity even after the sun has set. They do this by heating a heat-retaining substance - molten salt is currently popular - and storing it. New Chinese concentrated solar power stations are said to be able to store heat for several days using ceramics. Biofuels Biofuels are another source of renewable, carbon-free energy. About 17% of Brazil's ground transportation fuels are biofuels, mainly bioethanol from sugar. Competitive with oil at an oil price of around $60-70 per barrel, a level at which prices currently seem stable, the downside of biofuels is that they require land and water, both of which are scarce and likely to become scarcer as the global population moves towards 9 billion and the climate change alters hydrological cycles and agricultural productivity (Schlenker et al. 2006). Although the issue is far from settled, studies are beginning to suggest that it will not be possible to meet world?s demand for food and also supply a significant fraction of its energy from biofuels (Deutsche Bank 2009). Meeting our energy needs with renewable sources There are other renewable sources of energy - geothermal, wave, tidal, in-stream hydro and waste-to-energy. Currently none of these seems likely to be available on a sufficient scale to meet a useful fraction of our energy needs in the next two decades. Where does this leave us with renewables as a solution to the problem of climate change? We can replace some fossil fuel power with renewable power without a major cost increase, but we cannot hope to replace a major fraction of our fossil power with intermittent power sources such as wind and solar - unless we can develop storage technologies. Being able to store power and smooth the output of intermittent power sources would greatly enhance the attractions of renewable power. Without such storage technology, we will have to rely on non-renewable but carbon-free power sources - such as nuclear power and coal with carbon capture and storage - to provide a significant part of our power. As noted earlier, nuclear is no more expensive than coal with a carbon charge, although of course there are risks that are specific to nuclear power (Heal and Kunreuther 2009). The cost of capturing and storing CO2 emissions from coal power stations are not yet known, though we do know that this can be done from successful pilot projects. It will probably take the cost of electricity from coal above 10 cents/kWh. To replace 25% of current electric capacity in the US by wind power would require an investment of at least $2 trillion (Heal 2009), more for solar, without allowing for extensions and enhancements to the grid. To do this over the next 15 years would require allocating about 1% of current GDP to renewables each year - a large but feasible number. The bottom line is that neither costs nor capital requirement will prevent us from decarbonising the electricity supply. The real obstacle to doing this largely with renewables is our current inability to store power, and as long as we cannot store power we will need to use non-renewable sources like nuclear and coal with carbon capture and storage. 摩根士丹利:巨额超额准备金挑战全球央行 2009-11-12 17:57:20 提要:美国的超额准备金即将突破1万亿美元～其他国家的 准备金也普遍处于高位。如此庞大的规模令收缩准备金这项原本 简单的工作变得困难起来。巨额超额准备金的成因不仅在于央行 政策～也与信贷市场上的供求因素有关,因此～央行无法轻松解 决此问题。央行虽有种种政策工具～却无法控制商业银行的行为。 巨额超额准备金有可能带来政策或宏观经济风险:在央行转向收 紧政策之时～银行却可能凭借超额准备金扩大信贷～从而破坏央 行的政策转向,而且～以贷款形式流入实体经济的准备金有可能 推升通胀风险。 (外脑精华?北京)美国超额准备金将突破万亿美元大关 美联储资产负债表中的超额准备金即将突破1万亿美元大关。预计到 2010年1月，美国的超额准备金将达到1.2万亿美元。另一方面，其他国家的资产负债表和准备金规模也普遍处于高位。 如此庞大的规模令收缩准备金这项原本简单的工作变得困难起来。虽然商业银行仍保留着如此巨额的利率极低的超额准备金，但随着经济复苏的推进，市场机会改善，它们很可能会动用一部分超额准备金，用来放贷或购买资产，从而推动收益率下降。然而，直到经济进入可持续复苏状态、因而央行开始收缩货币政策之时，商业银行才最有可能找到合适的借款客户。 2008年9月，各央行开放了流动性工具，以缓解固定收益市场瘫痪的压力。这些举措导致了超额准备金的累积和央行资产负债表的膨胀。如果是在过去，央行本可以出售政府证券以“对冲”这些超额准备金，但这一次却没有这样做，原因有两方面。首先，在零利率的背景下，央行采取量化宽松政策的目的就在于刺激货币供应的增长，而超额准备金的增长会推动隔夜利率的下降。第二，相对于美联储持有或可以动用的政府证券规模而言，新增超额准备金的规模过于庞大，美联储无力收缩超额准备金的部分原因就在于此。在这些不利情况下，美联储甚至求助于财政部，由后者出台“补充融资”(Supplemental Financing Program)，以帮助其收缩超额准备金。 巨额超额准备金的成因 然而，为什么超额准备金规模如此之大,原因或许在于供应面。换言之，商业银行之所以持有超额准备金，是因为它们无法为这些资金找到更满意的用途。虽然准备金或许高于监管部门要求的水平，但商业银行未必认为，这些准备金在经济意义上是“超额”的。商业银行之所以积累这些准备金，可能是出于“预防性动机”，正如在收入流不确定性增大的时期，消费者会增加储 蓄一样。这就是可贷资金市场上的供应面问题。 另一方面，商业银行之所以持有巨额超额准备金，原因也可能在于银行信贷市场上的需求不足，即出现了需求面问题。不过，最有可能的情况还是供求两方面因素的共同作用。我们过去就曾指出，信贷市场回暖通常滞后于经济复苏进程，因为贷款机构放宽贷款标准和借款者回归市场的步伐都较为迟缓。 超额准备金居高不下的另一个原因在于，商业银行凭借这些资金获得了利息。美国的情况尤其如此。2008年10月之前，超额准备金不支付利息，因此商业银行会尽可能运用这些资金。而今，美联储按政策利率为超额准备金支付利息，其吸引力超过了短期国债的低利率。更何况，商业银行已经购买了大量国债，随着经济复苏的到来，它们或许不愿进一步增持国债了。监管面的一项风险在于，监管部门可能会要求银行提高低风险资产在其资产负债表中所占的份额。 美联储专家Keister和McAndrews表示，超额准备金的猛增几乎完全是央行政策的结果，而非商业银行贷款行为的反应。这似乎意味着，只要央行改变政策，就可以毫不费力地解决超额准备金问题。然而，这种观点难以令人信服。如果超额准备金的成因在于商业银行持有现金的意愿，而央行在这种情况未发生变化的情况下试图削减超额准备金，就可能导致贷款的减少。上世纪30年代就曾出现这种代价高昂的局面:美联储上调法定准备金率，结果导致商业银行削减了贷款。 超额准备金管理面临挑战 央行可以通过多种方式收缩超额准备金。这一次，美联储不大可能运用 旧式政策工具，即提高法定准备金率。正如Mayer和Cargill所说，1936,37年间法定准备金率的上调是导致1937,38年间美国经济衰退的重要原因，甚至可能是最重要的原因。我们预计，美联储很可能会运用一系列其他来收缩超额准备金，包括逆回购操作、定期存款以及调整准备金利率等。欧洲央行很可能运用反向招标或发行央行债券来控制流动性和准备金。英格兰银行已经缩小了每周的公开市场操作的规模，以削减超额准备金。下一步，英格兰银行还可能缩小期限较长的公开市场操作的规模，甚至发行短期央行票据。 Keister和McAndrews等专家表示，美联储对准备金支付利息的重要意义在于，此举将美联储的利率政策从涉及基础货币的政策目标中分离出来。简言之，如果央行以政策利率为准，不断提高准备金利率，那么商业银行就不愿将超额准备金用于其他领域。从理论上说，在这种情况下，央行即使提高了政策利率，也完全有能力在资产负债表上保持大量超额准备金，而不会让这些准备金流入实体经济之中。 这种观点的优点很突出，但并不像其支持者说的那样无懈可击。首先，商业银行的传统盈利手段在于，借助收益率曲线向上倾斜的特性，通过短期负债和长期资产之间的期限错配来获取利润。随着经济逐步复苏，如果风险资产能够提供更高的风险调整回报率，那么商业银行为什么要继续持有1万亿美元以上回报率较低的无风险资产呢,美联储官方认为，商业银行可以将资产负债表中的部分现金用于购买证券或发放贷款。此外，经历大衰退和住房与信贷市场的一系列冲击之后，商业银行业的赢家和输家已经变得非常分明，这种情况下，保持市场份额等非价格目标会成为银行决策中考虑的重要因素。总之，央行或许掌握着自身需要的所有政策工具，但仍要依靠一个 它们无法控制的因素:商业银行是否会按其意愿行事。 超额准备金是否会给政策或宏观经济带来风险, 如果央行能够有效地掌控超额准备金的收缩过程，或运用恰当的激励因素来控制超额准备金的增减，那么即使是巨额准备金也不会给宏观经济带来风险。然而，正如当今央行面临的许多难题一样，能否顺利地消除庞大的超额准备金还不得而知。目前，央行的视野已经延伸到经济复苏的初期阶段之后，要等到复苏进入可持续阶段、通胀预期止跌回升的情况下，才会上调政策利率。可持续的复苏意味着借款者回归信贷市场，从而为商业银行的庞大超额准备金提供新的投资机会。而风险在于，这种情况下，就在央行力图在一定程度上收紧其超宽松货币政策之时，商业银行却有可能利用市场回暖的机会扩大信贷，从而令央行的政策调整成为徒劳之举。 再则，如果超额准备金通过银行贷款流入实体经济，就很可能会导致货币供应量的增长，从而推升通胀风险。Keister和McAndrews也表示:虽然银行贷款不会改变银行体系中准备金的总额，却会影响法定准备金与超额准备金之间的比例。随着商业银行不断动用超额准备金发放贷款，存款创造和货币创造规模也将增大。活期存款和货币供应的增长意味着，银行必须持有的法定准备金的规模将随之膨胀。这种情况下，在超额准备金收缩的同时，法定准备金将随之上升。用超额准备金放贷将助长这两种趋势。 在央行面临的所有政策难题中，超额准备金的控制问题很可能是它们操心最少的，因为央行不仅对自身的资产负债表拥有强大的控制力，而且管理经验很丰富。但我们认为，现在并没有足够把握实现超额准备金的平稳收缩。未来几个季度中，最大的风险在于经济增长速度超出预期。如果此风险成为 现实，那么央行精心制定的计划也可能被信贷供求双方的共同作用所葬送。 英文原文:Reversing Excessive Excess Reserves Excess reserves on the Fed's balance sheet will soon cross the US$1 trillion mark. Our US economics team expects the combination of more QE asset purchases, smaller further decreases in passive QE and the wind-down of the Supplemental Financing Program (SFP) of the Treasury to drive excess reserves in the US to US$1.2 trillion by January 2010 (see US Economics: Fedspeak: Roadmap for the Exit, October 26, 2009). And balance sheets and reserves in other countries are at elevated levels too. Confronted with such massive amounts, even the normally straightforward task of draining excess reserves is no longer a simple task for central banks. While they retain so many excess reserves which are earning very low interest, commercial banks could well turn some of these reserves to lending when better opportunities show up later in the recovery, or purchase assets, pushing yields lower. More lending would lead to an increase in money supply, raising inflation risks. Ironically, commercial banks are most likely to find willing and suitable borrowers just as central banks start to tighten on the back of a sustainable recovery, lowering the impact of rate hikes. QE created a surge in excess reserves: In September 2008, central banks opened up liquidity facilities to alleviate the stress from frozen fixed income markets. These operations resulted in the build-up of „excess reserves' (ER) and an expansion in central banks' balance sheets. In the past, such a build-up in ER would have been 'sterilised' by central banks by selling government securities. This time around, however, that was not done for two reasons. First, we have argued that central banks have pursued QE with the intention of increasing the growth of money, given near-zero policy rates, while more ER would push overnight rates lower. Second, the sheer size of the increase in ER relative to the size of government securities held by or available to the Fed that could be used to drain reserves was at least partly responsible for central banks not being able to drain excess reserves (see Keister & McAndrews (2009), Haubrich & Lindner (2009)). Under these extenuating circumstances, the Fed even turned to the Treasury for assistance and the Supplemental Financing Program was created to help drain ER (see Appendix for details on how the SFP worked and how its wind-down will push up excess reserves). But why have excess reserves stayed so high? Could be a supply-side issue... Tautologically, commercial banks are holding on to excess reserves because they cannot put the funds to better use. However, this does not help us in identifying whether supply or demand is the source of the problem. While reserves may be higher than required by regulators, banks may not consider them „excessive' in an economic sense, as argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Commercial banks could be hoarding this cash with a 'precautionary motive', much as consumers increase savings when uncertainty around their income stream increases. This would be a problem on the supply side of the loanable funds market. Feedback from our money market desk in London provides some interesting insights into the supply side of the argument. First, the interbank market no longer functions as it used to. Lending up to maturities of 3 or 6 months has been replaced by overnight lending or up to a maximum of 30 days, and that too only among select institutions. Absent an interbank market from days gone by, it is little wonder that banks are electing to hold assets in the form of ER. Second, financial institutions still seem to be wary of risks other than liquidity risk. The risk of a possible downturn in the economy and asset prices thereby adversely affecting their balance sheets cannot be ruled out, while there are also risks that regulation could require these institutions to hold more liquid positions in the near future. Until there is some resolution of uncertainty on both of these fronts, it seems that the precautionary motive for holding ER will remain in place. ...but it could also be the lack of demand for bank credit: It could also, however, be that banks simply do not have enough demand for bank credit - a demand-side problem. Most likely, it is a combination of both supply and demand factors. We have argued before that credit lags the recovery as lending standards slowly relax and borrowers slowly re-enter the market as their income and revenue streams become less uncertain, or show outright improvement. Reserves earn interest...even at the Fed: Another reason why excess reserves have stayed elevated is that commercial banks earn interest on reserves (even at the Fed, which started this practice in October 2008). Particularly in the US where, prior to October 2008, ER would have received no interest, commercial banks would be strongly incentivised to move those funds elsewhere. Now, ER earn the policy rate, which is more attractive than low front-end rates on government yield curves. Further, commercial banks - having already purchased a lot of government bonds - are possibly reluctant to add to these positions, given an impending economic recovery. Part of the regulatory risk that we mention previously is that banks could be asked to hold more risk-less assets on their balance sheets. This process is already in motion in the UK, where banks are likely to hold more liquid assets (see Regulation-Driven Demand, Laurence Mutkin, October 9, 2009). Researchers at the Federal Reserve argue that the build-up of ER is almost exclusively the result of central bank policy and should not be seen as a reflection of the lending behaviour of commercial banks (see Keister & McAndrews, Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves? July 2009). The implication seems to be that a reversal of central bank policy will result in a painless resolution of the ER issue. If so, the argument is not convincing. If the decision to hold assets in the form of ER is the result of a desire to hoard cash by commercial banks, then an attempt by the central bank to reduce ER without a change in the underlying preferences of commercial banks could lead to a decrease in lending. This was costly for the Fed in the 1930s when higher reserve requirements led commercial banks to cut lending. Will managing excess reserves prove difficult? Central banks can drain/reduce ER in a variety of ways. The old-fashioned tool of requiring banks to hold a higher proportion of their demand deposits as reserves is unlikely to be used. The disastrous policy of raising the Required Reserve Ratio by the Fed in 1936 and 1937 was "an important contributing factor and perhaps even the most important factor" that led to the recession of 1937-38 (Mayer & Cargill (2004)). Rather, our US team expects that draining reserves in the US will likely be executed through a combination of reverse repo operations , term deposits and incentives via the interest rate on excess reserves. Please again see Fedspeak: Roadmap for the Exit for a discussion of the nuances of these operations. At the ECB, control of liquidity and reserves would likely be done through reverse tenders (at the traditional short maturity or for longer ones) or by issuing debt certificates (i.e., central bank bonds). The latter remains an option at the ECB's disposal, though it has not been used yet. The BoE has arguably already taken steps to cut 'excess' reserves by lower offerings in weekly open market operations. Going forward, the BoE could reduce offerings in its long-term open market operations or even issue short-term BoE bills. Interest on reserves helps central banks manage reserves... Keister & McAndrews and others have argued that the important step of paying interest on reserves allows the Fed to separate its interest rate policy from its policy objectives regarding the monetary base (reserves plus currency in circulation). In simple terms, if central banks kept raising the interest rate paid on reserves in line with policy rates, commercial banks would be less inclined to move ER elsewhere. In theory, central banks could well carry a large quantity of ER on their balance sheets even as policy rates are raised, without these reserves spilling over into the real economy. ...but the argument is far from watertight: There is clearly significant merit to this argument, but it does not seem to be as comprehensive as its proponents would suggest. For one thing, banks have traditionally earned profits via the maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-term assets with the benefit of an upward-sloping yield curve. Why they should then prefer to keep over US$1 trillion in the form of risk-free assets when (probably) better risk-adjusted returns are available in a recovering economy is not clear to us. Federal Reserve staff themselves believe that commercial banks could re-deploy some of the cash on their balance sheets into securities or loans (as per the FOMC September minutes). Further, non-price objectives (e.g., market share) are likely quite strong in an environment where the Great Recession and events in the housing and credit markets have created very distinct groups of winners and losers among commercial banks. In a nutshell, central banks may have all the tools they need at their disposal, but will need to count on the one factor that is not under their control: the willingness of commercial banks to play along. Do ER then pose any risk to policy or the macroeconomy? If central banks manage the process of draining ER efficiently or set the right incentives to control the movement of ER, then clearly even a large stock of reserves poses little risk to the macroeconomy. However, like many of the dilemmas facing central banks today, such a balanced exit is far from a foregone conclusion. In an earlier note (see "Growing Pains", The Global Monetary Analyst, September 23, 2009), we highlighted that central banks have looked through the initial stages of the recovery, waiting until the recovery is sustainable and inflation expectations turn up before they hike policy rates. A sustainable recovery is also when borrowers are likely to return to the market, providing commercial banks with alternative lending opportunities for the stockpile of ER. The risk is that commercial banks could seize these opportunities, expanding credit at a time when central banks are trying to reign in their über-expansionary policies somewhat, thereby rendering their efforts less effective. Second, the spillover of these ER into the real economy via lending will likely lead to an increase in the money supply, pushing inflation risks higher. As Keister & McAndrews themselves note, "while lending by banks does not change the total level of reserves in the banking system, it does affect the composition of that total between required and excess reserves". As lending out of ER increases, deposit creation and money creation will also be stepped up. The increase in demand deposits and money supply means that the level of required reserves that banks have to hold will rise. Thus, required reserves will increase at the expense of ER. As money supply has continued to increase during the recent past, so have required reserves. Lending out of ER will exacerbate both trends. Meltzer (2009) and Feldstein (2009) have also voiced concerns about these risks to inflation from inflated ER. Of all the policy dilemmas that confront central banks, reining in excess reserves likely worries them the least, given their experience and control in managing their own balance sheet. However, the smooth transition that they likely assume is not a done deal, in our view. We have suggested that the biggest risk going forward is stronger-than-expected growth in the next few quarters (see "„Up' with „Swing'", The Global Monetary Analyst, September 16, 2009). Both the supply of and demand for bank credit in such a scenario could conspire to lay to rest the best laid plans of central banks. Appendix: The Coming Surge in US Excess Reserves Our US economics team expects excess reserves on the Fed's balance sheet (B/S) to expand from US$987 billion now to about US$1.2 trillion by early 2010. With passive QE programmes already ratcheted down to a significant extent, the US$350 billion of active QE yet to come along with the wind-down of the Treasury's Supplementary Financing Program (SFP) from its November 2008 peak of US$589 billion to US$15 billion are the reasons for this expected surge. In this box, we try to explain how QE creates excess reserves and how the wind-down of the SFP facility means that excess reserves are likely to increase. The Fed's passive and active QE policies since September 2008 and early 2009, respectively have resulted in a massive expansion of its balance sheet. In the process of taking on illiquid assets via liquidity programmes (passive QE) or MBS/agency debt/USTs through outright purchase (active QE - see "QE2", The Global Monetary Analyst, March 4, 2009, for more on this distinction), the Fed issued „cash' by crediting the reserve account of commercial banks. Since the increase in reserves was over and above that required by regulation, the so-called 'excess reserves' account of commercial banks increased due to these programmes. The process of creation of excess reserves is best explained by the T-accounts below: In mid-September 2008, the US Treasury created the SFP "at the request of the Federal Reserve", under which the Treasury can auction Treasury bills that will "provide cash for use in the Federal Reserve initiatives". Under the SFP, the Treasury sold T-Bills at a special auction open to institutions already accessing the Fed's liquidity facilities. Proceeds from the auction were paid out of excess reserves and into the Treasury's account at the Fed. On the Fed's balance sheet, this simply amounts to a transfer of funds between excess reserves and the Treasury's deposit. On a net basis, however, it is almost like the Fed and the Treasury jointly financed the liquidity programmes started in September 2008. The SFP effectively helps the Fed to drain excess reserves by the amount of the T-Bills auctioned. The severity of the downturn, however, led to the Fed to pursue a US$1.75 trillion active QE programme starting January 2009, which made the SFP contribution relatively less vital, given the size of this programme. On the fiscal side, issuance needs for the massive US$787 billion fiscal package and the dramatic cyclical fall in tax revenues led the Treasury to wind down the SFP facility to US$15 billion in order to avoid breaching the debt ceiling. In the event that Congress raises the debt ceiling, the Treasury could re-issue T-Bills to assist the Fed in mopping up excess reserves. Effectively, this would mean that, as T-Bills mature, the funds from redemption are placed back in excess reserves. As of now, there are US$65 billion of SFP bills left, US$50 billion of which will be wound down. The SFP wind-down has thus already contributed to an increase in excess reserves and will continue to do so until the desired US$15 billion size for the programme is achieved. The much bigger impact on reserves going forward will be the US$291 billion of MBS securities and US$58 billion of agency debt that the Fed will purchase as it completes its active QE programme. 国际航空运输协会:9月份全球航空运输业分析报告 2009-11-12 17:57:21 提要:9月份～全球航空客运量同比增长0.3%～实现12个 月来的首次正增长。9月份航空货运量降幅由8月份的9.6%收窄 至5.4%。不过～9月份客运量和货运量双双环比回落～尚不清楚 这是由于统计偏差还是近期继续回升势头戛然而止所致。分地区 来看～经济复苏势头最猛的亚太地区、拉美和中东地区表现最佳, 欧洲航空业客运量再度出现下滑,北美航空业客运量略有增长。 库存周期似乎将会推动货运量继续增长～但客运量增长则需要消 费者信心回升的提振。 (外脑精华?北京)概要分析 9月份国际航空客运量实现了12个月来的首次正增长，同比增长了0.3%。8月份客运量和上半年客运量分别同比下降了1.1%和7.6%。航空客运量显然在从1季度末创下的低点一路回升。经季节性因素调整后的数据显示，如今国际航空客运量已从低点回升了5%。不过，9月份客运量实现同比增长则完全是由于始于去年9月的全球金融危机造成去年同期客运量锐减。实际上，经季节性因素调整后的9月份客运量出现了环比下滑。 航空货运市场表现同客运市场如出一辙。9月份航空货运量同比数据显著改善，9月份同比降幅从8月份的9.6%收窄至5.4%。这同样是由于去年9月份货运量暴跌所致。经季节性因素调整后的9月份货运量同样出现环比下降。 关键问题是客运量和货运量的环比下降只是由于统计偏差所致，还是由于近期客运量和货运量所呈现的回升趋势戛然而止。鉴于9月份美国和其他国家的商业和消费者信心指数同样出现回落，解开这一谜团的关键在于经济复苏态势能够持续多久。仍会持续的库存周期似乎将继续推动航空货运量增长，但航空客运量的继续攀升则需要消费者信心进一步回升的提振。 从各地区情况来看，经济复苏势头最猛的亚太地区、拉美和中东地区表现最佳。欧洲航空业客运量则再度出现下滑，而北美航空业客运量略有增长。航空客运需求的小幅回升似乎是因经济基本面出现好转，而且凸显出当前发展态势的不稳定性。 航空企业今年以来一直确保客运运力持稳，而货运运力在过去两个月中仅仅出现小幅增长。因此，需求增长直接推动了客座率和载货率的上升，如今客座率和载货率均已回升至经济衰退之前的水平。飞机承载率超过了过去12个月来的水平，这将至少会延缓收益率降速。但另一方面，航空企业一直无力将飞机飞行时间维持在正常水平。部分飞机的日均飞行时间下降了3%，这将会推高单位成本。 客运量和货运量双双环比下降 我们在最新一期《头等舱客运量监测报告》中曾经警示到9月份客运量出现下滑将不足为奇。随着全球贸易量的增长，头等舱客运量已经出现大幅增长，而经济仓客运量似乎需要消费者信心进一步回升的提振。由于全球贸易量以及消费者信心指数在9月份双双回落，航空客运量下滑显得完全顺理成章。 9月份国际航空客运量同比增长0.3%，但经季节性调整后的9月份客运量环比小幅下降。9月份客运量同比增速从8月份的-1.1%升至0.3%，这完全是由于雷曼兄弟公司破产引发的全球金融危机和经济危机造成去年同期客运量锐减。 不过，同经季节性因素调整后的客运量自1季度末创下低点以来超过5%的增幅相比，9月份客运量的环比降幅则显得微不足道。因为这一增幅数据意味着客运量很可能将维持每月平均增长近1%的温和增长态势。鉴于预期明年经济增长将会较为迟缓，我们预计2010年航空客运量平均增速将不会超过4%。 在主要地区中，亚太地区表现最佳，航空客运量恢复增长态势，客运量 从8月同比下降1.6%转为9月份同比增长2.1%。实际上，经季节性因素调整后的数据显示，9月份亚太航空业客运量环比增长了近1%，而去年同期客运量锐减并非造成客运量环比增长的唯一原因。亚太地区经济状况显然大为改观。亚太地区消费者负债水平相对较低，银行业经营状况较好，而且许多国家推出了大规模刺激经济计划。 相比之下，9月份欧洲网络航空公司的客运量出现下滑。低成本网络航空公司在短途市场的份额进一步流失，但主因在于跨大西洋和欧洲至亚洲这两个长途市场上的客运周转量出现下滑。乘客对本土航空公司的偏爱或许是主要原因所在，更迅猛的地区经济增长态势使得欧洲至亚洲航线的亚洲游客出现增长，但多数新游客选择乘坐亚太航空公司航班。欧洲经济依然萎靡不振(英国经济在3季度继续下滑)，而且可能在当前阶段并未能有效推动航空客运需求大幅增长。欧洲和美国航空业在大西洋航线的客运量同样出现大幅下滑，这可能是欧美地区9月份商业和消费者信心指数回落所致。 9月份中东航空业客运量增长势头尤为迅猛，但由于去年9月出现的斋月在今年8月末降临，斋月过后的客运需求反弹推高了9月份中东航空业客运量增速。过去两个月的平均客运增速将会更清晰地显示中东航空业客运量的发展趋势。中东航空业客运量的强劲增长主要得益于其在中东长途中转市场的市场份额增长。石油收入水平的下滑在继续抑制该地区经济增长和打压区内航空客运需求。 拉美航空业的国际航班客运量同样从下降转为增长，从而促使9月份客运量同比增长了3.4%。拉美航空业正在充分利用该地区经济表现较强的优势。在全球经济衰退背景下，非洲地区经济增长同样显出较强的韧性。不过，相比之下，非洲航空业却在努力确保市场份额，而且9月份客运量同比下降 了4.2%。 航空货运量在9月份也出现环比下降。不过，由于去年9月份货运量锐减，9月份货运量同比降幅从8月份的9.6%收窄至5.4%。同上半年20%以上的同比降幅水平，9月份货运量同比降幅大幅收窄。国际市场货运量已从去年12月份创下的低点回升了近12%。但仍比2008年初的峰值水平低17%。货运量要恢复至2008年初的水平尚需很长时间。 关键问题是这种环比下降是由于数据统计偏差造成的，还是由于近期复苏趋势戛然而止。货运量环比下降的同时，9月份美国商业信心指数出现回落。不过，从更具权威性的衡量指标来看，制造业采购意愿指数显示库存周期的持续将会支撑货运量增长。 从各地区情况来看，9月份货运市场表现要逊于客运市场，但这是由于去年末期货运量降幅远高于客运量降幅。不过，受经济状况好转提振，货运量呈类似的回升趋势，亚太航空业货运量激增，而且中东和拉美航空业货运量出现正增长。 客座率和载货率恢复至衰退前水平 虽然客运量环比下降，但9月份国际航空市场客座率继续攀升。今年以来航空企业成功地确保运力基本持稳，从而使得需求增长直接推动客座率上升。 航空客座率已恢复至经济衰退前的水平。2008年年底至今年年初期间过剩运力的激增造成票价和收益率出现大幅下滑，2季度期间票价和收益率降幅均超过了20%。趋紧的供需形势目前似乎确实正在稳定票价。不过， 虽然收益率有望开始出现回升，但要完全收复近期下跌的失地尚需很长时间，而且飞机利用率的下降对单位成本构成了上行压力。 航空载货率通常会远低于航空客座率水平。不过，由于货运需求增长以及航空企业严控运力，载货率如今已回升至经济衰退前的水平。9月份50.8%的载货率创下了近一年以来的最高水平。 表:2009年9月份全球航空运输业指标 2009年9月份同2008年9月份数据对比 客运量增客运运 货运量增货运运 客座率 载货率 幅 力增幅 幅 力增幅 非洲地区 -4.2% 2.2% 68.6 -6.9% -2.0 29.5 亚太地区 2.1% -4.2% 75.5 -3.1% -10.1 64.5 欧洲地区 -4.2% -5.4% 79.5 -13.0% -11.4 47.2 拉美地区 3.4% 3.8% 73.5 1.8% 6.2 33.9 中东地区 18.2% 15.2% 71.8 3.6% 5.5 43.5 北美地区 -2.4% -5.1% 81.1 -5.0% -11.2 40.6 整个行业 0.3% -2.4% 77.1 -5.4% -8.5 50.8 2009年1-9月份数据同2008年1-9月份数据对比 客运量增客运运 货运量增货运运 客座率 载货率 幅 力增幅 幅 力增幅 非洲地区 -8.9% -4.5% 69.6% -19.1% -4.6 26.0 亚太地区 -8.8% -7.3% 72.9% -17.0% -14.5 59.3 欧洲地区 -5.9% -4.4% 76.3% -19.3% -9.6 44.8 拉美地区 -2.3% 1.5% 72.0% -12.7% -2.8 30.9 中东地区 9.4% 13.2% 72.9% -2.6% 5.0 40.8 北美地区 -6.7% -5.1% 79.2% -17.9% -10.4 35.2 整个行业 -5.3% -3.4% 75.0% -16.4% -9.8 46.6 纽约时报:美元贬值令股价上涨 2009-11-12 18:01:53 (外脑精华?北京)周三，美元跌至15个月来新低的消息激发了一系列连锁反应，令美国经济的三大支柱,股市、油价和金价相继变动。由于金融股上涨，导致华尔街股市上扬;同时金价和油价持续攀升。当天，美元跌至2008年以来的最低点，美元兑欧元降至1.5美元以下，为1欧元兑换1.4976美元。持续的低利率使得货币交易回报率走低，迫使投资者转向回报更加丰厚的股市。许多分析人士担心，美国股市持续八个月的反弹夸大了实体经济的健康程度。有迹象显示，美国将继续实施财政刺激计划，同时吸引了大批投资者重新回到股市。 CNN财经:美股指升至13月新高 2009-11-12 18:01:54 (外脑精华?北京)美股周三收盘走高，道琼斯工业均指已连续3日再创13个月新高，投资者普遍对利率长期保持低位表示乐观。道琼斯工业平均指数涨44点，或0.4%，报10,291.26。标准普尔500指数涨6.27点，或0.5%，收于1,098.51点，那斯达克综合指数涨16点，或0.7%，收于2,166.90点。美联储官员周二表示，经济复苏速度可能趋于平缓，并认为央行将在可预见的一段时期内维持较低利率。Clark资本管理的Harry Clark认为，短期内央行将不会对目前利率政策作出任何变动，直到2010年第二季度为止。Fact and Opinion Economics首席经济学家Robert Brusca称，投资者信心来自上周公布的失业率比预期情况要好，市场也比多数人预想的要健康。 金融时报:金融危机致欧盟就业结构出现新变化 2009-11-12 18:01:54 (外脑精华?北京)欧盟统计局日前公布的统计数据表明,国际金融危机导致欧盟就业结构出现了一些新变化和新特点:全职员工工作时间减少,临时工人数增加;受教育程度低的人就业机会减少,受教育程度高的人就业机会增加。欧盟统计局最新公布的数据显示,从2008年第二季度到2009年第二季度,欧盟27个成员国的就业人数下降至2.227亿人,降幅为1.9%。与欧盟同一时期经济缩水4.9%的情况相比,欧洲就业人数下降的幅度远远低于经济降幅,其中主要原因就是企业主在减少全职员工工作时间的同时增加聘用临时工人数。 金融时报:日本债券收益率升至近5月最高 2009-11-12 18:01:54 (外脑精华?北京)日本10年期国债收益率近几周稳步走高并于10日收于1.47%，接近5个月来的最高水平，然而日本国债的收益率仍低于10年前的水平，且在全球范围内仍然相对较低。1999年时其基准收益率在5个月内由0.77%上升至2.47%，Barclays Capital资深收益策略师Stefan Liiceanu称，即使利率只上升一点，日本政府偿还债务的成本也将在短时期内大幅提高。目前日本政府债务总额已接近其GDP的200%。 泰晤士报:英国央行称英国经济正在走出危机 2009-11-12 18:01:55 (外脑精华?北京)比预期表现良好的失业率数据以及英国央行对于明年经济的预期使英国央行11日表示，英国经济正摆脱了最糟糕的时段并开始恢复。分析家先前曾警告称2010年英国失业人数将达到300万人，但官 方数据显示人们失去工作的速度正在显著放缓。尽管在6-9月失业人口新增3万人，使总失业人数达到246万人，但失业人数季度增长率为16个月以来最低，远低于先前预测的6.5万人。英国央行行长Mervyn King表示英国经济“刚刚踏上复苏的道路”并表示英国经济恢复两年前的状况需要经过一段“漫长而艰苦的旅程”。英国央行预计英国经济将在明年年初开始恢复增长，并在2011年年中达到3.75%的增长率。