[讲稿]双语阅读：欧元危机结束了吗？

[讲稿]双语阅读：欧元危机结束了吗？ 双语阅读: 欧元危机结束了吗, 环球外汇金融危机往往会突然爆发，出人意料的结束。三年前，欧元危机开始，希腊成为决策者关注的焦点，基金经理十分兴奋。2012年年末以来，停战盛行。这是否意味着危机结束了, 按金融危机的一般标准，三年是很长的一段时间。雷曼兄弟在2008年9月宣告破产，一年后，对美国金融体系的信心就已恢复，经济复苏开始。1997年，汇率崩溃引发亚洲经济体遭遇几十年来最严重的经济衰退。一年多后，他们再次繁荣。欧元区是否也终于到达拐点, 过去三年——在希腊、爱尔兰、西班牙和意大利，列举几个主要的——发生了多场战役。欧盟金融斗士筋疲力尽。对冲基金首先押注，赌危机会恶化，但损失了押在欧元区解体上的赌注。决策者因后知后觉失去了信誉，之后通过采取大胆的举措恢复了部分的信誉。最近的数据明，资本已经开始回到南欧地区。 当前市场情绪的变化受到两大政策变化的影响。首先，欧洲领导人2012年6月同意对欧元区进行大规模整修。通过银行业联盟(或将演变成欧洲层面的银行监管，最终走向该层面下 ，他们展现了应对整个货币联盟系统的不足的意图。 的决策和资本重组) 其次，欧洲央行9月推出了“直接货币交易(OMT)”，承担起了维护欧元区完整性的责任。OMT计划是一个严肃的承诺，市场也这样解释它，尤其是德国总理默克尔(Angela Merkel)支持它，尽管德国央行反对该计划。此外，默克尔访问了希腊，使其联合政府中公开呼吁希腊退出欧元区的人闭上了嘴。 然而，不幸的是，仍有3个要为未来担忧的理由。首先，政治落后于经济，相应的也落后于市场的发展。纽约或香港的交易情绪或许有所改善，但马德里和雅典民众的情绪在恶化。 事实上，南欧经济社会形势惨淡的状况必将维持几年。目前，所有的南欧国家面临着真正的失去的十年:根据国际货币基金组织(IMF)的预期，2017年，他们的人均国内生产总值(GDP)将低于2007年的水平。只要持续改善的经济没有实质化，政治风险将继续蔓延。 南欧国家的政治动荡足以点燃对欧元区的未来疑虑。此外，法国的竞争力以及它与德国的经济表现之间的差异是导致焦虑逐渐增加的原因之一。 其次，在究竟什么能使货币联盟有弹性，再次走向繁荣方面的共识有限。银行业联盟是一个积极的发展，但是没有额外的改革，比如创建共同的财政能力或共同的财政部。 北欧国家继续将导致危机的原因阐述为未能执行现有规则，特别是欧盟财政稳定标准。南欧 国家则更倾向于认为危机是由系统缺陷导致的。此外，北欧的国家认为紧缩是改革之母，而 南欧担心政府可能没有足够的政治资本来同时解决所有的问题。 最后，过去三年展现了明确的危机管理模式:几乎没有决定是在心平气和的审议后达成的， 大多数是迫于金融市场的压力，以避免最糟的状况。每当压力减轻时，政策改革计划就会推 迟——这点在默克尔著名的最后手段上最为明显。最后手段:只有在行动对欧元区存亡而言 必不可少时才采取。换句话说，欧洲表现出强烈的生存意识，但在共同目的方面的意识不是 很强。 这并不意味着欧元将崩溃。普遍认为，货币联盟解体相当于集体经济自杀，这推动了成员国 抵御风暴、克服障碍的意志。此外，到目前为止，取得的结果表明，未来有足够的防止风险 的能力，财政能力、常见的债券和建立欧洲财政联盟的规划仍在进行中。所以，实际上，可 以实行的改革和那些正在或即将实施的改革之间的差异没它看起来那么大。 但是，欧洲领导人有意识的避免讨论哪种改革将使欧元区成员较不危险，更有利于所有人， 这将使他们错过指出欧元正脚踏实地的走向繁荣、弹性、统一联盟的机会，也使他们错过了 表明严酷的经济调整将继续主导政策议程的机会。 Is the Euro Crisis Over? Financial crises tend to start abruptly and end by surprise. Three years ago, the euro crisis began when Greece became a cause for concern among policymakers and a cause for excitement among money managers. Since the end of 2012, a sort of armistice has prevailed. Does that mean that the crisis is over? By the usual standards of financial crises, three years is a long time. A year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, confidence in the United States’ financial system had been restored, and recovery had begun. A little more than a year after the 1997 exchange-rate debacle triggered Asian economies’ worst recession in decades, they were thriving again. Has the eurozone, at long last, reached the inflection point? Many battles were fought in the last three years – over Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, to name the main ones. The European Union’s financial warriors are exhausted. Hedge funds first made money betting that the crisis would worsen, but then lost money betting on a eurozone breakup. Policymakers first lost credibility by being behind the curve, and then recouped some of it by embracing bold initiatives. Recent data suggest that capital has started returning to southern Europe. The current change in market sentiment is also motivated by two significant policy changes. First, European leaders agreed in June 2012 on a major overhaul of the eurozone. By embarking on a banking union, which will transfer to the European level responsibility for bank supervision and, ultimately, resolution and recapitalization, they showed their readiness to address a systemic weakness in the monetary union’s design. Second, by launching its new “outright monetary transactions” scheme in September, the European Central Bank took responsibility for preserving the integrity of the eurozone. The OMT program was a serious commitment, and markets interpreted it that way, especially as German Chancellor Angela Merkel backed it, despite opposition from the Bundesbank. Moreover, Merkel visited Athens and silenced the voices in her coalition government who were openly calling for Greece’s exit from the euro. Unfortunately, however, there remain three reasons to be concerned about the future. For starters, politics lags behind economics, which in turn lags behind market developments. Sentiment on trading desks in New York or Hong Kong may have improved, but it has deteriorated on the streets of Madrid and Athens. Indeed, the economic and social situation in southern Europe is bound to remain grim for several years. As things stand, all southern European countries are facing the prospect of a true lost decade: according to the International Monetary Fund, their per capita GDP will be lower in 2017 than it was in 2007. As long as sustained economic improvement has not materialized, political risk will remain prevalent. Political upheaval in any of the southern countries would be sufficient to reignite doubts about the eurozone’s future. Furthermore, French competitiveness, and the gap between its performance and that of Germany, is a growing cause of anxiety. The second reason to worry is that there is limited consensus in Europe on what, exactly, is needed to make the monetary union resilient and prosperous again. Banking union is a positive development, but there is no agreement on additional reforms, such as the creation of a common fiscal capacity or a common treasury. In particular, northern Europe continues to interpret the crisis as having resulted primarily from a failure to enforce existing rules, especially the EU’s fiscal-stability criteria. Southern Europe is more inclined to view the crisis as having resulted from systemic flaws. Furthermore, northern Europe regards austerity as the mother of all reforms, while southern Europe fears that governments may not have enough political capital to do everything at the same time. Finally, the last three years have revealed a clear pattern in the management of crises: Almost no decision results from serene deliberation, with most taken under financial-market pressure in an attempt to avoid the worst. Each time the pressure abates, plans for policy reform are put off – an attitude best captured in Merkel’s famous ultima ratio: action is undertaken only if it is indispensable to the survival of the euro. In other words, Europe displays a strong sense of survival, but not a strong sense of common purpose. None of this means that the euro will collapse. The widely held conviction that letting the monetary union break up would amount to collective economic suicide provides a strong motivation to weather storms and overcome obstacles. Moreover, the results achieved so far may well prove sufficient to contain risks in the near future, while plans for a fiscal capacity, common bonds, and the creation of a European treasury are still being sketched. So, in practical terms, the difference between reforms that could be implemented and those that are being or will be implemented is less significant than it seems.