《国际经济学》 英文章节总结 英文答案imch17

CHAPTER 17 Fixed Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange Intervention Chapter Organization Why Study Fixed Exchange Rates? Central Bank Intervention and the Money Supply The Central Bank Balance Sheet and the Money Supply Foreign Exchange Intervention and the Money Supply Sterilization The Balance of Payments and the Money Supply How the Central Bank Fixes the Exchange Rate Foreign Exchange Market Equilibrium Under a Fixed Exchange Rate Money Market Equilibrium Under a Fixed Exchange Rate A Diagrammatic Analysis Stabilization Policies With a Fixed Exchange Rate Monetary Policy Fiscal Policy Changes in the Exchange Rate Adjustment to Fiscal Policy and Exchange Rate Changes Case Study: Fixing the Exchange Rate to Escape From a Liquidity Trap Balance of Payments Crises and Capital Flight Box: Mexico’s 1994 Balance of Payments Crisis Managed Floating and Sterilized Intervention Perfect Asset Substitutability and the Ineffectiveness of Sterilized Intervention Foreign Exchange Market Equilibrium Under Imperfect Asset Substitutability The Effects of Sterilized Intervention with Imperfect Asset Substitutability Evidence on the Effects of Sterilized Intervention The Signaling Effect of Intervention Reserve Currencies in the World Monetary System The Mechanics of a Reserve Currency Standard The Asymmetric Position of the Reserve Center The Gold Standard The Mechanics of a Gold Standard Symmetric Monetary Adjustment Under a Gold Standard Benefits and Drawbacks of the Gold Standard Bimetallic Standard The Gold-Exchange Standard Appendix I: Equilibrium in the Foreign-Exchange Market with Imperfect Asset Substitutability Appendix II: The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments Appendix III: The Timing of Balance of Payments Crises Chapter Overview Open-economy macroeconomic analysis under fixed exchange rates is dual to the analysis of flexible exchange rates. Under fixed exchange rates, attention is focused on the effects of policies on the balance of payments (and the domestic money supply), taking the exchange rate as given. Conversely, under flexible exchange rates with no official foreign-exchange intervention, the balance of payments equals zero, the money supply is a policy variable, and analysis focuses on exchange rate determination. In the intermediate case of managed floating, both the money supply and the exchange rate become, to an extent which is determined by central-bank policies, endogenous. This chapter analyzes various types of monetary policy regimes under which the degree of exchange-rate flexibility is limited. The reasons for devoting a chapter to this topic, almost thirty years after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, include the prevalence of managed floating among industrialized countries, the common use of fixed exchange rate regimes among developing countries, the existence of regional currency arrangements such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism through which some European nations peg to the euro, the recurrent calls for a new international monetary regime based upon more aggressive exchange-rate management, and the irrevocably fixed rates among countries which use the euro (a topic addressed in depth in Chapter 20). The chapter begins with an analysis of a stylized central bank balance sheet to show the link between the balance of payments, official foreign-exchange intervention, and the domestic money supply. Also described is sterilized intervention in foreign exchange, which changes the composition of interest-bearing assets held by the public but not the money supply. This analysis is then combined with the exchange-rate determination analysis of Chapter 14 to demonstrate the manner in which central banks alter the money supply to peg the nominal exchange rate. The endogeneity of the money supply under fixed exchange rates emerges as a key lesson of this discussion. The tools developed in Chapter 16 are employed to demonstrate the impotence of monetary policy and the effectiveness of fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate regime. The short-run and long-run effects of devaluation and revaluation are examined. The setup already developed suggests a natural description of balance of payments crises as episodes in which the public comes to expect a future currency devaluation. Such an expectation causes private capital flight and, as its counterpart, sharp official reserve losses. Different explanations of currency crises are explored, both those that argue that crises result from inconsistent policies and those that maintain crises are not necessarily inevitable but instead result from self-fulfilling expectations. (See Appendix III to this chapter for a more detailed analysis.) Equipped with an understanding of the polar cases of fixed and floating rates, the student is in a position to appreciate the more realistic intermediate case of managed floating. The discussion of managed floating focuses on the role of sterilized foreign-exchange intervention and the theory of imperfect asset substitutability. The inclusion of a risk premium in the model enriches the analysis by allowing governments some scope to run independent exchange rate and monetary policies in the short run. The chapter reviews the results of attempts to demonstrate empirically the effectiveness of sterilized foreign-exchange operations which, however, are generally negative. Also discussed is the role of central-bank intervention as a "signal" of future policy actions and the credibility problems entailed by such a strategy. At this point, the discussion abandons the small-country framework in favor of a systemic perspective to discuss the properties of two different fixed exchange rate systems: the reserve-currency systems and the gold standards. A key distinction between these systems is the asymmetry between the reserve center and the rest of the world compared to the symmetric adjustment among all countries under the gold standard. It is shown that this asymmetry gives the reserve center exclusive control over world monetary conditions (at least when interest parity links countries' money markets). The chapter ends with a discussion of the pros and cons of the gold standard and the gold-exchange standard. Appendix I presents a more detailed model of exchange-rate determination with imperfect asset substitutability. Appendix II describes the monetary approach to the balance of payments and its usefulness as a tool of policy analysis. Appendix III provides an analysis of the timing of balance of payments crises. Answers to Textbook Problems 1. An expansion of the central bank's domestic assets leads to an equal fall in its foreign assets, with no change in the bank's liabilities (or the money supply). The effect on the balance-of-payments accounts is most easily understood by recalling how the fall in foreign reserves comes about. After the central bank buys domestic assets with money there is initially an excess supply of money. The central bank must intervene in the foreign exchange market to hold the exchange rate fixed in the face of this excess supply: the bank sells foreign assets and buys money until the excess supply of money has been eliminated. Since private residents acquire the reserves the central bank loses, there is a non-central bank capital outflow (a capital-account debit) equal to the increase in foreign assets held by the private sector. The offsetting credit is the reduction in central bank holdings of foreign assets, an official capital inflow. 2. An increase in government spending raises income and also money demand. The central bank prevents the initial excess money demand from appreciating the domestic currency by purchasing foreign assets from the domestic public. Central bank foreign assets rise, as do the central bank's liabilities and with them, the money supply. The central bank's additional reserve holdings show up as an official capital outflow, a capital-account debit. Offsetting this debit is the capital inflow (a credit) associated with the public's equal reduction in its own foreign assets. 3. A one-time unexpected devaluation initially increases output; the output increase, in turn, raises money demand. The central bank must accommodate the higher money demand by buying foreign assets with domestic currency, a step that raises the central bank's liabilities (and the home money supply) at the same time as it increases the bank's foreign assets. The increase in official foreign reserves is an official capital outflow; it is matched in the balance of payments accounts by the equal capital outflow associated with the public's own reduction in net foreign asset holdings. (The public must exchange foreign assets for the money it buys from the central bank, either by selling foreign assets or by borrowing foreign currency abroad. Either course of action is a capital inflow.) A more subtle issue is the following: when the price of foreign currency is raised, the value of the initial stock of foreign reserves rises when measured in terms of domestic currency. This capital gain in itself raises central-bank foreign assets (which were measured in domestic currency units in our analysis)--so where is the corresponding increase in liabilities? Does the central bank inject more currency or bank-system reserves into the economy to balance its balance sheet? The answer is that central banks generally create fictional accounting liabilities to offset the effect of exchange-rate fluctuations on the home-currency value of international reserves. These capital gains and losses do not automatically lead to changes in the monetary base. 4. As shown in figure 17-1, a devaluation causes the AA curve to shift to A'A' which reflects an expansion in both output and the money supply in the economy. Diagram 17-1 also contains an XX curve along which the current account is in balance. The initial equilibrium, at point 0, was on the XX curve, reflecting the fact that the current account was in balance there. After the devaluation, the new equilibrium point is above and to the left of the XX curve, in the region where the current account is in surplus. With fixed prices, a devaluation improves an economy's competitiveness, increasing its exports, decreasing its imports and raising the level of output. Figure 17-1 5. a. Germany clearly had the ability to change the dollar/DM exchange simply by altering its money supply. The fact that "billions of dollars worth of currencies are traded each day" is irrelevant because exchange rates equilibrate markets for stocks of assets, and the trade volumes mentioned are flows. b. One must distinguish between sterilized and nonsterilized intervention. The evidence regarding sterilized intervention suggests that its effects are limited to the signaling aspect. This aspect may well be most important when markets are "unusually erratic," and the signals communicated may be most credible when the central bank is not attempting to resist clear-cut market trends (which depend on the complete range of government macroeconomic policies, among other factors). Nonsterilized intervention, however, is a powerful instrument in affecting exchange rates. c. The "psychological effect" of a "stated intention" to intervene may be more precisely stated as an effect on the expected future level of the exchange rate. d. A rewrite might go as follows: To keep the dollar from falling against the West German mark, the European central banks would have to sell marks and buy dollars, a procedure known as intervention. Because the available stocks of dollar and mark bonds are so large, it is unlikely that sterilized intervention in the dollar/mark market, even if carried out by the two most economically influential members of the European Community--Britain and West Germany--would have much effect. The reason is that sterilized intervention changes only relative bond supplies and leaves national money supplies unchanged. Intervention by the United States and Germany that was not sterilized, however, would affect those countries' money supplies and have a significant impact on the dollar/mark rate. Economists believe that the direct influence of sterilized intervention on exchange rates is small compared with that of nonsterilized intervention. Even sterilized intervention can affect exchange rates, however, through its indirect influence on market expectations about future policies. Such psychological effects, which can result from just the stated intention of the Community's central banks to intervene, can disrupt the market by confusing traders about official plans. The signaling effect of intervention is most likely to benefit the authorities when their other macroeconomic policies are already being adjusted to push the exchange rate in the desired direction. 6. The problems caused by exchange-rate variability are discussed at length in Chapter 19; some monetary policy autonomy might willingly be sacrificed to reduce these problems. Policy-makers might also sacrifice autonomy to enter into cooperative arrangements with foreign policy-makers that reduce the risk of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy actions (see the appendix to Chapter 19). 7. By raising output, fiscal expansion raises imports and thus worsens the current-account balance. The immediate fall in the current account is smaller than under floating, however, because the currency does not appreciate and crowd out net exports. 8. The reason that the effects of temporary and permanent fiscal expansions differ under floating exchange rates is that a temporary policy has no effect on the expected exchange rate while a permanent policy does. The AA curve shifts with a change in the expected exchange rate. In terms of the diagram, a permanent fiscal expansion causes the AA curve to shift down and to the left which, combined with the outward shift in the DD curve, results in no change in output. With fixed exchange rates, however, there is no change in the expected exchange rate with either policy since the exchange rate is, by definition, fixed. In response to both temporary and permanent fiscal expansions, the central bank must expand the money supply (shift AA out) to prevent the currency from appreciating (due to the shift out in the DD curve). Thus, Y goes up and E does not change after a permanent or temporary fiscal expansion when exchange rates are fixed. 9. By expanding output, a devaluation automatically raises private saving, since part of any increase in output is saved. Government tax receipts rise with output, so the budget deficit is likely to decline, implying an increase in public saving. We have assumed investment to be constant in the main text. If investment instead depends negatively on the real interest rate (as in the IS-LM model), investment rises because devaluation raises inflationary expectations and thus lowers the real interest rate. (The nominal interest rate remains unchanged at the world level.) The interest-sensitive components of consumption spending also rise, and if these interest-rate effects are strong enough, a current-account deficit could result. 10. An import tariff raises the price of imports to domestic consumers and shifts consumption from imports to domestically produced goods. This causes an outward shift in the DD curve, increasing output and appreciating the currency. Since the central bank cannot allow exchange rates to change, it must increase the money supply, an action depicted in the diagram as an outward shift in the AA schedule. Corresponding to this monetary expansion is a balance of payments surplus and an equal increase in official foreign reserves. The fall in imports for one country implies a fall in exports for another country, and a corresponding inward shift of that country's DD curve necessitating a monetary contraction by the central bank to preserve its fixed exchange rate. If all countries impose import tariffs, then no country succeeds in turning world demand in its favor or in gaining reserves through an improvement in its balance of payments. Trade volumes shrink, however, and all countries lose some of the gains from trade. 11. If the market expects the devaluation to "stick," the home nominal interest rate falls to the world level afterward, money demand rises, and the central bank buys foreign assets with domestic money to prevent excess money demand from appreciating the currency. The central bank thus gains official reserves, according to our model. Even if another devaluation was to occur in the near future, reserves might be gained if the first devaluation lowered the depreciation expected for the future and, with it, the home nominal interest rate. An inadequate initial devaluation could, however, increase the devaluation expected for the future, with opposite effects on the balance of payments. 12. If the Bank of Japan holds U.S. dollars instead of Treasury bills, the adjustment process is symmetric. Any purchase of dollars by the Bank of Japan leads to a fall in the U.S. money supply as the dollar bills go out of circulation and into the Bank of Japan’s vaults. A Japanese balance of payments surplus increases the Bank of Japan’s money supply (if there is no sterilization) and reduces the U.S. money supply at the same time. 13. A central bank that is maintaining a fixed exchange rate will require an adequate buffer stock of foreign assets on hand during periods of persistent balance of payments deficits. If a central bank depletes its stock of foreign reserves, it is no longer able to keep its exchange rate from depreciating in response to pressures arising from a balance of payments deficit. Simply put, a central bank can either choose the exchange rate and allow its reserve holdings to change or choose the amount of foreign reserves it holds and allow the exchange rate to float. If it loses the ability to control the amount of reserves because the private demand for them exceeds its supply, it can no longer control the exchange rate. Thus, a central bank maintaining a fixed exchange rate is not indifferent about using domestic or foreign assets to implement monetary policy. 14. An ESF intervention to support the yen involves an exchange of dollar-denominated assets initially owned by the ESF for yen-denominated assets initially owned by the private sector. Since this is an exchange of one type of bond for another there is no change in the money supply and thus this transaction is automatically sterilized. This transaction increases the outstanding stock of dollar-denominated assets held by the private sector, which increases the risk premium on dollar-denominated assets. 15. The monetary authorities can combine a change in the money supply with a purchase or sale of its foreign assets to keep the exchange rate fixed while altering the domestic interest rate. For example, the monetary authorities lower domestic interest rates by increasing the money supply. To maintain a fixed value of the exchange rate, the monetary authority would also sell foreign assets and purchase domestic assets. In the figure below, the increase in the money supply lowers the interest rate from R0 to R'. The purchase of domestic assets and sale of foreign assets, while having no further effect on the money supply, lowers the risk premium, shifts the interest parity schedule from II to I'I' and maintains the exchange rate at E0. Figure 17-2 Further Readings William H. Branson. "Causes of Appreciation and Volatility of the Dollar," in The U.S. Dollar-Recent Developments, Outlook, and Policy Options. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1985, pp. 33-52. Hali J. Edison. The Effectiveness of Central Bank Intervention: Survey of the literature after 1982. Princeton Special Papers in International Economics 18. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, July 1993. Milton Friedman. “Bimetallism Revisited.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (Fall 1990), pp. 85-104. Dale W. Henderson and Stephanie Sampson. "Intervention in Foreign Exchange Markets: A Summary of Ten Staff Studies." Federal Reserve Bulletin November, 1983. Owen F. Humpage. “Institutional Aspects of U.S. Intervention,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Review, 30 (Quarter 1, 1994), pp. 2-19. Olivier Jeanne. Currency Crises: A Perspective on Recent Theoretical Developments. Princeton Special Papers in International Economics 20. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, March 2000. Ronald I. McKinnon. A New Tripartite Monetary Agreement of a Limping Dollar Standard? Princeton Essays in International Finance 106. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, October, 1974. Robert A. Mundell. "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 29 (November 1963), pp. 475-485. Reprinted as Chapter 18 in Mundell, International Economics, New York: Macmillan, 1968. Michael L. Mussa. "The Exchange Rate, the Balance of Payments and Monetary and Fiscal Policy under a Regime of Controlled Floating," in Jan Herin, Assar Lindbeck, and Johan Myhrman, eds. Flexible Exchange Rates and Stabilization Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, pp. 97-116. Michael L. Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention. Occasional Paper 6. New York: Group of Thirty, 1981. Maurice Obstfeld. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Elements." European Economic Review 40 (April 1996). Lucio Sarno and Mark P. Taylor. “Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?” Journal of Economic Literature 39 (Sept. 2001). PAGE 141 _1081709464.doc 0 1 A A A’ A’ D D Y E X X _1081709634.doc R L1 E I’ I’ R0 R’ M/P I I M1/P M2/P