管理薪酬和企业绩效【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题：管理薪酬和企业绩效资料来源:美国经济评论，1970（4）作者：Lewellen,Huntsman.委托代理理论是现代企业理论的重要组成部分，在高管薪酬决定机制研究领域一直占据着主导地位，是高管薪酬研究的理论基础。在古典企业中，所有者、经营者和剩余利益索取者二者是合一的，但自从上世纪30年代以来，企业间的竞争越来越激烈，企业的规模也随之扩大，所有者不得不向外寻求具备专业知识、经验丰富的经营人员，则出现了所有者、经营者的分离，由所有者委托经营者经营管理公司。Berle和Means（1932）首次提出两权分离的概念，现代企业的一个最主要的特征就是所有权与经营权分离，而委托代理理论将两权分离公司中所有者与经营者的关系理解为一种委托代理关系。的委托代理理论有二个假设：一是代理人具有“私人信息”，其行为不易直接被观测到；二是委托人不介入生产活动，与代理人的信息不对称；三是代理人是“经济人”，追求自身效用最大化。委托代理理论旨在使受自我利益驱动的代理人能以委托人的效用目标作为行为准则，使代理成本最小化，经济学家们提出要建立一套既能够有效地约束代理人的行为，又能激励代理人按委托人的目标和委托人的利益而努力工作，从而降低代理成本的机制。经济学家们认为降低代理成本的可以采取三种措施。第一，使代理人成为“剩余权益”的拥有者。为了避免由于企业成员间互相偷懒和搭便车的机会主义动机带来的“道德风险”问题，企业内需要形成一种监督机制，让少数人专门从事监督其他成员工作绩效的工作，而现代企业中的“监督者”就是企业内部的经营管理者。为了调动监督者的积极性，还需要设计出一种新的制度安排，赋予监督者一种权利或地位，使之成为索取扣除其他要素所有者的报酬之后的剩余报酬的拥有者，即享有剩余索取权。第二，利用市场竞争机制约束代理人行为。市场经济中，即使在所有权和经营权分离的情况下，由于存在着管理者市场、产品市场和资本市场的竞争，代理人所受的压力是多方面的，这种压力使代理人不敢过于偏离委托人的目标而为所欲为，从而使代理成本被限制在某一限度内，不可能无限制地增长，可以通过完善市场机制可以实现对代理人一定程度的约束。第三，设计有效的激励约束方案，并对代理人的工作进行严格监督和准确评价。要依据代理人的效用函数制定报酬。委托人必须清楚，任何有效的激励、约束都必须与代理人的目标相一致。从信息非对称的角度来看，委托代理一般会产生逆向选择问题和道德风险两种问题。在企业委托——代理关系中，逆向选择是指委托人不知道代理人的某些信息，以致不能预测其代理行为，或者代理人有意隐瞒自己的实际情况，使委托人无法了解到代理人是否会很好的满足委托人的要求，从而签订有利于代理人的委托契约。为了最大程度地减少代理成本，降低代理人的道德风险，委托人和代理人之间经过多次博弈之后最终签订一种薪酬——绩效契约，使经营者的目标函数与股东的目标函数尽可能趋于一致，减轻经营者的机会主义行为和所有者对其进行监督的负担。委托人和代理人之间的薪酬——绩效契约，对上市公司的经营者进行激励和约束，使得经营者选择和实施可以增加股东财富的活动，实现企业价值最大化，最终实现股东和经营者的“双赢”。马斯洛需求层次理论把人的需求分成五个层次，从低到高依次是：生理需求、保障或安全需求、归属或取得他人认可需求、尊重的需求、自我实现需求即成就需求。当一个层次的需求满足了，就会向更高一层次发展。越到上层，则获得满足的人越少，并且同一时间可能存在不同的几种需求，但每一时期总有一种需求占支配地位。由于各层次的需求相互依赖并重叠，当高层次的需求发展时，较低层次的需求仍旧存在，只是对行为的影响比重减轻一些。这一理论表明，针对人的需求实施相应的激励是可能的，不同的人需要不同的激励，同一个人在不同需求阶段也需要不同的激励内容，因而激励方式也应当多元化。高管人员的需求相对来说是高层次的，大都追求个人在社会上的地位和声望，属于马斯洛的尊重和自我实现的需要。高级管理人员为了满足这两种主要需求，就要提高所在企业在社会上的地位，通过企业的发展证实自己的经营才能和价值，达到自我实现。对于企业来说，则要努力培养与高管人员之间的长期合作关系，鼓励高级管理人员通过提高企业的社会地位来提高自己的地位，但不能忽视高管的处于低层次的其他三种需求，它们仍然是高管人员工作的重要动因。因此，可以认为，高级管理人员不仅追求声望、权力等非经济性报酬，还追求生理、保障等经济性报酬，因为经济报酬在一定程度上也体现了高级管理人员的社会地位，二者并不矛盾而是统一的。但此理论也有其局限性，因为在低层次需求尚未满足时，高层次的需求其实也可以发展。赫茨伯格将人们需要的满足分为激励因素和保健因素。激励因素是指那些有了这种因素就能产生激励作用，没有也不会让人产生不满的因素，该因素大多与工作内容有关，包括成就、赏识、工作富有挑战性、晋升和在工作中成长等因素。这些因素得到满足后，可以激励个人或集体以一种成熟的方式成长，使工作能力得到提高，相当于马斯洛需求层次里面的高层次需要。保健因素是指那些缺少了会使员工产生不满情绪的因素，但是有了却不能产生激励作用。这类因素大多与工作条件或环境有关，如工作条件、薪酬福利、地位与安全、个人生活等。它启示人们更应注重工作本身的内容及工作的丰富化，以此促进人的进取心，从而提高工作效率。高管人员的薪酬构成可分为基本工资和风险性收入，根据赫兹伯格的“激励——保健”双因素理论，基本工资报酬可以被看作是保健因素，它主要是维持人的基本的生活需求，固定收入被认为是一种约束性而不会起到对高管人员激励作用的收入，其对高管的激励程度不高。但倘若在高管薪酬组合中，除固定报酬以外，还包括风险收入，薪酬就会随着风险收入的增多而逐渐增加激励力量。所以，薪酬结构的变化对高管人员行为有重要的影响。外文文献原文Title:ManagerialPayandCorporatePerformanceMaterialSource:TheAmericanEconomicReviewAuthor:Lewellen,HuntsmanPrincipal-agenttheoryisthemoderntheoryofanimportantpartofthedecisionmechanisminthefieldofexecutivecompensationhasbeendominated,isthetheoreticalbasisforthestudyofexecutivecompensation.Intheclassicalcompanies,owners,operatorsandtheremaininginterestisoneofthetwoclaimants,butsincethe1930shasbeenincreasinglyfiercecompetitionamongenterprises,alsowillexpandthesizeofthebusiness,theownershalldonotseekouttheexpertiseofexperiencedmanagementpersonnel,theemergenceoftheowner,theoperatoroftheseparationoftheoperatorbytheownerentrustedthemanagementcompany.BerleandMeans(1932)firstproposedtheconceptofseparationofownership,amodernenterpriseisthemostimportantfeaturesoftheseparationofownershipandmanagement,whiletheprincipal-agenttheory,separationofownershipandcompanyownersandmanagersunderstandtherelationshipasakindsofprincipal-agentrelationship.Standardprincipal-agenttheoryhastwoassumptions:First,anagentwith"privateinformation",theirbehaviorisnoteasytobeobserveddirectly;Second,theclientisnotinvolvedinproductionactivities,andtheagent'sinformationasymmetry;thirdagentis"economicman",thepursuitofself-utilitymaximization.Principal-agenttheorytotheself-interestdrivenbytheagentcantargettheclient'sutilityasacodeofconduct,sotominimizeagencycosts,economistshaveproposedtoestablishasetofbindingagentscanacteffectively,butalsocanmotivatetheagentbytheclient'sgoalsandinterestsoftheclient'swork,amechanismtoreduceagencycosts.Economistsarguethatthesolutiontoreduceagencycostscantaketwokindsofmeasures.First,theagentsbecomea"residualinterest"oftheowner.Inordertoavoideachotherascorporatemembersofthelazyandopportunisticfree-ridingmotivetogivethe"moralhazard"problem,theenterpriseneedtodevelopamonitoringmechanismtosuperviseasmallnumberofothermemberswhospecializeinjobperformance,whilethemodernenterprisethe"supervisor"isthein-housemanagers.Inordertomobilizetheenthusiasmofsupervisors,alsoneedtodesignanewinstitutionalarrangements,givingsupervisorsarightorstatus,tobecometheowneroftheotherelementsobtainedfromdeductingcompensationpaidaftertheownerleft,thathaveobtainedtheremainingrights.Second,theuseofmarketcompetitionmechanismtocontrolagentbehavior.Marketeconomy,evenintheseparationofownershipandmanagementrightsinthecase,duetotheexistenceofmarketmanagers,productmarketandcapitalmarketcompetition,thepressuresaremanyagents,thispressuresothatanagentcannotbetoodeviatefromtheclient'sgoalsdowhatevertheywant,sothatagencycostsarelimitedtoacertainextent,cannotbeunlimitedgrowth,byimprovingthemarketmechanismcanachieveacertaindegreeofcontroltheagent.Third,thedesignofeffectiveincentiveandrestraintprogram,andagentsworkstrictlymonitoringandaccurateassessment.Tobedevelopedbasedontheagent'sutilityfunctionreturnsthecontract.Theclientmustbeclearthatanyeffectiveincentiveandrestraintmustbeconsistentwiththeagent'sgoals.Fromtheperspectiveofasymmetricinformation,principal-agentproblemsthattendtogenerateadverseselectionandmoralhazardtwoproblems.Inthecorporateprincipal-agentrelationship,adverseselectionistheprincipalagentdoesnotknowcertaininformation,whichcannotpredictthebehaviorofitsagents,oranagentintendedtoconcealtheirownsituation,sotheclientcannotknowwhethertheagentwillbewellpositionedtomeettherequirementsofclients,whichisconducivetotheagent'scommissionsignedacontract.Inordertominimizeagencycosts,reducingtheagent'smoralhazard,principalandagentbetweentherepeatedgameafterthefinalsigningofasalary-theperformancecontract,makingtheoperator'sobjectivefunctionandtheshareholdersoftheobjectivefunctionasline,reducingtheoperator'sopportunisticbehaviorandtomonitortheburdenoftheirowners.Betweenprincipalandagentpay-performancecontract,theoperatorsoflistedcompaniesforincentivesandconstraints,allowingoperatorstoselectandimplementactivitiestoincreaseshareholderwealth,maximizeourenterprisevalue,andultimatelytheshareholdersandmanagers"win-win."Maslow'shierarchyofneedstheoryofhumanneedsintofivelevels,fromlowtohighare:physiologicalneeds,securityorsafetyrequirements,vestingrequirementsorobtainapprovalofothers,respectfortheneedsofself-actualizationneedsthatneedforachievement.Whenaleveltomeetthedemand,itwilldeveloptoahigherlevelofthehierarchy.Moretothetop,yougetfewerpeopletomeetandhead_thesametimetheremaybeseveraldifferentneeds,butthereisalwaysademandineachperioddominant.Astheneedsofalllevelsofinterdependenceandoverlap,whenthedemandforhigh-leveldevelopment,thelowerlevelofdemandstillexist,buttoreducetheproportionofthebehaviorofsome.Thistheorysuggeststhatpeople'sneedsfortheimplementationofappropriateincentivesarepossible,differentpeopleneeddifferentmotivation,needsthesamepersonatdifferentstagesrequiredifferentincentivescontent,andthusincentivesshouldalsobediversified.Thedemandforexecutivesishigh-level,mostindividualsinthepursuitofsocialstatusandprestige,respectandbelongingtoMaslow'sself-realizationneeds.Seniormanagementinordertomeetthetwokeyrequirementsnecessarytoimprovetheirenterprisesinthesocialstatus,confirmedbythedevelopmentofenterprisesandvalueoftheirbusinessinordertoachieveself-realization.Forbusinesses,andexecutiveswillhavetostrivetocultivatelong-termrelationshipbetween,toencourageseniormanagementbyimprovingthesocialstatustoimprovetheirstatus,butcannotignorelow-levelexecutivesintheotherthreerequirements,theyremainexecutivesoftheimportantdrivingforces.Therefore,wecanbelievethatseniormanagementisnotonlythepursuitofprestige,powerandothernon-economicrewards,butalsothepursuitofphysical,security,andothereconomicrewardsbecauseoftheeconomicrewardstoacertainextent,alsoreflectsthesocialstatusofseniormanagement,theyarenotcontradictorybutconsistent.However,thistheoryhasitslimitations,becauseunmetneedsinlow-level,thehighlevelofdemandcanactuallydevelop.Herzbergwillmeettheneedsofthepeoplearedividedintoincentivesandhealthfactors.Incentivesarethosewithsuchfactorscancreateincentives,notandwillnotmakepeopleunhappyfactors,thefactorsmostrelevantcontentwiththework,includingachievement,appreciation,challengingwork,promotionandworkgrowthandotherfactors.Thesefactorsaremet,caninspireindividualandcollectivegrowthinamatureway,sotheabilitytoworkisimproved,whichisequivalenttoMaslow'shierarchyofneedshigh-levelneeds.Healthfactorsarethosethatlackacausedissatisfactionamongemployeesoffactors,butwithitcannotproduceanincentive.Mostofthesefactorsandworkingconditionsorenvironment,suchasworkingconditions,payandbenefits,statusandsecurity,andpersonallife.Itrevealedthatpeopleshouldfocusonthecontentoftheworkitselfandworkenrichment,inordertopromotepeople'smotivationtoimproveworkefficiency.Compositionofexecutiveremunerationcanbedividedintothebasicwageandincomerisk,accordingtoHerzberg's"motivation-hygiene"two-factortheory,thebasicwagescanbeseenasahealthfactor,itismainlytomaintainthebasichumanlifeneeds,fixedincomeisconsideredabindingandwillnotplaytheroleofseniormanagementincentiveincome,itsexecutivestheincentiveisnothigh.Butiftheexecutiveremunerationpackage,inadditiontofixedremuneration,italsoincludestheriskofincome,salaryincomewillincreaseastheriskofgraduallyincreasingtheincentivepower.Therefore,changesinsalarystructureofthebehaviorofseniorexecutiveshaveanimportantimpact.2