国际私法案例

其他章节的案例、英文阅读材料和思考题见修订版增加内容的电子版和第二版第13-18章增加内容 第一章 涉外民事关系与国际私法 【案例1.1】一中国上海女子在美国纽约嫁给一印度孟买男子，婚后定居孟买并生儿育女。该女子不幸英年早逝，未留下任何遗嘱，但在上海和孟买均留下了价值可观的动产和不动产。其丈夫、子女及父母因析产不均发生争议，其父母诉诸上海市第一中级人民法院。 对于上述案件，上海市第一中级人民法院首先要确定这是一个国际私法案件还是国内民事案件，而确定国际私法案件的就是看案件所涉及的法律关系是否是涉外民事关系。从该案的事实看，站在中国的角度，继承关系的主体、客体以及继承关系发生的事实含有印度因素，因而这是一个典型的涉外继承关系，该案也是一个典型的国际私法案件。另外，与该案有关的中国女子与印度男子的夫妻关系，还含有美国因素。 【案例1.2】一中国人1995年死亡时在日本东京设有住所，并在东京留下若干动产，未立遗嘱，其继承人因析产不均诉诸日本法院。日本法院受理该涉外继承案件后，先要适用1989年修订的《日本法例》第26条关于“继承依被继承人本国法”的规定，从而认定应适用中国法律处理该涉外继承案件。但日本法院在案件审理过程中，查明中国《民法通则》第149条规定，遗产的法定继承，动产应适用被继承人死亡时住所地法律，把应适用的法律指回日本。这时，日本法院面临以下问题：究竟应依被继承人的本国法(中国法)还是他的住所地法(日本法)来处理这个继承案件呢?如果依中国法处理，是否违反日本的公共秩序？如果依日本法处理，是否能为中国继承人所接受，是否符合公正原则?等等。可见，法院在采用冲突规范调整涉外民事关系时，需要进行复杂的司法程序，判决的结果很难为当事人所预测。 【思考题】 1.下列案件涉及哪些民事关系？根据我国的法律，这些民事关系是否是涉外民事关系？ 【案例1.3】“富山海轮”与波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船碰撞案1 2003年5月31日格林尼治时间10点30分(北京时间18点30分)，在距丹麦博恩霍尔姆岛以北4海里的海域，中国远洋运输集团公司所属的“富山海轮”与一条波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船相撞，外轮撞到“富山海轮”左舷一、二舱之间，导致生活舱突然大量进水，“富山海轮”沉没，船上27名船员获救。 “富山海轮”船员离船前，封闭了船舶上所有的油路，避免了原油外溢造成严重的海域污染。“富山海轮”载有6.6万吨化肥，货主是中国农业生产资料集团公司，货物保险金额为870万美元。“富山海轮”船体保险金额为2050万美元。中国人民保险公司是“富山海轮”船体、货物的独家保险人。中国人民保险公司承保后，进行了再保险。“富山海轮”运载的货物出险后，中国人民保险公司迅速与国际再保险经纪人和再保险人取得联系，启动应急理赔程序，聘请律师等有关中介机构进行前期调查取证工作，分析事故原因，勘验定损，协助船东开展救助。 “富山海轮”出险后，中国人民保险公司于2003年6月6日决定预付赔款7000万人民币。“富山海轮”船体与货物保险金额为2920万美元，中国人民保险公司预计赔付金额在2亿元人民币左右，创我国国内海损赔付之最。 2.谈谈你对国际私法调整对象的理解。 3.如何正确理解国际私法的范围？ 4.试述国际私法的基本原则。 5.试述国际私法的性质。 6.你认为我国《民法通则》第142条中“国际惯例”所指为何？ 7.通过本章学习，你认为国际私法与国际经济法最大的区别在哪里？ 【扩展性阅读材料】 1．韩德培、李双元：《应当重视对冲突法的研究》，《武汉大学学报（社会科学版）》1993年第6期。 2．李双元等：《关于国际私法的几个理论问题》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2001年卷），法律出版社2001年版。 3．李双元、欧福永：《国际私法研究方法之我见》，《法学论坛》2003年第3期。 4．李健男：《论国际私法的国际法因素》，《暨南学报》2005年第3期。 5．李健男：《论国际私法的社会基础》，《法学评论》2006年第5期。 6．林燕平：《对我国国际私法司法解释现象的法理分析》，《法学》2000年第5期。 7. Substantivism versus Selectivism2 （1）The Original Substantivist Method The very name of our subject “conflict of laws”, and in particular “choice of law”, presupposes that in all cases that have contacts with more than one state: (a) each involved state has an active or passive desire or claim to have its law applied; (b) that these claims “conflict” in the sense of being of roughly equal intensity and validity; and (c) that the only way to resolve the conflict is to choose the law of one of the involved states. Each of these premises has been seriously disputed in different periods in history. For example, the last of the above premises has been rejected by what is generally regarded as one of the first recorded methods of resolving multistate problems. That method, which was employed by the Roman praetor peregrinus in adjudicating disputes between Roman and non-Roman subjects, was based on the notion of a constructive blending of the involved laws rather than on a choice from among them. The praetor resolved these disputes by constructing and applying to the case at hand a new substantive rule of decision derived from the laws of both or all involved countries. Thus, the first instinct of the legal mind when confronted with a multistate private-law dispute was one of compromise rather than of choice, eclecticism rather than all or nothing. Instead of choosing the law of one of the involved states regardless of the outcome such a choice might produce for the particular case, the praetor would focus on the needs of that case and devise for it the most appropriate substantive solution, drawn from the laws of all involved states. This substantivist method died out before the fall of the Roman empire and, by the time Roman law was “rediscovered” in Western Europe, the idea of choosing one of the involved laws rather than blending them had set in. The modern selectivist method was thus born and soon began to dominate the international scene. （2）Contemporary Scholastic Substantivism During the twentieth century, the substantivist method made a fairly momentous reappearance in international and interstate commercial arbitration, where it has become the preferred method among arbitrators. The result is the production of a voluminous, if not widely publicized, body of transnational, and at the same time a national, substantive law. In the United States, the substantivist method has also acquired new and eloquent supporters in the writings of established academic commentators, including two participants in this Symposium, Professors von Mehren and Juenger. Professor Arthur T. von Mehren has suggested that many true conflicts can be resolved expediently by a compromise of the conflicting policies of the involved states, rather than by a full vindication of the policies of the one state and a complete subordination of those of the other state. This compromise would take the form of a special substantive rule that would be constructed ad hoc for the case at hand and would be derived from the laws of both or all involved states. For example, a true conflict between the strict liability law of one state and the law of another state that does not impose liability could be resolved by a special substantive rule that would allow the recovery of only half of plaintiff’s actual damages, or of certain items only, such as medical expenses and loss of earnings. Professor Friedrich K. Juenger advocated a wider use of the substantivist approach. He proposed that conflicts of laws be resolved by constructing from among the involved states a rule of law that best accords with modern substantive-law trends and standards. For example, for products liability conflicts, Juenger proposed that, from among the laws of the places of conduct, injury, acquisition of the product, and domicile of the parties, the court should choose “[a]s to each issue . . . that rule of decision which most closely accords with modern standards of products liability.” Finally, Professor Luther L. McDougal argued that, in constructing the ad hoc substantive rule of decision, courts should not confine themselves to the laws of the states involved in the conflict but should instead look beyond those laws and try to construct “the best” rule of law. （3）Contemporary Judicial Substantivism The above scholarly suggestions have not yet had any appreciable conscious following from the bench. However, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, another participant to this Symposium, came close to using the substantive-law solution when he proposed the development of a “national consensus law” for handling a complex product-liability class action brought by the victims of Agent Orange. In his contribution to this Symposium, Judge Weinstein seems to move in a different direction when he proposes the application of the law of the forum qua forum in a similar hypothetical case. Both of Weinstein’s proposals seem to be motivated by his profound disillusionment with the selectivist method as practiced in the United States. Such disillusionment on the part of a judge with this breadth and depth of conflicts experience should give all of us a reason for pause. This disillusionment is quite common among judges called upon to decide the complex “mega torts” discussed by Weinstein. Indeed, the selectivist method comes very close to the crashing point in coping with these cases and thus the thought of abandoning the method is entirely understandable. In ordinary single tort cases, however, the selectivist method remains dominant and its use is rarely questioned. One possible exception to the judicial use of the selectivist method is the increasing use of dépeçage, namely the application of the laws of different states to different issues or aspects of the same cause of action. Dépeçage comes close to the substantivist method in that it leads to the creation of a hybrid substantive rule that does not exist as such in any of the involved states and that springs into existence only for the case at hand. Nevertheless, dépeçage differs from the substantivist method in that it is driven by selectivist rather than substantive considerations. It is not an intended substantive solution, but rather the unintended result of one feature of modern selectivist methods--their insistence in analyzing and resolving each issue separately (called “issue-by-issue analysis”). On balance, the lack of contemporary judicial following of the substantivist method should not be surprising. One reason is the fact that for so long “[w]e have become so accustomed by tradition and theory to ideas of conflict, choice and selection.” A more serious reason, however, has to do with contemporary understandings about the appropriate role of judges and the hierarchy of sources of law. For, unlike some arbitrators, judges are expected to decide disputes according to law, not ex aequo et bono. The problem with the judicial version of the substantivist method is that it authorizes the retroactive application to unsuspecting litigants of a “law” that does not in fact exist anywhere until the moment the judge invents and utters it. Although it could be argued that this is no different than what judges have been doing in expanding the common law, the better view is that there is, at a minimum, a large difference in degree (the degree of pretension) and, more likely, an important difference in kind. （4）Legislative Substantivism In contrast, the substantivist method does not encounter the above difficulties when employed by the legislature, that is, by the body that has the unquestionable authority to promulgate new law that is meant to be applied prospectively only. During the twentieth century the substantivist method has been employed repeatedly in enacting uniform substantive rules intended to resolve multistate problems directly, without the intervention of choice-of-law rules. At the international level, these rules originate in international conventions such as the 1980 United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which is now in force in 56 countries; the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air; the 1956 Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road; the 1964 Hague Convention on Uniform Sales Laws; and the 1973 Washington Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. At the interstate level, one very productive source of uniform substantive rules is the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, which has produced approximately 200 uniform laws during the twentieth century. One of these uniform laws is the Uniform Commercial Code, which is now in force in all fifty states of the United States. Obviously, by eliminating the multiplicity of substantive laws, the enactment of these uniform laws has also eliminated the possibility of conflicts of laws in the areas covered by the uniform laws. To that extent, the substantivist method has commensurably reduced the scope of operation of the selectivist method. This reduction is relatively small and, although it should continue to grow in the future, the growth will be slow. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the selectivist method will continue to dominate all efforts to resolve multistate conflicts of laws. 第二章 国际私法的历史 【案例2.1】3美国马萨诸塞州的一个居民与该州的“杜威和阿尔米化学公司”缔结了一份书面雇用，同意他以化学工程师和化学家的身份替该公司在马萨诸塞州的实验室做研究工作。1935年9月，在雇用期中，雇主将其派往该公司在加利福尼亚州的一家分厂工作，作为暂时性的技术顾问以求改进雇主在那家分厂制造的产品的质量。他期望在他完成任务以后回到雇主在马萨诸塞州的实验室工作，但在此时，他不幸在加利福尼亚州遭到了伤害。于是，他便要求“加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会”判定“太平洋雇用保险公司”对其在被雇用期间于加利福尼亚州受到的伤害加以补偿。加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会因此责成该保险公司根据加利福尼亚州保险法所规定的保险补偿费对其进行补偿。 太平洋雇用保险公司则在加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院提出上诉，要求撤销加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会责成它对被雇用人的补偿。其根据有两点：第一，由于被雇用人是长期在马萨诸塞州的公司总部工作，而且只是暂时出差来加利福尼亚州并不幸遭受伤害的，所以他应当受马萨诸塞州工人补偿法的保护，而不应当受加利福尼亚州工人补偿法的保护；第二，加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会在适用加利福尼亚州法律的同时，拒绝给予马萨诸塞州法律以忠诚信用。然而，加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院驳回了该保险公司的上诉请求，美国最高法院也维持了原判。 在上述案件中，加利福尼亚州是侵权发生地，马萨诸塞州则是雇用关系合同缔结地。根据美国传统国际私法的规定，被雇用人的伤害应当适用雇用关系合同缔结地法，在该案中，也就是马萨诸塞州法律。然而，美国最高法院在该案中背离了美国传统国际私法理论所主张的方法，坚持适用侵权发生地法，即加利福尼亚州法律。美国最高法院之所以做出这一判决，在于它认识到，加利福尼亚州在该案中是侵权发生地州，而马萨诸塞州则是雇用关系发生地州，两个州对本案均有管辖权，且均有根据本州法律保护受雇佣者权利的利益。而法院地则刚好是侵权发生地的加利福尼亚州，而加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院显然认为，在本案中，该州的利益需要得到保护。 美国最高法院这一判决的意义在于，它明只要法院地在该案中具有利益，那么它就可以适用法院地法，从而为“政府利益分析说”的出现和发展提供了肥沃的土壤。另一方面我们也可以看出，该学说在实践操作中很有可能导致法院地法的滥用。 【思考题】 1．巴托鲁斯何以被称为“国际私法之父”？ 2．萨维尼何以被称为“近代国际私法之父”？ 3．试述当代国际私法的发展趋势。 【扩展性阅读材料】 1．李双元、吕国民：《萨维尼法学实践中一个矛盾现象之透视》，《浙江社会科学》2000年第2期。 2．韩德培、杜涛：《晚近国际私法立法的新发展》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2000年卷），法律出版社2000年版。 3．Historical Roots: The Legacy of Savigny4 These historical roots lie in the ideas of one of the greatest legal scholars of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Savigny is primarily known as the founder of the historical school of jurisprudence and the great opponent of codification. Yet, he is also one of the fathers of modern conflicts law. Exactly 150 years ago, Savigny published volume VIII of his magnum opus, System des heutigen römischen Rechts. In this volume, he broke away from the unilateral method of the medieval statutists that had dominated for five hundred years and put private international law on a modern, multilateral foundation. Conflicts rules, Savigny argued, must be neutral, i.e., they must not prefer particular parties, laws, or jurisdictions as such. To conform with this principle, he suggested that every legal relationship be governed by the law of the state or nation to which “it belongs, or to which it is subjected by virtue of its particular nature”, i.e., in which it has its “seat”. For Savigny, the idea of a such a “seat” of a relationship was only a metaphor for the best connection. He called it “a formal principle”, indicating that it needed to be filled with content under the circumstances of each case. With regard to obligations in particular, Savigny argued that in finding this connection, the primary factor should be the parties’ intentions. In the absence of a clear manifestation, these intentions should be inferred. Even objective choice-of-law criteria should reflect what the parties would have wanted had they thought about the problem. From these general premises, Savigny derived a concrete system of conflicts rules for international contracts. The basic rule was freedom of choice. Savigny postulated that the parties to a contract should be allowed to select the applicable law. To be sure, this was not his original idea, but he nonetheless made it the centerpiece of his entire approach. He understood that the choice could be explicit or implicit. Of course, Savigny recognized that the parties’ freedom was not unbridled since they could not be allowed to escape certain mandatory norms. In the absence of such a choice, Savigny called for objective rules that determine by neutral criteria which jurisdiction’s law will govern. In order to be neutral, these criteria had to be jurisdiction-selecting, i.e., independent of the content of the potentially applicable laws; they must also not give any preference to forum law nor to any party on grounds of his or her nationality. His basic principle reflects these aspirations: a contract was governed by the law of the jurisdiction to which the transaction most appropriately belonged. This most appropriate connection should be determined in careful consideration of all relevant circumstances. The answer could vary from case to case, but since Savigny did not wish to leave the result completely indeterminate, he provided a set of particular presumptions. In case of doubt, he thought that courts should resort to the place of performance, i.e., normally to the debtor’s domicile or principal place of business, since this was what the parties probably would have expected. Yet, in order to be more specific and to provide greater predictability, he distinguished between several kinds of contracts and considered different presumptions appropriate for each category. Of course, where necessary, these objective choice-of-law provisions had to yield to mandatory rules and to considerations of public policy. Methodologically, Savigny attempted to steer a middle course between the Scylla of uncertainty and the Charybdis of inflexibility. This goal is evident in his overall approach where he combined a general principle--the seat of the legal relationship--with a list of factors guiding its application (domicile of the parties, location of property, place of certain acts, location of the forum). The striving for a combination of predictability and flexibility is even more obvious in particular areas of law, such as contracts. On the one hand, Savigny sought to provide guidance for the courts by concretizing his general approach through specific rules for the various types of contracts. On the other hand, he avoided rigidity by conceiving of these rules merely as generalized presumptions that could be overcome if the particular circumstances suggested a different result. 第二编 冲突法的基本制度 第三章 冲 突 规 范 【案例3.1】1908年英国奥格登案。一名住所在法国的19岁法国男子，未经父母同意，去英国与一住所在英国的英国女子结婚，后来该法国男子以自己结婚未经父母同意，因而不具备结婚能力为由，在法国一法院起诉并获得一宣告婚姻无效的判决，其依据是根据法国的规定“未满25岁的子女未经父母同意不得结婚”。而后该英国女子在英国与一个住所在英国的英国男子结婚。后与该女子结婚的英国男子(原告)却以他与该英国女子结婚时她还存在合法婚姻为由，请求英国法院宣告他们的婚姻无效。结果英国法院根据英国法的观点将法国法中“须经父母同意的要件”识别为“婚姻形式要件”，从而援引“婚姻形式依婚姻举行地法”这一冲突规范，确定英国法为准据法来解决是否需要父母同意的问题，而英国法中并没有法国法中的上述限制性规定，因此该英国女子与法国男子的婚姻是有效的。于是，英国法院否定了法国法院作出的宣告婚姻无效的判决，并且满足了英国男子的请求。 在上述案例中，如果英国法院依法国法将须经父母同意的要件识别为婚姻能力问题，就要适用英国法中另一条冲突规范——“婚姻能力适用当事人住所地法”，即法国法。而根据法国法，就应承认法国法院的宣告婚姻无效的判决，并驳回英国原告的请求。可见，由于各国对同一法律概念或同一事实性质的理解可能不同，就有可能将同一事实确定为不同的法律性质，从而可能会导致援引不同性质的冲突规范，并作出不同的甚至截然相反的判决。从本案可以看到，在国际私法中，识别乃是一个非常重要的问题。同时我们还可以看到，在国际私法案件中，法官还面临一个依据哪个与案件相关的国家的法律概念来进行识别的问题。 【案例3.2】中国技术进出口总公司诉瑞士工业资源公司侵权损害赔偿纠纷上诉案。5被上诉人中国技术进出口总公司受浙江省温州市金属材料公司的委托，于1984年12月28日与美国旭日开发公司签订购买9000吨钢材的合同。之后，旭日开发公司因无力履约，请求中国技术进出口总公司同意将卖方变更为上诉人瑞士工业资源公司。瑞士工业资源公司随即于1985年3月14日向被上诉人发出电传称：“货物已在装船港备妥待运”，“装船日期为1985年3月31日”，要求被上诉人“将信用证开给挪威信贷银行(在卢森堡)，以瑞士工业资源公司为受益人”。同年３月26日，上诉人又向被上诉人发出电传称：“所供钢材可能由我们的意大利生产厂或西班牙生产厂交货”，并告知了钢材的价格条款、交货日期等。1985年4月1日，双方签订了《合同修改》，约定上诉人应在接受信用证后两周内装船待运。 1985年4月19日，被上诉人通知中国银行上海分行开出以上诉人为受益人不可撤销的信用证。随后，上诉人将全套单据通过银行提交被上诉人。同年６月１日，中国银行上海分行将上述货款汇付上诉人。货款汇付后，被上诉人因未收到上述钢材，向上诉人一再催促，上诉人全盘推卸自己的责任。 根据双方提供的证据证实，上诉人在意大利和西班牙既无钢厂，也无钢材；向被上诉人提交的意大利卡里奥托钢厂的钢材质量检验证书、重量证书和装箱单均系伪造。以上诉人为托运人并经其背书的提单上载明的装运船“阿基罗拉”号，在1985年内并末在该提单所载明的装运港意大利拉斯佩扎停泊过，从而证明上诉人并未将钢材托运装船，所提交的提单是伪造的。上诉人在答复被上诉人催问的电函中所称“中国港口拥挤”和“船舶将改变航线”的情况也纯属虚构。为此，被上诉人于1986年3月24日向上海市中级人民法院提起诉讼，要求上诉人返还货款、利息和经营损失等费用559万多美元，并申请诉讼保全。上海市中级人民法院准许被上诉人的诉讼保全申请，裁定冻结上诉人在中国银行上海分行的托收货款440万美元，查封了上述托收项下的全套单据。上海市中级人民法院经审理后判决瑞士工业资源公司应偿还中国技术进出口总公司的钢材货款、利息、经营损失及其他费用共计513万多美元，驳回瑞士工业资源公司的反诉。 上诉人不服一审判决，向上海市高级人民法院提出上诉称：双方签订的购销钢材合同中有仲裁条款。原审法院对本案无管辖权；原审法院裁定准许被上诉人诉讼保全申请，冻结上诉人的与本案无关的货款不当；上诉人被诉有欺诈行为并无事实依据；被上诉人在不同的法院对上诉人提出重复的诉讼不当；根据中国《涉外经济合同法》的规定，禁止间接损失，原判损害赔偿数额过高，并无事实和法律依据的支持，请求撤销原判。 上海市高级人民法院经公开审理确认：上诉人瑞士工业资源公司在无钢材的情况下，诱使被上诉人与其签订合同。上诉人利用合同形式，进行欺诈，已超出履行合同的范围，不仅破坏了合同，而且构成了侵权。双方当事人的纠纷，已非合同权利义务的争议，而是侵权损害赔偿纠纷。被上诉人有权向法院提起侵权之诉，而不受双方所订立的仲裁条款的约束。因本案侵权行为地在上海，依照我国《民事诉讼法(试行)》第22条关于“因侵权行为提起诉讼的，由侵权行为地人民法院管辖”的规定，以及该法第185条、第156条的规定，上海市中级人民法院对本案具有管辖权。上诉人提出的中国已加入《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》，当事人签订的合同又有仲裁条款，中国法院无管辖权，其理由不能成立。被上诉人并未在其他法院对上诉人提出过侵权损害赔偿的诉讼，因此，也不存在重复诉讼的问题。上海市高级人民法院于1988年10月11日，判决驳回上诉人瑞士工业资源公司的上诉，维持原判。 该案件涉及国际私法方面的很多问题，如识别问题、管辖权问题、诉讼保全的适当性问题、重复诉讼的问题和损害赔偿额的确定问题等，但最重要也是最具争议的还是识别问题。如果法院将本案识别为合同纠纷（这很自然），由于合同有仲裁条款，我国法院便无管辖权；如果将本案识别为刑事犯罪，则可提起刑事诉讼，实际上，瑞士法院已经对瑞士工业资源公司的负责人提起了刑事诉讼，所以被告在上诉中提出了重复诉讼的问题6。结果我国法院将案件识别为侵权纠纷，并按我国《民事诉讼法（试行）》第22条关于“因侵权行为提起的诉讼，由侵权行为地人民法院管辖”的规定决定管辖权，从而排除了合同中约定的仲裁管辖权条款的效力。显然，我国法院是依据我国的法律观念将本案识别为侵权纠纷的，同时坚持了我国法院在平行诉讼情形下的一贯做法，即充分考虑原告对诉因的选择权。对于上海两级法院在本案中的做法，一直存在争议。中国《仲裁法》实施后，在后来的类似案件中，最高人民法院改变了原来对此所持的肯定态度。 【思考题】 1.在下列案例中，最高人民法院将双方之间的关系识别为信托关系是否合理？为什么？ 【案例3.3】广东省轻工业品进出口集团公司与TMT贸易有限公司商标权属纠纷上诉案7 广东省轻工业进出口集团公司(以下简称“广轻公司”)分别于1979年和1980年与香港东明贸易有限公司(以下简称“东明公司”)签订两份“包销协议”，约定由东明公司定牌及包销广轻公司生产的TMT牌吊扇，吊扇所用TMT牌文字和图形组合商标由东明公司提供，由广轻公司在国内办理商标注册。1982年东明公司歇业，由香港TMT贸易有限公司（以下简称“TMT公司”）接手原东明公司与广轻公司的业务，也承受TMT商标。广轻公司并曾于1987年10月和12月向TMT公司发出两份文件证明广轻公司注册的1980年第142201号“TMT”商标以及其他相关的两个商标由香港TMT公司所有和受益，广轻公司只是作为受托人代表TMT公司持有此商标。1994年双方又签订一份协议，约定在中国境内，TMT商标由广轻公司注册，该公司有绝对的经营和管理权利，并负责处理境内任何假冒或侵犯该商标的行为。后来双方在履约中发生纠纷。1998年，TMT公司向广东省高级人民法院起诉，请求判令终止其委托广轻公司在国内注册和管理TMT商标的关系，并赔偿损失。 广东省高级人民法院经审理认定双方之间存在商标委托注册、管理的关系，依照《民法通则》及《民事诉讼法》中的有关规定，确认广轻公司注册的TMT商标归TMT公司所有，但TMT公司应向广轻公司作出一定的补偿。广轻公司不服，上诉到最高人民法院。在上诉审中，TMT公司答辩称广轻公司与TMT公司之间存在着事实上的信托法律关系。 1998年最高人民