滞涨将横行世界十年

滞涨将横行世界十年 简介 经济数据一个比一个漂亮，八国集团甚至是世界媒体都开始欢呼胜利，好像大好 前景就在眼前。可是，当我们揭开面纱，找出那些被深埋而无人理睬的数据时， 一切都好像变了，一个更大更严重的危机就在眼前：超级大萧条来了。 我出了一本关于大 萧条的书，当参加采访时，一个问油然而生：现在的危机会 像30年代的大萧条那样严重吗？ 我的回应是一个典型经济学家的：“这真不好说。”一方面，一个明显 的原因就是1933年时失业率居然超过了25%，而在今天这样的事情不会再发生了。我认为官方的失业率再也不会接近那个灾难性的水平，尽管很可能位居历史 排名第二。 然而，尽管失业率不会那么高，我仍然认为我们会经历一个悲惨的、经济停滞的 十年，现在我们正在为此做准备。尽管过去六个月人们对联邦政府干预私营经济 进行了铺天盖地的批评，坦率地说，我还是无法理解这些人是怎么看到所谓的“绿 芽（即希望）”的，除了那些真正的马克思主义信徒。 也许更糟糕的是，除了商品和服务的产出停止增长外，我预计美国将经历历史上 最严重的物价膨胀。 滞涨指的是70年代时高失业率高通胀的局面——凯恩斯主 义认为这不可能发生——我们可以用超级大萧条来指超级通货膨胀和严重的经 济衰退同时出现的情况。下面，我将解释产生这个悲观预期的原因。 1929年10月股市崩盘以后，赫伯特?胡佛所犯的最大的单个错误就是，强制企 业维持高工资。胡佛信奉一种所谓的“消费不足”的经济周期理论，依据这种理 论，如果放任市场不管，经济的一次小波动可能引发经济的全面萧条。在胡佛看 来，当时最糟糕的事情就是企业降低工资，因为这将导致工人没钱去消费；并最 终导致经济的螺旋式下跌。 问题是当时美国还在执行金本位，所以美联储根本不能毫无顾忌地向经济中注入 纸币（下次危机时它就这么干了）。当美国人开始变得恐慌、银行发生挤兑时， 货币的总量（以包括M1和M2的总量计算）就急剧下降，从1929年到1933年4 年间共下降了三分之一。 由于货币骤减以及人们对现金的巨大需求，物价普遍大幅下跌，在胡佛执政的4 年里，下降速度达到了每年10%。 这就是胡佛的高工资政策产生灾难性后果的原因。所有的东西每月都贬值，而工 资依旧坚挺，失业工人们却发现根本找不到工作。随着销售和收入的骤减，再也 没有企业愿意为工人支付1929年泡沫横飞时的高额工资了。由于胡佛坚持工资 不能变，但是随着生产能力和整体价格的下降，市场结清工资早已下调，结果就是一波又一波的失业。这就是Econ 101（不知为何物）。 面对现在的危机，我们无须再为25%的失业率担惊受怕了，因为这不可能。即使 联邦政府的政策会降低劳动生产率，即使奥巴马倾向工会的政策将进一步增强 “工资粘性”，我预计在未来几年价格的大幅通胀将会抵消这些因素。简而言之， 大部分工人依旧能找到工作，因为伯克南加足马力的印钞机将确保他们的工资在 商店里买不到太多东西。结果就是，相对于胡佛当政时期，现在的企业雇佣下岗 工人并不会困难如初了。 我还没有愚蠢到预测未来GDP的年增速的地步；我的看法简单的说就是经济未来 十年将进行深度调整。（你可以咨询另一个经济学博士，让他解释这些术语。） 我实在没办法理解一些所谓的自由经济分析师在CNBC和其他电视台上的讲话，他们声称经济衰退今年就结束了，或者经济已经“触底了”。如果他们真这样认 为，我实在弄不明白他们为什么把自己的职业生涯都浪费在称颂自由市场和批评 社会主义上。如果布什所有的和奥巴马现有的庞大干预措施仅仅带来了几个季度 的适度不良衰退，那么现在这些乱七八糟的东西又能带来什么呢？ 我们总是对联邦政府攫取权力的欲望反应迟钝，因为它们的行动总是很突然，而 且无所不包。不过，人的思维总是能很快的适应新环境。 让我们回到一年前。记得当时很多人都对美联储悍然介入贝尔斯登的收购案感到 “不公正”。而和当时形成鲜明对比的是，现在联邦政府已经明目张胆的收购主 要大银行的普通股权了，而银行的精密会计机制却被变成了（问题资产援助项目） “借款”，这些银行在政府的胁迫下被迫接受这些“借款”，而且不能还款赎身。 这又是怎么回事：2008年春天，布什政府通过了一项1500多亿美元的减税刺激。你还记得吗，这在当时被认为是一大笔钱。在CNBC做节目的分析师甚至担心这一措施会对财政赤字和利率产生不利影响。 可是总统奥巴马的刺激计划价值7870亿美元；本财政年度的联邦赤字预计竟达 到1.8万亿美元。国会预算局估计未来10年联邦债务占经济的比重将会翻番， 从去年的41%增长到2019年的82%。 除了资源向政府大量集中，联邦政府的权力也大量渗透到各行各业。美联储已经 把银行业部分国有化了（这一过程始于“自由放任又保守”的小布什）；它们已 经接管了世界上最大的保险公司（AIG）以及三大汽车公司中的两家；它们还接 管了房地美和房利美，并控制了过半的美国抵押贷款市场。 更要命的是，奥巴马政府台还通过了一个限制二氧化碳排放的计划——这一计划 将允许政府控制能源市场，并且——为什么不呢？——它们还准备把医疗保障也 收归国有。为了确保国际投资者远离美国经济，奥巴马政府为了克莱斯勒的破产 案居然剥夺了担保债权人的权利，并依据国际商业法则新招聘了800名国税局的员工满世界收税（译者注：这句话不是很明白）。 毫不夸张的说，上一次政府如此大规模的、如此迅猛的扩张权力还是在罗斯福的 新政时期。在那个特殊的时期，我们经历了十年的痛苦。为什么这次会有所不同？ 以上的事情看起来并不太让人太绝望，不过更重要的是我们面临着美元崩溃的现通缩力量是正在起作用，但是我认为伯克南已经战胜了它并且会继续不断获取新实威胁。中央银行家们已经开始公开讨论抛弃美元转向“一篮子”货币的可行性；的胜利。首先，让我们看一下伯克南对“基础货币”的所作所为，这基本反映了这样的讨论在18个月前还是闻所未闻的。 伯克南注入到银行系统的储备货币的数量。 文字：Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 资料来源：圣路易斯联邦储蓄银行 Shaded areas indicate US recessions 灰色部分代美国经济衰退 我知道，经济学家可能给我们很多聪明的说法，告诉我们“大伙，这什么也说明 不了。”但是如果美元崩溃，我们将面临20%以上的价格膨胀，那时候人们就会 回头看到上面的图表时，想知道“我们到底是怎么说服自己为通缩忧心忡忡的？” 我们可以得出，2008年 狭义货币供应量M1（包括现金和支票存款在内的流动 性好的资产）增长了17%。而在胡佛当政时期，美联储根本没有办法阻止M1快速下降。在对“萧条时期”的价格变化得出结论之前，我们必须牢记这些不同点。 通缩和通胀的最重要一点：如果你看过CNBC的头条新闻或者听过本?伯克南的讲话，你就会认为2009年我们正在承受“通缩压力”。但是猜猜看。如果 你看一下劳工部发布的未经过季节调整的消费者价格指数，就会发现从上一年 12月到09年4月，价格的年增速为4.3%。是的，你没听错：如果抛开所谓的“季关于 度调整”，只要看一下原始的CPI指数就会发现在过去4个月中物价通胀率早就超过了伯克南所谓的“适度水平”。 我意识到不可避免的做一个非常悲观的预测，因为这样才能获得更多的关注。你 可能认为我会屈服于那种诱惑。但是当你回顾我上面的论证，我不认为其中掺入 了任何不理智的情感和感觉。 让我做完最后的论证。设想一下，在2007年，给你一张纸和一支笔，让你写下“能导致2010年到2019年严重滞涨的经济政策清单”。你会写些什么？ 这张清单上的内容不正和正在发生的事情非常吻合吗？ Why I Expect Serious Stagflation When doing interviews for my new book on the Great Depression, a natural question comes up: will the present crisis turn out as bad as the 1930s? My standard answer is typical for an economist: "yes and no." On the one hand, there were very specific reasons that unemployment broke 25 percent in 1933, and we don't have those factors in place today. So I don't think the official unemployment rate will get anywhere near that catastrophic level, though it could very well come in at the #2 spot in US economic history. However, even though unemployment rates will not be as severe, I still predict that we are in store for a miserable of economic stagnation. decade Given all of the huge assaults of the federal government into the private sector in just the past six months, I frankly don't understand how anyone except true believers in Karl Marx can be seeing "green shoots." What is perhaps worse, laid on top of the stalled output in goods and services, I predict Americans are in store for the worst price inflation in US history. Just as stagflation referred to the combination of high unemployment and price inflation rates in the 1970s — something Keynesians thought was impossible — we can use the term hyperdepression to refer to the mix of hyperinflation and a serious recession in real output. In the remainder of this article I'll explain my pessimistic outlook. Why Did Unemployment Hit 25% in the 1930s? The single biggest blunder Herbert Hoover made was insisting that businesses maintain wage rates after the stock-market crash in October 1929. Hoover adhered to an "underconsumptionist" theory of the business cycle, in which a small shock to business could end up cascading into a full-blown depression if market forces were left to their own devices. In Hoover's view, the worst thing businesses could do in 1930 would be to slash wage rates, because then workers would have even less money to buy products; there would be a downward spiral into oblivion. The problem was that the United States was still on a gold standard, and so the Fed couldn't inflate the economy with new paper money with reckless abandon (the way it has done in subsequent recessions). When Americans began panicking and pulling their money out of the banks, the overall quantity of money (measured by aggregates such as M1 or M2) fell sharply, declining by about a third from 1929 to 1933. Because of the shrinking money stock as well as people's desire to hold larger cash balances, prices in general fell substantially as well, falling at an annualized rate of more than 10 percent for portions of the Hoover years. This is why Hoover's high-wage policy proved so disastrous. With everything except labor getting cheaper by the month, unemployed workers found it difficult to re-enter the work force. With sales and revenues plummeting, no employer wanted to hire workers at the same wage rate prevailing at the height of the boom in 1929. Because Hoover insisted that wage rates stay the same, even though the market-clearing wage rate was falling with productivity and general prices, the result was larger and larger unemployment. This is Econ 101. In our present crisis, we don't need to worry about unemployment rates hitting 25 percent. Even though federal policies will reduce labor productivity, and even though Obama's pro-union policies will exacerbate "wage stickiness," over the next few years I predict large price inflation that will tend to mitigate these factors. In short, most workers will still be able to find jobs, because Bernanke's running of the printing press will ensure that their paychecks don't buy very much at the stores. Consequently, it won't be as difficult for employers to justify taking on people laid off from other firms, compared to the situation in the Hoover years. Why Real GDP Will Stagnate I am not going to be foolish and give annual rates of projected real GDP growth; let me simply summarize my view by saying that the economy will be in the toilet for a decade. (Consult another economics PhD for a precise translation of those terms.) I really don't understand how even some free-market analysts on CNBC and the like can talk about the recession ending this year, or who speculate that we've finally "hit rock bottom." If they really believe that, then I wonder why they spend so much of their careers praising free markets and blasting socialism? If all of Bush's and now Obama's enormous interventions only yield a few quarters of a moderately bad recession, then what's all the fuss about? We have all been desensitized to the federal power grabs, because they have been so sudden and so sweeping. The human mind is able to adapt to any new environment fairly quickly. Let's think back just one year ago. Remember when plenty of people were worried about the "unjustified" intrusion of the Federal Reserve into the Bear Stearns takeover? Contrast that to today, when the federal government is literally acquiring outright, common-stock ownership in major banks, where the precise accounting mechanism is a conversion of (TARP) "loans" that it forced some of these banks to take, and which the government (as of this writing) refuses to allow to be paid back. Or how about this one: in the spring of 2008, the Bush administration pushed through a stimulus tax cut that cost a little more than $150 billion. Do you remember that at the time, this was considered a fantastic sum of money? Analysts on CNBC fretted about the impact on the deficit and interest rates. Well President Obama's stimulus package was $787 billion; the expected federal deficit this fiscal year is $1.8 trillion. The CBO projects that the federal debt as a share of the economy will double over the next decade, from about 41% last year to 82% by 2019. Beyond the massive shift of resources to the government, though, are the massive intrusions of federal power into various sectors. The feds have already partially nationalized the banking sector (a process started under that "laissez-faire conservative" George Bush); they have taken over one of the biggest insurers in the world (AIG) and two of the Big Three car companies; and they have taken over Fannie and Freddie and now control more than half of US mortgages. On top of that, they are pushing through a plan to cap carbon-dioxide emissions — which allows the government to control energy markets, and — oh why not? — they are trying to nationalize health care too. Just to make sure investors around the world stay clear of the American economy, the Obama administration has overturned secured-creditor rights in the Chrysler fiasco and has hired 800 new IRS employees to put the screws to wealthy filers with international business operations. It is no exaggeration to say that the last time the government expanded this much, this quickly, was under FDR's New Deal. And we got a decade of misery during that particular experiment. Why would things be different this time? A Dollar Collapse, Just for Good Measure As if all of the above weren't bleak enough, on top of that we have the very real possibility that the dollar will crash. Central bankers have openly discussed switching away from the dollar and into a "basket" of currencies; this talk would have been unheard of even 18 months ago. It's true there are deflationary forces at work, but I believe Bernanke has overcome them and will continue to do so. First of all, look again at what he has done to the "monetary base," which basically captures how much in reserves Bernanke has pumped into the banking system: I know, I know, there are all sorts of clever arguments economists can give, to explain why there's "nothing to see here, folks." But if and when the dollar collapses and we see 20+ percent price inflation, I think people will look back at the above chart and wonder, "How in the heck did we manage to convince ourselves to worry about deflation?" For what it's worth, the monetary aggregate M1 (very liquid assets such as cash and checking deposits) rose by 17 percent during 2008. Remember, during the Hoover years the Fed was unable to prevent M1 from falling at a steep clip. We need to keep these differences in mind before drawing any conclusions about what happens to prices "during a depression." One last point about deflation/inflation: If you have been reading CNBC headlines and listening to Ben Bernanke, you would get the impression that we are still experiencing "deflationary pressures" in 2009. But guess what? If you look at the non-seasonally-adjusted consumer price Index figures maintained by the BLS, you will see that from December 2008 to April 2009, prices have risen at an annualized rate of 4.3 percent. Yes, you heard right: if you throw out the "seasonal adjustments" and just look at the raw CPI figures, over the last four months the rate of price inflation is well above Bernanke's professed "comfort level." Conclusion I realize there is a temptation to give very gloomy forecasts, since that's the way to attract attention. You may think I'm succumbing to that here. But looking back over my arguments above, I don't see where emotion or sensationalism is creeping in. Let me try one last thing to get my point across. Suppose in 2007 you were handed a piece of paper and a pencil, and were asked, "Come up with a list of bullet points for how to generate severe stagflation in the years 2010 through 2019." Wouldn't your list look pretty similar to what has already happened?