地缘视野下的南海与印度洋

National Strategy Forum Review Blog www.nationalstrategy.com Geopolitics in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region: Tiny Ripples or Shifting Tides? By Eric S. Morse August 30, 2010 The Pentagon’s military analysis1 of China’s military, released on August 16th, concluded that China’s rapid military modernization objective is to extend its reach and influence into the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean Region. Just prior to the report, the U.S. unveiled a tough new stance on China’s encroachment into the South China Sea during Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Vietnam, calling freedom of navigation on the sea an important U.S. national security interest. The statements indicate a U.S. commitment to the region to both stabilize security interests and reengage with regional actors. India and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also concerned about China’s growing expansion of activities in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Debate lingers over the importance of these regions to China’s overall national strategy. On the one hand, officials from the U.S. National Security Council and the U.S. State Department reported in March 2010 that Chinese officials view the South China Sea as one of China’s “core interests.” On the other hand, this contention of core interests is publically denied by Chinese officials who claim that China is not an expansionist power and that any territorial disputes with regional neighbors can be solved peacefully through bilateral diplomatic discussions. Nevertheless, China’s expanding military and naval power and increased maritime activity and port building projects in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region are geopolitical currents that affect not only U.S. national security interests but also the security interests of India and ASEAN. India For India, China’s maritime encroachment is a complex issue. India is an emerging power in South Asia and perhaps the only feasible contender to oppose China’s maritime power in the region. As a solidifying democracy and rapidly growing economy, India is defining its maritime strategy and developing a modernized, flexible, blue water2 navy. 1 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf 2 A navy capable of operating across the high seas and away from shallow territorial waters. 2 National Strategy Forum Review Blog www.nationalstrategy.com China is viewed as a serious peer competitor for India. Like India, China is beginning to shift its military focus from a predominantly land based strategy to a blue water strategy, one capable of projecting naval power over a great distance. Consequently, China’s encroachment into the Indian Ocean Region is concerning to Indian strategists. For example, China is building ports and strengthening maritime relations in a number of IOR locations. One example is the construction of a port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Apart from India and Pakistan's historical conflicts, the China-Pakistan connection is inflammatory due to a strategic situation described as India’s “Hormuz Dilemma.” This refers to India’s dependence on imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz in close proximity to Pakistan’s Makran coast, and emphasizes the danger of a strong China-Pakistan relationship in that area of the IOR. China is also pursuing the “String of Pearls” strategy, whereby China strategically builds naval bases and secures naval agreements for porting and re-supply rights throughout the Indian Ocean. Gwadar is one such base, a listening post, but others exist as well. Examples of these “pearls” include a port in Pasni, Pakistan; a fueling station and port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka; a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong, Bangladesh; and porting rights in Aden (Yemen), Salalah (Oman), and Djuboouti. Naval strategists would describe such activities as typical Mahanian pursuits.3 Coincidentally, China’s port presence in the IOR signals that China recognizes India as a naval competitor and is actively taking measures to protect and further Chinese interests in the region. It is difficult to draw direct conclusions from China’s increasing involvement and port building activities in the IOR and ascribe mal-intentions. For example, increased People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) involvement in the area is a part of China’s multi-lateral anti-piracy endeavors, certainly a benign and helpful regional activity. However, perceptions matter in international relations and military strategy, and Indian security analysts are growing wary of what they perceive as China’s great power intentions in the region. To counter the perception of a rising China in the IOR, India is rapidly modernizing its own blue water navy. Important modernization benchmarks for the future include: building two new aircraft carriers (India has one operational carrier soon to be decommissioned) over the next decade; increasing the number of tactical submarines by 6 to 22, and building, for the first time, 6 new nuclear powered submarines equipped with sea launched ballistic missiles over the next decade; and building more logistic and re-supply ships for deployment abroad (there was an increase of 46% from 2008-2009 alone). These specific developments suggest that India is modernizing its naval forces towards blue water naval capabilities, meaning that India would be able to project maritime force across great expanses of water, particularly the IOR and the South China Sea. 3 From Thomas Mahan, the great naval commander of the Battle of Trafalgar. The theory suggests that rising powers must have "command of the sea," naval projection, control of sea routes, and access to bases in order to maintain international power and secure interests. Chinese scholars and policy makers have become very interested in these ideas over the past few decades, and their ideas connect a thriving economy to naval primacy. 3 National Strategy Forum Review Blog www.nationalstrategy.com Despite concerns about China, India has been unusually lax in its historic outreach to U.S. naval presence in the region.4 However, this trend is changing as the U.S. and India have strengthened their military and economic relationship in recent years. Room for improvement exists and is growing greater by the day. ASEAN ASEAN is an important regional organization in Southeast Asia that networks countries in the region into a tight knit economic and security5 organization. ASEAN has experienced extraordinary growth in the past decades and its importance to regional and international trade is highly regarded. ASEAN security capabilities are more difficult to pin down, since its militaries are coordinated individually by member states (for instance, there is no ASEAN army comparable to that of NATO). Consequently, great powers like China may at times succeed in bullying the group on territorial matters, such as disputes over the Spratley and Paracel islands. Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are ASEAN claimants to territorial disputes with China. China’s preference for resolving disputes among ASEAN members via bilateral talks outside of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) favors China’s claims by isolating a weaker country from the multilateral ASEAN umbrella. Lack of a larger, organizing entity/power in the ASEAN-China disputes creates a vacuum where China can force issues to go its way. In addition, ASEAN has been passed over by U.S. foreign policy priorities in the past. As Eduardo Lachica wrote in the Spring 2010 NSFR, the U.S. is guilty of “serial absenteeism” in Southeast Asia. However, recent U.S. foreign policy developments suggest that the U.S. is beginning to take seriously its ASEAN friends. Mr. Lachica contended that it was the responsibility of the Obama administration and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to use its “smart power” foreign policy tools to convince Southeast Asian countries that the U.S. was “there to stay.” Secretary Clinton’s recent assertive statements that the U.S. and ASEAN will not be bullied by Chinese naval encroachment sends a strong message to Southeast Asian countries that the U.S. is not only serious about this region of the world but also that the U.S. is pursuing improved relations and interactions with Southeast Asian countries. Consequently, the tide may be shifting towards deeper U.S.-ASEAN relations. Concluding Implications As the Pentagon report points out, China’s growing military power is both an expected development and cause for concern. The U.S. has strategic interests in Southeast Asia that would benefit by counter-balancing China’s unimpeded military and economic expansion in the region. At the same time, the U.S. does not want to overly antagonize our largest debt holder and military rival in the region. For example, forthcoming U.S.-South Korea military exercises in the Yellow Sea are seen as a hostile gesture by the Chinese public and government officials. 4 Scholars connect this to India's political and foreign policy culture of "non-alignment," which takes its root from India's colonial experience, non-violent independence movement, and Hindu tradition. 5 Security issues area handled through the ASEAN Security Community. 4 National Strategy Forum Review Blog www.nationalstrategy.com The U.S. may use tensions in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region to ratchet up U.S. national security goals in the region. China may object vehemently, but this is simply the great power game. In the meantime, India and ASEAN stand to gain from greater U.S. attention to their mutual interests. How the U.S. manages these interactions will affect the balance of power in the Indian Ocean Region and Southeast Asia in the future. Consequently, a deft hand at strategic diplomatic relations and rhetoric are needed to realize the complex national goals of the U.S. and other regional actors. Developing regional relationships and supporting Southeast Asian and Indian security interests abroad facilitates the U.S. goal of peacefully counter-balancing Chinese military and economic expansion in the region. All parties stand to gain for increased cooperation. For ASEAN, the U.S. is a powerful ally that can allay fears of Chinese territorial bullying. For India, the U.S. has deepened both security and economic relations over the past few years. As India’s military develops, there will be more opportunities for joint military training missions that build trust, establish dialogue, and avoid miscalculations and communications. For the U.S., stronger ties to India and Southeast Asia builds a regional community of partners that establishes a point of departure for future security and economic collaboration. In many ways, the U.S. is using China’s military buildup in East and South Asia as a way to turn lemons into lemonade.