中国反卫星武器试验：战略回应

China Security Winter 2007 31 China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response Eric Hagt Eric Hagt is the director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, in Washington, D.C. and Beijing. His research interests include Sino-U.S. relations in the field of space, energy and a range of non-traditional security issues. China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 31 - 51 ©2007 World Security Institute China’s testing of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon on Jan. 11, 2007, was an unambiguous challenge not to U.S. power in space but to its dominance in space. With little explanation emanating from officialdom in China, their prin- cipal motivation has not been made clear. A number of alternative intentions have also been offered up, for example, it was a clumsy maneuver to force the United States to the negotiating table for a space arms control treaty. Or, with a turbulent year expected in the run up to Taiwan elections, it was a grave reminder of Beijing’s resolve to defend the nation’s sovereignty at all cost. Or, that it was a raw show of force, a flexing of its growing military muscle. It is possible that all these motivations played a part in China’s decision to test an ASAT. But behind the test was a simpler message and arguably one more benign to international space security than this spectacular test and the orbital debris cloud it created would suggest. In fact, the test is consistent with both China’s notion of active defense and its deterrence doctrine, and should not have been a surprise in light of the growing threats that China perceives in Theresa Hitchens China Security Winter 200732 space. While the fundamental aim of the test may have been relatively straight- forward the process and conflict within China’s political and military system associated with deciding to conduct the test are far less clear. That process has been marked by 1) diverging domestic influence over China’s space pro- gram and its direction and 2) the differing responses by constituencies within China to the nations’ perceived security threats in space. Understanding the domestic actors and their objectives does not alter the danger this test poses to the security of space. It can, however, illuminate the critical defects in the present strategic architecture in space and may point a way forward to avoid an arms race in space. ASAT Test as a Response In the past decade, China has derived a number of key conclusions from its observations of U.S. military activities in space that have fundamentally shaped China’s own strategic posture. The first is the profound implications of space for information and high-tech wars. China witnessed with awe and alarm the power of the U.S. military using satellite communication, recon- naissance, geo-positioning and integration capabilities for an impressive show of force beginning first with the Gulf war in 1991 to the recent campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 The U.S. military’s almost complete dependence on space assets has also not escaped the close examination of Chinese analysts.2 Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the development of space weapons as well as the U.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and control space.3 This per- ceived U.S. intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space.4 Even more worrisome for China is the direct impact of these developments on China’s core national interests. The ac- celerated development of the U.S. ballistic missile system, especially as it is being developed in close cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening China’s homeland and nuclear deterrent.5 The ‘Shriever’ space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2001, 2003 and 20056 strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S. space control sets China has concluded that the United States is determined to control space. Eric Hagt China Security Winter 2007 33 China as a target.7 Most central to China’s concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have on China’s ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.8 As U.S. military space developments have evolved, China’s observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sover- eignty as well as China’s broader interests in space – civilian, commercial and military – America’s pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose an intolerable risk to China’s na- tional security.9 China’s own ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Its willingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys China’s grim resolve to send that message. This still leaves unanswered nagging questions about: who made the deci- sion, who was party to the decision, when was the decision made, and its significance for China’s intentions in space. Knowing the answers to some of these important issues may do little to temper the detrimental effects of the test, but can hopefully provide clues as to how the United States and the international community can respond to avert a further escalation of military competition in space. Conflicting Voices China’s approach to addressing its perceived insecurity in space funda- mentally took on two separate forms: one political/diplomatic, the other military. At the international level, China’s pursuit of a space weapons ban and test ban treaty as well as attendant verification measures is most visibly represented by China’s efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.10 Other official initiatives included China’s opposition, along with Russia and Belarus, over the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and its push to build the NMD system.11 China’s White Papers on space, the first issued in 2000 and the other in 2006, reinforce this message but also put China’s ambitions in space in a broader national and strategic context, calling the space industry an important part of the state’s comprehensive development strategy.12 Though official documents reveal limited information about China’s space program, especially its military components, at a minimum they clearly lay out the political/diplomatic stance of China’s interest in pursuing the peaceful development of space and its willingness to cooperate with others to China’s ASAT Test: Strategic ResponseEric Hagt China Security Winter 200734 achieve those goals. The other solution is a military hedge, including the strengthening of capabilities to protect China’s satellites and a robust ASAT capability. This military hedging approach largely focuses on capabilities to enhance the survivability of China’s satellite networks, and to ensure its access to space.13 ‘Active defense’, a central component of this strategy, includes countermea- sures such as anti-interference and anti-jamming techniques, and in extreme situations using micro-satellites to actively guard other satellites, act as decoys or even counter-attack.14 The heart of this strategy is to protect against an adversary’s ability to prevent or restrict China from using space to its economic and national security advantage and constitute “comprehensive defensive actions.” ASAT technology has been cited as an “evitable choice for most medium-sized and small space-faring states to protect themselves and deter strong enemies.”15 Although most aspects of China’s military program in space are largely unknown, the open source literature indicates that it proceeded in several stages as a response to developments in the United States. It largely began in the late 1980s with a realization that the U.S. missile defense, ASAT and space weapons programs could endanger China’s national security interests.16 Yet, at this time, it seems China preferred to solve this through a diplomatic approach. With gridlock at the CD beginning in the mid-1990s, however, the military option took on greater urgency with the call for a development of relevant space technology.17 An awareness that effective defensive capabilities in space would require a long time to develop gave early impetus to these trends.18 The sec- ond phase was marked by the Shriever war game exercise in 2001 (reinforced by the Rumsfeld Commission and other factors19), which vindicated China’s long- held fear of being a primary target of the U.S. military space program and triggered China’s determination to resolve this threat in space – either through military or diplomatic means. From China’s perspective, all U.S. actions since that time have served to diminish a diplomatic solution while underscoring the necessity of a military hedge in space. While there is no explicit evidence of a concerted ASAT program in China, a significant increase in calls to meet China undertook diplomatic and military hedging approaches to address a perceived threat in space. Eric Hagt China Security Winter 2007 35 this threat as well as various research and development programs for ASAT and related space defense technologies began in the mid-1990s, and accelerat- ing in the early 2000s. 2021 (The ASAT test itself also attests to the fact that China’s military space program, particularly its ASAT program, has been in development for some time.) This urgency to address China’s rising security concerns is also evidenced by the call within key military institutes around the 2003-2005 timeframe to create a dedicated military space command with a stated purpose of tackling the growing strategic and national security threats in space.22 The driving force behind this new command system appears to be the PLA General Armament Department (GAD) or the closely related Armament Academy (AA).23 Presently, command over civilian space experiment activities is roughly divided between the State Council, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and functional sections of the GAD.24 Although the institutional hierarchy of China’s military space program is not fully understood, military space activities are probably led by the CMC and the PLA General Chief Department, with significant personnel coming from the GAD.25 Under a new powerful supreme command department for space, an agency with the Chinese president as the supreme commander, military space would take on a new priority in terms of budgeting and military and political authority; similar to what occurred with the Second Artillery, China’s strategic force, upon its establishment.26 While a space command and space forces may not have formally taken shape, the call for them strongly indicates the need for the military to seriously counter perceived threats to its national security challenges in space.27 China’s increasingly heightened sense of insecurity in space and its calls for a separate space command in response to the U.S. drive for space control have additional significance for the development of its military space initiatives and its eventual ASAT test. These trends have driven the establishment of domestic institutional and industrial constituencies that have taken root in the system and are vying for political and economic influence and authority. This phenomenon is certainly not unique to China as the experience of bureau- cratic agencies in the United States will attest.28 With deepening institutional interests, such agencies naturally evolve a degree of imperviousness to outside influence. The closed and nontransparent nature of China’s military establish- ment, which largely runs the space program, only exacerbates this tendency. The sum of these realities suggests that once set in motion, national defense considerations planned over a long period to address security threats may be China’s ASAT Test: Strategic ResponseEric Hagt China Security Winter 200736 influenced to a degree by external factors but cannot be altered at the whim of those factors.29 In this sense, China’s space program may have been less malleable to altering its course of developing as a military hedge than has been hoped. Nevertheless, the poignant lesson that the U.S. pursuit of space control has not only triggered this process but has deeply reinforced it remains. Furthermore, this internal dynamic within China would have been particularly immune to U.S. pressure and influence since there are virtually no political or military relations between the two countries in space. Sadly, even business interaction is scarcely better.30 As with many other areas, commercial interests act as a salve for otherwise tense bilateral relations, as is arguably the case between China and the United States. But without any commercial relations in space, and with perceived security concerns bearing down, China has too little to lose by conducting the test. Not a Ruse The ASAT test itself also implies that the military option is beginning to win out over a diplomatic one in China as a solution to head off U.S. space control ambitions. Every call by China’s diplomatic effort at the CD for prevention of space weaponization has been effectively blocked by the United States.31 It has rejected any treaty that will restrict its freedom to act in space, claiming it has the most to lose and therefore has unique security considerations.32 The United States has also offered the reasoning that a treaty to ban weapons in space was not needed because there was no military space race.33 China sees this U.S. stance as a thinly veiled attempt to retain absolute access to space while leaving the door open for the United States to develop space weapons in the future if necessary.34 Along with the Bush administration’s willingness to use force against those who threaten U.S. national security interests in space, concluding an arms control treaty in space seems remote.35 Verification measures for a test ban for ASAT and other space weapons have also been rejected as infeasible due to the inherent dual-use nature of space technol- ogy.36 The Chinese side has believed, fairly accurately, that the United States simply will never sign such a treaty for lack of trust, fearing others will secretly pursue space weapons capabilities while America’s hands are tied.37 China has also taken a deeper lesson from U.S. action: the United States negotiates based primarily on strength. Without strength of its own, China cannot bring the United States to the negotiating table.38 This reveals a strong Eric Hagt China Security Winter 2007 37 strain of realism running through Chinese strategic thinking. A balance of force, attained by a show of strength, can redress strategic imbalance in space and ultimately promote peace.39 These lessons are ingrained in China’s per- spective on the Cold War, where such a balance maintained world peace for 50 years.40 The ASAT test will, the Chinese hope, restore a modicum of balance and deter the United States from acting on that position of superiority.41 Questions have also been raised about whether the ASAT test was con- ducted without the full knowledge of China’s top leadership .42 If so, it would indicate that outsiders still know disturbingly little about China’s internal decision-making process or its intentions. But more importantly, it would cast doubt on the leadership’s control over the decision to test and therefore the motives behind it. Perhaps those motives include a direct challenge to the United States rather than a defensive response to perceived threats in space. However, there are two factors that make this implausible. First, the president of China is both the head of the top political entity in China (CCCP) and the commander in chief of the military (head of CMC).43 A significant military test cannot be taken without the top political leadership’s acquiescence or, at a minimum, its knowledge. Second, and more importantly, in its decision-making, the government considers the comprehensive national interest of the country, not only narrow military interests, or solely diplomatic concerns. Having said this, it doesn’t exclude the possibility of bargaining within the system between those advocating and those opposing such a test. In fact, the balance between competing constituencies in China may have an unpredictable influence on such a critical decision. Especially since China lacks the equivalent of the U.S. ‘national security council’, it is more difficult to weigh competing political and strategic considerations in a coherent and comprehensive way.44 In light of this, it is possible that the decision to test was in fact unfavorable for China (as some would argue is the case), but the sum of competing interests created a bias for testing. Nevertheless, the gravity of the ASAT test and its obvious strategic implications for relations between China and the United States rules out the reasonable possibility of a decision to test based purely on narrowly conceived (military) interests. The above discussion indicates that the military’s actions to develop space China’s heightened sense of insecurity in space has raised calls for a space command. China’s ASAT Test: Strategic ResponseEric Hagt China Security Winter 200738 weapons during China’s diplomatic offensive were a separate and perhaps independent hedging track rather than a deliberate design to develop space weapons. The opposite has been suggested by some: that diplomacy was nothing more than a smokescreen to buy time for the military to achieve an ASAT capability.45 These accusations simply do not square with China’s interests or its past behavior. First, outside of purely military interests, as a vastly inferior power in space, China has no conceivable interest in blindly pursuing an all-out space weapons program (let alone conducting a test). Such a move would not only launch China into a costly space race with the United States but would threaten China’s delicate strategic balance with nearly all its neighbors (both potentially adversarial, such as Japan and India, as well as others in Southeast Asia) and even with Europe. Such behavior by China is also inconsistent with history. The military has frequently been subordinated to greater diplomatic and national interests. China’s highly restrained develop- ment of its nuclear weapons program in the face of direct nuclear threat by both the Soviet Union and the United States in the past is an instructive example.46 The tight control over military program spending during the first decades of its opening up and reform is another case in point.47 Second, implicit in this charge is also that the diplomatic effort was collud- ing with the military to pursue a space weapons program. Undermining years of China’s reputation and hard work for dubious military gains fraught with high risk is utterly inconsistent with China’s otherwise patient international diplomacy.48 Similarly, the test could not reasonably be a ploy – particularly by China’s Foreign Ministry – to force the United States back to the negotiating table. Nations do not respond to threats by acquiescing, particularly when threatened by a weaker state. It would smack of appeasement, or worse, cow- ardly surrender, neither of which would be an option in any country’s domes- tic political environment. There is no historical U.S. behavioral precedent that would lead Ch