新加坡将拥有人民币清算银行

新加坡将拥有人民币清算银行 FINANCE Vol.21,2011 * Bank * Insurance * Investment * Stock * Bond * Fund * Personal Finance * Financial Time MCanxixun Information and News Service Mcanxixun * Information Contents Bank(银行) .................................................................................................................................. 3 Singapore to become renminbi trade hub ................................................................................................. 3 新加坡将拥有人民币清算银行 ......................................................................................................... 3 Fears over CFO changes at banks ........................................................................................................... 4 华尔街银行频换CFO ...................................................................................................................... 5 US watchdogs line up 100 cases against rescued banks‘ executives ............................................................ 5 上百名美银行高管面对“秋后算账”............................................................................................... 6 The banks get away with it again ............................................................................................................ 6 银行并未改过自新........................................................................................................................... 8 A shadowy presence ............................................................................................................................. 9 中国的―影子银行‖ ..........................................................................................................................12 Economic Analysis(经济分析) ............................................................................................. 15 China credit agency: cut US debt rating six months ago............................................................................15 分析:大公国际的先见之明............................................................................................................16 Huawei‘s path to gaining a foothold in the US.........................................................................................17 分析:上市有助华为进军美国 ........................................................................................................18 London will outlast the City grumblers...................................................................................................19 伦敦活力不减当年..........................................................................................................................20 China lights a fire in global dealmaking .................................................................................................21 中国企业的触角伸向全球并购 ........................................................................................................23 Investment(投资) .................................................................................................................... 25 Is the Market Overvalued?....................................................................................................................25 股市被高估了吗,..........................................................................................................................27 Deal of the day: CIC invests in SMIC ....................................................................................................29 中芯国际获中投2.5亿美元投资 .....................................................................................................30 A New Tack In China For Equity Firms..................................................................................................30 在华私募新尝试:国内募资 海外投资 ............................................................................................32 Financial Time(金融时报) ...................................................................................................... 33 China Owns Us--And Other Fallacies ....................................................................................................33 美国的大债主真是中国吗,............................................................................................................34 Which one is more like ,1996 or 1999?.............................................................................................35 要是现在更像1996年，而不是1999年呢, ...................................................................................38 Managers facing challenge over Taiwan fees rule ....................................................................................40 海外基金公司不再看好台湾市场.....................................................................................................41 The global oil casino benefits only its players .........................................................................................42 全球石油赌场只让玩家受益............................................................................................................44 High-frequency traders switch their focus to emerging markets .................................................................45 1 MCanxixun * Information 高频交易商盯上新兴市场 ...............................................................................................................45 Stock(股票)............................................................................................................................... 46 Private equity: spanning the culture gap .................................................................................................46 私人股本在中国 .............................................................................................................................49 Glencore's IPO: what the analysts are saying...........................................................................................51 嘉能可首次公开发行，分析师评论不一 ..........................................................................................53 Chinese equities recover as Beijing battles inflation .................................................................................54 通胀趋缓为中国股市打气 ...............................................................................................................56 Fund(基金) ................................................................................................................................ 57 China moves slowly to lift hedge fund barriers ........................................................................................57 中国缓慢开放对冲基金市场............................................................................................................58 Municipal Bond Closed-End Funds Attractive.........................................................................................60 迷人的封闭式市政债券基金............................................................................................................60 Bond(债券) ............................................................................................................................... 61 Treasuries Fall Before Inflation Reports; Pimco‘s Gross Sells ...................................................................61 国债下跌，Pimco将其出售 ............................................................................................................63 German Bonds Fall on Rates; Portugal Debt Drops After Bailout...............................................................64 德债券走低;葡萄牙债务滑落 ........................................................................................................65 2 Mcanxixun * Information Bank(银行) Singapore to become renminbi trade hub Singapore has made a bid to become the first overseas hub for trading renminbi, marking a new stage in the internationalisation of the Chinese currency. The Monetary Authority of Singapore said on Tuesday that Beijing would soon appoint a Chinese bank to clear renminbi trades in the city state, giving Singaporean banks direct access to renminbi rather than having to route transactions via Hong Kong or commercial banks in China. ―It‘s a huge development,‖ said Mirza Baig, a Singapore-based currency strategist for Deutsche Bank. ―Think of a clearing bank as a pipeline that flows between Singapore and mainland China. Singapore won‘t need to go through Hong Kong any more.‖ About 7 per cent of China‘s international trade was settled in renminbi in the first quarter of this year, official data showed this week. The People‘s Bank of China, which declined to comment on the Singapore plans, is pushing for a greater role for the renminbi in global trade and investment to reduce China‘s almost total reliance on the US dollar. According to Goh Chok Tong, the former prime minister who chairs the board of the MAS, the PBoC will soon approve a Singapore branch of a major mainland bank to handle the clearing. The clearing bank is expected to be either Industrial and Commercial Bank of China or Bank of China, which have the largest Chinese banking operations in Singapore. Mr Goh did not say what services the clearing bank would provide. The only place outside mainland China that currently has a renminbi clearing bank is Hong Kong, where Bank of China has been appointed by the PBoC to clear trades with the mainland market. As renminbi has flowed out of mainland China through trade channels, Hong Kong banks have taken in the lion‘s share of deposits and used them to fuel a growing market in renminbi- denominated financial products. Renminbi deposits in Hong Kong surged to Rmb408bn ($62bn) in February – up more than eightfold from two years ago. Singapore‘s renminbi ambitions reflects its long financial rivalry with Hong Kong. Hong Kong hosts more regional headquarters of international banks but has lost out to Singapore as a centre for commodities and currency trading. A designated bank clearing operation in Singapore would facilitate trade in the renminbi between China and south-east Asia. But Mr Goh played down Singapore‘s prospects of rivalling Hong Kong – a self-governing Chinese territory – as the main international centre for renminbi-based financial activity. ―We have no ambitions to try to rival Hong Kong,‖ he said. 新加坡将拥有人民币清算银行 新加坡已向成为首个海外人民币交易中心迈出第一步，此举标志着人民币的国际化进入了一个新阶 段。 新加坡金融管理局(MAS)周二表示，中国政府不久将指定一家中资银行在新加坡进行人民币交易的清 算，这将使新加坡各银行能够直接经手人民币，而无需经由香港或中国内地各商业银行转手。 “这是一个重大进展，”德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)常驻新加坡的货币策略师米尔萨•贝格(Mirza Baig)表示。“可以把一家清算银行想象为一条接通新加坡和中国大陆的管道。新加坡将不再需要经过香 港了。”本周官方数据显示，今年首季中国的国际贸易大约7%是用人民币结算的。 3 MCanxixun * Information 中国央行(PBOC)正致力于提升人民币在全球贸易和投资中所扮演的角色，以改变中国几乎完全依赖 美元的局面。中国央行拒绝对上述新加坡计划予以置评。 据新加坡前总理、现任金管局主席吴作栋(Goh Chok Tong)介绍，中国央行不久将批准中国内地一家 大银行的新加坡分行处理清算业务。预计这家负责清算的银行将是中国工商银行(ICBC)和中国银行(BOC) 两家中的一家。这两家银行在新加坡的经营规模是中资银行中最大的。吴作栋没有说明该清算行具体将 提供哪些服务。 目前，中国内地以外地区唯一拥有人民币清算银行的地方是香港，在那里，中国央行指定由中行清 算与内地市场的交易。 随着人民币通过贸易途径流出中国内地，香港各银行吸收了其中大部分储蓄，并利用这些资金推动 以人民币计价的金融产品市场不断增长。 2月，香港的人民币储蓄飙升至4080亿元人民币(合620亿美元)，比两年前高出8倍以上。新加 坡在人民币业务上的雄心，反映出这个城市国家在金融方面与香港的长期角力。 香港拥有更多国际银行的区域总部，但在大宗商品和外汇交易方面逊于新加坡。在新加坡指定一家 人民币清算银行，将为中国与东南亚的人民币贸易创造条件。但吴作栋淡化了新加坡与自治的中国特别 行政区香港一争高下的前景。“我们没有和香港竞争的野心，”他表示。 Fears over CFO changes at banks Wall Street banks have been losing chief financial officers at an unusually high rate since the financial crisis, a trend that is unnerving investors at a time when they crave a return to stability in the sector. The surprise decision by Bank of America last Friday to replace Chuck Noski after just a year as CFO means that all the large US financial institutions, with the exception of Goldman Sachs, have replaced their finance chiefs in the past two years. This wave of change is uncommon for corporate America where CFOs tend to stay for several years and play a crucial role not only in companies‘ internal workings but also as a linchpin in their relationships with investors and regulators. At General Electric, for example, Keith Sherin has been CFO since 1998, serving under two chief executives: Jack Welch and Jeff Immelt. Goldman‘s David Viniar has been CFO since the company went public in 1999. Analysts said the merry-go-round of CFOs on Wall Street was alarming given investors‘ concerns over the strength of banks‘ finances and their ability to deal with more stringent regulations and capital requirements. ―It is always a red flag when the CFO of a bank leaves,‖ said Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA. Glenn Schorr, an analyst at Nomura, wrote to clients on Friday that the replacement of BofA‘s Mr Noski was an ―eyebrow-raising event‖. Mr Noski‘s move to become a vice-chairman and his replacement by chief risk officer Bruce Thompson came two months after Howard Atkins abruptly resigned as CFO of Wells Fargo . Both banks said their CFOs left for personal reasons, but investors were left speculating about other motives behind the moves. Other departing CFOs over the past two years include Colm Kelleher and Michael Cavanagh, of Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan respectively. Both were deemed to have performed well during the financial crisis and were replaced with highly-regarded internal candidates. At Citigroup, John Gerspach was the bank‘s fifth finance chief in five years when he took over in July 2009. ―The departure of a CFO is a reason for concern and investors need a full explanation of their reasons and 4 Mcanxixun * Information rationale to allay their fears,‖ said Charles Elson, director of the centre for corporate governance at the University of Delaware. 华尔街银行频换CFO 自金融危机爆发以来，华尔街各银行失去首席财务官(CFO)的速度一直高得出奇。在投资者祈盼金融 业恢复稳定之际，这样的趋势令他们感到不安。 上周五，美国银行(Bank of America)出人意料地决定撤掉上任仅一年的CFO查克•诺斯基(Chuck Noski)。至此，除了高盛(Goldman Sachs)以外，美国所有大型金融机构最近两年里都撤换了CFO。 这股换人风潮在美国企业界并不常见。在美国，CFO一般都会担任很多年，他们不仅在企业内部运 作中发挥着重要作用，还在企业与投资者和监管者的关系中扮演着关键角色。 譬如在通用电气(General Electric)，凯斯•谢林(Keith Sherin)从1998年起担任CFO，先后效力 于两任首席执行官(CEO):杰克•韦尔奇(Jack Welch)和杰夫•伊梅尔特(Jeff Immelt)。高盛的戴维•维尼 亚(David Viniar)从1999年高盛上市时起就一直担任CFO。 分析师表示，华尔街走马灯似地更换CFO令人心惊。投资者担心银行的财务状况，以及它们是否有 能力应对更加严苛的监管法规和资本金要求。“一家银行的CFO离任，永远都是一个危险信号，”里昂 证券(CLSA)分析师迈克•梅奥(Mike Mayo)表示。 野村(Nomura)分析师戈兰•斯科尔(Glenn Schorr)上周五在客户报告中写道，美银撤换诺斯基之举 令人诧异”。 “ 诺斯基将出任副董事长一职，而首席风险官布鲁斯•汤普森(Bruce Thompson)将接替CFO一职。两个 月前，富国银行(Wells Fargo)的CFO霍华德•阿特金斯(Howard Atkins)也突然辞职。 两家银行均表示，它们的CFO离职是出于个人原因，但投资者猜测背后另有隐情。最近两年里离职 的CFO包括摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的科尔姆•凯勒尔(Colm Kelleher)和摩根大通(JPMorgan)的迈 克尔•卡瓦纳(Michael Cavanagh)。两人均被认为在金融危机期间表现良好，而后却被声望颇高的内部人 选取代。 在花旗集团(Citigroup)，约翰•戈斯帕奇(John Gerspach)在2009年7月出任CFO一职时，已是该 行5年内第五位CFO。 特拉华大学(University of Delaware)公司治理中心主任查尔斯•埃尔森(Charles Elson)表示: “CFO离职可能会引起人们的担忧。公司需要对他们离职的原因做出充分的解释，给出合理的缘由，才 能减轻投资者的担忧。” US watchdogs line up 100 cases against rescued banks’ executives US regulators are expected to file up to 100 lawsuits against executives and directors of bailed-out banks in the next two years, as they seek to hold people accountable for management failings and recover billions of dollars, industry experts said. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is only now beginning to step up its efforts to make an example of overly aggressive executives or inattentive directors of the 348 banks that have failed since 2008. The failures have cost the FDIC‘s insurance fund $59bn. Analysis by Nera Economic Consulting of material on the FDIC‘s website suggests it has lost $80bn. 5 MCanxixun * Information Insurers who write policies known as D&O, which are held by directors and officers to protect them in the event of a bank failure, are likely to be liable for much of the money the FDIC aims to recover. Many have tightened up their terms, making it difficult for the 884 banks that remain on the group‘s watch list to renew cover. The FDIC has authorised the filing of suits against 158 directors in total seeking more than $3.5bn. But of those, it has brought only six cases so far against 44 officials totalling $1.5bn, with the lion‘s share of recoveries, about $900m, expected to come from Washington Mutual, the failed lender acquired by Wells Fargo. ―We‘re still very early in the process in terms of the claims that we will be bringing,‖ said Richard Osterman, the FDIC‘s deputy general counsel. ―There are still a lot of failed banks that we are investigating.‖ Most of the FDIC‘s suits have been filed in the first months of this year. Bank failures have continued with another 26 shutting their doors by the end of March, after 157 failures in 2010. 上百名美银行高管面对“秋后算账” 业内专家预计，未来两年，美国监管机构将对接受纾困银行的高管和董事提起多达100起法律诉讼， 以追究管理过失的责任，并追回数十亿美元资金。 2008年以来，美国已有348家银行破产，但联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)直到如今才开始加紧惩治行事 过于激进的高管和疏于职守的董事，以儆效尤。这些银行破产案耗费了FDIC 590亿美元的保险资金。诺 恒经济咨询公司(NERA Economic Consulting)对FDIC网站上的分析显示，实际损失已经达到800 亿美元。 FDIC计划追讨的大部分资金，可能会追究到承保“董监事及高级管理人员责任保险”(D&O)的保险 商头上。许多保险商都已收紧了相关条款，使仍处于FDIC观察名单中的884家银行难以续保。上了D&O 保险的董监事和高级管理人员在银行发生倒闭情况下可以得到保障。 FDIC已批准对158名高管和董事提起诉讼，希望追回逾35亿美元资金。但是，该机构截止目前只 对44名高管提出了6起诉讼，总共涉及15亿美元资金，其中大部分资金(大约9亿美元)预计将来自 华盛顿互惠银行(Washington Mutual)。这家银行在破产后，已被富国银行(Wells Fargo)收购。 “就索赔而言，我们还处在相当初期的阶段，”FDIC副总法律顾问理查德•奥斯特曼(Richard Osterman)表示。“我们仍在调查大量破产银行。”FDIC的诉讼大多是在今年头几个月提起的。继2010 年157家银行破产后，到今年3月底，又有26家银行关门。 The banks get away with it again There are a couple of things to say about Britain‘s banks. They still pose a serious threat to the nation‘s long-term stability and prosperity. They rely for their profits – and for the huge bonuses paid to senior staff – on the fact that taxpayers are underwriting the risks. Thus public subsidy is turned into private profit. Add to the mix the banks‘ pivotal role in the global financial crash, and it is unsurprising that bankers are today less popular than second-hand car dealers and journalists. Nationalisation of the banks‘ losses has left most British households facing cuts in their standard of living as steep as any since the 1920s. The banks have responded by reinstating big pay-outs for top executives and traders. Mervyn King puts it well. Britain, the Bank of England governor says, has not solved the problem of ―too-important-to-fail‖ banks. Reckless risk-taking and extravagant rewards are a consequence of the moral hazard that allows bankers to gamble with taxpayer‘s money. In Mr King‘s commonsense judgment, the idea that some businesses cannot be allowed to fail ―should have no place in a market economy‖. 6 Mcanxixun * Information The nation‘s politicians mostly understand this. They know there is no surer way to garner easy popular applause than by promising to get tough with those at the helm of financial institutions. George Osborne has imposed a ?2.5bn-a-year tax on the banks. The chancellor would have been cheered more loudly had he doubled or trebled that figure. For their part, bankers seem perversely determined to make it easier for their critics. Thus Bob Diamond, chief executive of Barclays and the industry‘s self-appointed shop steward, announced a couple of months ago that the time for remorse about the crash was over. Mr Diamond is equally unapologetic about the return of big bonuses. Rather, he has been urging his staff at Barclays to take more risks in order to generate them. As one person close to Mr Diamond‘s thinking told Patrick Jenkins of the Financial Times: ―One of our [Barclays] challenges is that not enough risk is being taken.‖ The bank, it seems, should be placing bigger bets with the public subsidy it gets in the form of its too-important-to-fail guarantee. The Barclays chief executive is no fool, however. My guess is that he judges that, for all the sound and fury at Westminster, the banks have got away with it. Politicians eager to hurl rhetorical brickbats have been a lot more reluctant to embrace the radical regulatory reforms that would meet Mr King‘s criteria for a well-functioning market economy. The reason is simple enough: much as a fundamental overhaul would be good for the economy in the long term, ministers fear possible short-term costs. If Britain moves faster than others, London could lose some of its competitive edge. Mr Diamond, for one, has been threatening to take his bank elsewhere. He is probably bluffing and, in any event, it is far from obvious that Britain would suffer as a consequence. But David Cameron‘s Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition is not in the mood to take risks. These are tough times. The economy has been stagnating under the weight of Mr Osborne‘s fiscal austerity. Mr King may soon be obliged to put up interest rates to counter runaway inflation. Financial services are a hefty slice of the economy. This is not the time to undermine confidence in the City. So the coalition has been looking for a halfway house – a set of measures that would make the banks safer and please the voters, but not at the expense of London‘s role as an international financial centre. Such a compromise would also ease some of the tensions between Lib Dem hawks and Tory doves in the coalition. An independent commission, headed by Sir John Vickers, now seems to have served up just the recipe. The analysis set out in the commission‘s interim report is impeccable. The state guarantees for retail banking provide cheap funding for the wagers made by investment banks. Most of this activity, in the apt description of Lord Turner, the chairman of the Financial Services Authority, is ―socially useless‖. If things go wrong, the state pays; if not, the banks collect the profits. One of the commission‘s answers is to propose an increase in the capital held by banks to reduce the implicit state subsidy and to increase the institutions‘ resilience to shocks. It wants firebreaks between utility and casino banking activities, and a requirement on the banks to hold more ―loss-absorbing debt‖. All this sounds eminently sensible. The commission, however, baulks at the intellectual logic of its own diagnosis. What is needed is a formal separation between retail and investment banking. Such a break-up would see taxpayers guaranteeing the socially essential parts of the industry and the gamblers obliged to wager their own money. Separation along these lines would not remove all the risks. It would be an important stride in that direction. Instead, Sir John has seemed more attuned to political expedience than to the wider national interest. The bankers, of course, will protest against even the report‘s fairly modest proposals. They have grown accustomed to collecting fat rents in a rigged market. But you can already hear the sighs of relief in Downing Street and the clinking of glasses in the Barclays boardroom. 7 MCanxixun * Information 银行并未改过自新 关于英国的银行，有些事情需要讲一讲。它们仍然对英国的长期稳定与繁荣构成了严重威胁。它们赚取的利润以及向高管支付的巨额奖金，都有赖于这样一个事实:纳税人承担着风险。于是，对公众的补贴变成了私人的利润。 再加上银行在全球金融危机中扮演的关键角色，如今银行家们还不如二手车经销商和记者受欢迎，也就不足为奇了。银行亏损的国有化使大多数英国家庭的生活水平面临上世纪20年代以来最大幅度的下滑。但银行的回应却是，重新开始向高管和交易员发放巨额报酬。 英国央行(BoE)行长默文•金(Mervyn King)说得很到位。他指出，英国还没有解决银行“太重要而不能倒”的问题。银行家们可以拿纳税人的资金去赌博，这种道德风险造成了不计后果的冒险行为和过高的高管薪酬。按照金出于常识的判断，一些公司不允许倒闭的观点“在市场经济中应当没有立足之地”。 英国的政治家大多对此心知肚明。他们知道，要想轻松赢得公众的赞誉，没有什么能比承诺严惩金融机构更有把握。财政大臣乔治•奥斯本(George Osborne)已经在向英国各银行每年征税25亿英镑。如果他把这个数字加上一倍或两倍，准能赢得更大声的欢呼。 就银行家来说，他们似乎下定决心要给批评人士更多的借口。于是，巴克莱(Barclays)首席执行官、自封的银行界代表鲍勃•戴蒙德(Bob Diamond)几个月前宣布，为金融危机而悔恨日子结束了。 同样，戴蒙德也不认为重新发放高额奖金有什么错。恰恰相反，他一直在鼓励巴克莱员工多冒险，以便获得高额奖金。一位了解戴蒙德想法的员工向《金融时报》记者帕特里克•詹金斯(Patrick Jenkins)表示，“我们(巴克莱)面临的挑战之一就是冒险不足。 ”看起来，巴克莱在“太重要而不能倒掉”的理由下获得的公共补贴，似乎应该更多地拿去冒险。 不过，这位巴克莱首席执行官并不愚蠢。我的猜测是，他判定，虽然国会里的严惩之声甚嚣尘上，但银行界已经顺利脱险。政治家虽不吝批评之辞，但更不愿意接受激进的监管改革，以达到金对运转良好的市场经济设定的标准。 原因很简单:虽然彻底改革从长远来看有利于英国经济，但内阁部长们可能更担心短期成本。如果英国的改革步伐超前于其他国家，伦敦可能会丧失部分竞争优势。 举例来说，戴蒙德一直威胁要将银行总部迁出英国。他可能是在虚张声势，即便巴克莱真地撤离，英国会受多大影响还远未明朗。不过，戴维•卡梅伦(David Cameron)领导的保守党和自由民主党联合政府可不打算冒险。 眼下形势十分严峻。在奥斯本财政紧缩的压力下，英国经济已出现滞涨。也许不久之后，金就不得不提高利率，以抗击失控的通胀。金融服务业在英国经济中占据了很高的比重，目前不应该打击民众对伦敦金融城的信心。 因此，联合政府一直在寻找中间路线——一套既能提高银行的安全性、取悦选民，又不会损害伦敦国际金融中心地位的措施。这样一个折衷，还能缓和联合政府中自由民主党鹰派和保守党鸽派之间的紧张关系。 现在看来，约翰•维克斯爵士(Sir John Vickers)领导的银行业独立委员会开出的是对症的药方。该委员会的中期报告所做的分析无可挑剔。国家为零售银行提供的担保，为投资银行的赌博提供了廉价资金。英国金融服务管理局(FSA)主席特纳勋爵(Lord Turner)的描述可谓恰如其分。他认为，这种活动大多“对社会没用”。如果情况变糟，国家埋单;如果没有，银行获利。 银行业独立委员会提出的对策之一是，建议银行持有更多资本，以减少隐性的国家补贴，提高银行对冲击的适应能力。它希望在公用事业与赌博性的银行业务之间筑起防火墙，并要求银行持有更多“可以吸收亏损的债务”。这一切听起来都非常有道理。 不过，该委员会对自身诊断的智力逻辑也有所迟疑。英国需要的是零售银行和投行业务的正式分离。这样一来，银行业中为社会所不可或缺的那部分业务就可以由纳税人提供担保，赌徒们则只能用自己的 8 Mcanxixun * Information 钱去冒险。按照这些原则分离业务虽不能消除所有风险，却是向实现这一目标迈出重要的一步。 不过，相比于更广泛的国家利益，约翰爵士似乎更热衷于政治上的便利。尽管报告中的建议相当温 和，但银行家们肯定会提出抗议。他们已经习惯了在受到操纵的市场上收取丰厚的租金。你已经能听到 唐宁街宽慰的叹气声和巴克莱董事会会议室的碰杯声了。 A shadowy presence John Kuhns was in Hong Kong at the end of January, visiting local branches of his mainland banks in search of money. That was because ―my banks told me they might only be able to provide 60 per cent of what they lent last year, given restrictive new quotas‖, says the head of China Hydroelectric, a Beijing-based investor in hydropower. But there was no need for alarm, these bankers added, according to Mr Kuhns, an American who has been active in Chinese power generation since the 1990s. ―They said: ?If you need more, we can help you arrange a bond issue in Hong Kong. Or we can help you set up a trust company to obtain more money.‘?‖ Welcome to the unofficial financial realm that has sprung up outside China‘s heavily regulated banking system. At the same time as banks in China – under orders from a government anxious to rein in a lending boom – act to cut their credit to China Hydroelectric and other borrowers, their Hong Kong arms are offering alternative arrangements. Mr Kuhns says he was told he could raise as much as HK$3bn ($385m) in bonds tied to the value of the renminbi, an amount far greater than he needed. The message he had received in Beijing was the same as that conveyed to countless other borrowers across China as the authorities try to control credit growth. This year, with inflation running at almost 5 per cent and expected to rise, the government has signalled that it is serious about adopting a more restrictive policy. But can it? In response to the heavy hand of the regulators, a host of grey-market institutions and arrangements has sprung up precisely to get around formal restrictions in China‘s heavily controlled financial markets. Analysts say annual flows could involve Rmb2,000bn ($305bn) – equivalent to about one-third of gross domestic product. ―The People‘s Bank of China has difficulty in controlling liquidity and getting the banks to meet the loan quotas,‖ says Francis Cheng at CLSA in Hong Kong. He reckons the banks account for only half of total financing. The rest comes from a variety of trust companies, finance companies, 9 MCanxixun * Information leasing companies and underground banks. All of them are less regulated than the banks, subject to conflicting regulators or not regulated at all. Yet Beijing operates as if the banks account for all of the financing. That is one reason credit growth has continued to exceed official targets, fuelling the inflation that worries Beijing. Some senior banking officials deny the very existence of the informal sector. ―The term ?shadow banking‘ doesn‘t really apply to China,‖ says Jiang Jianqing, chairman of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, one of the country‘s biggest banks. ―There are no financial institutions outside the supervisory and regulatory system here.‖ Whether Beijing succeeds or not in reining in informal fund flows is important, since the fate of these restrictions provides clues to the future direction of China‘s economy. If credit growth became too great, China would face more inflation in the short term and possible excess capacity in the longer term. That could lead to a resumption of the profitless growth that China is trying to leave behind. If inflation remained high, social unrest would become increasingly likely. If, conversely, China slammed the monetary brakes on too hard, it would have a big contractionary impact both at home and abroad, given that Chinese imports have become an important source of global growth. Monetary policy matters more in China than it does in most developed markets, because the ability to allocate capital remains largely the preserve of the state. It is where financial power and political power intersect. One main spur to the shadow financial world has been the strict rules in place on the price of money. The shadow system has developed because interest rates in the formal financial sector are tightly controlled – and kept within a narrow band. So banks prefer to lend to large state enterprises that can be relied on to repay. They will never be blamed for lending to these giant enterprises; indeed, that is what they are supposed to do. Dealing with the state sector buys the lenders political goodwill and puts the individual bankers making the loans in a good light. By contrast, the banks have virtually no incentive to lend to private enterprises, since they cannot charge higher rates to compensate for the greater risk of lending to entities that often have less collateral. Yet China boasts an ever growing number of entrepreneurs and other wealthy individuals with excess savings. They have no desire to put their money in a bank when real interest rates on deposits are negative. They are therefore happy to put money into informal channels that lend to cash-strapped young private companies that will pay 20-30 per cent a year to obtain it. ―Without interest rate deregulation, you will drive more money underground,‖ says Christina Chung at RCM Asia Pacific in Hong Kong, a fund manager. ―It is difficult to reduce the importance of the black market until financial reforms take place and banks have the incentive to lend to small and medium enterprises and diversify their loan books.‖ ―Credit quotas are ineffective,‖ adds Qiang Liao, a director of Standard & Poor‘s in Beijing and a former official at the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission. ―Non-banks such as trust companies are a response to a regulated interest rate regime.‖ The trust companies are often at the heart of these new kinds of money flows, operating in a murky domain where the official banking system meets the shadow banking system. The trust companies cater largely to two groups of clients: private companies that need capital and cash-rich families in search of higher returns. The trust companies and other shadow institutions are particularly active in the politically sensitive real estate market. Informal money flows are a big reason why property prices continue to rise. Across China, money continues to flow into apartment blocks, gleaming office towers and shopping malls. Since developers cannot borrow money from banks until they own the land, many need to raise funds elsewhere. As they are willing to pay upwards of 10 per cent for the privilege, that sort of return attracts lots of interest from those with a surplus to invest. So when Banyan Tree, a Singapore-based resort company, was looking to raise a Rmb1.1bn fund for China, it turned to established entrepreneurs and high net worth individuals whom it tapped through wealth management 10 Mcanxixun * Information consultants. ―Institutional investors in China are not mature enough to understand the concept and give us their money,‖ says a Banyan Tree executive. ―Wealthy entrepreneurs can make decisions very quickly.‖ Virtually everyone has a stake in keeping the game going and turning a blind eye to edicts from Beijing. Since the trust companies are supposed to be simply intermediaries and cannot collect deposits from retail customers, Beijing is not all that bothered about them, bankers say. Banks themselves take advantage of less regulated institutions, shifting loans off their balance sheets by selling them to the trust companies, which slice them up and distribute them to their clients. That enables the banks to make more loans. ―Innovative tools can make credit simply not appear,‖ says Helen Qiao, an economist with Goldman Sachs in Beijing. Meanwhile, local governments rely on land sales to fund their own operations. So they are happy to ensure developers have the capital to bid extravagantly at land auctions. Local governments in many cases own the trust companies that help developers finance their purchase of the land, taking fees in the process. Finally, senior municipal bureaucrats are often among those who have the money and are seeking high returns. Private lending in this form started in Zhejiang province near Shanghai, the heart of entrepreneurship in China, as clubs to which entrepreneurs and other wealthy people contributed and borrowed, depending on their circumstances. These informal underground banks rely on personal networks, and work as long as their scale remains personal. But as they expand, the personal knowledge and constraints invariably break down. Many of the cases clogging up courts in Hong Kong, where a lot of the investment companies that have been used in the process are based, concern disputes between underground banks and borrowers in China. Beijing is aware that it needs to do more to ensure that capital reaches private companies, which these days account for more economic activity than state-owned enterprises. Yet they receive only 30-40 per cent of the official financing and have to pay more for money in the underground market. ―Your cost of capital depends on who you are,‖ says the founder of one advisory boutique in Beijing. One thing the government has attempted to do is to encourage the establishment of credit guarantee companies that backstop loans to private groups and pay off the loans in the event of default. Today there are thousands of guarantee outfits. But many of them are themselves far from creditworthy. ―The amount of the guarantee compared to the capital is very large,‖ says May Yan, an analyst with Barclays Capital in Hong Kong but formerly a rating agency employee who rated some of these companies. ―They are very levered and there are no rules on leverage. Both the industry and the regulators are very fragmented.‖ Still, thanks to these informal channels, analysts estimate that lending in 2010 was at least as much as the Rmb9,000bn quota set centrally for 2009, the year China turned up the lending tap in the wake of the global crisis. In 2010, the banks were meant to slow their loan growth sharply. The head of markets at the Shanghai branch of one big international bank describes the formal financial system and monetary policy as a policy for a socialist economy. But that is a framework that China has long left behind. ―At some stage, China could control what was going on,‖ adds China Hydro‘s Mr Kuhns. ―It‘s a much more complex economy today. They are a lot less able to do that now.‖ (Side Bar) A more nuanced regime delivers mixed results For years, one of the January rituals in Beijing was for regulators to issue explicit quotas to banks, telling them how much they were expected to lend – no more, no less. This year that changed as regulators stopped issuing such guidance. The shift was seen as an admission by the authorities that quotas were routinely ignored and therefore ineffective. Instead, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission has adopted a regime that, says Helen Qiao of Goldman Sachs, is ―more nuanced, discrete and intransparent‖. Beijing has also tried to signal recently that it is serious about enforcing a less generous monetary policy. It has tightened reserve requirement ratios – so-called RRRs, or money that banks have to keep on reserve with the central bank – three times this year, most recently in mid-March. 11 MCanxixun * Information Compared with restrictions on loans, the RRR has the advantage of ―limiting the fundamental ability of banks to lend‖, writes Ms Qiao in a recent report co-authored with a colleague, Yu Song. Under the guidance system, banks with ample liquidity found ―innovative ways to lend which are not officially called lending‖. The result was ―a difficult cat and mouse game for authorities‖. Both monetary growth and loan growth have apparently slowed in the first two months of 2011. Yet analysts agree with HSBC‘s Qu Hongin that ―liquidity in China remains more than ample‖. Indeed, the rate at which banks lend to each other is dropping. The Goldman economists reckon that a rise in the RRR rate does not necessarily mean a tighter monetary policy stance. Stiffer requirements only partly offset other central bank actions and foreign exchange inflows as companies bring home the proceeds of overseas business. ―The magnitude of tightening is not as large as [the monetary] data suggest,‖ they note. One big distortionary factor is that a lot of financial products do not show up as normal deposits. These include wealth management products created by taking bank loans and chopping them up and then selling the slices to their customers, who can earn more from such investments than from deposits. As long as real interest rates remain negative in China – and become more negative as inflation ratchets up – retail bank deposits become ever more unattractive. That may explain why deposit growth at the banks is slowing dramatically. New deposits totalled only Rmb1,300bn ($200bn) for the first two months of the year, compared with Rmb2,500bn over the same period in 2010. 中国的“影子银行” 中华水电(China Hydroelectric)首席执行官约翰•库恩斯(John Kuhns) 1月底在香港，到其内地银 行的本地分支机构寻找资金。库恩斯是一位美国人，从上世纪90年代开始就一直活跃在中国的发电行业， 他所在的中华水电总部位于北京。他表示，他当时去香港是因为“我的银行告诉我，鉴于限制性的新额 度，它们可能只能提供去年贷款的60%”。 但库恩斯表示，这些银行家也告诉他无需恐慌。“他们说:‘如果你需要更多资金，我们可以帮你 在香港安排债券发行。或者，我们可以帮你组建一家信托公司，以获得更多资金。’” 欢迎来到在中国监管森严的银行体系之外已蓬勃兴起的非官方金融王国。当在急于控制贷款热潮的 政府的命令下，中国内地银行采取行动，减少对中华水电及其它借款者的贷款时，它们在香港的分支机 构却在提供其他的安排。库恩斯表示，有人告诉他，他可以通过与人民币挂钩的债券，筹集高达30亿港 元(合3.85亿美元)的资金，远远超出他的需求。 在中国政府努力控制信贷增速之际，他在北京获得的信息与传达给中国各地无数其它借款者的信息 是一样的。今年，中国的通胀率几乎达到5%，预计还会继续上升。中国政府已表明，对于采取限制性更 强的政策，其态度是认真的。 但它能做到吗,面对监管机构的强硬手段，中国涌现出了大量灰色市场机构和安排，就是为了绕开 管控严格的中国金融市场的正式规定。分析人士表示，年度资金流动可能达到2万亿元人民币(合3050 亿美元)，约相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的三分之一。 里昂证券(CLSA)驻香港的郑名凯(Francis Cheng)表示:“中国人民银行(PBoC)很难控制流动性，让 银行按额度放贷。”他估计，银行仅占中国融资总额的一半。其余部分来自各种信托公司、金融公司、 租赁公司和地下银行。它们要么受到的监管不如银行那么严格，要么受到互相冲突的监管机构的监管， 要么根本不受监管。 然而，中国政府的做法就好像所有的融资全都来自银行。这就是中国的信贷增速总是超出官方目标 的一个原因，引发了令中国政府担忧的通胀。 12 Mcanxixun * Information 一些银行业高级官员甚至否认非正规领域的存在。“‘影子银行’这个词不太适用于中国，”中国四大国有银行之一——中国工商银行(ICBC)的董事长姜建清表示。“这里没有游离于监督和监管体系之外的金融机构。” 中国政府能否成功遏制非正规资金流很重要，因为这些限制措施的命运预示着中国经济未来的走向。如果信贷增长变得过快，中国短期内将面临更多通胀，较长期内或许会遭遇产能过剩。这可能会导致中国一直在努力摆脱的“无利润增长”重现。如果通胀持续高企，社会出现不稳定的可能性就会越来越大。 相反，鉴于中国进口已经成为全球增长的一个重要源头，如果中国的货币刹车踩得过猛，在国内外都会产生重大收缩性影响。 货币政策对中国比对大多数发达市场都更重要，因为中国的资金配置能力仍主要掌握在政府手中。金融力量与政治权力在这里交叉。 刺激影子金融世界形成的一个主要因素是中国对货币价格的严格规定。影子体系得以发展壮大，是因为正规金融领域的利率受到严格管制，并保持在狭窄的区间内。因此，银行更愿意贷款给可以指望其偿还资金的大型国有企业。 它们永远不会因为贷款给这些大企业而受到批评;实际上，这似乎就是它们该做的。与政府部门打交道让银行获得了政治名誉并让个人银行家在有利的情况下放款。相比之下，银行几乎没有贷款给私营企业的动机，因为它们无法收取更高的利息，以弥补贷款给通常抵押较少的机构的较大风险。 然而在中国，拥有过多储蓄的企业家和其他富裕个人数量正在不断增多。在实际存款利率为负值之际，他们无意把钱存入银行。因此，他们乐于把资金投入非正规渠道，借给那些资金拮据的年轻私营企业，每年收取20%至30%的利息。 “如果不放开利率，就会推动更多资金转入地下，”基金管理公司RCM Asia Pacific驻香港的钟秀 13 MCanxixun * Information 霞(Christina Chung)表示。“除非进行金融改革，让银行有动机贷款给中小企业并实现贷款的多样化，否则就难以降低黑市的重要性。” “信用额度没什么作用，”标准普尔(Standard & Poor)驻北京董事、曾在中国银监会(CBRC)任职的廖强表示。“信托公司等非银行机构是对受到监管的利率机制作出的回应。” 信托公司通常处在这些新类型资金流动的中新，运营在正规银行体系与影子银行体系交汇的阴暗领域。信托公司主要为两类客户服务:需要资金的私营企业以及资金充裕寻求更高回报率的家庭。 信托公司等影子机构在颇具政治敏感性的房地产市场上尤为活跃。非正规资金流是房地产价格持续上涨的一个重要原因。在中国各地，资金继续流向住宅楼、熠熠生辉的办公大楼和购物中心。由于开发商在拥有土地前无法从银行借款，因此有很多开发商需要从别处筹集资金。它们愿意为此多付出10%的利息，那些有盈余资金可供投资的人对此颇感兴趣。 因此，当新加坡度假酒店公司悦榕集团(Banyan Tree)考虑为中国市场设立一只11亿元人民币的基金时，它求助的是通过理财顾问筛选出来的著名企业家和高净值个人。“中国的机构投资者还不够成熟，它们无法理解这个概念，不会把资金交给我们，”该公司的一名高管表示。“富有的企业家能够非常迅速地做出决定。” 让游戏继续进行下去，对中国政府的法令视而不见，几乎与每个人都利害攸关。银行家们表示，由于信托公司应该是单纯的中介机构，无法吸纳散户的存款，因此政府对它们并不是很担心。银行本身则利用监管不那么严格的机构，把贷款出售给信托公司，再由信托公司将贷款切割发放给客户，由此将贷款从银行的资产负债表上转移出去。这让银行扩大了放贷规模。高盛(Goldman Sachs)驻北京经济学家乔虹(Helen Qiao)表示:“创新性工具能够让信贷隐身。” 与此同时，地方政府依靠卖地为自己的活动融资。因此，它们乐于确保开发商拥有资金在土地拍卖会上大肆抬高报价。在很多情况下，地方政府就是帮助开发商为买地融资的信托公司的所有者，并在此过程中收取费用。最后，在那些拥有资金并希望获取高额回报的人中也不乏市政高官的身影。 这种私人放贷最早以俱乐部的形式出现在作为中国企业家之都的浙江省，企业家和其他富有人士可根据自身状况，在此放贷或是借款。这些非正规的地下银行依赖于私人关系，只要规模仍属于私人性质，它们就能良好运转。但随着它们的扩张，个人知识和局限性必然会出现问题。香港是在此过程中使用的许多投资公司的总部所在地，在香港法院积压的许多案件都与中国地下钱庄与借款者之间的纠纷有关。 中国政府意识到，它必须采取更多措施，确保民营公司能够获得资金。民营企业如今在经济活动中所占比重超过了国有企业。然而，它们仅能获得官方融资的30%至40%，不得不在地下市场付出更高代价来获得资金。北京一家顾问机构的创始人表示:“你的资金成本取决于你的身份。” 中国政府一直尝试在做的一件事是鼓励组建贷款担保公司，支持对私营企业的贷款，在私营企业出现违约时代为偿还贷款。如今，市场上有数千家担保公司，但有很多自己的信誉就不佳。“相对于资金而言，担保规模非常大，”巴克莱资本(Barclays Capital)驻香港分析师、曾在一家评级机构供职期间为部分担保公司做过评级的颜湄之(May Yan)表示。“它们杠杆系数很大，而中国没有杠杆方面的规定。行业和监管者都非常不成体系。” 不过由于有了这些非正规渠道，分析师估计，去年的贷款规模至少与2009年中央确定的9万亿元人民币贷款额度相当——2009年，在全球金融危机爆发后，中国开启了贷款闸门。2010年，各银行本应大幅放缓贷款增长。 某大型国际银行上海分公司的市场主管将正规金融体系和货币政策形容为一项为社会主义经济制定的政策。但中国早已抛弃了这一框架。“在某个阶段，中国确实能够控制住形势，”中华水电的库恩斯表示。“如今的中国经济要复杂得多。现在它们能够做到这一点的可能性大大降低了。‖ 附:中国的存款准备金率 多年来，每到1月份中国政府都有一些例行的公事要做。其中一件事就是监管部门向各银行分配明确的贷款额度，告诉它们可以放多少贷——不许多，也不许少。今年情况发生了改变，监管部门不再提供此类指导。这一转变被人解读为，有关部门承认贷款额度一贯不被银行理会，因此是无效的。 14 Mcanxixun * Information 高盛(Goldman Sachs)的乔虹(Helen Qiao)表示，中国银监会(CBRC)已转而采用一套“更微妙、不连 续和不透明”的体制。 中国政府最近还试图发出信号，表明自己适度收紧货币政策的态度是认真的。今年，中国政府已三 次提高存款准备金率——即各银行必须存在央行的资金额度——最近一次是在3月中旬。 乔虹在和同事宋宇合著的一份最新报告中写道，与贷款限令相比，存款准备金率拥有“限制银行基 本放贷能力”的优势。在贷款额度指导体系下，流动性充沛的银行找到了“一些新的放贷途径，而根据 官方标准这些都不算作放贷”。结果就是“有关部门陷入了一场棘手的猫捉老鼠游戏”。 2011年头两个月，无论是货币量增长还是贷款增长都明显放缓。尽管如此，分析师们却认同汇丰 (HSBC)屈宏斌的观点，即“中国的流动性仍相当充沛”。的确，银行间同业拆借利率正逐渐下降。 高盛的经济学家们认为，存款准备金率上调不一定意味着中国政府转向收紧货币政策的立场。更严 厉的准备金要求，只能抵消央行其它行动和(企业将海外业务收益汇回国内所导致的)外汇流入的部分 影响。他们在报告中写道:“收紧力度并不像(货币量)数据显示的那样大。” 一个重要的扭曲因素是，许多金融产品并不以常规存款的方式出现，例如一些理财产品。这些理财 产品其实是将银行贷款切割成一小块一小块地出售给客户，而客户从中可以获得比存款更高的收益。 只要中国的实际利率仍为负数——并随着通胀率逐步上升，负值越来越大——零售银行存款就会变 得越来越没有吸引力。这也许解释了为何目前银行存款增长正大幅减速。今年头两个月，新增存款总额 仅为1.3万亿元人民币(合2000亿美元)，低于去年同期的2.5万亿元人民币。 Economic Analysis(经济分析) China credit agency: cut US debt rating six months ago When S&P downgraded Japan in January, markets took fright. The move, it seemed, had come relatively out of the blue. Except in Beijing, where Dagong, China‘s own official ratings agency already had Japan‘s debt down as ?AA-‘. Look back a few months further, and there‘s another Dagong move that now looks eerily prescient: in November it downgraded the US from AA to A+. Here‘s what S&P said on Monday when it cut its outlook for US debt to ?negative‘: •The economy of the U.S. is flexible and highly diversified, the country‘s effective monetary policies have supported output growth while containing inflationary pressures, and a consistent global preference for the U.S. dollar over all other currencies gives the country unique external liquidity. •We believe there is a material risk that U.S. policymakers might not reach an agreement on how to address medium- and long-term budgetary challenges by 2013; if an agreement is not reached and meaningful implementation does not begin by then, this would in our view render the U.S. fiscal profile meaningfully weaker than that of peer ?AAA‘ sovereigns. And here‘s what Dagong said back in November: •The serious defects in the United States economic development and management model will lead to the long-term recession of its national economy, fundamentally lowering the national solvency. 15 MCanxixun * Information •The new round of quantitative easing monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve has brought about an obvious trend of depreciation of the U.S. dollar, and the continuation and deepening of credit crisis in the U.S. Such a move entirely encroaches on the interests of the creditors, indicating the decline of the U.S. government‘s intention of debt repayment. •Analysis shows that the crisis confronting the U.S. cannot be ultimately resolved through currency depreciation. On the contrary, it is likely that an overall crisis might be triggered by the U.S. government‘s policy to continuously depreciate the U.S. dollar against the will of creditors. Dagong and S&P may disagree with the Fed‘s medicine (perhaps because of the side effects for certain ?US creditors‘ – i.e. China), but they clearly share some dim views of the patient. Dagong finished its assessment with a stark warning in its outlook for the US: 'Dagong believes that the occurrence and development process of the credit crisis in the U.S. resulted from the long-standing accumulation of the contradictions in its economic system… Under the circumstances that none of the economic factors influencing the U.S. economy has turned better explicitly it is possible that the U.S. will continue to expand the use of its loose monetary policy, damaging the interests the creditors. Therefore, given the current situation, the United States may face much unpredictable risks in solvency in the coming one to two years.' Dagong ranks a handful of countries AAA, its top grade, including Switzerland and Australia. China and Germany are among those on the next rung down, AA+. Then come AA and AA- followed by A+. Last year, when Dagong published a list of 50 sovereign ratings, the lowest ranked country was Ecuador on CCC. Plenty of scope for downgrades for those on A+. 分析:大公国际的先见之明 当标普(S&P) 1月份下调日本信用评级时，市场吓了一跳。此举似乎有些出乎国际社会的意料—— 不过北京是个例外，因为位于该市的中国本国官方信用评级机构大公国际早已将日本的债务评级调降至 “AA-”。 再往前推几个月，大公的另一举动现在看起来也出奇地具有先见之明:去年11月，它将美国的信用 评级从AA调降至A+。 下面是标普周一将美国债务前景展望调降至“负面”时给出的理由: 1、美国经济灵活，多元化程度高;其有效的货币政策支撑了产出增长、控制住了通胀压力;全球市 场一贯最为偏爱美元，这赋予美国独一无二的外部流动性。 2、我们认为存在一个重大风险，即美国政策制定者可能无法在2013年前就如何解决中长期预算问 题达成协议;如果到那时还达不成协议、还没有展开有效的贯彻行动，我们认为，这将使美国的财政状 况显著弱于同为“AAA”信用评级的主权国家。 而大公在去年11月份给出的降级理由是: 1、美国经济发展与管理模式存在的严重缺陷，将导致其国民经济步入一个长期衰退期，从而从根本 上削弱该国的偿付能力。 2、美联储(Fed)采取的新一轮量化宽松货币政策，已引发美元明显的贬值趋势，并导致美国信用危 机的持续与深化。此举严重损害了债权人的利益，表明了美国政府偿还债务意愿的下降。 3、分析表明，美国现在面临的危机无法通过货币贬值得到彻底的解决。相反，美国政府不顾债权人 意愿持续推动美元贬值的政策，很可能会引发一场全面危机。 大公与标普也许对美联储开出的药方有着不同的看法(这或许是因为这些药对于某些“美国债权人” ——比如中国——有些副作用)，但它们显然对被救治的病人有一些共同的悲观看法。 大公在其评估报告的结尾，对美国的前景给出了严重警告:“大公国际认为，美国信用危机的发生 和发展过程是其经济体制矛盾长期积累的结果„„在各种影响美国的经济要素没有明确变好的前景下， 16 Mcanxixun * Information 美国有可能会扩大使用其宽松货币政策，继续损害债权人的利益。因此，鉴于目前的形势，美国在未来 1至2年内所面临的国家偿债能力方面的不可测风险将会较多。” 大公给予少数几个国家“AAA”的最高评级，其中包括瑞士与澳大利亚。中国和德国等国则被给予稍 低的AA+级。然后是AA、AA-和A+级。去年，大公发布了50个国家主权信用评级的报告，其中排名最低 的是厄瓜多尔，评级为CCC。对于那些评级为A+的国家来说，仍有很大的降级空间。 Huawei’s path to gaining a foothold in the US Huawei, the world‘s second-biggest maker of mobile telecommunications network equipment by market share, made a big concession to transparency this week, revealing for the first time the names of its board members. Unfortunately, the effect was somewhat undermined by the company‘s failure to address issues such as the suggestion, reported in the Chinese media, that Sun Yafang, the chairwoman, used to work for China‘s Ministry of State Security. For a company that complains about being unfairly demonised in the US for alleged but unproven links to the Chinese security apparatus, that is a significant omission. But is it enough to explain Huawei‘s failure to win a single network equipment contract from major US networks? Or is there, as the Chinese whispers have it, a plot in Washington to keep the company out of the US market? The case against Huawei is easily stated. The company is privately owned and its shareholding structure is opaque. In addition to the security links attributed to the chairwoman, Ren Zhengfei, the founder and chief executive, is a former officer in China‘ People‘s Liberation Army. Classified intelligence material in the US is said to link the company to the PLA, prompting senior Republican lawmakers to warn that allowing it to become a major supplier would give the Chinese military a critical hold over US communications. As critics point out, China has form in this area already, having used, or connived at, cyberattacks against foreign companies operating in China, such as Google. Clearly, a regime that is prepared to use technology to defend itself against scrutiny might also be willing to use it to disrupt a rival country‘s communications. As if this was not enough, Huawei has twice faced litigation from US groups for allegedly copying or stealing technology. The cases, brought by Cisco Systems and Motorola, were both dropped. But against a background of wider unease about China‘s failure to enforce intellectual property rights, they have done much to encourage damaging speculation about the company‘s integrity. All this has had a serious impact on Huawei‘s ambitions in the US – a market it must crack if it is to continue its long march towards overtaking Sweden‘s Ericsson as the world‘s number one equipment maker. Most seriously, it lost out last year to Samsung as a key supplier for a $5bn infrastructure project for a next generation mobile network being built by Sprint Nextel, the third-largest US telecoms operator. The contract went to South Korea, after Gary Locke, the US commerce secretary, called Dan Hesse, Sprint‘s chief executive, to express concerns. However, there are plenty of weaknesses in the prosecution case. For a start, not a shred of evidence has been produced to link Huawei to any attempts to interfere with the security of networks it has been involved in building. The classified intelligence referred to by US critics may be damning, or it may be a useful cover for bashing a successful Chinese company. Worst of all, it is clear from some of the rumblings on Capitol Hill that Huawei has been repeatedly confused with 17 MCanxixun * Information a different company called Hua Mei, which was linked to the PLA and was involved in controversial technology transfers under the Clinton administration. The case for Huawei is that, Madam Sun‘s security links notwithstanding, it appears to be serious about increasing transparency. As the recent identification of the board demonstrates, the bamboo curtain is slowly coming down. This is part of a deliberate strategy that began two years ago, when the company started to produce financial reports, even though as a private company it could have kept its numbers quiet. In addition, Huawei has split its operations into several units, accompanied by vague suggestions that one of them may eventually be listed. The company has also shown itself willing to find technological solutions to security worries, such as a ―secure cell‖ structure in the UK under which software codes are compiled and input locally. Huawei is desperate to get into the top tier of the US market. Its chances of continuing to grow fast may depend on achieving that. In spite of all its efforts, though, it is not much of a surprise that a private company run by a former military officer in a country with an unaccountable government and no rule of law has trouble selling sensitive products in the US. If Huawei really wants to allay fears in Washington, Mr Ren has the solution in his own hands: an initial public offering of the whole company, preferably outside mainland China, or at the very least including a listing in Hong Kong. That would dispose of ownership and management transparency worries at a stroke. But is Mr Ren willing to make such a dramatic move to make his point? Or, perhaps we should ask, will he be allowed to? Kevin Brown is the Financial Times‘s Asia Regional Correspondent 分析:上市有助华为进军美国 本周华为公司在透明度问题上做出了重大让步，首度公布了董事会成员名单。以市场份额衡量，华 为是全球第二大移动通信网络设备制造商。 不幸的是，这个举动的效果在一定程度上受到了影响，因为该公司未能针对一些问题作出解释，如 中国媒体报道的有关华为董事长孙亚芳曾任职于国家安全部的说法。 对华为而言，这是一项重大遗漏，因为该公司抱怨自己在美国遭到不公平的妖魔化——理由便是华 为据称(但未经证实)与中国安全机构存在联系。但这是否就足以解释华为迄今未能从美国主要网络运 营商赢得一单网络设备合约呢,还是像中国传言所说的那样，这是华盛顿的阴谋，为的就是将华为拦在 美国市场之外, 对华为不利的证据简单明了。该公司为民营非上市企业，且股权结构不透明。除了董事长的安全部 背景之外，华为创始人和首席执行官任正非也曾是中国人民解放军军官。 据说，美国有机密情报显示华为与解放军存在联系，促使资深共和党议员发出警告称，若允许华为 成为主要供应商，将会让中国军方掌控美国通信的要害环节。 批评者指出，中国在这方面有过前科，曾经发起(或纵容)针对在华外企的网络攻击，谷歌(Google) 就是受害者之一。显然，一个愿意利用技术保护自己不受外界关注的政权，可能也会愿意利用技术来破 坏竞争对手国家的通信网络。 就好像这还不够似的，华为还因涉嫌抄袭或剽窃技术，两次被美国企业提起诉讼。 思科(Cisco)与摩托罗拉(Motorola)提起的两宗诉讼最终都达成和解。但由于世界对中国未能保护知 识产权普遍感到不安，这些诉讼产生了严重的负面影响，令人对华为的诚信产生疑虑。这一切都对华为 在美国争取业务的雄心构成了沉重打击——如果华为希望再接再厉，有朝一日超越瑞典爱立信 (Ericsson)，成为世界第一的电信设备制造商，就必须攻破美国市场。 更严重的是，去年在竞标美国第三大电信运营商Sprint Nextel建设的下一代移动通讯网络价值50 18 Mcanxixun * Information 亿美元的基础设施项目时，华为输给了三星(Samsung)，未能成为主要供货商。合约被韩国企业赢得之前， 美国商务部长骆家辉(Gary Locke)曾致电Sprint首席执行官丹•赫瑟(Dan Hesse)表示关切。 然而，想要证明华为“有罪”的一方存在许多漏洞。首先，迄今没有一丝证据证明，华为曾企图破 坏自己参与建设的网络的安全性。美国批评者提及的机密情报或许真的说明华为有问题，也可能只是敲 打一家成功的中国企业的有用幌子。 最糟糕的是，从美国国会的一些吵吵嚷嚷中可以清楚看出，有些议员一再把华为和另一家名为“华 美”的企业搞混，后者有着军队背景，在克林顿政府时期曾经涉嫌有争议的技术转让。 而有利于华为的证据是，尽管回避了孙亚芳的安全部门背景，但该公司在提高透明度方面似乎是认 真的。最近披露的董事会成员信息表明，竹幕正被慢慢拆除。这是华为两年前启动的战略的一环，当时 华为开始发布财务报表，尽管作为一家非上市企业，它本来无需公布这些数据。此外，华为已将旗下业 务分拆成若干子公司，同时含糊暗示其中一家最终有可能上市。 公司还表示，愿意针对安全方面的担忧，从技术上找到解决方案，例如其在英国采取的“安全密 室”(secure cell)架构，即软件代码由当地企业编写并输入。 华为迫切希望进入美国高端市场。该公司能否继续快速增长，或许就取决于它能否实现这个目标。 然而，尽管公司做出了种种努力，但它难以在美国销售具有敏感性的产品并不太出人意料——毕竟，这 是一家由前军官执掌的民营非上市企业，所在国家缺乏法治，且政府没有问责机制。 如果华为真的希望消除华盛顿的担忧，任正非手上是有办法的:将公司进行整体公开上市，最好在 中国大陆以外的市场，或者至少同时在香港上市。 这将一举消除有关所有权和管理透明度的担忧。但任正非是否愿意采取如此大刀阔斧的举措来阐明 自己的态度呢,或者我们应该问，他会被允许这么做吗, 本文作者是英国《金融时报》亚洲地区记者 London will outlast the City grumblers Not everyone likes One Hyde Park, the new Richard Rogers-designed luxury residential complex in London‘s Knightsbridge. A commentator in the Financial Times‘s House & Home section thought the four iron-shuttered glass towers ―could have been teleported from Dubai‖. But people are buying. The developers say more than 50 of the 86 flats, the most expensive in the UK, have been sold. Ninety per cent of the buyers are from abroad. It is not just One Hyde Park. Buyers, many from the Middle East, have been piling into other prime London properties too, pushing city centre prices up 2.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2011, even as the rest of the UK‘s housing market stagnated. Yolande Barnes, research director at Savills, the estate agents, says that above the ?15m level, almost the entire market is foreign. But while housing investors have been swarming into London, bankers, anxiously scanning Monday‘s interim report from the Independent Commission on Banking, have been threatening to leave. Perhaps some will. Just possibly, a bank will shock the City by moving its headquarters. More likely, bankers will hint darkly that, when it comes to adding staff, they will send them to New York, Hong Kong, Zug or Shanghai instead. London will become less important. The most recent Global Financial Centres Index, published last month, reflected these worries, citing high taxes and regulatory uncertainty. It quoted research showing that 43 per cent of financial professionals had considered leaving London, that 11 per cent were definitely or likely to go and that 25 per cent of senior managers thought their organisations would move operational teams out of the UK over the next few years. Where did London stand in the index after all this woe? At number one, the same as last time, above New York and Hong Kong and well above the likes of Zurich, Frankfurt and Shenzhen. 19 MCanxixun * Information Banking activity may fluctuate between London, New York and Hong Kong, but, as the compilers of the global financial index note, the three cities operate together, each in a different time zone. They vie with one another, but, as a group, they compete with all the pretenders to their positions. One asset manager based in New York said: ―I think, if anything, the global leaders of New York, London, Hong Kong and even Singapore are moving ahead of the chasing pack.‖ The addition of Singapore to the leading trio is interesting. The last person I heard put the four together was a senior Chinese official. Sitting outside a Starbucks in Shanghai a couple of years ago, I suggested to him that the city‘s ambition of being a world-leading financial centre by 2020 couldn‘t be achieved without the rule of law. He agreed. He went further. Look at London, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore, he said. Perhaps you needed English common law to be a world financial centre. Common law isn‘t enough. India and Nigeria have English-derived legal systems, but they are plagued by corruption. Some in the UK think their country is corrupt too. A UK survey for Transparency International last year found that 53.4 per cent thought corruption had increased over the previous three years – not surprising after the parliamentary expenses scandal. The researchers then asked Britons whether they had ever paid a bribe; 1.7 per cent said they had. Transparency said this was so low as to be statistically insignificant. Many people in the world will consider it so low as to be staggering. Investors, whether in financial services or luxury homes, need more than the absence of everyday corruption. They need the assurance that their assets will not be seized without explanation and that they can settle any disputes before judges who cannot be bought. London has that, with the added attraction that when protesters fill Hyde Park outside those Richard Rogers towers, the government will not fall, the next elections will take place and the votes will be counted honestly. Britons have had that assurance for generations. There are few countries that have London‘s advantages of the English language, cultural attractions, openness to ideas, or its range of legal and accounting services. The influx of property investors may not be to everyone‘s taste. Among them may be some who did not come by their riches in the most straightforward fashion. Their investment in penthouses, and their employment of a few retainers and a concierge service, cannot compensate for any losses to a high-revenue, job-creating financial sector. However, when countries are rocked by revolution, people with money know where it is safest. London cannot afford to be complacent, but it will prove more resilient than any grumbling bankers may suggest. 伦敦活力不减当年 并非所有人都喜欢“海德公园一号”(One Hyde Park)——它是位于伦敦骑士桥、由理查德•罗杰斯 (Richard Rogers)设计的一处新豪华住宅楼盘。英国《金融时报》房产家居版的一位评论员认为，看到 该楼盘那四座玻璃外墙配钢制窗框的大厦，“你仿佛置身于迪拜”。不过，该楼盘可不缺买家。开发商 表示，在这个英国最贵公寓楼盘的总计86户公寓中，有50多户已名花有主，其中90%的买家来自海外。 受到热捧的不仅仅是海德公园一号。各路买家(其中很多来自中东)一直在大举买入伦敦的豪宅地 产，此举推动伦敦市中心房价在今年第一季度上涨了2.8%，而与此同时，英国其余地区的房地产市场正 陷入停滞。房地产经纪公司第一太平戴维斯(Savills)的研究主管约兰德•巴恩斯(Yolande Barnes)表示， 房屋单价高于1500万英镑的住房市场，几乎全部被外国人占据。 尽管房地产投资者正大举涌入伦敦，但不安地浏览英国银行业独立委员会(ICB)周一公布的中期报告 的银行家们，却一直扬言要离开伦敦。或许一部分人真会离开。若有银行将总部迁走，那将震动整个金 融城——尽管发生这种情况的可能性不大。更有可能的是，银行家们会略带威胁地暗示，在涉及增加人 20 Mcanxixun * Information 手时，他们会把新招的这些人派往纽约、香港、瑞士楚格或上海。伦敦将因此变得不那么重要。 上月公布的最新全球金融中心指数(GFCI)报告，就反映出了上述担忧。报告提及了伦敦的高税收和 监管不确定性。报告援引的研究显示，43%的金融专业人士考虑过离开伦敦;11%肯定或很可能会离开伦 敦;25%的高管认为，未来几年里，他们所在的公司将把运营团队迁出英国。 在细数了这种种苦恼之后，伦敦在该指数排行榜上位置如何,与上次一样，高居榜首～不仅领先于 纽约和香港，还把苏黎世、法兰克福和深圳等城市远远甩在身后。 伦敦、纽约和香港的银行业活动可能存在此消彼长的关系，但正如全球金融中心指数的编制者指出 的那样，这三个分处不同时区的城市是作为一个整体在运转。它们虽然彼此竞争，但作为一个整体，它 们正与觊觎它们地位的所有其它城市展开竞争。 一位驻纽约的资产经理表示:“我认为，如果非要强调点什么的话，那就是纽约、伦敦、香港乃至 新加坡这些全球领跑者正在拉大与追赶者的距离。” 把新加坡归入领跑集团是件有意思的事情。上次我听到的、把这四个城市放在一起的话，是出自一 位中国高官之口。几年前，我坐在上海一家星巴克(Starbucks)店外向这位高管指出，如果没有法制，上 海想在2020年前成为全球领先金融中心的愿望是不可能实现的。他不仅对此表示认同，而且有着更深入 的认识。他说，看看伦敦、纽约、香港和新加坡吧，要成为全球金融中心，可能需要英国的普通法。 具备普通法还不够。印度和尼日利亚都拥有源于英国的司法体系，但那里充斥着腐败。有些英国人 认为，自己的国家也存在腐败。去年，透明国际(Transparency International)的一项英国调查发现， 53.4%的受访者认为，腐败现象在过去三年里有所加剧——在看到英国议会的开支丑闻后，这也就不足为 奇了。研究人员当时问英国受访者，他们是否行过贿;1.7%的受访者表示行过。透明国际表示，这一比 例非常之低，在统计上可以忽略不计。全球有很多人也会认为这一比例低得令人乍舌。 不管是投资金融服务业还是投资豪华住宅，投资者需要的不仅仅是不存在日常腐败。他们还需要确 信，他们的资产不会在不作任何解释的情况下被没收，同时他们可以通过法庭了结任何纠纷、而且法官 无法被收买。 伦敦拥有这一切。除此之外，它的吸引力还在于，当抗议者挤满理查德•罗杰斯设计的那些大厦外面 的海德公园时，政府不会倒台，下届选举将如期举行，计票将诚实可信。几代人以来，英国人一直对此 充满信心。 很少有哪个国家具备伦敦的优势:英语、文化吸引力、思想开放、法律和会计服务种类。 房地产投资者的涌入可能不会让每个人都称心如意。其中一些人可能不会以最直接的方式从这些投 资者的财富中受益。这些投资者投资豪华公寓、聘用几名仆人和使用门房服务带来的好处，无法弥补收 入高且创造就业的金融业遭受的损失。 然而，当一些国家受到革命的冲击时，有钱人知道哪里最安全。伦敦没有理由自满，但事实将证明， 它要比那些满腹牢骚的银行家所认为的更具弹性。 China lights a fire in global dealmaking The might of the Chinese buyer has become a recurring talking point in global dealmaking circles. Sell-side advisers in the US and Europe point to interest from well-funded Chinese bidders when trying to liven up an auction. Competitors disparage Chinese companies‘ sophistication and their ability to execute a deal while secretly fretting about what valuation they might put on the table. And regulators, particularly in the US, wrestle with how they should treat Chinese acquirers should the long-predicted flurry of global deals come to pass. The position of China as an economic power is well established. But its presence as a force in global dealmaking is just becoming clear. 21 MCanxixun * Information Outbound dealmaking jumped 37 per cent last year to $55.4bn, or about a third of all mergers and acquisitions by Chinese buyers, according to Thomson Reuters. Moreover, 2011 has got off to a strong start, with about $14.7bn-worth of deals to March 23. A decade ago, Chinese companies bought barely $1.5bn overseas each year. ―Today, if you are selling certain types of assets, you have to be able to present them to Chinese companies because they may well be the best buyers,‖ says Jim Lawrence, co-head of global investment banking at Rothschild. ―That wasn‘t the case five years ago.‖ Mr Lawrence adds: ―The activity has shifted from western companies looking to buy in China to Chinese companies actively looking at opportunities globally.‖ According to Zhang Xiuping, co-head of Asian M&A at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Chinese outbound dealmaking ―has really started to pick up since 2006 and 2007, largely driven by natural resources companies‖. ―And despite the fluctuations in the oil price,‖ says Ms Zhang, ―I‘d expect Chinese oil and gas companies to continue this activity in the near future.‖ In fact, the history of Chinese M&A to date has been dominated by the country‘s hunger for natural resources. Over the past 10 years, the oil and gas and mining sectors have accounted for more than half of total outbound deal volume. Already this year, PetroChina has paid $5.4bn for a 50 per cent stake in a Canadian shale gas project owned by EnCana, the energy group. Last year, Cnooc, the Chinese state-owned oil company, bought a 50 per cent stake in Argentina‘s Bridas, while Sinochem, the chemicals group, spent $3.1bn for a stake in Brazilian oil assets. ―About 15 years ago, China‘s National Development and Reform Commission started publishing the strategies it expected corporations to pursue. Some of those were only possible through M&A, particularly in automotive, steel and iron ore, and oil,‖ says Meyrick Cox, a managing director at Moelis & Company, the independent US investment bank, who advised China‘s Geely on last year‘s $1.8bn deal to buy the Volvo brand from Ford Motor. The priorities established by the state regulator have, so far, helped direct the flows of Chinese dealmaking – as has an acute sensitivity on the part of corporate China to how its interest will be received in a target‘s home country. Marcus Silberman, head of Latin American M&A at Credit Suisse, says both those factors have helped prompt substantial interest by Chinese companies in the region. ―The Chinese are very hungry for natural resources, while Latin America is rich in resources and needs capital to develop its reserves,‖ he says. ―The Chinese know they are very welcome in Latin America.‖ Other markets, in contrast, have been considered no-go areas – most notably the US, where the high-profile problems of past dealmaking forays and the influence of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has deterred Chinese interest. Cnooc‘s abortive bid for Unocal, the US oil group, in 2005 has lingered in Chinese memories. Meanwhile, Huawei, the software and telecoms equipment maker, recently decided to unwind a $2m patent deal in the US following opposition from the US authorities, providing another reminder that any deal – no matter how small – risks a sceptical reception abroad. ―State-owned companies feel at a disadvantage,‖ notes one adviser. ―In recent years, they had an advantage over international competitors in terms of funding and liquidity. But [being state owned] doesn‘t help them when it comes to a competitive auction process.‖ Sellers may shy away from choosing a Chinese buyer, say advisers, wary that the chance of a security review and a protracted approvals process may delay or even derail the deal. Huawei last year was sidelined in two US auctions, despite being the highest bidder, losing 2Wire, a privately owned broadband router maker, to Pace of the UK, and a unit of Motorola to Nokia Siemens Networks. However, the scope of Chinese interest in finding opportunities internationally is expanding. 22 Mcanxixun * Information ―Most of the companies that are actively looking overseas are doing so either because they can‘t grow their business any more in China or because they have a need such as upstream resources or technology,‖ adds Ms Zhang of BoA Merrill Lynch. Meanwhile, a more ambitious approach is also being promoted by the regulator. Moelis & Company‘s Mr Cox points out that recent rule changes now broadly require international automotive joint ventures by Chinese companies to be Chinese-controlled and to own and develop their key technology. Bankers also point to the increasing activity in the consumer products sector, where Shanghai-based consumer group Bright Food has taken part in several international sales processes and Wahaha, the soft-drinks producer, is said to be scouting for targets abroad, including in the US. Food security is also an area of focus. Chinese groups, including Cofco, the state-owned agribusiness group that recently bought Château de Viaud, a 49-acre Lalande-de-Pomerol estate in Bordeaux, France, are looking for chances to buy less exotic farmland or for deals that would help secure supplies of food and agricultural commodities. Of course, the process is not always smooth. Bankers privately admit that most Chinese companies have never been through the M&A process before, arguing that most show particular caution in public company transactions and shy away from anything that smacks of hostility. Moreover, bankers have expressed disappointment that some would-be buyers have reached the advanced stages of a sales process only for their interest to fade on the home straight. Bright Food, which is majority-owned by the Shanghai provincial government, has been a leading bidder in at least three auctions without success. The group last year walked away from talks to buy the UK‘s United Biscuits and GNC, the US vitamin retailer. Last month, it lost out to General Mills in the auction for a 50 per cent stake in Yoplait, the French yoghurt maker. Getting the necessary regulatory consent and approvals at home can also be an unfamiliar process – and put the brakes on companies‘ ambitions abroad. ―In general, the National Development and Reform Commission is very supportive of outbound M&A initiatives by Chinese companies,‖ says Ms Zhang. But Rothschild‘s Mr Lawrence adds that dealing with the authorities can prove unpredictable. ―The governance process is such that you can have surprises emerge towards the end of a deal,‖ he says. ―Those issues are not as straightforward as in the west.‖ He adds: ―Getting deals across the line has been more difficult than anticipated. But I‘m quite confident you‘ll see more Chinese companies buying western assets in the coming years.‖ 中国企业的触角伸向全球并购 中国买家的实力已成为全球交易撮合圈子里一个反复谈论的话题。 在试图给拍卖会注入生气时，美欧卖方顾问会提到资金充沛的中国买家的兴趣。竞争对手一边大肆 贬低中国企业的老练程度和交易执行能力，一边对中国企业可能提出的报价暗自焦虑。监管者(特别是 在美国)正在斟酌，一旦长期预言的全球交易热潮成为现实，他们应如何对待中国的收购者。 中国作为经济强国的地位已确立无疑，但作为全球交易撮合领域的生力军而存在只是刚刚变得明显 起来。 汤森路透(Thomson Reuters)的数据显示，去年，中国的海外并购交易额跃升37%，至554亿美元， 约占中国买家并购总额的三分之一。今年也是开局强劲，截至3月23日，并购总额已达到约147亿美元。 10年前，中国企业每年在海外的并购额仅为15亿美元。 23 MCanxixun * Information “如今，如果你要出售某些类型的资产，你必须能够将其呈现给中国企业，因为它们很有可能是最好的买家，”罗斯切尔德(Rothschild)全球投行业务联席主管吉姆•劳伦斯(Jim Lawrence)表示。“5年前并不是这样。” 劳伦斯补充称:“并购活动已经从西方企业希望在中国收购资产，转变为中国企业在全球积极寻找收购机会。” 美国银行美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)亚洲并购业务联席主管张秀萍表示，中国的海外并购交易“从2006年和2007年起确实已开始升温，主要是受到自然资源公司的推动”。 “尽管油价不断波动，”张秀萍表示，“但我预计，中国的油气公司近期内将继续展开并购活动。” 事实上，中国对自然资源的渴求在中国迄今为止的并购史上占据着主导地位。过去10年，油气和采矿行业在中国海外并购交易总额中占据了一半以上的份额。 今年，中石油(PetroChina)斥资54亿美元收购加拿大能源集团(EnCana)旗下一个加拿大页岩气项目50%的股权。去年，中国国有石油公司中海油(CNOOC)购入了阿根廷油气公司Bridas 50%的股权，而化工集团中化(Sinochem)以31亿美元购入了巴西石油资产的股权。 美国独立投行Moelis & Company董事总经理梅瑞克•考克斯(Meyrick Cox)表示:“大约15年前，中国国家发改委(NDRC)开始公布希望企业推行的战略。其中一些只能通过并购实现，特别是在汽车、钢铁和铁矿石以及石油领域。”考克斯曾在去年吉利(Geely)以18亿美元从福特汽车(Ford Motor)手中收购沃尔沃(Volvo)品牌的交易中担任吉利方面的顾问。 迄今为止，国家发改委提出的优先任务帮助引导了中国交易撮合的流向，同时，中国企业界对于收购目标所在国会如何看待其收购兴趣极为敏感。 瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)拉美并购业务主管马库斯•希尔伯曼(Marcus Silberman)表示，这两个因素都促使中国企业对拉美产生了浓厚兴趣。 “中国非常渴求自然资源，而拉美拥有丰富的自然资源，同时需要资金开发储备，”他表示。“中国人知道，他们在拉美非常受欢迎。” 相比之下，其它市场一直被视为禁区，最明显的是美国。在美国，以往并购行动引发的惹人注目的问题，以及美国对外投资委员会(Committee on Foreign Investment)的影响，遏制了中国的兴趣。中国人仍然记得，2005年，中海油收购美国石油集团优尼科(Unocal)的交易最终宣告流产。 与此同时，在遭到美国有关部门的反对后，软件和电信设备制造商华为(Huawei)最近决定放弃在美国价值200万美元的专利交易。这再次提醒人们，任何交易，不管其规模多么小，都有可能在海外遭到质疑。 “国有企业感觉自己处于不利地位，”一名顾问指出。“最近几年，国有企业在融资和流动性方面比国际竞争对手有优势。但在竞购过程中，(国有身份)并未让它们受益。” 交易顾问表示，卖家可能会避免选择中国买家，担心受到安全审查以及审批程序拖延的可能性，可能会延误甚至断送交易。去年，尽管出价最高，但华为在两宗美国并购交易中仍然落败:在收购私营宽带路由器制造商2Wire的交易中败给了英国的Pace，在收购摩托罗拉(Motorola)子公司的交易中输给了诺基亚西门子网络(Nokia Siemens Networks)。 然而，中国在国际上寻找收购机遇的兴趣正不断扩大。 美国银行美林的张秀萍补充称:“大多数正在海外积极寻找并购机遇的企业，要么是因为它们在中国的业务已经无法继续增长，要么是因为它们存在诸如上游资源或技术方面的需求。” 与此同时，国家发改委还在谋划一条更为雄心勃勃的路径。Moelis & Company的考克斯指出，最近的规定变化现在普遍要求，中国企业组建的汽车合资企业要由中方控股，由中方拥有和开发关键技术。 银行家也提到消费品领域的交易活动正日益增多，上海消费集团光明食品(Bright Food)参与了多宗海外并购，软饮生产商娃哈哈(Wahaha)据称正在寻觅海外收购目标，包括在美国。 食品安全也是一个颇受关注的领域。中国企业正在寻找机会，收购不那么引人瞩目的农地，或是有助于中国获得食品和农产品供应的交易。这其中就包括最近收购了法国维奥庄园(Château de Viaud)的 24 Mcanxixun * Information 国有农产品集团中粮(Cofco)。该庄园位于波尔多拉朗德一波默罗尔种植园内，占地49公顷。 当然，这个过程并非总是一帆风顺。银行家们私下里承认，多数中国企业以前从未经历过并购，称 许多企业对于上市公司的交易表现得极其谨慎，并且会回避任何有敌意味道的交易。 另外，让银行家们感到失望的是，一些潜在买家已经到了出售过程的后期，但在最后冲刺阶段，兴 趣却减退了。 上海市政府持有多数股权的光明食品在至少3宗收购交易中都是领先竞价者，但一宗都没有获得成 功。该集团去年退出了收购英国联合饼干(United Biscuits)和美国维他命零售商GNC的谈判。上个月， 该公司在收购法国酸奶生产商Yoplait 50%股权的交易中输给了通用磨坊公司(General Mills)。 获得国内监管机构必要的认可和批准可能也是一个陌生的过程，从而限制了中国企业的海外抱负。 张秀萍表示:“总体而言，国家发改委非常支持中国企业发起海外并购。” 但罗斯切尔德的劳伦斯补充称，与政府部门打交道可能会充满不可预知性。“治理过程可能直到交 易就要结束的时候还会给你带来惊讶，”他表示。“那些问题不像在西方那样直截了当。” 他补充表示:“让并购交易得到认可比你预想的更加艰难。但我非常相信，未来几年，你会看到更 多中国企业收购西方资产。” Investment(投资) Is the Market Overvalued? It's a question that is always on investors' minds, but rarely more so than right now: Is the market overvalued? Two heavyweights of financial analysis believe they hold the answer. Robert Shiller, the Yale University economist who correctly predicted the bursting of the stock market bubble in 2000 and the housing crash that started in 2006, has data that show stocks are pricey by historical measures. David Bianco, U.S. stock strategist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, has been on a campaign to revise the good professor's math. Once he tweaks the calculations, he says, stocks look cheap. The issue is more than a tempest in an academic teapot. The stock market has roared back from its March 2009 lows, doubling in value on an intraday basis in less than two years. But the last leg of the rally, which began last summer, largely has been driven by the Federal Reserve, whose policy of buying Treasury bonds to inflate asset values across the economy is set to end in June. Investors want to know whether stock prices are too frothy now, or whether they are reasonable estimations of companies' underlying earnings power. Which side you take—Mr. Shiller's or Mr. Bianco's—depends partly on whether you are more comfortable with the analysis of an academic who works far from Wall Street and whose job is to test theories, or a Wall Street strategist who is paid to track the market closely and bring in business. Mr. Shiller bases his analysis on a comparison of the value of the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index to its component companies' earnings results over time. Data of this kind don't predict when stocks will start to decline. They just show when stocks are getting expensive compared with their companies' earnings, a sign they could be headed for trouble sooner or later. Mr. Shiller keeps data going back to the late 19th century on his website, at www.econ.yale.edu/?shiller/data.htm. The innovation of Mr. Shiller's system is that it is designed to avoid distortions from short-term profit swings. Most Wall Street analysts compare stock prices to the previous year's profits or to analysts' predictions of future 25 MCanxixun * Information profits. Mr. Shiller takes an average of corporate profits over the previous 10 years. Long favored by sophisticated investors, that method smoothes out the business cycle, producing a measure of sustainable corporate profit that investors sometimes call normalized profit. On that basis, Mr. Shiller's method shows the S&P 500 trading at 23 times profits, well above the historical average of 16. It doesn't necessarily mean stocks are about to fall; the S&P 500 went to a record 44 times earnings during the dot-com bubble before collapsing in 2000. But today's level isn't far from the peak of 27.5 hit before stocks fell during the financial crisis of 2007-09. At the 2009 bottom, it went down to 13 before quickly pushing higher again. Alternative Calculations Mr. Bianco, who is bullish on stocks, says Prof. Shiller's measure is inaccurate, and the Wall Street strategist has taken his criticism public. Over the past year, he has written two reports offering alternative calculations. Mr. Bianco says he began looking for ways to revise the Shiller numbers last year after a page-one article in The Wall Street Journal on the subject. Clients, he says, started using Mr. Shiller's data to contest his bullish thesis. Mr. Bianco's massaging shows the S&P 500 trading currently at about 14.5 times his own calculation of 10-year profits, a much more attractive level than Mr. Shiller's 23 times profits. 'Clients call it the Bianco method vs. the Shiller method,' Mr. Bianco says. 'People call it Wall Street vs. the universities, or the Ivory Tower vs. the Bank of America Tower.' Prof. Shiller says he hadn't paid attention to Mr. Bianco's work until recently, when The Journal inquired. Prof. Shiller reviewed his calculations in light of the criticism and says he likes his math the way he did it. 'The basic analysis I have been presenting is right as is,' he said in an email message. Mr. Bianco doesn't dispute the usefulness of a 10-year average, an idea in line with the thinking of the founders of modern stock analysis, Benjamin Graham and David Dodd. He proposes to change Prof. Shiller's numbers in three ways, however, to remove what he thinks are distortions. First, Mr. Bianco would adjust the way corporate earnings are calculated. Instead of the as-reported profits Mr. Shiller favors, he would use what analysts call operating earnings, which don't count some of the write-offs of the dot-com bust and the financial crisis. That change sharply boosts 10-year average earnings, making price/earnings ratios look less scary. Second, he would change the historical data to which today's numbers are compared. He prefers to compare today's numbers only to data since 1960 or 1980, a period during which P/E ratios have been higher than in the past, making current levels look less extreme. If long-term data are used, he wouldn't count the decade following 1914, on the grounds that corporate profits were distorted by World War I more than by any other modern event, even the Great Depression. Throwing out that decade also makes past P/E ratios higher, so that today's look better. Finally, he would adjust earnings figures still higher, based on the fact that companies have been retaining a higher percentage of profits and paying lower dividends for decades. When companies retain and invest more profits, he says, earnings growth is faster and reported earnings don't fully reflect the ability of retained earnings to spur growth. He calls this the Equity Time Value Adjustment, or ETVA. The debate goes well beyond Mr. Bianco and Prof. Shiller. Prof. Shiller's old friend and sometime critic, Jeremy Siegel of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton business school, is Mr. Bianco's former professor. Mr. Siegel is siding with his student and against his friend. Mr. Siegel agrees that earnings should be adjusted for the ETVA, and he also would massage earnings to remove some one-time charges. Earnings recorded at the depth of the financial crisis were highly unusual figures that shouldn't be used now to project future profits and stock values, he says. 'I respect Bob [Shiller] a lot. He is very thoughtful,' Prof. Siegel says. 'But to keep that once-in-a-75-year event in your data set, to say that is normal earnings, doesn't seem to be realistic.' 26 Mcanxixun * Information Dividends and Earnings Robert Arnott, whose firm Research Affiliates LLC manages $73 billion from Newport Beach, Calif., has done his own research on one element of the debate: the relationship between dividends and earnings. He says his work shows it is a fallacy to think that lower dividends lead to faster earnings growth. Lower dividends come when companies are worried about the future or may be spending cash hoards on big acquisitions, which can hold down earnings growth, he says. 'It is peculiar that this thesis keeps coming up year after year when it is so demonstrably wrong,' Mr. Arnott says. Like Mr. Shiller, Mr. Arnott also doesn't trust operating earnings and prefers to use those reported according to generally accepted accounting principles. Such numbers tend to show lower earnings results, but are more accurate, he says. Mr. Arnott says he uses Shiller-style P/E calculations in his work. The figures helped persuade him to boost his U.S. stock exposure in 2009, when the 10-year P/E was low, and then cut his exposure when the P/E moved higher. Mr. Bianco says he will have to discuss this with Mr. Arnott. 'Rob is one of the best minds in the business,' Mr. Bianco says. Just to show how small the financial world can be, Mr. Arnott also has had run-ins over the years with Prof. Siegel, Mr. Bianco's former professor. Mr. Siegel and Mr. Shiller, who despite their differences often vacation together, have been debating these issues since they were graduate students together, 40 years ago. In the summer of 2009, walking on the beach on a barrier island near Atlantic City, N.J., they got so involved in a debate about stock-valuation methods that they briefly wandered away from their wives. They can accuse one another of errors without raising their voices, then thank each other for the critiques and talk about plans for the next vacation. Mr. Shiller did his own calculation about the impact of declining dividends on earnings growth and concluded that it is marginal at best, not meriting any adjustment. He scoffs at the idea of eliminating the decade after World War I. He says he will think about Prof. Siegel's concern about the big write-offs. But he is reluctant to make too many adjustments to data that he feels have painted a useful picture up to now. 'I think I should just keep it simple,' Mr. Shiller says. 股市被高估了吗, 这是一个一直萦绕在投资者心头的问题，但他们几乎没有哪个时候比现在更想知道这个问题的答案: 市场被高估了吗, 金融分析界的两个重量级人物认为他们已经有了答案。耶鲁大学(Yale University)经济学家席勒 (Robert Shiller)曾准确预测了2000年股市泡沫破裂以及始于2006年的楼市大跌，他的分析表明，从 历史上的指标来衡量，目前的股价是昂贵的。 而美国银行美林(Bank of America Merrill Lynch)的美国股票策略师比安科(David Bianco)则对这 位知名教授的演算法进行了修正。他说他调整了计算方法后，发现目前的股价是便宜的。 这件事在学术界引发了轩然大波。股市从2009年3月份时的低点强力反弹，在不到两年的时间内单 日市值上涨了一倍。但始于去年夏天的最近一轮涨势在很大程度上是受到了美联储(Federal Reserve) 的推动，其购买美国国债的政策全面推高了资产价值，而这一政策将于6月份结束。投资者想知道目前 27 MCanxixun * Information 的股价是否包含了大量泡沫，股价是否是公司潜在盈利能力的合理体现。 你认同哪一方——席勒还是比安科——从某种程度上要取决于你是更乐于接受哪种观点:是一位远离华尔街工作、其任务就是对理论进行检验的学者的分析，还是一位依靠密切追踪市场来挣薪水的华尔街策略师的观点。 席勒的分析是基于将一段时间中标普500(Standard & Poor's 500)股指成分股的市值与其收益数据所做的比较。这类数据并不是预测股票将于何时开始下跌。它们只是说明了相比公司的收益而言，这些股票是从什么时候变贵的，这也是预示公司可能早晚要出现麻烦的一种征兆。席勒分析的数据一直追溯到19世纪末，详细信息可参见他的网站www.econ.yale.edu/•shiller/data.htm。 席勒这一套分析体系的创新之处在于它避免了短期利润变化造成的失真。大部分华尔街分析师都会将股价与上一年的利润或是与分析师对于将来利润的预期做比较。而席勒则是对企业此前十年的利润进行了平均计算。这种为经验老道的投资者所长期青睐的方法消除了经济周期波动的影响，创造出一种能够衡量企业持续性利润的指标，这种利润有时被投资者称为常态化利润。 在此基础上，席勒的研究显示，标普500目前的市盈率为23倍，远高于16倍的历史平均水平。这并不一定意味着股市即将下跌;标普500在互联网泡沫时期的市盈率曾达到创纪录的44倍，随后在2000年遭遇重挫。但相比股市在2007-09年金融危机期间下跌之前创下的27.5倍的峰值，目前的水平与它相差并不远。2009年时标普500的市盈率曾降至13倍的低值，但很快它便再次升高。 另一种计算方法 看涨股市的比安科说，席勒教授的计算方法是不准确的，这位华尔街策略师还将他的评论公诸于众。他在过去一年中撰写了两份提供不同计算方法的报告。 比安科说，在《华尔街日报》登载了一篇关于该问题的头版文章后，他从去年开始搜寻各种途径来修正席勒的数据。他说，客户们开始用席勒的数据来对他的看涨观点提出异议。 比安科的分析显示，基于他自己对十年间盈利的计算，标普500目前的市盈率约为14.5倍，这一水平相比席勒得出的23倍的市盈率要有吸引力得多。 比安科说，客户们说这是比安科方法与席勒方法的对比，人们说这是华尔街与大学的对比，或者象牙塔与美国银行大厦的对比。 席勒教授说，直到最近当《华尔街日报》询问他时，他才注意到比安科的研究。席勒教授针对那些不同观点对他的计算进行了复查，他说他还是喜欢自己的计算方法。 他在一封电子邮件中说，我所做的基本分析本来就是正确的 比安科并没有对十年平均值的有效性提出质疑，这种观点与现代股市分析的创始人格拉汉姆(Benjamin Graham)以及多德(David Dodd)的看法是一致的。然而，他建议通过三种方式来修正席勒教授的数据，以此消除他认为这其中存在的失真。 首先，比安科会调整公司收益的计算方式。他不会采用席勒所锺爱的收益报告中提到的公司利润，而是会选取被分析师称为营运收益的数据作为参考，这种收益不会计入互联网泡沫破裂以及金融危机期间出现的部分冲销。这种计算方式的调整大大提高了十年期平均收益，从而令市盈率看起来没有那么吓人了。 其次，他会改变与今天的数据进行比较的历史数据。他只想把如今的数据与1960年或是1980年之后的数据做比较，这段时期内的市盈率水平要高于以往，这就使目前的市盈率看起来没有那么极端了。如果要采用更久之前的数据，他不会计入1914年之后的那个十年，因为企业利润由于第一次世界大战而出现的失真比现代其他任何重大事件(即便是“大萧条”)对它造成的影响都要大。剔除这个十年后，以往的市盈率再次升高，相比之下今天的市盈率也就更有吸引力了。 最后，他会进一步调高收益数据，因为数十年来企业一直支付着较低水平的派息，同时将更大比例的利润予以留存。他说，当企业将更多的利润留下用于进行投资时，收益会以更快的速度增长，收益报告中提到的收益无法完全反映出留存利润在刺激增长方面的能力。他将其称为股票的时间价值调整(Equity Time Value Adjustment，ETVA)。 28 Mcanxixun * Information 这场辩论所涉及的人远远不止比安科和席勒。席勒的故友、宾夕法尼亚大学(University of Pennsylvania)沃顿商学院(Wharton Business School)的塞格尔(Jeremy Siegel)曾是一名评论家，他过 去是比安科的教授。这一次塞格尔站到了他的学生一边，与朋友意见相左。 塞格尔赞同对收益进行ETVA方面的调整，他在研究收益时还会剔除一些一次性的开支。他说，在金 融危机最严重时期报告的收益数据具有非同一般的特殊性，它们不应被用来预测今后的利润以及股票价 值。 塞格尔教授说，我很尊重席勒，他很善于思考，但将这种75年才发生一次的事情纳入你的数据组， 将它看作是正常情况下的收益，显然是不可行的。 派息与收益 加州纽波特比奇(Newport Beach)Research Affiliates LLC公司董事长阿诺特(Robert Arnott)对 这场辩论中的一个问题进行了自己的研究:派息与收益之间的关系。Research Affiliates LLC公司管 理着730亿美元的资产。 他说他的研究显示，认为低派息造成了收益高增长的观点是错误的。他说，当公司对未来感到担忧 或是当公司也许是在利用现金储备进行大规模的收购时，派息水平会比较低，而这两种情况均会抑制收 益增长。 阿诺特说，这种观点的错误之处是如此明显，它却仍然年复一年地甚嚣尘上，这种现象有些奇怪。 与席勒一样，阿诺特也不看重营运收益，他更愿意使用根据普遍接受的会计准则所得出的收益数据。 他说，这种方法计算出的收益往往比较低，但却更加准确。 阿诺特说，他在工作中采用了席勒的市盈率计算法。依此得出的数字，他在2009年当十年期市盈率 处于低位时增持了美国股市的股票，然后在市盈率上升时进行了减持。 比安科说，他将和阿诺特讨论这个问题。他还说，阿诺特是这个行业里最聪明的人之一。 这些年来，阿诺特也曾与比安科当年的教授塞格尔有过争论，这也从某个角度说明了金融界确实是 个很小的圈子。 塞格尔和席勒从40年前他们在一起读研究生时就开始辩论这些问题，一直延续到现在。尽管二人之 间存有分歧，他们却常常一起外出度假。 2009年夏天，塞格尔和席勒在新泽西州大西洋城(Atlantic City)附近一座堰洲岛的海滩上一边漫 步一边对股价估值方法进行争论，他们太过忘我，以至于一度与妻子走散。他们指出对方的错误但却没 有大喊大嚷，然后还互相感谢彼此提出的意见，接下来便开始畅谈起下一次度假计划了。 关于派息减少对收益增长的影响，席勒按照自己的方式进行了计算，最后他认为这种影响充其量只 是很有限的，不值得做任何调整。对于剔除一战后十年的想法，他也不以为然。他说他倒是会考虑塞格 尔在大笔冲销这个问题上的疑虑。 但他不愿对数据做过多的修正，他觉得到目前为止这些数据对人们是有説明的。 席勒说，他觉得让这些数据保持原来的样子就好了。 Deal of the day: CIC invests in SMIC On the face of it, the amount of attention that China‘s semiconductor sector is getting seems unwarranted for a sector which typically has low profit margins and high costs. But upon closer look, the logic behind recent investments in the sector- which have come mostly from the government and state-owned companies- may be more strategic. The most recent evidence of this came with news on Tuesday that China‘s sovereign wealth fund has invested in state-owned Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). On Tuesday, a Hong Kong-listed SMIC received US $250m from CIC in exchange for 11.6 per cent of SMIC‘s 29 MCanxixun * Information outstanding share capital. Proceeds from this transaction will be used to improve the company‘s production capability, said Ke Li, director of semiconductor industry research group from China Semiconductor Industry Association. SMIC, which has a market cap of HK $18.08bn broke even in 2010 after making losses for five years until 2010. The government plans to nurture two dominating semiconductor foundry companies, SMIC and Hua Hong Group, to compete against the world giants including Taiwan Semiconductor (with a TW $1.76 tn market cap), which grabs about 60 per cent global market share of the industry, Li said. Semiconductor manufacturers tend to be less attractive and lucrative to investors than semiconductor design companies (like Nationz Technologies) since they are more capital-intensive and typically see low profit margins. It‘s for this reason, that the Chinese government has been proactive in urging its sovereign fund and state-owned companies like China Mobile and China Telecom to invest into these less-profitable but strategically important industry companies, Ke Li said. CIC was established on September 29th 2007 with the issuance of special bonds worth RMB 1.55 trillion by the Ministry of Finance. 中芯国际获中投2.5亿美元投资 表面上看，中国半导体行业目前的受关注程度似乎不可理喻——通常而言，半导体行业属于低利润 率、高成本的行业。不过，深入观察就可以发现，在中国半导体行业近期获得的投资——主要来自政府 和国有企业——背后，可能隐藏着更具战略性的缘由。周二有关中国主权财富基金投资国有的中芯国际 集成电路制造有限公司(SMIC)的消息，就是这方面的最新例证。 周二，在香港上市的中芯国际获得中国投资有限责任公司(CIC)总额2.5亿美元的投资，而中投公司 将获得中芯国际已发行股份的11.6%。 中国半导体行业协会(CSIA)信息交流部主任李珂表示，中芯国际将把这笔资金用于扩大产能。中芯 国际在连续亏损5年之后，于2010年实现盈亏平衡，目前市值为180.8亿港元。 李珂表示，政府计划扶持两大集成电路生产公司——中芯国际和华虹集团(Hua Hong Group)，以与 包括台积电(Taiwan Semiconductor)在内的世界巨头竞争。台积电的市值为1.76万亿新台币，在业内， 该公司占据着大约60%的全球市场份额。 对投资者来说，集成电路制造公司的吸引力和盈利性，往往不及国民技术股份有限公司(Nationz Technologies)之类的集成电路设计公司，因为这些制造公司更具资本密集性，而且通常利润率较低。 李珂表示，正是出于这个原因，中国政府力促主权基金以及中国移动(China Mobile)和中国电信 (China Telecom)等国有企业投资此类利润率较低、但具有重要战略意义的行业企业。 中投公司成立于2007年9月29日，当时中国财政部通过发行特别国债的方式，为其筹集了1.55 万亿元人民币的资金。 A New Tack In China For Equity Firms For years, private-equity funds have been searching for the best way to invest into China. Now they're looking for ways to get Chinese money out. In one of the first moves of its kind, RIT Capital Partners PLC -- an investment firm chaired by Jacob Rothschild 30 Mcanxixun * Information -- together with local Chinese investment company Creat Group and investment advisory firm Quercus Ventures at the end of March said they plan to raise $750 million in yuan from domestic Chinese investors to invest in overseas companies. Their efforts to raise funds and get deals done will be a test of how easily private equity will be able to regularly use Chinese money in international markets, something that isn't yet assured of success. With China growing increasingly wealthy -- and much of the developed world still suffering the effects of the global financial crisis -- fund managers are starting to look toward China as not just an investment destination, but a potential source of funding for deals elsewhere in the world. Already China has become a major investor internationally, with firms demonstrating a voracious demand for overseas resources and individuals snapping up real estate around the globe. Much of that gets greenlighted by Beijing because it is in the country's strategic interests, or comes from savings amassed overseas. But China still maintains strict capital controls that make it difficult for the yuan to be changed into foreign currency to make a financial investment. Investment in foreign stock markets can be done only through funds that have a quota to convert a certain amount of foreign exchange for the purpose. 'Regulators like the concept [of outward private equity], particularly when it involves helping Chinese firms go' abroad, says Ying White, a partner at law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP in Beijing. 'But there's a lot of issues that need to be worked out.' Ms. White says that China's current system for regulating Chinese purchases abroad is geared toward regulators approving each outward investment deal by deal. That is fine for major firms that make only the occasional strategic purchase, but might prove problematic for a private-equity fund looking to make multiple deals a year. And given the often slow pace of approval, requiring the sign-off of multiple government agencies, there is always the risk of missing a window of opportunity for competitive deals. So far the early movers are trying to demonstrate that their funds will benefit China's broader interests. J. Rothschild Creat Partners -- the name of the venture between RIT and Creat -- is aiming to invest in foreign firms that have growth opportunities in China, and holds open the potential for Chinese firms to invest alongside them. That is a similar approach to A Capital, a European-backed fund involved in arranging China-based Fosun International Ltd.'s stake in resort-chain Club Mediterranee SA of France last year. A Capital has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Beijing municipal government to set up a yuan-denominated fund to invest overseas. The plan is for the fund to sometimes invest alongside firms introduced to it by the Beijing government that are looking to expand abroad. For the early movers, such political support is likely to be key. RIT is hoping it has that covered. According to Quercus Chief Financial Officer Maxim Parr, the fund already has support from one of the key regulators, the National Development and Reform Commission, China's top economic decision-making body. And Chairman Zheng Yuewen of Creat Group, which has 20 years of experience investing in China, also heads up the China International Chamber of Commerce for the Private Sector, a government-backed industry group geared to helping private Chinese firms expand overseas. The fund hopes the chamber's members -- which include high-profile Chinese firms such as Lenovo Group Ltd., Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co., Shimao Property Holdings Ltd. and Fosun -- will form a base of investors. It hopes to start raising funds in May. It will initially focus on technology and clean-tech, the green economy, health care, natural resources, and luxury goods, areas where China has already demonstrated a demand for Western expertise and brands. 31 MCanxixun * Information 在华私募新尝试:国内募资 海外投资 多年来，私募股权投资基金一直在寻找进入中国进行投资的最佳方式。现在，他们正在想办法将国内投资者的钱带到海外。 作为这项创举的一个代表，投资公司RIT Capital Partners PLC(主席为雅各布•罗斯柴尔德)携手国内本土投资公司科瑞集团(Creat Group)和投资顾问公司Quercus Ventures于3月底宣布，三者计划从国内投资者那里以人民币募集规模相当于7.5亿美元的资金以投资海外公司。 上述三家投资实体努力募集资金并完成交易的尝试将成为一个试验，可以检测私募股权投资基金定期利用国内资本在国际市场进行投资的便利性。到目前为止这件事情还没有成功的保证。 随着中国越来越富裕，而多数发达国家还在受全球金融危机负面影响的拖累，许多基金经理开始不仅将中国看成是一个投资目的地，而且是一个可以为全球其它地区的交易提供资金的潜在来源。 在国际上中国已经成为了一个主要投资者，中国的各大企业极度渴求海外资源，中国的个人投资者在全球抢购房产。这些投资大都得到了中国政府的批准，因为这符合中国的战略意义，或投资的资金来自海外储蓄。 但中国仍然实施严格的资本管制，因此将人民币兑换成外币进行金融投资并不容易。想要投资海外股市只有通过特定的基金才能实现。这些基金拥有配额，能够将人民币兑换成一定数量的外币以投资海外股市。 美国艾金•岗波律师事务所(Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP)北京分所合伙人张莹(Ying White)说，监管机构喜欢这种对外私募股权投资的概念，特别是当其涉及帮助中国企业“走出去”的时候。但这同时也有很多相关问题需要解决。 张莹说，中国现行在监管中国人海外股权投资时，监管机构总是逐一审批每一笔对外投资项目。 这种审批方式对于那些偶尔进行战略性股权投资的大型企业来说没有问题，但对于一年要做好几笔交易的私募股权投资基金来说恐怕就有麻烦了。由于审批的过程通常缓慢，需要好几个政府部门的批准，对于那些竞争激烈的交易来说，总有可能错失机会的窗口。 到目前为止，这批先行者正试图证明，各自的基金有利于中国广泛的利益。此次RIT Capital Partners PLC和科瑞集团共同成立的私募基金名叫J. Rothschild Creat Partners，其瞄准的对象是在中国有成长机会的海外公司，同时也打开机会的大门，允许中国企业和该基金一同投资。 这和欧洲的一家私募股权投资基金A Capital的做法类似。这家基金在去年曾安排中国的复星国际(Fosun International Ltd.)收购度假连锁集团法国地中海俱乐部(Club Mediterranee SA)的部分股份。 为了设立一支以人民币计价的海外投资基金，A Capital同北京市政府签署了一份理解备忘录。如果遇到北京市政府介绍的正在寻求海外扩张机会的公司，该基金有时也会和这些公司一起投资。 对于先行者来说，上述来自政府的支持可能非常关键。RIT也希望能得到类似的支持。Quercus的首席财务长帕尔(Maxim Parr)介绍，该基金已经得到了一个主要监管机构??国家发展和改革委员会(简称:发改委)的支持。发改委是中国最高的经济决策机构。 科瑞集团董事长郑跃文在中国有20年的投资经验，他同时还担任中国民间国际经济合作商会的负责人。该商会是政府支持的行业性组织，旨在协助中国私营企业进行海外扩张。 该基金希望商会成员企业能形成一个投资者团体，同时希望今年5月开始募集资金。商会成员企业包括一批知名的中国公司，其中有联想集团、浙江吉利控股集团有限公司、世茂房地产控股有限公司以及复星集团。 该基金最初将主要聚焦科技类企业、清洁技术、绿色经济、医疗保健、自然资源以及奢侈品。在上述领域，中国已经表现出对西方的专业知识和品牌的需求。 32 Mcanxixun * Information Financial Time(金融时报) China Owns Us--And Other Fallacies As a member of the media, let me say we do a lot of things well. But when it comes to parsing the nation's budget, deficit and debt burden, our math deficiency shows. We didn't get into this business because of our love of the Black-Scholes model--whatever that is. When it comes to the U.S. debt picture, we either are out of our league or tend to let too many compromised, ideologue voices do the interpretation. That's why the debate about the federal budget for the near and long term this week probably has a lot of my colleagues confused, though they would never admit it. If we are overwhelmed, chances are our audience is, too. You may be smarter than us, but you depend on us for the information. So, in an effort to bring some clarity, I've tried to cull some of the best analysis of the budget-deficit debate this week. The most compelling stuff hasn't been reheated arguments about trickle-down economics or the wealth gap from people such as Paul Krugman and David Stockman. It has been, for the most part, simple numbers. For instance, Jeff Grundlach at DoubleLine Funds gave a revealing presentation this week about U.S. debt. The media myth is that China and other foreign countries own most of our $13.5 trillion in outstanding debt. Grundlach points out that China owns less than 10% of that amount. More than half is owned domestically: 42.1% by U.S. individuals and institutions, 17.7% in the Social Security trust fund, 6% in the military retirement fund and so on. More good information can be found at the Office of Management and Budget's website. The OMB broke down the proposed 2012 numbers into a graphic in which the sizes of blocks represent the amount of the budget pie they are eating. This, too, helped to dismiss some myths. It turns out that Planned Parenthood, which receives $360 million, and National Public Radio, which receives grants of about $5 million, aren't even big enough to show up on the graphic. On the flip side, Social Security, at 20% of the pie, dwarfs just about everything. The OMB punches a hole in another myth: that the deficits will skyrocket. As a debt burden over time, that's true. On an annual basis, however, the budget deficit is expected to shrink from the current 10% of gross domestic product to 5% as soon as 2014. Another story that doesn't add up: that U.S. corporations have the highest tax rates in the world. That's true, but it's an incomplete picture. For one, U.S. corporate-tax rates have been shrinking for 50 years. Secondly, most companies avoid paying the top rate. Here, the conservative Tax Policy Center, aligned with the Brookings Institution, dispels the myth with a chart that shows corporate income taxes have fallen steadily to less than 1% of gross domestic product from more than 6% in the early 1950s. Though its latest data are from 2007, the TPC also points out that U.S. corporations were able to lower their taxable income by nearly 25% using the raft of deductions--including parking profits offshore--that are available from the Internal Revenue Service. Assuming companies in other parts of the world are paying their taxes, that makes the 35% corporate-tax rate seem less of a burden. The long-term budget battle also has had its share of he-said-she-said analysis. 33 MCanxixun * Information Wisconsin Congressman Paul Ryan, the GOP point man on the budget, wants to lower the corporate-tax rate. His long-term proposal was reviewed by the Congressional Budget Office. It didn't have much to say about the tax cuts, but it thoroughly examined the spending cuts, particularly those for Medicare. The CBO found that Ryan's plan would, by 2030, essentially force 45% of retirees to pay for 68% of the costs currently paid for by Medicare. Ryan's plan also calls for making permanent those controversial Bush administration tax cuts that were extended in 2010 and will expire again in 2012. The left-leaning Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates, using government statistics, a tax revenue loss of $4.5 trillion over the next decade if the cuts are made permanent. If the cuts expire, the added revenue would be enough to halt the rise in debt projected over the next decade, ending at more than 95% of GDP in 2021 and keep debt levels at about 80% of GDP. On Wednesday, President Obama offered few specifics, but he did say Social Security isn't a deficit problem. He may want to check with his own deficit commission. The Federal Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform said the program will run a $600 billion deficit during the next 10 years. Is it a problem? The commission, the Social Security Administration, Congress and everyone else seems to agree: Do nothing and the Social Security Trust fund will run out in 2037. You get the picture. There are nearly as many claims about what where we stand fiscally as there are claims to inventing Facebook. Numbers can be massaged and taken out of context. And this is by no means a complete analysis of the nation's budget and debt picture. But it's also fair to say we can put to rest some myths that have been floating around. The Chinese don't own us. Corporate taxes probably can be lowered as long as corporations are made to pay their taxes. The deficit can be stabilized either through higher taxes, in the president's plan, or benefit cuts, in Ryan's plan, or simply by the elimination of the Bush-era tax cuts. Knowing the truth about exactly where we stand doesn't make any of our budget problems less daunting, but at least we will be debating facts instead of fiction. 美国的大债主真是中国吗, 作为媒体的一员，我认为很多事情我们都做得很好。不过在剖析一国的预算、赤字和债务负担时， 我们在数学上的不足就显露无遗了。我们干媒体这一行又不是因为喜欢布莱克-斯科尔斯期权定价模型 (Black-Scholes)，管它是什么呢。 涉及到美国债务状况时，我们不是力不从心，就是经常让太多不能彻底说明问题的理论派言论来解 释。 这就是为何本周有关短期和长期联邦预算的争论会让很多同行困惑不已，尽管他们永远不会承认这 点。如果我们晕头转向，读者大概也是。你可能比我们聪明，但你要靠我们获取信息。 因此，为了拨开一些迷雾，我试着挑了一些对本周预算赤字争论的最佳分析。最有说服力的分析在 很大程度上都是简单的数字，而非克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)和斯托克曼(David Stockman)这类人对 涓滴经济学(trickle-down economics)或贫富差距炒冷饭般的论证。 例如，DoubleLine Funds的债券基金经理冈德拉奇(Jeff Grundlach)本周发布了一份很能说明情 况的美国债务简报。 媒体的谬误观点认为，美国13.5万亿的债务大部分是由中国和其他国家持有的。冈德拉奇指出，中 国的持有美国债务在其中所占的比例不到10%。美国的负债多半都是国内的债务:美国个人和机构持有 42.1%，社保信托基金持有17.7%，军队退休基金持有6%，以及其他机构。 白宫管理及预算办公室(Office of Management and Budget)网站上能找到更多有用的信息。该办 34 Mcanxixun * Information 公室将拟定的2012年预算数据做成图表，每部分的大小代表在预算中所占比例。 这也有助于消除一些谬误。人们发现，接收3.6亿美元拨款的美国计划生育联盟(Planned Parenthood)和接收约500万美元拨款的全国公共广播电台(National Public Radio)都不够资格出现 在该图表上。而另一方面，占预算20%的社会保障令其他任何部分相形见绌。 白宫管理及预算办公室还打破了另一个谬误:那就是赤字会猛涨。考虑到一直以来的债务负担，确 实如此。不过以年度情况来看，预算赤字最早在2014年就会从目前占国内生产总值(GDP)10%的比例降 至5%。 还有一个不合理的说法是:美国企业是全世界税率最高的。确实如此，但不完全正确。首先，美国 公司税率50年来一直在下降。第二，大多数公司都避免了按最高税率纳税。持保守主义观点的税收政策 中心(Tax Policy Center)联合布鲁金斯研究所(Brookings Institution)用一个图表推翻了这个谬 误。图中显示，公司所得税从20世纪50年代初占GDP逾6%的比例稳步降到了不到1%。 尽管税收政策中心的最新数据是2007年的，但它还指出，利用美国国税局(Internal Revenue Service)提供的众多减免税项目(包括将利润留在海外)，美国公司将应税收入减少了近25%。假设其他 国家的公司都依法纳税，那么美国35%的公司税看来就不是那么沉重的负担了。 围绕长期预算的争论也是纷纷扰扰。 共和党预算问题核心人物、威斯康星州议员瑞恩(Paul Ryan)提议下调公司税税率。美国国会预算办 公室(Congressional Budget Office)审议了他的长期预算提案。提案没有太多地谈及减税措施，而是全 面探讨了支出的削价，特别是美国联邦医疗保险(Medicare)支出的削减。国会预算办公室发现，按照瑞 恩的提案，到2030年实际上将迫使45%的退休人员为目前由美国联邦医疗保险支付的费用的68%埋单。 瑞恩的提案还呼吁将布什政府备受争议的减税措施确定为永久性措施。减税措施在2010年获得延 期，2012年将再次到期。据偏左的预算与政策优先事宜中心(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities)估计，利用政府的统计数字，如果将减税措施永久性地实施下去，未来10年税收收入将损失4.5万亿美 元。 如果减税措施到期后不再延期，随之而来的额外税收收入将足以使未来10年的预期债务不再增加， 保持在GDP的约80%，否则2021年债务将达到GDP的95%以上。 周三，奥巴马没有详细介绍，不过他确实说，社保不是造成预算赤字的原因。他可能将与赤字委员 会进行核实。联邦财政责任与改革委员会(Federal Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform) 说，这项计划将在未来10年造成6,000亿美元赤字。这是问题吗,该委员会、社保局(Social Security Administration)、国会和其他所有人看来一致认为:如果什么也不做，2037年社保信托基金就会枯竭。 你明白是怎么回事了。关于Facebook的发明有多少种说法，就几乎有多少种财政主张。 数字可以修改、可以断章取义。但这绝非对美国预算和债务形势的一个全面分析。 不过，也有理由说，我们可以平息一些流言蜚语。中国并没有拥有美国。公司税或许可以下调，只 要公司依法纳税。赤字可以稳定下来，方法要么是总统提出的增税，要么是瑞恩提出的削减福利，要么 干脆取消布什时期的减税措施。 明白真实的现状并不会使我们的预算问题不那么艰巨，但至少我们将开始争论事实而不是虚构的东 西。 Which one is more like ,1996 or 1999? In May 1996, Open Market completed a successful IPO and more than doubled on the first day of trading, ending with a $1.2 billion market capitalization. We had recorded $1.8 million in revenue the year before. If investors observing this extraordinary phenomenon in 1996 were to have concluded that the technology market 35 MCanxixun * Information was in the midst of an unsustainable bubble, they would not have been wrong. But if that observation led them to refrain from investing in the Internet sector, they would have missed one of the most stunning legal creations of wealth in history. In 1997, Charles River Ventures yielded a stunning 15x return for its fund, backing such superstars as Ciena, Vignette and Flycast. Matrix Partners had a fund in 1998 that yielded an eye-popping 514+% IRR. The Internet bull market continued to run for four more years after the Open Market IPO, finally ending in the spring of 2000. The average venture capital fund raised between 1995 and 1997 returned more than 50% per year. Amidst all the recent talk of boom vs. bubble, there is a hue and cry that the current environment may smack of 1999. But what if it's actually more akin to 1996? What if the fundamentals are good enough to support four more years of insane behavior before the music stops and the natural business cycle correction settles in? The chart below from this week's Economist on unemployment made me pause and consider this question. As evidenced from the unemployment curve in the last economic cycle, these business cycles can often last 4-5 years. 2009 was the trough year of the most recent business cycle -- and a deep trough at that. 2010 was a year of firming and climbing out of a hole, but the tepid IPO market and general macroeconomic malaise seemed to linger until late in the year (similar to how 1995 felt). 2011 is the first year where it feels like a real boom – much like 1996. Employment lags economic output and is an admittedly imperfect indicator, but if you continue the analogy, it may be that the next 4-5 year boom cycle lasts until 2015! Consider the following: • When bellwether players go public (such as Netscape in 1995), there is a massive rush of capital and companies that follow. Facebook will likely go public in 2012 and be valued in the $50-75 billion range. This IPO and others like it (e.g., Groupon, Zynga) will create tremendous liquid wealth for a number of people and institutions who will likely pour that wealth back into the start-up ecosystem. That liquidity flowing back into the start-up ecosystem will arguably fuel the boom. • Macroeconomic choppiness is holding back more dramatic market euphoria. Tsunamis, Middle East crises, government shutdown threats and a looming budget deficit are all dampers on the market. But if some of these dampers clear out – if there is a period of reasonable international stability, if a divided US government can strike another fiscally responsible deal for the upcoming budget year and begin to deal with some of the long-term, fundamental drags on growth -- then the markets will become even more euphoric. Remember, it wasn't a straight line between 1995 and 2000; there were a series of macroeconomic crises on the domestic front, such as a near government shutdown (sound familiar?) as well as international crises, including the Mexican debt default, Russian currency defaults and the Asian market crisis. Let's not forget that Time Magazine featured Alan Greenspan, Rob Rubin and Larry Summers on the cover in February 1999 as "The Committee to Save the World." At times, this period saw pretty grim macroeconomic trends, while the Internet continued to boom in the trenches. • Thanks to recent decades of strong growth, the combination of China, India and Brazil have GDPs that are 4x the size and impact on the global economy as compared to the 1990s (see chart below). Demand from these, now larger, economies are having a very positive effect on the US tech market. They are gobbling up mobile devices, PCs, routers and other technology gear at a rapid rate. This powerful source of economic demand didn't exist 15 years ago. 36 Mcanxixun * Information • All the existing technology players are awash in liquidity and all the numbers are bigger this time. There are eight US-based global technology companies with market capitalizations of greater than $100 billion (Apple, Google, Oracle, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, HP, Cisco). There are a handful of companies that are very well-positioned, growing fast and could be the next $100 billion players (Amazon, Dell, Netflix, EMC, VMWare, Salesforce.com and Baidu come to mind). These companies either didn't exist in the mid-90s or are in infinitely stronger positions than they were 15 years ago. Internet usage, mobile phone usage, advertising dollar spend – all have grown enormously over the last 15 years to provide a stronger foundation underneath the latest boom. See the chart below, which will only explode further when updated for more recent figures that will take into account Internet access via mobile phones. The point here isn't to be Pollyannaish. I recognize that we have major structural issues in the global economy and they are perhaps more daunting than they have ever been. And the recent run up in the stock market has many 37 MCanxixun * Information arguing that the bull market won't last much longer. If oil soars to $150 per barrel, a few more soverign nations default on their debt obligations and gridlock persists in Washington, we could be looking at another recession as soon as 2012. Yet, with entrepreneurship on the rise, with this generation of young people ("the Entrepreneur generation") surging in their use and interest in technology and digital content, with some of the positive fundamental forces in innovation, it may just be that the music may not stop for another 4-5 years. Wouldn't that be something? Jeffrey Bussgang is general partner at venture capital firm Flybridge Capital Partners. 要是现在更像1996年，而不是1999年呢, 1996年5月，Open Market IPO大获成功，新股首日交易涨幅超过一倍，市值达12亿美元。而此前一年，公司实现的营业收入仅180万美元。 假如1996年注意到这一离奇现象的投资者得出结论，科技市场已处于不可持续的泡沫之中，那确实是对的。但如果上述发现导致他们回避投资互联网股票，他们则会错过历史上合法创造财富的奇迹时刻。 1997年，Charles River Ventures的基金回报率达到惊人的15倍，投资股票包括Ciena、Vignette和Flycast等超级明星股。1998年，Matrix Partners有一只基金的内部收益率达到令人瞠目的514%以上。在Open Market IPO后，互联网牛市又延续了4年，终结于2000年春季。1995-1997年间筹得的风险资本平均年回报率超过50%。 在近期有关繁荣期还是泡沫期的讨论中，很多人认为当前的市场环境有点像1999年。但如果实际情况更接近于1996年呢,如果基本面非常好，足以再支撑4年的高歌猛进，然后才会停下脚步，进入自然的商业周期调整呢, 下面这张刊登于本周《经济学人》(Economist)杂志的失业率图，让我停下来思考这个问题。上一轮经济周期的失业率曲线证明这样的商业周期通常能持续4-5 年。2009年是最近一轮商业周期的低点——而且是相当低的低点。2010年是回稳攀升的一年，但不温不火的 IPO市场以及整体宏观经济疲弱仍持续到了当年年末(感觉类似于1995年)。2011年是感觉到真正繁荣的第一年——很像1996年。由于就业数据滞后于经济产值数据，必须得承认这是一个不完美的指标，但如果你继续类比，可能会得出下一个4-5年的繁荣期将延续至2015年～ 图片来源:《经济学人》 我们不妨思考下述问题: •当标志性企业上市[如1995年网景(Netscape)的上市 ]时，会出现大量资本和公司跟随。Facebook可能将于2012 年上市，估值为500-750亿美元。这宗IPO以及其他类似的IP O(比如Groupon、Zynga)将为很多人和机构创造巨大的流 动财富，而这些人和机构可能将财富重新投入初创企业生态 系统中。回流到初创企业生态系统的这些资金无疑将促进繁 荣。 •宏观经济时好时坏，抑制了更乐观的市场情绪。海啸、 中东危机、美国政府关门的风险以及隐现的预算赤字都是市 场抑制因素。如果有些抑制因素消除——如果一段时期内国 际局势较为稳定，如果存在分歧的美国政府能为即将到来的 预算年达成一个具有财政责任感的方案并开始处理一些长期制约经济增长的的基本面因素——那么，市场将变得更加乐观。记住，1995年至2000年也不是一条直 38 Mcanxixun * Information 线，美国国内也经历了像政府几近关门(有点耳熟,)等一系列宏观经济危机，而国际危机则包括墨西哥债务违约、俄罗斯债务违约和亚洲市场危机。我们不应忘记1999年2月《时代周刊》(Time Magazine)刊登封面文章，将艾伦•格林斯潘、罗伯•鲁宾和拉里•萨默斯称为 “拯救世界的委员会”。这期间的宏观经济趋势有时也非常灰暗，但互联网领域持续繁荣。 •由于最近几十年的强劲增长，中国、印度和巴西的GDP总量和对全球经济的影响力已是上世纪90年代的四倍(见下图)。这些国家的需求对美国科技市场有非常积极的影响。他们正在快速大量地购入移动设备、个人电脑、路由器和其他科技设备。这样强劲的需求15年前是不存在的。 •当前的科技公司都拥有大量流动资金，而且资金数额比过去更大了。总部位于美国、市值超过1,000亿美元的全球科技公司有8家，分别是苹果(Apple)、谷歌(Google)、甲骨文(Oracle)、IBM、微软(Microsoft)、英特尔(Intel)、惠普(HP)和思科(Cisco)。还有一些公司处于有利的市场地位，增长迅速，有望成为下一批1,000亿美元级公司，如亚马逊(Amazon)、戴尔(Dell)、Netflix、 EMC、VMWare、Salesforce.com以及百度。这些公司要么在上世纪90年代时还不存在，要么比15年前强大了无数倍。互联网应用、手机应用、广告支出——所有这些在过去15年中都有了巨大的增长，为最新一轮繁荣提供了更强有力的支持。请看下图，如果考虑到手机上网增长，纳入更新的数据，曲线只会更陡峭。 39 MCanxixun * Information 我并不想鼓励盲目乐观。我知道全球经济仍存在一些重大的结构性问题，情况可能比过去更严峻。而且， 在最近的美国股市上涨中有很多人认为牛市将不会持续太久。如果油价飙升至150美元/桶，更多国家陷 入主权债务危机，华盛顿僵局持续，我们可能最早在2012年就会再次看到经济衰退。 但是，随着企业家精神抬头，随着这一代年轻人(“企业家一代”)对科技和数字的兴趣和使 5年。这难道不值得我们重视吗, 用激增，随着创新领域显现一些积极动向，也可能欢歌还会再持续4- 本文作者杰弗里•巴斯刚是风险投资公司Flybridge Capital Partners的普通合伙人。 Managers facing challenge over Taiwan fees rule Taiwan has been among the most profitable retail markets for international asset management companies operating in Asia, but fund groups may experience some challenges to profitability now that a fee disclosure rule is in place. ―Taiwan is where most of the [fund] companies make most of their money,‖ said Douglas Eu, Hong Kong-based chief executive at Allianz Global Investors Asia Pacific, speaking at the Fund Forum Asia in Hong Kong. ―Taiwan packs a very powerful punch from an asset base perspective and a profit perspective.‖ Over the years, retail sales have been growing steadily in Taiwan, offshore fund sales have been strong, and there has been a good take up of Ucits funds, according to Mr Eu. ―Taiwan is a lucrative place to sell funds.‖ However, ―change is coming‖ in the wake of the new fee disclosure rule, which was bound to affect profitability, he said. Taiwan‘s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has required existing funds to disclose all commission fees they award to bank distributors from March 2. That move aims to improve the transparency of distribution because offshore fund managers have been providing higher commission fees for banks than onshore fund managers. Onshore funds typically offer 1.5 per cent in commission to banks while offshore funds can offer as much as 3 per 40 Mcanxixun * Information cent, says Mario Chou, Taipei-based president of SinoPac Securities Investment Trust Company. Offshore funds are products registered outside Taiwan by international fund companies. Onshore funds are registered in Taiwan by domestic groups as well as by foreign managers with onshore subsidiaries. The disparity in commission fees is made possible by the lower business costs incurred by offshore fund managers, which do not need to build infrastructure in Taiwan to sell their funds. Due to the higher commission fees from offshore funds, banks prefer to sell offshore funds. ―With that full disclosure and full transparency‖ there will be pressure to ease up on commission fees, according to Mr Eu, which would in turn potentially affect sales. ―That will take quite a lot of revenue from the asset management space in the next 18 months.‖ Banks account for 80 per cent of the distribution of offshore funds in Taiwan by asset volume and just 50 per cent for onshore funds, according to industry estimates. The remaining 50 per cent of the distribution of onshore funds is through securities firms, insurance companies and the direct sales teams of fund companies. There were 550 onshore funds launched by 38 onshore fund companies in Taiwan at the end of November. Those funds had assets of about NT$1,900bn ($65bn) according to a December report from the Securities Investment Trust and Consulting Association of Taiwan (Sitca). The number of offshore funds for sale in Taiwan reached 1,013 at the end of November, with assets of NT$2,400bn, according to the report. The new fund disclosure rule is just one of the challenges that international asset management companies are facing in Taiwan. Increasing competition is another. ―The number of new entrants [in Taiwan] has significantly increased our cost of doing business,‖ Mr Eu said. After experiencing stable growth for about 15 years, asset management companies in Taiwan have started to experience a ―dent in margins‖ over the past three years, he added. There is also pressure to produce a wider product range. ―Distributors are looking for partners of scale. The pressure on us from distributors has been building up on resources,‖ he said. Although Taiwan‘s pension funds are outsourcing more of their assets to external managers, they are nevertheless not a significant source of revenue for asset management companies at this point, Mr Eu said. Such pension funds include Taiwan‘s Public Service Pension Fund, which is seeking managers for a total of US$1bn in foreign mandates. Others include the Labour Insurance Fund, the Labour Pension Fund and the Chunghua Post Fund. ―For the first time in about five to six years, I am least optimistic about Taiwan‘s ability to grow,‖ said Mr Eu. ―Taiwan is a very good cash cow for us,‖ he added. But it was time to look at ―the other markets for growth‖ within Asia. Rita Raagas De Ramos is managing editor of Ignites Asia 海外基金公司不再看好台湾市场 对于在亚洲运营的国际资产管理公司而言，台湾一直是最赚钱的零售市场之一;但随着佣金披露规 定的出台，基金公司的盈利能力可能会遇到一些挑战。 德盛安联资产管理(亚太)(Allianz Global Investors Asia Pacific)驻香港的首席执行官余义焜 41 MCanxixun * Information (Douglas Eu)在香港举行的亚洲基金论坛上表示:“台湾是大多数(基金)公司最赚钱的地方。” “不管是从资产基础的角度还是从利润的角度来看，台湾都是一个不容小觑的市场。” 余义焜表示，过去几年，台湾的零售销售稳步增长，离岸基金销售表现强劲，可转让证券集合投资计划(Ucits)基金的认购情况也相当不错。 “台湾是一个利润可观的基金销售市场。” 不过他表示，在肯定会影响盈利能力的佣金披露新规实施后，“情况将发生改变”。 台湾金融监督管理委员会(FSC)要求，从3月2日起，现有基金必须披露支付给银行分销商的所有佣金。 此举旨在提高分销过程的透明度，因为离岸基金管理公司向银行支付的佣金一直高于在岸基金。 永丰投信(SinoPac SITC)驻台北的总经理周德龙(Mario Chou)称，在岸基金通常向银行支付1.5%的佣金，而离岸基金最高可能支付3%。 离岸基金指的是国际基金公司在台湾以外地区注册的产品。在岸基金则是台湾本土公司及在台湾拥有分支机构的外国公司在台湾注册的产品。 之所以会存在佣金方面的差异，是因为离岸基金公司的业务成本更低，它们不需要在台湾建设基础设施来销售基金。 由于离岸基金支付的佣金更高，银行更愿意代销离岸基金。 余义焜表示，“在实现全面披露与完全透明后”，离岸基金将面临下调佣金的压力，进而可能会影响到销售。“未来18个月，这将导致资产管理市场丧失很多收入。” 据业内估计，以资产规模计算，银行代销了台湾约80%的离岸基金，而代销的在岸基金只有50%。剩下的50%在岸基金由证券公司、保险公司与基金公司的直接销售团队销售。 去年11月底，台湾38家在岸基金公司推出的在岸基金有550只。 根据台湾证券投资信托暨顾问商业同业公会(SITCA) 去年12月的一份报告，这些基金管理的资产总额约为1.9万亿元新台币(合650亿美元)。 报告显示，去年11月底，在台湾销售的离岸基金数量达到1013只，管理资产总额为2.4万亿元新台币。 基金佣金披露新规只是国际资产管理公司在台湾面临的诸多挑战中之一。另一个挑战是不断加剧的竞争。 余义焜表示:“(台湾)市场新进入者的数量明显提高了我们的业务成本。” 他还表示，在经历了大约15年的稳定增长后，过去三年，台湾资产管理公司的“利润率已开始削减”。 台湾的资产管理公司还面临扩大产品种类的压力。 余义焜称:“分销商正在寻找上规模的合作伙伴。他们在资源方面向我们施加的压力在不断增大。” 他表示，尽管台湾的养老基金正在将更多资产外包给外部的管理公司，但它们目前还不是资产管理公司的主要收入来源。 此类养老基金包括台湾的公务人员退休抚恤基金(Public Service Pension Fund)、劳工保险基金(Labour Insurance Fund)、劳工退休基金(Labour Pension Fund)与中华邮政基金(Chunghua Post Fund)。公务人员退抚基金正在为总计10亿美元的外国资产委托寻找管理公司。 余义焜表示:“大约5到6年以来，我第一次最不看好台湾的增长能力。”他接着表示:“对我们而言，台湾是一个非常能赚钱的地方”，但现在是时候去亚洲“其它市场”谋求发展了。 The global oil casino benefits only its players Tensions in the Middle East and north Africa, we are told, lie behind the recent increase in global fuel prices, 42 Mcanxixun * Information which Wednesday hit a 2 ?-year high. Yet while Brent crude this week stayed above $120 a barrel, in Tripoli petrol hovered at around 34p a gallon. And that is not a typo. The popular reason for why those closest to the fighting, in this case, suffer less than those farther afield, is Libya‘s hefty subsidies. The less popular reason is that world energy markets have been carefully designed to profit from the slightest supply hiccup, even if there is little evidence of actual shortages. The energy-trading fraternity has never let the facts get in the way of a good supply scare. True, this historically fragile market is vulnerable to price swings as demand threatens to climb faster than production. But there is more to it than that. Indeed, what President Barack Obama did not mention last week in his energy security speech about the faults of the global energy market could fill a Saudi oilfield. Rising from the ashes of a failed potato exchange in downtown Manhattan, the modern-day oil market came to prominence in the 1980s. Its main architect was Michel Marks, the Paris-born son of a produce merchant, who to this day is none too happy with how his creation turned out. Over time, the market has mushroomed to include futures, options and swaps contracts traded on a handful of exchanges round the world. There is also a thriving private, over-the-counter market, where physical ―wet‖ barrels change hands. Today, the oil market‘s global daily value comes to about $600bn, even if limited transparency means exact figures remain elusive. The central market for oil is now part of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, although it is making inroads into London in an apparent effort to escape new US rules under the Dodd-Frank act. As is the case with liquid markets subject to swift price changes, the oil market attracted speculators from the start. Their role was, and is, necessary – allowing those who drill for, store and sell oil to manage risks that otherwise would jeopardise their businesses. Oil takes years to pump from the ground, so the long-term viability of the producers is crucial to supply. As governments on both sides of the pond reassess their rules, some have floated the idea of kicking speculators out of the market altogether. That would be a bad idea. Nonetheless, their licence to speculate should run only so far – and much less far than at present. Since the second Iraq war, for instance, the value of the speculative oil futures market has grown more than threefold. At the same time the amount of oil actually being produced hasn‘t risen nearly as much. Speculators this year have also been predicting future rises in prices by a factor of 3 to 1, according to US government data. Yet this comes as global production hit an all-time high in February – and higher supply typically cools prices. Meanwhile, the market‘s migration from pit trading to electronic trading has seen a fresh problem associated with high-frequency trading. Rules governing these markets have not kept pace with this rise in speculation. Speculators can trade with almost no money down, allowing them to influence prices via large bets, while often risking only 5 to 10 per cent of the overall value of the trade. The US Congress has, from time to time, berated ―big oil‖ in public hearings, but has shied away from reducing the traders‘ immense use of leverage. In fact Washington has not only done little to remedy the situation; it has often made it worse. A shining example of this is the ―bona fide hedging exemption‖, first granted to Goldman Sachs in 1991. It allowed the bank – and then other large speculative players – to make large commodity bets that previously were forbidden without taking delivery of the underlying product. In 2000 the US also passed the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act, which barred regulators from apprehending fraud in high-risk, over-the-counter energy and financial markets. This set the stage for the credit crisis, while off-exchange commodities volumes rose sharply over the next five years to $32,000bn, according to the Bank of International Settlements. In the UK, the Financial Services Authority failed to produce a consistent set of commodities rules, even though it did act quickly to fine one broker for triggering an increase in the price of Brent while drunk. In short, this is a market that has done what it has pleased for too long. However, the UK, Europe and the US are considering complicated new rules that threaten to cure the disease with more poison – paving the way for regulatory arbitrage among the major global exchanges. Instead, these regions might consider a simpler solution. Rather than limiting speculation outright, they should require that speculators put forward more of their own money when placing bets. Raising margins, or the downpayments on trades, has long been ruled out by Wall Street as the nuclear option. There is a good reason for that: it would work. 43 MCanxixun * Information The writer is the author of ?The Asylum: The Renegades Who Hijacked The World‘s Oil Market‘. She is a fellow at the Center for Environmental Journalism at the University of Colorado. 全球石油赌场只让玩家受益 有人告诉我们:中东与北非的紧张局势，导致了全球燃料价格近期的上涨——上周三触及了两年半以来的高点。不过，尽管布伦特原油(Brent crude)上周一直维持在每桶120美元以上，但在利比亚的黎波里，油价却始终在每加仑34便士上下徘徊(这不是笔误～)为何最靠近战场的地区，所受的影响反而小于远离战场的地区,就该案例而言，最流行的解释是，利比亚有丰厚的补贴。一个不那么流行的解释是，世界能源市场经过了精心的设计，可从最微小的供给问题中获利，即使没有太多证据证明石油供应会出现实际的短缺。 能源交易界绝不会让事实阻扰一场有利的供给恐慌。诚然，由于需求可能比供给爬升得快，这一向来脆弱的市场很容易受价格波动的影响。但这并非近期涨势的唯一解释。事实上，巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统在最近能源安全演讲中对全球能源市场缺陷只字不提，这些缺陷足以填满沙特的一处油田。 现代石油市场形成于上世纪80年代，其前身是曼哈顿中心区一个失败的土豆交易所。它的主要设计师是米歇尔•马克斯(Michel Marks)，直到今天，马克斯对自己心血的最终结局都很不满意。马克斯出生于巴黎，是一名农产品商人的儿子。该市场随后迅速发展，世界各地有一批交易所纷纷推出了期货、期权与互换合约等交易产品。与此同时，买卖实物石油的不公开的场外交易市场也蓬勃发展。如今，全球石油市场的日价值已达到大约6000亿美元，即便有限的透明性意味着我们无从得知准确数字。如今，这个中心石油市场已成为芝加哥商品交易所(Chicago Mercantile Exchange)的一部分;与此同时，为了躲避美国《多德-弗兰克法》(Dodd-Frank Act)中的新规，它也正进军伦敦。 与容易受价格迅速波动影响的高流动性市场一样，石油市场从建立之初就吸引了投机者。不管是过去、还是现在，他们的作用——让钻探、储藏与出售石油的公司得以管理风险——都是必要的，否则，这些风险将危及他们的业务。开采石油要花费很多年时间，所以，生产商的长期生存能力对供给至关重要。鉴于大西洋两岸的政府正重新评估他们的规定，一些人提出了将投机者全体踢出市场的想法。这将是一个糟糕的想法。不过，他们的投机权限应该是有限的，应该比目前大大缩小。 例如，自伊拉克战争以来，投机的石油期货市场的价值已经增长超过3倍。而同期实际石油产量增长却远没有这么多。美国政府数据显示，今年大部分投机者预测未来价格还将上涨。不过，他们作出该预测，恰逢全球产量于2月份触及空前的高点——而供给增加一般会为价格降温。此外，从场内交易转向电子交易，又导致该市场出现了一个与高频交易相关的新问题。 治理这些市场的规定的出台速度，赶不上投机活动的增加。投机者几乎不用投入什么资金便可进行交易，使得他们得以通过大额押注影响价格，同时往往仅有交易总价的5%到10%面临风险。美国国会经常在公开听证会上严厉斥责“大型石油公司”，但没做什么事来抑制交易员对杠杆的过分使用。 事实上，华盛顿不仅几乎没有采取措施来纠正这一情况，甚至还常常让情况变得更糟。一个引人注目的例子便是“真实对冲豁免权”。高盛(Goldman Sachs)于1991年首先获得这种豁免。随后，又有几家大型投机机构获得了这种豁免，让它们得以冲破之前的禁令，进行大宗商品的豪赌，而无需进行实物产品的交割。2000年，美国又通过了《商品期货现代化法》(Commodity Futures Modernisation Act)，阻止监管机构逮捕高风险的能源与金融场外市场中的诈骗者。国际清算银行(BIS)表示，这为信贷危机埋下了伏笔——在接下来的5年，场外大宗商品交易量飙升至32万亿美元。英国的金融服务管理局(FSA)也未能制定出一套连贯的大宗商品规定，尽管它的确够迅速地对一名经纪人在醉酒期间引发布伦特原油价格上涨的行为予以了处罚。 简言之，这是一个已经为所欲为过久的市场。然而，英国、欧洲与美国却正在考虑用可能带来更多毒素的复杂的新规，来治愈该疾病。这将引发全球一些主要交易所的监管套利。相反，这些地区应该考 44 Mcanxixun * Information 虑一个更简单的解决方法。它们应该要求投机者在押注时，投入更多自己的资金，而不是彻底限制投机。 提高保证金或者交易的首付款，长期以来一直被华尔街视为“原子武器”而抵制。现在我们有了动用该 武器的理由:它会奏效。 本文作者是科罗拉多大学环境新闻学中心(Center for Environmental Journalism at the University of Colorado)学者，著有《避难所:绑架世界石油市场的背节者》(The Asylum: The Renegades Who Hijacked The World’s Oil Market)一书 High-frequency traders switch their focus to emerging markets Low market volumes and stiff competition have led to a sharp fall in ―high-frequency‖ trading as industry experts warn that the past two years of rapid growth may be coming to a halt. Instead, high-frequency traders are flocking to emerging markets such as Russia, Brazil and Mexico where exchanges are beginning to revamp their systems to attract such players. High-frequency traders use automated trading systems to dart in and out of markets at high speed with holding periods of a fraction of a second. The practice has come under scrutiny by regulators in the US and Europe who want to know whether it provides liquidity to markets – as its proponents claim – and whether high- frequency trades increase or reduce volatility in markets. However, growth in the practice has slowed significantly in the US and Europe, market experts said on Tuesday. The Vix index, produced by the Chicago Board Options Exchange and also known as ―Wall Street‘s fear gauge‖, has been steadily falling since the second quarter of last year, although it jumped temporarily during Japan‘s earthquake. Larry Tabb, chief executive of Tabb Group, a consultancy, said high-frequency trading now accounted for 54 per cent of overall US equity trading, down from an earlier Tabb estimate of 61 per cent in 2009. The level in Europe fell from 38 per cent last year to 35 per cent, although Tabb is expecting a small uptick towards the end of the year. ―That has a lot to do with the fact that volumes and volatility have made it much more difficult for these players to operate,‖ Mr Tabb said. A technological arms race is also hurting profitability. Peter Nabicht, executive vice-president at Allston Trading, a Chicago-based proprietary trading firm, said: ―You‘re seeing competition expand like crazy and we are taking a big hit on our margins because of the investment we make in our systems. I wouldn‘t be surprised to see some HFT firms being bought.‖ 高频交易商盯上新兴市场 较低的成交量和激烈的竞争导致“高频”交易大幅减少，业内专家警告称，这种交易过去两年的快 速增长可能正趋于停顿。 相反，高频交易商正涌向俄罗斯、巴西和墨西哥等新兴市场——那里的交易所正开始改造系统，以 吸引此类投资者。 45 MCanxixun * Information 高频交易商利用自动交易系统，在转瞬之间进出市场交易。 这种交易做法已受到美国和欧洲监管机构的密切监视——它们想知道这种交易是否像其拥护者所说 的那样，会为市场提供流动性;以及它是加大、还是降低了市场的波动性。 然而，市场专家周二表示，美国和欧洲的高频交易增长已明显放缓。 由芝加哥期权交易所(Chicago Board Options Exchange)推出、也被称作“华尔街恐慌指标”的波 动率指数(Vix index)，自去年二季度以来一直稳步下挫，但在日本地震期间一度短暂飙升。 咨询公司Tabb集团(Tabb Group)首席执行官拉里•塔普(Larry Tabb)表示，高频交易目前占到美国 总体证券交易量的54%，低于2009年他所估计的61%。欧洲高频交易所占的比例从去年的38%降至35%， 不过塔普预计在接近年底时将会出现小幅回升。 塔普表示:“这与交易量和波动性明显加大了这种交易的操作难度有很大的关系。” 技术上的竞争也在影响盈利性。芝加哥自营交易机构Allston Trading的执行副总裁彼得•纳比希特 (Peter Nabicht)表示:“人们在疯狂竞争。由于在系统方面的投资，我们的利润率大幅下降。我将不会 对某些高频交易公司被收购感到意外。” Stock(股票) Private equity: spanning the culture gap At the beginning of March, Providence Equity Partners, one of the large international buy-out firms, sent a note to investors to announce that Sean Tong, one of its Hong Kong-based managing directors, was leaving the firm to launch a China-focused private equity investment platform. Mr Tong is just one of many locals leaving western firms to set up his own shop, adding to competition that was intense even before the defections. ―With the growth of domestic private equity firms in China, the major international firms are losing their competitive edge,‖ says a China lawyer at one of the big US law firms in Hong Kong. So today, if they are to flourish in the Chinese market, private equity firms will have to reinvent themselves once more. Buy-out firms have already had to adapt their model to the reality of the Chinese market several times, because the formula that has worked so successfully in the US does not travel particularly well. For one thing, there is now a lot of money in the country. Having capital is no longer something unique or differentiating. As the example of Mr Tong shows, there are no barriers to entry on the mainland. In addition, there are virtually no control deals. It is hard to use masses of borrowed money. Aggressive restructuring and cost cutting is difficult. That means many of the deals involve minority stakes in companies that are either about to go public or have already done so. However, there is still money to be made on such small stakes. Carlyle Group‘s minority holding in China Pacific Insurance is likely to be among the most profitable deals any buy-out firm has done anywhere to date. Similarly, TPG, the US private equity firm, made billions on its stake in Shenzhen Development Bank. It is likely to make even more on its China Grand Auto deal, which gives it a stake in car dealerships all over China but effectively is also a property play, since the dealers sit on land that is increasing in value. Indeed, in 2010, TPG‘s Asian funds performed far better than its flagship US funds. Its Asian funds were up between 40 per cent and 50 per cent for the year. But those kinds of returns are likely to fall in the future. ―The gravy train of buy low and sell high is over,‖ says the 46 Mcanxixun * Information head of Asia for one major private equity firm. ―Perhaps the market opportunity is growing, but the money is growing faster.‖ Now, as the competition for deals becomes more intense, private equity firms are having to adapt again. One sign of that change is their willingness to raise local-currency funds in China in the hope that the country‘s wealthy entrepreneurs will be the source of both funds and deal flow. Many also hope that a template that was pioneered when Lenovo, the computer vendor, bought IBM‘s computer business can be replicated on a bigger scale in the future. Lenovo turned to TPG and General Atlantic, another private equity firm, for help in running the US technology operation. That should be a natural role for the private equity firms to play, as they can serve as a bridge between two cultures. They can ease political and regulatory concerns, or advise on the practicality of the process as partners rather than paid advisers. ―The value-add is what the private equity firms know outside China,‖ says Joe Gallagher, head of mergers and acquisitions, Asia-Pacific, at Credit Suisse in Hong Kong. But so far there have not been many such deals. When Haier, the white-goods maker based in Qingdao, was looking to bid for Maytag, the US appliances maker, it teamed up with Bain, the management consultancy, and Blackstone, the private equity group, for help in what was ultimately an unsuccessful bid. Blackstone is also helping China National BlueStar, a consumer company in which it has a stake, make overseas investments. As Chinese companies become more interested in making acquisitions in the developed markets of the west, the private equity firms can potentially do much to help. That is because one of the main fears of domestic companies, even the biggest state-owned enterprises, is about integrating differing cultures. Their lack of experience in the international arena represents an opportunity that does not exist in a market such as India, where executives have far more confidence about their ability to manage multinational companies. That is one of the principal reasons there have not been more deals, bankers say. Only where deals involve heavy engineering skills or natural resources do the Chinese have the confidence that they can manage the companies they acquire. Private equity can also help ease fears of overpaying, a fear that has paralysed many Chinese companies and kept them from closing on deals they desperately want – as was the case when Bank of China tried to buy Bank Internasional Indonesia several years ago. That reluctance to pay up also helps explain why many China bankers hate domestic deals. ―The China advantage should be cheap financing, but because they drip-feed the price, that cheap financing doesn‘t mean automatic success,‖ says the head of M&A at one large international firm. There are many other reasons for frustration. Virtually everything in the country is government directed, so when deals come up, a key task for bankers is to figure out who will get Beijing‘s blessing to bid. One of Credit Suisse‘s great success stories was in selling local Wing Lung Bank in Hong Kong to a Chinese bidder in the form of second-tier China Merchants Bank, despite the fact Beijing was backing Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest of the country‘s state-owned banks. But such upsets are rare. Meanwhile, there is another template that private equity firms hope does not get repeated. Last month, China‘s Wanhua Industrial Group gained full control of Borsodchem, a Hungarian chemicals manufacturer, for ?1.2bn ($1.7bn). Wanhua first bought a stake in the distressed company by acquiring the debt at bargain prices after a poorly timed purchase of Borsodchem by London-based private equity firm Permira in 2006. Chinese companies love such bargains, but private equity firms are not rejoicing when the deals come at their expense. Beneath the surface: a fishing trip to China In July 2010, Carlyle Group, a Washington-based private equity firm, put almost $200m into China Fishery Group, giving the buy-out firm a 13.6 per cent stake in the world‘s largest fish processor. Except it obviously was not a 47 MCanxixun * Information buy-out at all. But then very little private equity activity in China actually involves true buy-outs. Doing deals in the country is not easy: valuations are high, and most entrepreneurs are still young and have little desire to sell their companies and retire. Instead, international private equity groups such as Carlyle are reduced to taking minority stakes in companies that are private, about to go public or already listed. Indeed, as many as 70 per cent of all China-related listings and secondary offers involve private equity players, according to data from UBS, the Swiss bank. That is not to say the upside cannot be as good as – or far better than – the true leveraged buy-out deals that these big investment firms with tens of billions of dollars under management undertake in the US. Indeed, in 2009, after China Pacific Insurance, the country‘s third-largest insurer, went public in Hong Kong (one of the top 10 listings that year worldwide), Carlyle began to sell down its minority stake. That deal will probably prove to be one of the most profitable private equity transactions to date, and earned the Hong Kong-based Carlyle deal team hundreds of millions of dollars collectively. Thus are fortunes made in China. Because China Fishery is already public, it will not prove as lucrative as Carlyle‘s insurance deal. But because the fishery was founded by a Hong Kong entrepreneur and is listed in Singapore, happily the investment is not nearly as risky as deals in China itself. On the mainland, regulators are constantly changing the rules, and concerns about local protectionism and potential xenophobia are never far from the surface. Indeed, China Fishery was just what Patrick Siewert, managing director at Carlyle in Hong Kong, was looking for when he joined the group several years ago after running the Asia-Pacific region for Coca-Cola, the US beverages group. He wanted investments in companies that would be plays on the growth of domestic consumption in China, and believed food prices would rise as hundreds of millions of people in Asia became integrated into the world economy. But, concerned with the reputational risks that are often an issue in the country, Mr Siewert wanted reassurance that the company‘s practices were appropriate. (Carlyle had already ploughed money into a dairy company after careful due diligence to ensure there was no possibility of another melamine-in-the-milk scandal.) Moreover, he had heard that Ng Joo Siang, managing director of China Fishery, had been talking to UBS about a secondary listing in Oslo (Norwegians understand fish), suggesting the company was looking for additional funds. Mr Ng, meanwhile, wanted to expand and upgrade. He had arrived in Hong Kong in 1992, a ―negative millionaire‖, he recalls, fleeing creditors from the family business in Singapore. In Hong Kong, he began processing and selling fish. While his competitors were selling to Japan, he ranged further afield to Europe and Russia where the competition was less intense. Today the company‘s sales total HK$11bn ($1.4bn), Carlyle has helped it comply with best environmental compliance, and the business has operations from China to Chile. Private equity can also help ease fears of overpaying, a fear that has paralysed many Chinese companies and kept them from closing on deals they desperately want – as was the case when Bank of China tried to buy Bank Internasional Indonesia several years ago. That reluctance to pay up also helps explain why many China bankers hate domestic deals. ―The China advantage should be cheap financing, but because they drip-feed the price, that cheap financing doesn‘t mean automatic success,‖ says the head of M&A at one large international firm. There are many other reasons for frustration. Virtually everything in the country is government directed, so when deals come up, a key task for bankers is to figure out who will get Beijing‘s blessing to bid. One of Credit Suisse‘s great success stories was in selling local Wing Lung Bank in Hong Kong to a Chinese bidder in the form of second-tier China Merchants Bank, despite the fact Beijing was backing Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest of the country‘s state-owned banks. But such upsets are rare. Meanwhile, there is another template that private equity firms hope does not get repeated. Last month, China‘s Wanhua Industrial Group gained full control of Borsodchem, a Hungarian chemicals 48 Mcanxixun * Information manufacturer, for ?1.2bn ($1.7bn). Wanhua first bought a stake in the distressed company by acquiring the debt at bargain prices after a poorly timed purchase of Borsodchem by London-based private equity firm Permira in 2006. Chinese companies love such bargains, but private equity firms are not rejoicing when the deals come at their expense. Beneath the surface: a fishing trip to China In July 2010, Carlyle Group, a Washington-based private equity firm, put almost $200m into China Fishery Group, giving the buy-out firm a 13.6 per cent stake in the world‘s largest fish processor. Except it obviously was not a buy-out at all. But then very little private equity activity in China actually involves true buy-outs. Doing deals in the country is not easy: valuations are high, and most entrepreneurs are still young and have little desire to sell their companies and retire. Instead, international private equity groups such as Carlyle are reduced to taking minority stakes in companies that are private, about to go public or already listed. Indeed, as many as 70 per cent of all China-related listings and secondary offers involve private equity players, according to data from UBS, the Swiss bank. That is not to say the upside cannot be as good as – or far better than – the true leveraged buy-out deals that these big investment firms with tens of billions of dollars under management undertake in the US. Indeed, in 2009, after China Pacific Insurance, the country‘s third-largest insurer, went public in Hong Kong (one of the top 10 listings that year worldwide), Carlyle began to sell down its minority stake. That deal will probably prove to be one of the most profitable private equity transactions to date, and earned the Hong Kong-based Carlyle deal team hundreds of millions of dollars collectively. Thus are fortunes made in China. Because China Fishery is already public, it will not prove as lucrative as Carlyle‘s insurance deal. But because the fishery was founded by a Hong Kong entrepreneur and is listed in Singapore, happily the investment is not nearly as risky as deals in China itself. On the mainland, regulators are constantly changing the rules, and concerns about local protectionism and potential xenophobia are never far from the surface. Indeed, China Fishery was just what Patrick Siewert, managing director at Carlyle in Hong Kong, was looking for when he joined the group several years ago after running the Asia-Pacific region for Coca-Cola, the US beverages group. He wanted investments in companies that would be plays on the growth of domestic consumption in China, and believed food prices would rise as hundreds of millions of people in Asia became integrated into the world economy. But, concerned with the reputational risks that are often an issue in the country, Mr Siewert wanted reassurance that the company‘s practices were appropriate. (Carlyle had already ploughed money into a dairy company after careful due diligence to ensure there was no possibility of another melamine-in-the-milk scandal.) Moreover, he had heard that Ng Joo Siang, managing director of China Fishery, had been talking to UBS about a secondary listing in Oslo (Norwegians understand fish), suggesting the company was looking for additional funds. Mr Ng, meanwhile, wanted to expand and upgrade. He had arrived in Hong Kong in 1992, a ―negative millionaire‖, he recalls, fleeing creditors from the family business in Singapore. In Hong Kong, he began processing and selling fish. While his competitors were selling to Japan, he ranged further afield to Europe and Russia where the competition was less intense. Today the company‘s sales total HK$11bn ($1.4bn), Carlyle has helped it comply with best environmental compliance, and the business has operations from China to Chile. 私人股本在中国 3月初，国际大型收购公司之一——普罗维登斯投资(Providence Equity Partners)向其投资者宣 布，其驻香港的董事总经理童小幪(Sean Tong)将从公司离职，转而创立一个专注中国的私人股本投资平 台。众多当地人士正离开西方公司另立门户，加剧了已然十分激烈的私人股本市场竞争，童小幪只是其 49 MCanxixun * Information 中的一员。 “随着中国国内私人股本公司的发展，大型国际公司正失去竞争优势，”香港一家大型美资律师事务所的中国律师说。 所以今天，如果私人股本公司希望在中国市场蓬勃发展，将不得不再次重塑自我。收购公司已经多次根据中国市场的现实调整自身模式，因为曾在美国大获成功的公式换一个地方效果并不是特别好。 一方面，现在中国国内有大量资金。拥有资本已不再是某种独特或具有差异化的特征。正如童小幪的例子所示，内地私人股本业没有进入壁垒。此外，这里几乎没有取得控股权的交易。因为很难动用大量借贷资金。大规模重组和削减成本很难进行。这意味着很多交易只涉及到即将或已经上市公司中的少数股权。 但是，这样的少数股权仍然能带来利润。凯雷集团(Carlyle Group)投资中国太平洋保险(China Pacific Insurance)少数股权的交易，很可能是迄今为止全球所有收购公司利润最丰厚的交易之一。同样，美国私人股本公司TPG投资深圳发展银行(Shenzhen Development Bank)股份也获利达数十亿元。 TPG入股广汇汽车(China Grand Auto)的交易可能会带来更多利润，TPG因此在覆盖全中国的汽车经销权中获得一份股份，但事实上这也是一场房地产博弈，因为广汇汽车所拥有的土地一直在增值。事实上，2010年， TPG的亚洲基金远比它的旗舰产品美国基金表现更为出色。其亚洲基金当年资产增值幅度在40%至50%之间。 但是，未来这种收益也有可能走低。“低买高卖轻松发财的时机已经结束了，”一家主要私人股权投资公司的亚洲主管说，“市场机会或许正在增多，但是进入市场的资金增速也在加快。” 现在，随着交易竞争日趋激烈，私人股本公司都不得不重新调适。这种变化的一个迹象是，它们愿意在中国成立人民币基金，希望中国资金雄厚的企业家可以为它们带来更多资金和交易。 许多公司还希望，电脑经销商联想(Lenovo)收购IBM个人电脑业务的先驱案例在未来可以被更加广泛的复制。联想转向TPG和另一家私人股权公司General Atlantic，寻求运营美国技术部门的帮助。这应该是私人股本公司天生适合扮演的角色，因为它们可以成为沟通两种文化的桥梁。它们能够缓解政治和监管担忧，或是以合伙人而不是付费顾问的身份对进程的可行性出谋划策。 “私人股权公司对中国以外地区的了解是其附加值，”瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)驻香港亚太并购主管乔•加拉格尔(Joe Gallagher)说。 但到目前为止，这种交易并未大量出现。总部设在青岛的白色家电制造商海尔竞购美国家电制造商美泰克(Maytag)时，曾联手管理咨询公司贝恩(Bain)以及私人股本集团黑石(Blackstone)寻求帮助，但是最终收购未果。黑石集团还在帮助一家消费者公司中国蓝星(China National Bluestar)进行海外投资。黑石持有该公司股权。 随着中国企业对在西方发达市场展开收购的兴趣愈发浓厚，私人股本公司的潜在作用也愈发凸显。这是因为中国企业，乃至规模最大的国有企业最主要的担忧是如何整合不同的文化。他们在国际舞台上贫乏的经验意味着这里存在印度之类的市场所不能提供的机会——在印度，高管们对自己管理跨国公司的能力更有信心。 银行家们表示，这是没有出现更多交易的主要原因之一。只有当交易涉及重型机械技术或天然资源时，中国人才对管理自己所收购的公司充满信心。 私人股本公司还可以帮助缓解收购方对出价过高的担忧，这一担忧曾使许多中国公司望而却步，最终退出他们渴望达成的交易——几年前中国银行(Bank of China)试图收购印尼国际银行(Bank Internasional Indonesia)就是一例。 许多中国银行家之所以讨厌国内交易，还因为收购方不愿付清全部款项。“中国的优势应当是廉价融资，但是因为他们采取分期支付收购款的方式，所以廉价融资并不意味着最终一定会取得成功，”一家大型国际公司的并购主管说。 造成这一挫折感的还有其它许多原因。在中国，几乎一切行动都是在政府的指令下进行，因此当交易出现时，银行家的一个重要任务，就是找出谁将在竞标中得到中国政府的支持。 50 Mcanxixun * Information 瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)曾经大获成功的交易之一，就是将香港当地的永隆银行(Wing Lung Bank)出售给代表二线银行招商银行(CMB)的中国竞标方，尽管中国政府当时支持的是中国最大的国有银行——中国工商银行(ICBC)。但此类违逆中国政府意愿的例子非常罕见。 与此同时，还有一个典型案例私人股本公司也希望不要再度遭遇。 上个月，中国的万华实业集团(Wanhua Industrial Group)出资12亿欧元(合17亿美元)，全盘控股匈牙利化学品制造商博苏化学(Borsodchem)。万华首先以低廉的价格收购了博苏化学的债务，以此方式入股这家困境中的公司。而此前，伦敦私人股本公司Permira则是选择2006年这个错误的时机收购的博苏化学。中国公司喜欢这样的便宜货，但私人股本公司并不开心，因为它们在这类交易中吃了亏。 水面之下:中国的钓鱼之旅 2010年7月，总部位于华盛顿的私人股本公司凯雷集团(Carlyle Group)向中渔集团(China Fishery Group)投资近2亿美元，此举令这家收购公司在世界最大的鱼类加工企业中获得13.6%的股份——只是这显然不是一宗收购交易。但话说回来，在中国，私人股本活动实际上极少涉及到真正的收购交易。在中国做交易并不容易:估值很高，而且大多数企业家都还年轻，没什么兴趣卖掉自己的公司然后去过退休生活。 凯雷等国际私人股本集团退而求其次，转而对即将上市或已经上市的私营公司进行少数股权投资。事实上，根据瑞士银行(UBS)的数据，在所有与中国有关的上市和二次发行交易中，有私人股本公司参与的比例高达70%。 这并不是说，此类发行前交易的回报不可能赶得上或远远超过真正的杠杆收购交易——这些管理着数百亿美元的大型投资公司，在美国进行的就是后一种交易。事实上，2009年，在中国第三大保险公司——中国太平洋保险(China Pacific Insurance)在香港上市后(当年全球前10大上市交易之一)，凯雷便开始减持其在太保的少数股权。凯雷在太保的投资可能会是迄今最赚钱的私人股本交易之一，它让香港的凯雷交易团队总计赚到了数亿美元。在中国赚大钱就得靠这种方式。 因为中渔集团已经上市，所以它不会给凯雷带来类似太保交易那样的丰厚利润。但令人高兴的是，由于中渔集团是由一位香港企业家创立的并在新加坡上市，因此凯雷这笔投资的风险将远不及中国内地交易那样大。在中国内地，监管部门一直在改变，人们对地方保护主义和潜在仇外心理的担心从未真正消失过。 事实上，中渔交易正是凯雷驻香港董事总经理施维德(Patrick Siewert)在他几年前加入凯雷时寻求的交易。在那之前，施维德曾是美国饮料集团可口可乐(Coca-Cola)亚太地区主管。他希望投资于那些将受益于中国国内消费增长的公司，并认为随着数亿亚洲人融入世界经济，食品价格将逐步上涨。 但是，出于对中国经常出现的企业声誉风险的担心，施维德希望确保所投资公司的行为是适当的。(凯雷已对一家乳品公司进行了投资，投资前它进行了仔细的尽职调查，确保不会再次出现牛奶中添加有三聚氰胺的丑闻。)此外，他已经听说中渔集团董事总经理黄裕翔(Ng Joo Siang)一直在与瑞银接触，商谈在奥斯陆二次上市事宜(挪威人了解渔业)，这意味着该公司正在寻求更多的资金。 同时，黄裕翔还希望业务进一步扩大和升级。他回忆说，1992年，为了躲避新加坡家族企业的债权人，他作为一个“负百万富翁”到了香港。在香港，他开始加工和销售鱼产品。当他的竞争对手将产品销往日本时，他已将市场延伸到更远的欧洲和俄罗斯，那里的竞争相对不那么激烈。 如今，中渔集团的销售总额已达110亿港元(合14亿美元)。在凯雷的帮助下，该公司严格遵守环境法规，业务遍及从中国到智利的广大市场。 Glencore's IPO: what the analysts are saying Commodities trader Glencore has unveiled plans for a joint London/Hong Kong IPO that will value group at up to $60bn. Here's how the analysts reacted: 51 MCanxixun * Information Miriam Hehir, Director Of Credit Research, RBC Capital Markets Details are largely in line with market expectations, with the commitment to maintaining investment grade ratings unsurprising but debt holders may benefit from potential bank and bond debt redemptions. We continue to see Glencore having listed equity as a positive for its credit ratings. Its spreads have come a long way in recent weeks, outperforming strongly, but we see potential on this IPO confirmation for further modest convergence towards Xstrata levels. Tim Barker, Portfolio Manager, BT Investment Management It worries me a little bit that there's a frenzy of activity. You always get worried that it's difficult to add value when people aren't necessarily buying things for the right reasons. You do have to look at it and make a judgment call on what the underlying assets are worth. The mining side of the business is relatively straight forward from a resource analyst point of view. It then just comes down to what you consider the trading side to be worth, and that is more difficult. Different people will look at it differently. Rob Edwards, MD, Metals And Mining Research, Renaissance Capital The key for me is that they are increasing their stake in Kazzinc potentially up to 99pc so they have clearly identified that as an asset that they want to consolidate more of. The market has got cash, we believe, for the right investments. We've seen IPOs get away in the last couple of weeks, although markets have been fairly volatile [...] People are not paying premium valuations at this point in the cycle. It will get away. People want a different way to play the cycle and the business as a whole of mining, trading and selling commodities so this will definitely be a welcome addition in terms of a broader access to commodity markets." People have to believe that this company can now go to the next level. They are looking for assets and people recognize that if you invest alongside Glencore you've got a fairly good chance of making money long term because these people are probably commercially the most savvy people in the entire commodities sector. Cameron Peacock, Market Analyst, IG Markets No one knows that China won't unravel. No one saw the [global financial crisis] coming. People who invest in the float could get burned but that's just market risk. Other than something like that, I don't see why it won't be a reasonable float to be a part of. To me, the fact they are going ahead during this slight softness means they are very confident that prices will remain quite robust. If you are willing to look past short term aberrations in the market, the outlook for commodities and stocks over the next 12 to 18 month period is very buoyant. They are speaking to investor groups and it would appear they've had enough interest to be confident they can get the float away at a reasonable price and have a reasonable secondary market. Paul Mumford, Cavendish Asset Management It's not really for me, it's just not my sort of stock. In terms of valuation, they've been waiting for the most appropriate opportunity. It's not an area of the market I want to invest in because so much of the valuation depends on commodities. I prefer more simple companies. Damien Hackett, Mining Analyst, Canaccord Genuity It ought not trade with the same premium and success that pure mining companies like Rio Tinto have in the past 52 Mcanxixun * Information or going forward. I worry a little bit that a couple of billion dollars of this money being raised is going to pay out people who previously made this company very successful in the past and who have now gone. I wonder how much transparency one is going to get on all that trading activity and how good mining analysts are going to be at understanding it. I think it's going to be a spectacularly successful float. I suspect that after it settles into the market it may trade at the lower end of the range that people are forecasting. Ion-marc Valahu, Fund Manager, Clairinvest I'm not going to buy into the offering straight away, I'll see how the stock trades before deciding to buy the shares or not. The company is one of the leaders in its sector and is very successful, but it's not clear where we are in the commodities market cycle, and whether commodities prices might ease off from their bull run. Paul Renken, Mining Analyst, VSA Capital They did actually make the decision to head toward some kind of public flotation back in 2005 because they realised their current limited partnership structure wasn't going to work for them if they chose to get even bigger. And also they wanted to move even more so into the upstream end where they actually get involved in the mining (of commodities) itself. They have been working on this for several years now. It happens to be fortuitous for them that commodities prices are high. I'm not sure that it is the top of the cycle at this point because there simply are this many people that are trying to get a Western lifestyle. Craig Yeaman, Fund Manager, Saracen Fund Managers It is certainly something that we will look at. When you're looking at a company of this size coming onto the market, we would be neglectful if we did not at the very least consider it. 嘉能可首次公开发行，分析师评论不一 全球最大的大宗商品交易商嘉能可(Glencore)披露了将公司估值为600亿美元左右的首次公开发行 (IPO)计划。以下是一些分析家所作出的回应: 加拿大皇家银行资本市场(RBC Capital Markets)驻伦敦的米里亚姆? 赫尔(Miriam Hehir)表示: 详细信息很大程度上与市场预期相吻合，维护投资级债券评级的承诺并没有令人吃惊，但是债务持 有人可能会从潜在的银行和债务赎回债券中受益。 我们将继续目睹嘉能可作为其信贷评级的上市股。它的传播在近几周已取得很大进展，且形势迅猛， 但我们也看到了嘉能可与斯特拉塔(Xstrata)合并的可能。 BT投资管理投资组合经理Tim Barker: 狂热的活动令我存有几分担忧。你一直担心，当人们未必因正当理由而购买东西时，增加价值变得 有些困难了。你只能看着它，并主观判断哪一方面的相关资产是有价值的。 一位资源分析师认为，采矿方面的生意是相当直接的。 这就归结为:你认为哪一方面的交易是有价值的，这便会存在一些困难。不同人的观点可能会有所 差异。 复兴资本公司(Renaissance Capital)金属采矿业研究博士Rob Edwards 对我来说最关键的是:他们正在增加其在Kazzinc公司的股份，可能高达99,，因此他们已明确表 53 MCanxixun * Information 明，作为一种资产，他们希望更多的合并。 我们认为，市场已为正确的投资筹集了现金。我们已经看到IPO在上两周结束，尽管市场一直处于相当不稳定的状态。[...]人们并没有在这个周期点上溢价估值。 它将会结束。人们想通过一个不同的方式来操纵这个周期以及作为矿业、贸易和销售商品的整体业务，因此，很显然，这在广泛获取商品市场方面将成为一个很受欢迎的附加物。 人们不得不去相信，该公司现在可以达到更高水平。他们需找资产，并且人们逐渐意识到，如果你在嘉能可周围进行投资，那么你就会获得一个长期赚钱的良机，因为这些人很可能是整个商品领域上最有悟性的人。 IG Markets分析师Cameron Peacock 没有人知道中国将成为未解之谜。也没有人看见[全球金融危机] 即将到来。在股市中投资的人会变的遍体鳞伤，但是这仅仅是市场风险。除了类似的事情，我不知道它为什么没有成为合理股市的一部分。 对我来说，事实是，他们将在这一疲软中前行，也就是说他们坚信价格将保持相当强劲的状态。 如果你愿意回顾市场上的畸变，那么未来一年或一年半商品和股票的前景将是非常活跃的。 他们同投资集团对话，这一对话似乎表明他们已满怀信心，能够以合理的价格将这一股票驱逐，并且拥有一个合理的二手市场。 Cavendish资产管理的Paul Mumford 我与他们的观点不同，它完全不是我喜欢的类型。在估值方面，他们一直在等待恰当的时机。这并不是我想要投资的市场，因为这样的估价很大程度上取决于商品。我喜欢比较简单的公司。 Canaccord Genuity的矿业分析师Damien Hackett 具有同样的保费和成就的纯矿业公司，不应该从事贸易，例如力拓矿业集团(Rio Tinto)。 我有点担心，几亿美元的资金将报复那些曾为该公司创造辉煌的人，或者是已经离开该公司的人。 我想知道，有多少透明度才能获得所有的交易活动，又有多优秀的矿业分析师会真正理解它。 我认为，这是一个非常成功的股票。我怀疑，在它适应市场之后，它的交易将很糟糕，这也正是人们所预测的。 Clairinvest的基金经理Ion-marc Valahu 我将不会立刻买进新股，我会在作出决定之前仔细观察股票交易。 该公司是一个具有领导意义的公司，也是一家成功的公司，但是在商品市场周期中我们处于什么位置，还是一个未知数，并且商品价格是否会从牛市中得到缓解也还不清楚。 VSA资本公司矿业分析师Paul Renken 实际上，在2005年末，他们确实决定开始很不错的上市筹款，因为他们意识到，如果他们选择扩大规模，那么目前有限的合伙结构对他们将不利。并且，他们非常想迁入上游端----实际上他们将矿业(商品)也卷入到了其中。 几年来，他们一直致力于这件事。巧合的是，商品价格上涨了。我并不确定，这是否是一个循环周期的峰值，原因很简单，许多人正尝试着获得西方的生活方式。 基金经理Craig Yeaman 可以肯定的是，我将会考虑这些。当你正着眼于这种上市公司的规模时，而我们却没有考虑到，那么我们将会被忽视。 Chinese equities recover as Beijing battles inflation After falling more than any other leading Asian equity index in 2010, the Shanghai Composite has jumped almost 9 per cent this year – making it the region‘s best performer. The new optimism of Chinese investors is underpinned by the increasingly widespread belief that the government 54 Mcanxixun * Information has won, or is close to winning, its battle against rising inflation. That idea will be put to the test on Friday when Beijing releases a treasure trove of statistics on the economy, including gross domestic product for the first quarter and inflation figures for March. ―Everybody is watching Friday‘s numbers,‖ says Victoria Mio, a Hong Kong-based fund manager at Robeco, who warns it is too soon to conclude Chinese inflation is under control. Too high an inflation number would raise the prospect that the People‘s Bank of China, the central bank, will need to tighten monetary policy more aggressively than expected. In the past, mainland stock prices have been strongly influenced by the amount of money and credit sloshing around the economy. So moves by the PBoC to rein in bank lending or raise interest rates can hit the market hard – and were a key reason for the Shanghai market‘s decline in 2010. Official data showed consumer prices rose 4.9 per cent in February from a year earlier, exceeding the government‘s full-year target of 4 per cent. Economists estimate the figure for March will be about 5.2 per cent. Some analysts, and many consumers, question whether the official data can be relied upon to reflect the true extent of the price rises sweeping in the country. ―Consumer prices are rising at double-digit rates in so many products and services,‖ says Andy Xie, an independent strategist and former Morgan Stanley economist for Asia. ―There are signs that inflation panic is spreading. Hoarding is already visible from time to time. When it becomes widespread, a social crisis is likely.‖ Yet most analysts expect inflation will peak at about 5-6 per cent in the middle of this year, thanks to a series of tightening measures by the PBoC over the past six months. Last week the central bank raised interest rates for the fourth time in five months, increasing the deposit rate to 3.25 per cent and the lending rate to 6.31 per cent. The increase ―gets us close enough to the end of China‘s late tightening cycle to mitigate a key policy overhang‖, says Michael Kurtz, a Hong Kong-based strategist at Macquarie. Mr Kurtz is one of several investment bank analysts who have this month lifted their recommendations for Chinese stocks from ―underweight‖ to ―neutral‖ within Asian equity portfolios. ―There are a growing number of strategists who have turned more positive on China in the belief that the central bank has nearly completed its tightening process and will shortly be able to declare victory in the inflation battle,‖ says David Shairp of JPMorgan Asset Management. ―By contrast, the historian‘s perspective is that it may be too early to declare victory over inflation, given the scale of the monetary boom that preceded it.‖ Chinese banks issued Rmb7,950bn ($1,200bn) in new renminbi-denominated loans in 2010, overshooting the Rmb7,500bn target Beijing set at the start of the year. But money supply growth has moderated in recent months as government tightening has started to bite. Alan Lam, China analyst at Julius Baer, the Swiss private bank, says the Shanghai market has largely priced in the tightening measures and the slowdown in money supply growth. He reckons the Shanghai Composite will rise to 3,300 points by the end of 2011, compared with Wednesday‘s closing level of 3,050.4. China bulls point out that, despite the recent tightening measures, inflation is still higher than Chinese deposit rates – an incentive for mainland investors to speculate on stocks rather than keep cash in the bank. To back up their view, they also argue that mainland stocks look inexpensive. The Shanghai Composite is trading at about 14 times forecast earnings, according to Bloomberg data, or a 25 per cent discount to its average over the past five years. The Graham-Dodd price-to-earnings ratio is a more conservative valuation metric based on inflation- adjusted earnings over the past 10 years. By this measure, Chinese equities are trading at a multiple of about 25, close to 55 MCanxixun * Information their long-term average but much higher than other major equity markets. The Hong Kong-listed shares of mainland Chinese companies, known as H shares, have seen big inflows from international investors in recent weeks as global fund managers increase their exposure to China. This month H share companies concluded their full year 2010 results season. Earnings, on average, beat consensus by about 7 per cent. With earnings on the rise and valuations below long-term averages, the bulls reckon the rally shows little sign of stopping. All they need now is for inflation to peak and the Chinese economy to keep on humming. 通胀趋缓为中国股市打气 上证指数2010年的跌幅居亚洲主要股指之首，但今年迄今，该指数已经跃增近9%，成为亚洲地区表现最好的股指。 中国投资者新生的乐观情绪，受到了一个传播得越来越广泛的信念的支撑:中国政府抗击通胀的战斗已经或是即将获得胜利。 这种观点将在本周五得到验证，届时，中国政府将发布一系列重要的经济数据，包括一季度的国内生产总值(GDP)和3月份的通胀数据。 “所有人都在关注周五的数据，”荷宝(Robeco)驻香港基金经理缪子美(Victoria Mio)表示。她警告，现在就得出中国通胀已经得到控制的结论还太早。 如果通胀率过高，那么中国央行可能就有必要以比预期更大的力度收紧货币政策。 过去，流动在中国经济中的资金和信贷额会对中国内地股市价格产生影响。因此中国央行抑制银行放贷或是提高利率，都会给市场造成巨大冲击——这也是上海股市2010年下跌的一个重要原因。 官方数据显示，今年2月，中国的消费者价格指数同比上涨4.9%，超出了政府4%的全年目标。经济学家估计3月份的数字会在5.2%左右。 一些分析人士和许多消费者都对官方数据不放心，怀疑它们能否反映席卷全国的物价上涨的实际程度。“许多商品和服务的消费者价格都在以两位数的速度上涨，”独立策略师、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)前亚洲经济学家谢国忠(Andy Xie)表示。“有迹象表明，通胀恐慌正在蔓延。囤积现象时有发生。一旦变得普遍起来，便有可能爆发社会危机。” 不过，大多数分析师预计，由于中国央行过去半年采取的一系列紧缩措施，中国的通胀率将在今年年中达到5%至6%的峰值，然后回落。 上周，中国央行5个月来第四次上调了利率，将一年期存贷款利率分别上调至3.25%和6.31%。麦格理集团(Macquarie)驻香港策略师迈克尔•库尔茨(Michael Kurtz)表示，加息之后，“中国为消除一个重要政策威胁而进行的最新一轮紧缩已逼近尾声”。 本月，有几位投资银行的分析师把亚洲股票组合中对中国股票的投资建议从“减持”上调至“中性”，库尔茨便是其中之一。 “越来越多的策略师对中国更加乐观，他们相信，中国央行的紧缩过程已接近完成，很快就会宣告抗击通胀获胜，”JP摩根资产管理公司(JPMorgan Asset Management)的戴维•谢普(David Shairp)称。“与此形成反差的是，历史学家认为，考虑到此前货币激增的规模，宣称战胜通胀或许还为时过早。” 2010年，中国各银行新增人民币贷款7.95万亿元人民币(合1.2万亿美元)，超过了政府年初设定的7.5万亿元的目标。但随着政府的紧缩政策开始发挥效力，货币供应增幅最近几个月有所放缓。 瑞士私人银行宝盛集团(Julius Baer)的中国分析师林志远(Alan Lam)表示，紧缩措施和货币供应增长放缓基本上已体现在上海股市的价格之中。 他认为，上证综指将在2011年底前升至3300点。该指数周三收于3050.4点。 看涨中国的人士指出，尽管最近出台了多项紧缩政策，但中国的通胀率依然高于存款利率——这会 56 Mcanxixun * Information 激励内地投资者到股市上去投机，而不是把钱存进银行。 为了支持自己的观点，他们还指出，内地股市似乎价格偏低。彭博(Bloomberg)的数据显示，上证综 指目前的预期市盈率在14倍左右，较过去5年的平均水平低25%。 格雷厄姆-多德(Graham-Dodd)市盈率是一个更加保守的估值指标，使用的是过去十年经通胀因素调 整后的利润。按此标准衡量，中国股市的市盈率在25倍左右，接近长期平均水平，但远高于其它主要股 市。 最近几周，随着跨国基金管理公司增加对中国的投资，来自国际投资者的大量资金流入了在香港上 市的内地公司股票，即所谓的H股。H股公司2010年财报的发布于本月结束，它们的收益平均比预期高 出7%。 鉴于收益在上升而估值低于长期平均水平，看涨者认为此次反弹几乎丝毫没有结束的迹象。他们现 在需要的只是通胀见顶回落和中国经济继续蓬勃发展。 Fund(基金) China moves slowly to lift hedge fund barriers Considering China‘s stock market is only 20 years old, and its asset management industry a mere 10 years old, it may appear premature to discuss the current state of its alternative investment market. But in 2010, the fund management industry grew some 40 per cent to reach $392bn under management, according to a report by Z Ben Advisors, a Shanghai-based consultancy firm, and 38 mutual funds have already been launched in 2011. However, hedge funds currently play a limited, almost zero, role on the mainland, at least legitimately. There are two distinct markets. On the one hand there are the big asset management companies running domestic hedge fund strategies approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the state regulator, which are legally entitled to raise money from wealthy individuals on the mainland. Then there are the unregulated private fund managers operating in the shadows. Roughly 100 or so are ―sunshine private funds‖ that are created through trust companies (which themselves are regulated); but there are also unknown numbers of fund managers, many of whom are finance industry professionals, running a classic ―two guys in a garage‖ operation. Regulatory developments are underway to address the ―sunshine‖ private fund managers. Peter Alexander, principal at Z Ben Advisors, says there is an ―expectation‖ that at some point in the next few months a revised funds management law will be put in place that will bring them into the CSRC fold. ―Currently these guys are only targeting wealthy individuals and institutional clients; bringing them into the regulatory fold will potentially allow them to offer retail funds,‖ says Mr Alexander. E Fund Management is China‘s second largest asset manager with $29bn under management. Last September, when it began trading onshore hedge fund strategies, it was one of the first to raise assets domestically from wealthy individuals using separate managed accounts. Zhen Liu, head of index quantitative investment at E Fund Management, is bullish on the outlook: ―I wouldn‘t be surprised if in two to three years we see multiple billion dollar hedge funds.‖ That may be so but the CSRC remains cautious on hedge funds, unsure as to quite how much risk they pose. Only institutions with a Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor quota can invest overseas for clients. ―Domestic investors can go to them to invest in offshore stocks and mutual funds but for hedge funds it‘s a big no-no,‖ says 57 MCanxixun * Information Matt Feldmann, a partner at Clifford Chance Hong Kong. ―[Hedge funds] have always been on the watch list of Chinese regulators so there‘s no urgency for them to open up the market.‖ One of the main problems for potential hedge fund managers in China is a simple lack of tools. At the turn of the year, the Chinese government approved the use of short selling using stock index futures, along with margin trading. But borrowing individual stocks to sell short is difficult. There are currently only about 50 stocks in the CSI 300 index that can be shorted with government approval, and it is an expensive business, costing around 10.1 per cent a year. ―The broker is only allowed to buy stocks and loan them to you using his own money – he can‘t use customers‘ stocks. That‘s why the market is so limited and expensive,‖ says E Fund‘s Mr Liu. ―Prior to last year, although people were calling themselves hedge funds, in reality they weren‘t,‖ he adds. Leverage, another basic hedge fund tool, is also lacking. Hedge fund managers cannot borrow to invest. However, Mr Liu says investors who want to gear up often borrow from family or friends, agreeing to pay interest on the loan at, say, 6 per cent a year. ―At the end of the year the investor then splits the returns with his friend according to the prior arrangement.‖ This is the only legal way to create leverage in China, and is popular, he says. Despite the barriers to running hedge funds, some managers have been offering what they call hedge funds for several years. ―We started our first hedge fund in October 2009,‖ says Zack Liu, head of quantitative investment at China Southern Fund Management, one of the mainland‘s longest established asset managers with more than $28bn under management. ―By hedge fund, I mean that the products allow us to draw performance fees if the returns in the defined time period are above the preset targets.‖ By end-December 2010, China Southern was running seven hedge funds with total assets of about Rmb1.2bn. There are about 200 licensed institutions that could potentially run hedge fund strategies: 63 asset management companies, 100 or so brokerages and roughly 20 insurance companies. But few of these are running ―actual‖ hedge funds – that is private funds charging performance fees, hedging with futures and using leverage. There are only three or four that qualify on that basis. Most of China‘s hedge fund strategies are being run by private managers, with a basic asset management licence and operating largely off-radar. The CSRC is expected to start to bring these unregulated managers out from the shadows, if for no other reason than to determine where the money they manage is coming from. ―Regulators want to see hedge funds within the fold of the regulatory framework,‖ says Mr Liu of E Fund. ―But it has to go both ways. The CSRC needs to accommodate the private fund managers. At the same time, managers can‘t just speculate on the markets. They need to learn about risk and returns, deploy real hedge fund strategies and help make China‘s capital market more efficient.‖ One current initiative to circumvent the problem of private funds illegally raising assets is to encourage the formation of private partnerships. Typically, managers eschew them because they involve double taxation (business and income tax). In Tianjin province, about 90 minutes outside Beijing, state authorities are now offering tax breaks to encourage private partnership formation. Mr Feldmann estimates around seven hedge funds are operating in Tianjin. He says Shenzhen and Shanghai could also become ―hot spots‖ for fund formation. 中国缓慢开放对冲基金市场 考虑到中国股市仅有20年的历史，资产管理行业仅有区区10年的历史，讨论其另类投资市场的现 58 Mcanxixun * Information 状也许显得为时过早。但总部位于上海的咨奔商务咨询有限公司(Z-Ben Advisors)的报告显示，去年，中国基金管理业增长了近40%，管理资产规模达到3920亿美元;今年以来已推出了38只共同基金。 然而，至少就合法的情况而言，对冲基金目前在中国内地发挥的作用非常有限，几乎于零。中国有两个截然不同的市场。一方面是采用中国证监会(CSRC)批准的国内对冲基金策略的大型资产管理公司，它们拥有向内地富裕个人募集资金的合法权利。 另一方面是不受监管、暗中经营的私募基金公司。中国有100家左右通过信托公司(它们本身是受到监管的)设立的“阳光私募基金”;但还有数目不详的基金经理经营着典型的“推荐型”业务，他们中的许多人都是金融行业的专业人士。 监管机构正在研究相关措施，解决“阳光”私募基金管理公司的问题。咨奔商务咨询负责人彼得•亚历山大(Peter Alexander)表示，人们“预期”，经过修订的基金管理法将在未来几个月内出台，将私募基金纳入证监会的监管范畴内。“目前，这些人的目标只是富裕个人和机构客户;将它们纳入监管范围，它们可能就可以发行零售基金了，”亚历山大表示。 易方达基金管理有限公司(E Fund Management)是中国第二大资产管理公司，管理资产规模为290亿美元。去年9月在岸对冲基金策略的启动，使该公司成为首批利用分开管理的账户向国内富人募集资产的公司之一。该公司指数与量化投资部总经理刘震很看好对冲基金的前景:“如果两三年后出现规模数十亿美元的对冲基金，我不会感到吃惊。” 情况也许会是这样，但证监会对对冲基金仍持谨慎态度，不确定它们会造成多大的风险。仅有拥有合格境内机构投资者(QDII)配额的机构，才能为客户进行海外投资。香港高伟绅律师事务所(Clifford Chance)合伙人麦天岳(Matt Feldmann)表示:“国内投资者可以委托这些机构投资离岸股票与共同基金，但对于对冲基金而言，这还是一个禁区。(对冲基金)一直在中国监管机构的观察名单上，因此他们也不急着打开市场。” 对于中国潜在的对冲基金管理公司来说，一个主要的问题是缺乏工具。新年之交，中国政府批准了利用股指期货与保证金交易进行卖空操作。但很难借入散户的股票进行卖空。 目前，沪深300指数(CSI 300 index)中政府允许进行卖空操作的股票仅有大约50只，且成本高昂，一年的成本大约为10.1%。 易方达的刘震表示:“券商只能用自己的钱买入股票、然后借给你——他不能用客户的股票。这就是该市场局限性如此严重、成本如此高昂的原因所在。” 他还指出:“去年之前，尽管大家都把自己叫做对冲基金，但事实上他们并不是。” 另外一个基本的对冲基金工具——杠杆同样缺乏。对冲基金经理无法通过借贷进行投资。然而刘震表示，希望追加投资的投资者通常会向家人或朋友借钱，同意支付利息，例如每年6%。“然后在年底的时候，投资者会根据之前的安排，与朋友分割投资收益。”他表示，在中国，这是制造杠杆的唯一合法方式，而且颇受欢迎。 尽管经营对冲基金存在诸多障碍，但多年来，一些经理一直在提供他们所谓的对冲基金。“我们2009年10月推出了首只对冲基金，”中国南方基金管理公司(China Southern Fund Management)量化投资部总监刘治平(Zack Liu)表示。“所谓对冲基金，我指的是这样的产品:如果在规定时间期限内，产品的回报高于预定的目标，我们可以收取绩效费。”南方基金是中国内地成立时间最长的资产管理公司，资产管理规模超过280亿美元。截至2010年12月底，南方基金共经营着7只对冲基金，总资产约为12亿元人民币。 中国约有200家获得许可、有可能采用对冲基金策略的机构:63家资产管理公司、100家左右的券商和大约20家保险公司。但这些机构很少经营“真正的”对冲基金，即收取绩效费、利用期货进行对冲并使用杠杆的私募基金。根据这一标准，只有3、4家符合要求。 中国的对冲基金策略大多都由私募基金推行，它们拥有基本的资产管理执照，其运作基本上都不公开。 59 MCanxixun * Information 证监会预计将开始让这些不受监管的私募基金走出阴影，原因无非就是要确定它们所管理的资金的 来源。 “监管机构希望对冲基金处于监管框架之下，”易方达的刘震表示。“但这只能是双方面的。证监会 需要包容私募基金。与此同时，基金经理不能只是在市场上投机。他们需要了解风险和回报，部署真正 的对冲基金策略，帮助提高中国资本市场的效率。” 目前绕过私募基金非法融资问题的一个方法是，鼓励成立合伙制私募基金。 私募基金基本上对此不予考虑，因为这涉及双重征税(营业税和收入所得税)。在距离北京约90分 钟车程的天津市，政府机构如今正推出税收优惠，以鼓励合伙制私募基金的成立。 麦天岳估计，目前天津约有7家对冲基金。他表示，深圳和上海也可能成为合伙私募基金成立的“热 点”。 Municipal Bond Closed-End Funds Attractive A few months ago, banking industry analyst Meredith Whitney decided to offer her two cents on the municipal bond market. Her comments precipitated a correction in the municipal bond market. In spite of this, municipal bond closed-end funds are attractive. Ms. Whitney forecast that a few hundred issuers of tax-exempt bonds will default on their bonds over the next several years. Of course, after everything investors have been through over the past three years, this was the last thing they needed to hear. Subsequent to Ms. Whitney‘s comments, Nouriel Roubini – otherwise known as Doctor Doom – posited that the number of default would be bad but only around 100 issuers. This did nothing to settle nerves. The first question the level-headed investor would ask is: which 100 issuers? If 50 of those 100 issuers are the States, yes, we have a problem. However, if those 100 issuers are rural wastewater districts, we have a completely different story. Along this line, the follow-up question – which gets to the heart of the matter – is what are the values of bonds being defaulted upon and what portion of the overall market do they represent? Another follow-up question is: how does this default rate compare to the historical rate of default? The answer to these questions leaves one unimpressed by Ms. Whitney‘s and Mr. Roubini‘s forecasts. What one is impressed by are the yields that are available from municipal bonds, particularly the closed-end funds. Recently, the Alliance New York Municipal Income Fund (AYN) was yielding 6.23%; the BlackRock MuniYield California Fund (MYC) was yielding 7.37%; and, the Eaton Vance Massachusetts Municipal Income Fund (MMV) was yielding 7.02. As a matter of disclosure, my firm invests in similar funds but has no long or short positions in the above-mentioned funds. Such funds are not for everyone. But, if tax-exempt bond closed-end funds are appropriate for your circumstances, you can find a list at , the prophets of doom predicted in September 2007 that the muni market would experience a default meltdown. In spite of this, municipal bond insurers such as Ambac Financial (ABK) and MBIA (MBI) are somehow still solvent. And, in the end, Warren Buffett got into the muni insurance business. So, who‘s right? My money is with Mr. Buffett. 迷人的封闭式市政债券基金 几个月前，银行业分析师迈瑞迪斯?惠特尼(Meredith Whitney)决定在市政债券市场上提出自己 60 Mcanxixun * Information 的观点。她的评论在市政债券市场上被修改。尽管如此，封闭式市政债券基金仍具吸引力。 惠特尼(Whitney)女士预计，几百个免税债券的发行商在未来几年里将拖欠他们的债券。当然，在 过去三年中投资者所完成的所有事情中，这是他们需要审理的最后一件。在惠特尼女士的评论后，鲁比 尼----也被称之为末日博士，他设想违约的数量将会很糟糕，但大约只有100个发行商。这对于缓解投 资者的忧虑来说毫无用处 。 清醒的投资者所要提出的第一个问题便是:哪100个发行商呢,如果那100个发行商中有50个是州 政府，那么我们就有难题了。但是，如果这100个发行商是农村的污水地区，那么我们的难题就完全不 一样了。既然这样，我们接下来的问题，也就是核心问题便是，债券被拖欠的价值是什么,他们在整个 市场占据哪一部分,接下来还有一个问题，即这一违约率是如何与历史贷款拖欠率相比较的,这些问题 的答案却与惠特尼女士和鲁比尼先生的预测不同。 留下深刻印象的便是----可从市政债券中获得的收率，尤其是封闭式基金。最近，the Alliance New York Municipal Income基金(AYN)收率为6.23%; the BlackRock MuniYield California基金(MYC) 收率为7.37%; the Eaton Vance Massachusetts Municipal Income基金(MMV)收率为7.02. 作为一 个公开的问题，我的公司投资于类似的基金，但是在上面提到的基金中，没有多头或空头。 这些基金并不是针对每个人。但如果封闭式免税债券基金适合于你，那么你们访问 了解更多详情 。 试着回想一下，2007年9月那些悲观的预言家的预测:市政公债市场将经历一个违约危机。尽管如 此，市政债券保险商，如安巴克金融集团(ABD)和债券保险公司MBI都有偿还债务的能力。并且，沃伦?巴 菲特(Warren Buffett)最终迈进了市政保险行业。因此，谁是对的,我的基金与巴菲特共前进。 Bond(债券) Treasuries Fall Before Inflation Reports; Pimco’s Gross Sells Treasuries fell as economists said U.S. reports this week will show inflation is quickening and after Pacific Investment Management Co. reported that Bill Gross set a bet against government debt. Longer maturities led the decline as the U.S. prepared to sell $32 billion of 3-year notes, $21 billion of 10-year debt and $13 billion of 30-year bonds in three daily auctions starting tomorrow. Pimco‘s record-size $236 billion Total Return Fund had minus 3 percent of its assets in government and related debt, the Newport Beach, California-based company said on its website, after reducing the position to zero in February. ―There is a fear of inflation in the U.S.,‖ said Hiroki Shimazu, an economist in Tokyo at SMBC Nikko Securities Inc., a unit of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., Japan‘s third- largest publicly traded bank by assets. ―This week‘s reports will be bad news for Treasuries.‖ Ten-year rates increased two basis points to 3.59 percent as of 6:46 a.m. in London, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader prices. The 3.625 percent note maturing in February 2021 declined 1/8, or $1.25 per $1,000 face amount, to 100 7/32. 61 MCanxixun * Information The Labor Department on April 15 will say consumer prices rose 0.5 percent last month from February, and gained 2.6 percent from March 2010, according to a Bloomberg News survey. Core prices, which exclude volatile food and fuel, increased 0.2 percent for a third month, another survey showed. Wholesale Prices Labor Department figures earlier in the week will show wholesale prices and the cost of goods imported into the U.S. also climbed. So-called producer prices rose 1 percent in March, while import prices gained 2.2 percent, the surveys show. The difference between yields on 10-year notes and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, a gauge of trader expectations for consumer prices over the life of the debt, widened to 2.66 percentage points today, the most in three years. Five-year inflation swaps rose to 2.70 percent on April 8, also the most since 2008. The securities allow investors to exchange fixed-interest rates for returns equivalent to the consumer price index. Treasuries handed investors a 2.8 percent loss in the six months ended March 31, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch‘s Treasury Master index. The MSCI All Country World Index of stocks returned 14 percent in the period. Yields are still below levels seen in the past decade. Ten- year rates climbed as high as 5.53 percent in May 2001. The figure has averaged 4.12 percent over the last 10 years. Lawmaker Resolve Investors say they are seeing lawmaker resolve this year to trim the $1 trillion deficit. ―The market doesn‘t care where you cut, as long as you are cutting, and we are starting to see that,‖ said Tad Rivelle, head of fixed-income investment at Los Angeles-based TCW Group Inc., which oversees about $115 billion. ―The budget-cutting environment is bond friendly.‖ Optimism that Congress will rein in spending has driven yields on 10-year U.S. notes to the lowest level relative to German bunds since September. Traders are paying the least to insure Treasuries against losses with credit-default swaps than at any time since August, according to CMA prices. Budget cuts would mean the U.S. wouldn‘t sell as much debt, which has grown to $9.13 trillion in marketable Treasuries from $4.34 billion in mid-2007 as the government boosted spending to pull the economy out of recession. Pimco‘s Holdings Pimco‘s Gross increased cash and equivalents to 31 percent from 23 percent, making it the largest component for the first time in four years. Gross has said he‘s concerned about what will happen when the Federal Reserve stops buying Treasuries, after the securities fell for a second quarter. The central bank implemented a program in November to purchase $600 billion of debt by June 30 to sustain the economic expansion. The Fed plans to scoop up $6.5 billion to $8.5 billion of debt due from October 2016 to March 2018 today. ―Their objective obviously is to improve the economy and to create jobs, but also to put a floor under the stock market, and we know that‘s working,‖ Gross said April 1 in a radio interview on ―Bloomberg Surveillance‖ hosted by Tom Keene. ―The question remains, when the Fed stops buying Treasuries, does the private sector take the baton and run the last leg of the relay race?‖ The Total Return Fund can have a so-called negative position by using derivatives, futures or by shorting. Shorting is borrowing and selling an asset in anticipation of making a profit by buying it back after its price has fallen. 62 Mcanxixun * Information Pimco‘s government-related holdings consist of sovereign bonds, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, agency debt, interest rate swaps, Treasury futures and options and corporate securities guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., according to the company. 国债下跌，Pimco将其出售 美国国债下跌，经济学家表示:本周美国的报告将表明通膨正在加速，之前太平洋投资管理公司就曾报道，比尔?格罗斯(Bill Gross)设定了一个赌注反对政府债券。 正当美国准备在三个日常拍卖中(从4月12日开始)出售320亿美元的3年期债券、210亿美元的10年期债券和130美元的30年期债券时，较长的期限领先下跌。太平洋投资管理公司(Pimco)的最高纪录---2360亿美元的总回报基金(Total Return Fund)在政府和相关债务中，资产减少了3,，总部位于加州纽波特比奇的公司在其网站上表示。 东京SMBC日兴证券公司(三井住友金融集团的下属单位，也是日本第三大公开交易银行)的经济学家Hiroki Shimazu说:“在美国，存在对通膨的恐惧，本周的报道对于国债来说将是坏消息。” 据彭博交易价格显示，伦敦时间上午6:46时，10年期利率提升了两个基点至3.59点。而2021年2月份到期的3.625,的债券则下降了1/8,或1.25美元(每1000美元面值)，至100 7/32。 据彭博咨询调查显示，4月15日，美国劳动部将公布，与2月份相比消费价格上月上涨了0.5,，比2010年3月份增加2.6个百分点。核心价格，不包括波动较大的食物和燃料，连续三个月增长0.2个点。 批发价格 调查显示，本周早些时候，劳动部的数据将显示，批发价格和进口到美国的商品的成本也将攀升。所谓的生产价格在三月份上升了1个百分点，而进口价格增加了2.2个百分点。 10年期债券的收率与国库抗通胀债券(评估交易者对消费价格的期望值)之间的不同，于今日扩大到2.66个点，为三年来最大值。 五年通膨率于4月8日上升至2.70点，也是2008年来的最高值。证券允许投资者为了回报而交换债券利率，相当于消费品价格指数。美银美林的财政主管指出，截至3月31日，国债在六个月内给投资者带来了2.8,的亏损。 收率仍低于过去十年的水平。10年期利率在2001年5月攀升高达5.53点。而过去十年里，这一数字平均值为4.12点。 立法者的决定 投资者表示，他们正拭目以待立法者的决定，即消减一万亿美元的赤字。 总部位于洛杉矶的TCW集团有限公司(监督约1150亿美元)固定收益投资的负责人Tad Rivelle 说:“市场并不关心你在哪消减，只要消减就可，我们拭目以待。预算消减环境是友好的纽带。” 美国国会将抑制开销，这一乐观的态度已带动10年期美国债券的收率至最低水平，相较于德国债券在九月份以来的收率而言。交易者将进行最低支付来保收信贷违约交易自八月以来任何时期的损失。 预算消减将意味着美国不会出售大量的国债，这些国债在可销售的国债中已从2007年中期的43.4亿美元，增至9.13万亿美元，原因是政府推动消费以帮助经济摆脱危机。 太平洋投资管理公司的控股 太平洋投资管理公司的格罗斯(Gross)增加了现款，也就是从23,到31,，使其成为四年来第一次最大的组成部分。 Gross表示，继证券在第二季度下跌后，他担心，一旦联邦储备局停止购买国债时，将会发生什么事情。中心银行于11月份实施了一个方案，即在6月30日之前购买6000美元的债务，以维持经济扩张。美联储计划拿出65亿—85亿美元的债务(2016年10月---2018年4月11日到期)。 63 MCanxixun * Information Gross 在4月1日接受《彭博观察》的记者Tom Keene的采访中说:“很显然，他们的目的是改善 经济状况和创业情况，抑制股市下跌以及我们所了解的作用。现在的问题是，当美联储停止购买债券时， 私营部门会手持接力棒坚持跑到终点吗,” 总回报基金可以通过金融衍生工具、期货或做空来占据一个所谓的消极立场。 做空就是在当期价位高时卖出所拥有的股票或基金，再到股价跌到一定程度时将其买进。 太平洋投资公司的相关政府所持股份包括主权债券、国库抗通胀债券、机构债券、利率掉期、国债 期货和期权以及受联邦存款保险公司所担保的公司证券，据公司所述。 German Bonds Fall on Rates; Portugal Debt Drops After Bailout German bonds fell for a third week as the European Central Bank raised interest rates for the first time in almost three years. Portuguese and Greek yields rose as Portugal sought a bailout from the European Union. ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet increased the benchmark rate by 25 basis points from a record low of 1 percent to tackle rising inflation pressures, a move predicted by all 57 economists in a Bloomberg News survey. Portugal failed to stem a surge in borrowing costs, even as it followed Greece and Ireland in asking the EU for a financial assistance package estimated at 80 billion euros ($115 billion). The ECB ―was quite hawkish,‖ said Vincent Chaigneau, head of rate strategy at Societe Generale SA in London. ―There is more adjustment coming, higher in yields, at the front end of the curve. Portugal has lagged and Greece has been faring pretty badly.‖ Germany‘s 10-year yield increased 10 basis points in the week to 3.48 percent at 4 p.m. in London yesterday, after reaching the most since Aug. 13, 2009. Yields on two-year notes rose eight basis points to 1.90 percent, after reaching 1.92 percent, the highest since December 18 2008. European inflation risks remain on the upside and the ECB‘s monetary policy is still ―accommodative,‖ Trichet said at a press conference in Frankfurt after the rate decision. Debt Sale Portugal requested financial aid after it sold 1 billion euros ($1.4 billion) of bills this week, paying more to borrow for six months than it costs Germany for 30 years of funding. It faces redemptions totalling 9 billion euros ($12.9 billion) in April and June. Portuguese 10-year bonds fell 13 out of the previous 14 days, pushing the yield to as high as 8.80 percent, the most since the introduction of the euro in 1999. Two-year note yields surged to 9.3 percent yesterday, also a euro-era high. Greek two-year yields climbed to as high as 16.43 percent, the most since March 15. The Iberian nation‘s debt ranks as the worst performer in 2011, down 10.1 percent, as investors price in concerns of a default. Bunds lost 2.7 percent in the same period according to indexes compiled by the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies and Bloomberg. Germany will auction 3 billion euros of interest linked bonds and 2 billion euros of 30-year notes next week. Italy plans to sell debt maturing in 2016 and 2023, while the Netherland auctions up to 2 billion euros of debt maturing in 2042. Portugal faces its first bond redemption on Friday. 64 Mcanxixun * Information 德债券走低;葡萄牙债务滑落 德国债券持续三周走低，原因是欧洲中央银行近三年来首次提升利率。葡萄牙和希腊的收益率上升，原因是葡萄牙向欧盟寻找援助。 欧洲央行行长特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)将基准利率由1的历史低点上调25个基点，以应对通膨，这一举动曾被彭博咨询调查的57名经济学家所预测。葡萄牙未能制止借贷成本的飙升，即便它是继希腊和爱尔兰后，又一个向欧洲寻求约800亿欧元(1150亿美元)的金融援助的国家。 法国兴业银行驻伦敦的全球利率策略主管Vincent Chaigneau说，欧洲央行“相当强硬”，“大量的调整将不断涌现，收益率的大幅提高，将处于领先位置。葡萄牙已滞后，希腊的发展状况一直萎靡。” 伦敦时间昨天下午4点，德国10年期国债收益率在一周的时间里上升了10个基点至3.48,，是自2009年8月13日以来的首次。2年期国债收益率上升了8个基点，至1.90,，是自2008年12月18日(1.92,)以来的首次。 欧洲通膨风险仍处于上峰，欧洲央行的货币政策仍然“宽松”， Trichet在决定上调利率之后，在法兰克福的一个新闻发布会上说道。 债务拍卖 葡萄牙于本周出售10亿欧元(14亿美元)的法案之后向欧盟发出财政请求，葡萄牙政府6 日出售2012年3月到期的国债，其收益率高于德国30年期的国债收益率。它将在4月份和6月份面临90亿欧元(129亿美元)的赎回金额。 葡萄牙10年期国债较前14天相比有所回落，推动收益率高达8.80,，是自1999年欧元引入以来的最高值、2年期国债收益率于昨天创纪录地飙升至9.3,。希腊2年期国债攀升至16.43,，是自3月15日以来的首次。 伊比利亚国家的债务被列入2011年“最差”行列，下降了10.1,。据欧洲联盟金融分析学会和彭博的数据所示，同一时间债券下跌了2.7,。 德国将于下周拍卖30亿欧元的股息和债券，以及20亿欧元的30年期债券。意大利计划出售于2016年和2023年到期的债券，而荷兰则拍卖于2042年到期的高达20亿欧元的债券。葡萄牙将于周五面临第一次债券偿还。 65