康德的道德理想主义

JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL KANT'S MORAL IDEAL ISM (Received 28 July, 1986) Moral Idealism identifies morality with the ideal set of moral rules, where this set of rules is in turn identified in terms of a moral ideal. Morality, according to a moral idealism, is that set of rules universal obedience to which would realize this idealism's moral ideal. Moral idealisms, as here understood, define morality in terms of universal obedience tests. Theories of morality that instead use uni- versal acceptance and universal allegiance test are thus not, for present purposes, moral idealisms. Such theories encounter some of the prob- lems of obedience-theories, but not all. Most notably, obedience in contrast with acceptance and allegiance-theories lack resources for imposing limits on the complexity of moral rules. There are different ways of understanding universal obedience to a rule or rules. To mark one distinction, let universal actual obedience to a rule in a situation be a set of actions each one of which satisfies the rule in this, the actual, situation given what others are doing in it, and would do were the agent to do this thing, or this or that alternative to this thing. Let universal projected conformity to a rule in a situation be a set of actions each one of which would satisfy the rule in that situation in which others were doing their actions in this set, given what, in that projected situation, these others would be doing and would do were the agent to do this or that alternative to this action. All references to universal obedience in this paper are to universal obedience in the 'projected' sense. (I discuss and apply this and related distinctions in 'Everyone's conforming to a rule', Philosophical Studies, 1985, and in 'Utilitarianism and cooperation', Dialogue, 1985.) Moral idealisms differ in their characterizations of the moral ideal. According to Kant, universal obedience to the rules of morality would realize a Realm of Ends: PhilosophicalStudies 52 (1987) 277--287. �9 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. 278 JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL a whole of all ends in systematic connection, a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the particular ends which each may set for himself. (Founda- tions of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. L. W. Beck, Chicago, 1949, p. 433. All quotations unless otherwise indicated are from this text.) [a union in which] everybody may pursue his happiness in the manner that seems best to him, provided he does not infringe on other people's freedom to pursue similar ends, i �9 on another's right to do whatever can coexist with every man's freedom under a possible universal law. (Immanuel Kant, On the OM Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in Practice, tr. E. B. Ashton, Philadelphia, 1974, p. 58.) The moral ideal for Kant is, I think, that state in which freedom for each is at a maximum consistent with like freedom for all, and, subject to the realization of this libertarian end, persons' particular ends are satisfied and happiness is maximized. His moral ideal seems to have combined in lexical fashion libertarian and utilitarian elements. In possible contrast, Kant seems to have endorsed a purely libertarian political ideal that he viewed as only 'de facto utilitarian', happiness being an attendant of, but not a part of, the ideal. A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others -- I do not speak of the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself -- is . .. [an] idea, which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws. (Critique of Pure Reason, A316/B373.) Connectedly, while Kant may not have favored paternal, or 'good Samaritan', civil laws, he endorsed moral principles calling for benefi- cence, and enjoining that, when one can, one help others. The details of Kant's conception of morality's end are not, however, important for present purposes. What is now important is that he conceived of morality as having an end, and as being defined by its end. According to Kant, morality, is that legislation through which alone a realm of ends is possible. (p. 434) Morality is that body of laws through which a realm of ends would actually be realized �9 if they were universally obeyed. (p. 438) That is Kant's moral idealism. Moral idealisms one and all, and including most notably Kant's, are defective, logically defective. And moral idealisms, including again most notably Kant's, can make particularly acute, for their believers, the question, "Why be moral?". The defect of all moral idealisms is KANT'S MORAL IDEALISM 279 established and explored in the next section. The difficulty is elabo- rated, in the section after that. MORAL IDEALISM'S DEFECT, AND POSSIBLE REMEDIAL MODIFICATIONS 1. Every moral idealism presupposes that there is a unique set of ideal moral rules, that set of rules universal obedience to which would give rise to the state of affairs that is the moral ideal of the idealism. But there cannot be a unique set of rules that satisfies the universal obedience test. Proof: Assume for purposes of indirect argument that M is the one and only set of rules that satisfies a certain universal obedience test (that is, a universal obedience test that incorporates some specific moral ideal). Let M' include every rule in M and also some rules that prescribe specifically and only for cases in which rules in M are not obeyed. If the rules in M' are universally obeyed, then so, of course, are the rules in M. For M' includes M- M is a subset of M'. And, conversely, if the rules in M are universally obeyed, then so are the rules of M'. For rules of M' that are not also rules of M positively apply only when not all rules in M are universally obeyed. When all rules in M are universally obeyed, rules in M' that are not also rules of M are satisfied 'by default' or 'vacously' somewhat as is the rule to keep promises in a world in which no promises are made. Though M' is different from M, given the defined relation between M' and M, the rules of M are universally obeyed if and only if the rules of M" are, and M satisfies a universal obedience test if and only if M' also satisfies it. So M is not the one and only set of rules that satisfies the given universal obedience test, and regardless of the exact details of a given moral ideal, there cannot be a unique set of rules universal obedience to which would realize it. 2. What can be done? Probably any one of a number of things. The following suggestions take moral idealism some steps towards what can be termed Humean Realism or Practicalism. As a first pass at remedying the defect one might propose that 280 JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL morality is the intersection or the common part of ideal morafities. But morality, on this suggestion, will be incomplete. Most notably, it will contain no rules that would resolve issues in one way when there are other equally good ways in which they could be resolved -- e.g., no rules relating to many of the details of property and contract, if as it seems, there are details here that, though they need to be settled, can be settled equally well in a number of different ways, Also, morality will not include rules that say what is to be done is cases of breaches of moral rules, if, as seems true, there are always several things that might be prescribed in the event of various breaches. Morality, on the present proposal, will not include any rules that concern responsibilities of law-breakers tomake amends, or that concern responsibilities of others to punish law-breakers. Morality on the present proposal will, it seems, include few if any rules for cases in which, through earlier transgres- sions, an agent finds himself under conflicting moral demands and prohibitions. And perhaps most disturbing, morality on the present proposal will include few if any rules for situations, possibly awful situations, that can arise for agents only given the immoral doings, past, present, or future, of other agents. Is morality, understood as the intersection of ideal moralities, there- fore hopelessly incomplete? Must we consider some entirely different line of remedy for the radical defect of moral idealisms? No. Morality as currently understood, that is, morality as the intersection of all ideal moralities, though not including rules that deal directly with many important matters, can by a small addition be made to address itself to these matters indirectly, through the actual norms of well-arranged societies. Proposal -- Let morality be the intersection of ideal moralities, together with the rule: Defer to those norms of your society that are ideal norms. Let a norm be an 'ideal norm' if it is a member of at least one ideal morality. This, while perhaps a move in the fight direction, does not really solve the problem that provokes it. For consider that the norms of many societies, while doing good work and being better than no norms, may even so not be ideal norms for the cases they cover and the KANT'S MORAL IDEALISM 281 institutions they structure -- they may well not be members of any ideal moralities universal obedience to which would realize an ideal moral state. It should suffice here to recall that ideal norms can be of any order of complexity and can be expected often to elicit the response, That may be all very well and good in theory, but it would never work in practice. Even with the admixture of realism just proposed -- that is, even with this reference from within morality proper to actual positive moralities of agents' societies, agents will be without moral guidance in cases in which they most need it, since actual rules, even good and useful ones, will seldom if ever be ideal rules. Here is a new proposal that responds to this difficulty. Replace the rule displayed in the previous paragraph by the following rule: Defer to the norms of your society in so far as they are promoting morality's end and are in this sense improve- ments on the State of Nature. We are, one may feel, nearly done. It remains only to consider that moralities of actual societies vary in their coverage, and that at the extreme there is the State of Nature, a condition of man in which there are no actual social rules or conventions. Focusing for simplicity on this extreme, must morality in the State of Nature come down to nothing more than the common part of all ideal moralities? No. The inspiration for the course we have taken makes one last Step nearly irresistible. Final proposal -- Let morality be the intersection of all ideal moralities, together with the rule stated at the end of the just previous paragraph, as well as the following rule: Subject to obedience to every other rule of morality, do whatever will promote morality's end at least as much as any other thing you can do. 3. We began this section with the observation that Moral Idealism is logically defective, and that it must be changed in some way if it is to be even a candidate for a correct theory of morality. One line of correction was then followed to its natural culmination. Elements of realism were introduced in the form of referrals to actual moralities, idealism was tempered and actual norms allowed to be relevant if they 282 JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL are good norms, even if they are not best or ideal norms, and the account was provided with a kind of completeness through a rule that would have decisions directly serve morality's end subject to conformity to all other moral rules. And what is this theory that our remedial action has produced? It is, we can say, Moral Idealism Humeanized, but not completely so. Suppose we were to operate in the manner described on Kant's moral idealism. The result, while closer to, would not be Hume's theory of moral actions as actions of virtuous persons, just and benevolent persons. One difference would be in the conception of morality's end. For Hume it is the pure utilitarian end of maximum happiness. For Kant it was, I think, first the libertarian end of maximum freedom, and only secondarily and subordinately the utilitarian end of maximum happiness. Another difference, a more important one in the present context, is that the account we have reached retains an element of idealism not found in Hume's theory. Morality on the present qualified idealistic account includes the common part of ideal moralities, whereas morality for Hume includes, at the level of rules only certain actual and generally observed rules of the agent's society. To dramatize the contrast I observe that morality on Hume's completely non-idealistic account includes no rules (for example, no rules of justice relating to property or promises) in a State of Nature, in which state active moral virtues are confined to species of benevolence, and moral principles (as distinct from rules of thumb) reduce to the single principle, the Supreme Law, that you should do what you can to make people happy. I am, of course, not saying that Kant was Hume. Kant was Kant. He was first and last an unremitting moral idealist. Kant's pronouncements on the subject are, I think, unequivocal. He endorses moral idealism without qualification, and without complicating additions. 'But what are you implying here about the logical defect of moral idealisms? Do you mean to say that Kant didn't notice it?' Yes. And I have no idea what he would have done about this defect, and related problems, if he had been confronted with them. It would have depended, I suppose, on who arranged the confrontation, on how resourceful and relentless he was in this connection, and on what remedial possibilities suggested them- selves in the conversation. KANT'S MORAL IDEALISM 283 MORAL IDEALISM'S PROBLEM WITH MORALITY'S JUSTIFICATION 1. Moral idealism -- the identification of morality with rules universal obedience to which would realize some end or ideal -- can seem to make particularly acute the problem of morality's justification. Suppose that someone wonders why he should be moral, why he should commit himself totally and without reservation to morality's rules, and scrupu- lously satisfy morality's every demand. Suppose, to take what one might have thought would be the easiest case, that this person is already inter- ested in morality's end -- that ideal that universal obedience would realize. Suppose, for example, that he is already excited by the nobility of the conception of a 'realm of ends' and prepared to do everything he can to promote its realization. What can be said to this person that will suffice to interest him in Kantian morality and move him to submit without reservation to its constraints? 'But what could possibly be this" person's problem? He makes morality's end his own end, so isn't he bound, if consistent, to be prepared to make morality's rules his rules, and to do his part in that practice of universal obedience that by hypothesis would realize that end?' No. He is not, by his acceptance of morality's end, bound to accept morality. For consider: ... though he scrupulously follow the rules of morality, [he] cannot for that reason expect every other rational being to be true to it . . . . Still the law: Act according to the maxims of a universally legislative member of a merely potential realm of ends, remains in full force . . . . And just in this lies the paradox that merely the dignity of humanity as rational nature without any end or advantage to be gained by it, and thus respect for the mere idea, should serve as the inflexible precept of the will. (pp. 438--9) A moral idealist who makes morality's end his own end cannot automatically take his interest in this end as a ground for interest in and commitment to morality's rules. For obedience by a person to rules, universal obedience to which would realize some end, can, of course, in the absence of obedience to these rules by other persons, or by himself at other times, be "without any end or advantage." In such cases, scrupulous adherence to morality's rules can seem not only pointless, but positively counter-productive, and can seem so even, perhaps 284 JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL especially, to a person who makes morality's end his own end. Such a person could think, correctly it seems, that in some bad circumstances morality's end, and morality itself, could be best promoted by immoral means that would violate some of its rules. For example, a little 'noble lying' about the nature and grounds of morality to get others to join in adherence to it, though against morality, that is, though against its rules, might be just the thing that in some imperfect circumstances would best serve and promote its objective. 2. I digress to observe that the present problem with moral idealism does not arise for a certain related, though in spirit very different, conception of morality. Let Practical Moral idealism identify morality with rules or prescriptions that satisfy two obedience-conditions: First, for idealism, universal obedience to these rules is to realize some specified moral end or ideal; and second, for practicality, individual obedience to them is (both in the presence, and in the absence of obedience by others or by the agent at other times) to serve that end or ideal at least as well as would any other course open to the individual obeying agent. Generalized Act Utilitarianism (see B. C. Postow, 'Generalized Act Utilitarianism', Analysis, 1977), and, arguably, Cooperative Utilitari- anism (see Donald H. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, Oxford 1980), are examples of what could be termed 'utilitarian practical moral idealism'. These practical moral idealisms depart in one way or another from exclusively individual-act-oriented conceptions of morality. Ac- cording to the first, GAU, morality includes prescriptions for actions of groups of agents, as well as for actions of individual agents. According to the second, CU, morality includes prescriptions for attitudes and motives (in particular, it requires that one be ready and willing in a certain manner to cooperate) in addition to prescriptions for actions proper. It is demonstrable that every practical moral idealism that satisfies a certain condition must depart in one way or another from the 'exclusive individual-act-orientation' exemplified by act utilitarianisms. The condition is this: That the ideal of the practical moral idealism order interactions in situation in a manner that is sufficiently inde- pendent of the actions involved in them to allow for the possibility of a situation of the structure, KANT 'S MORAL IDEAL ISM 285 C1 *C2 ,, R1 ! 2 0 1 *R2 I, 0 1 where numbers order possible interactions from worst, 0, to best, 2, according to the moral ideal, asterisks indicate what each agent will do, and actions are causally independent so that, for example, even if Row were to do R1, Column would still do R2. Proof: suppose that there is an exclusively individual-act-oriented practical moral idealism, API, for which a situation of this kind is possible. Since API is a practical moral idealism, individual obedience to its rules in this situation would include Row's doing R2 -- that is the best Row can do given that Column is doing C2 -- and would include Column's doing C2, which is the best Column can do given what Row is doing. Since API is an exclusively individual-act-oriented practical moral idealism, total obedience to it would include nothing more than these obedient individual acts, so that there is universal obedience