Soft Power-约瑟夫·奈：《软实力》Nye

CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceSoftPowerAuthor(s):JosephS.Nye,Jr.Source:ForeignPolicy,No.80,TwentiethAnniversary(Autumn,1990),pp.153-171Publishedby:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceStableURL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580Accessed:08/02/200903:04YouruseoftheJSTORarchiveindicatesyouracceptanceofJSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUse,availableathttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.JSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUseprovides,inpart,thatunlessyouhaveobtainedpriorpermission,youmaynotdownloadanentireissueofajournalormultiplecopiesofarticles,andyoumayusecontentintheJSTORarchiveonlyforyourpersonal,non-commercialuse.Pleasecontactthepublisherregardinganyfurtheruseofthiswork.Publishercontactinformationmaybeobtainedathttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ceip.EachcopyofanypartofaJSTORtransmissionmustcontainthesamecopyrightnoticethatappearsonthescreenorprintedpageofsuchtransmission.JSTORisanot-for-profitorganizationfoundedin1995tobuildtrusteddigitalarchivesforscholarship.Weworkwiththescholarlycommunitytopreservetheirworkandthematerialstheyrelyupon,andtobuildacommonresearchplatformthatpromotesthediscoveryanduseoftheseresources.FormoreinformationaboutJSTOR,pleasecontactsupport@jstor.org.CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceiscollaboratingwithJSTORtodigitize,preserveandextendaccesstoForeignPolicy.http://www.jstor.orgSOFTPOWERbyJosephS.Nye,Jr.TheColdWarisoverandAmericansaretry-ingtounderstandtheirplaceinaworldwith-outadefiningSovietthreat.Pollsreportthatnearlyhalfthepublicbelievesthecountryisindecline,andthatthosewhobelieveindeclinetendtofavorprotectionismandtocounselwithdrawalfromwhattheyconsider"overex-tendedinternationalcommitments."Inaworldofgrowinginterdependence,suchadviceiscounterproductiveandcouldbringonthedeclineitissupposedtoavert;forifthemostpowerfulcountryfailstolead,theconse-quencesforinternationalstabilitycouldbedi-sastrous.Throughouthistory,anxietyaboutdeclineandshiftingbalancesofpowerhasbeenaccompaniedbytensionandmiscalculation.NowthatSovietpowerisdecliningandJapa-nesepowerrising,misleadingtheoriesofAmericandeclineandinappropriateanalogiesbetweentheUnitedStatesandGreatBritaininthelatenineteenthcenturyhavedivertedourattentionawayfromtherealissue-howpowerischanginginworldpolitics.TheUnitedStatesiscertainlylesspowerfulattheendofthetwentiethcenturythanitwasin1945.EvenconservativeestimatesshowthattheU.S.shareofglobalproducthasdeclinedfrommorethanathirdofthetotalafterWorldWarIItoalittlemorethanafifthinthe1980s.Thatchange,however,reflectstheartificialeffectofWorldWarII:Unliketheothergreatpowers,theUnitedStateswasstrengthenedbythewar.Butthatartificialpreponderancewasboundtoerodeasothercountriesregainedtheireconomichealth.TheimportantfactisthattheU.S.economy'sshareoftheglobalproducthasbeenrelativelyconstantforthepastdecadeandahalf.TheCouncilonCom-petitivenessfindsthattheU.S.shareofworldJOSEPHS.NYE,JR.,isdirectoroftheCenterforInterna-tionalAffairsatHarvardUniversity.Thisarticledrawsfromhis1990book,BoundtoLead:TheChangingNatureofAmericanPower(NewYork:BasicBooks).153.FOREIGNPOLICYproducthasaveraged23percenteachyearsincethemid-1970s.TheCIA,usingnumbersthatreflectthepurchasingpowerofdifferentcurrencies,reportsthattheAmericanshareofworldproductincreasedslightlyfrom25percentin1975to26percentin1988.ThesestudiessuggestthattheeffectofWorldWarIIlastedaboutaquartercenturyandthatmostofthedeclineworkeditswaythroughthesystembythemid-1970s.Infact,thebigadjustmentofAmericancommitmentsoccurredwiththenPresidentRichardNixon'swithdrawalfromVietnamandtheendoftheconvertibilityofthedollarintogold.Thedictionarytellsusthatpowermeansanabilitytodothingsandcontrolothers,togetotherstodowhattheyotherwisewouldnot.Becausetheabilitytocontrolothersisoftenassociatedwiththepossessionofcertainre-sources,politiciansanddiplomatscommonlydefinepowerasthepossessionofpopulation,territory,naturalresources,economicsize,militaryforces,andpoliticalstability.Forex-ample,intheagrarianeconomiesofeight-eenth-centuryEurope,populationwasacriti-calpowerresourcesinceitprovidedabasefortaxesandrecruitmentofinfantry.Traditionallythetestofagreatpowerwasitsstrengthinwar.Today,however,thedefi-nitionofpowerislosingitsemphasisonmili-taryforceandconquestthatmarkedearliereras.Thefactorsoftechnology,education,andeconomicgrowtharebecomingmoresignifi-cantininternationalpower,whilegeography,population,andrawmaterialsarebecomingsomewhatlessimportant.Ifso,areweenteringa"Japaneseperiod"inworldpolitics?Japanhascertainlydonefarbetterwithitsstrategyasatradingstatesince1945thanitdidwithitsmilitarystrategytocreateaGreaterEastAsianCo-ProsperitySphereinthe1930s.Ontheotherhand,Japan'ssecurityinrelationtoitslargemilitaryneighbors,ChinaandtheSovietUnion,andthesafetyofitssearoutesdependheavilyonU.S.protection.Whiletheymaydiminish,theseproblemswillnotvanishwiththeendoftheColdWar.OneshouldnotleaptooquicklytotheconclusionthatalltrendsfavoreconomicpowerorcountrieslikeJapan.154.NyeWhatcanwesayaboutchangesinthedistri-butionofpowerresourcesinthecomingde-cades?Politicalleadersoftenusetheterm"multipolarity"toimplythereturntoabalanceamonganumberofstateswithroughlyequalpowerresourcesanalogoustothatofthenine-teenthcentury.Butthisisnotlikelytobethesituationattheturnofthecentury,forintermsofpowerresources,allthepotentialchallengersexcepttheUnitedStatesaredeficientinsomerespect.TheSovietUnionlagseconomically,Chinaremainsaless-developedcountry,Eu-ropelackspoliticalunity,andJapanisdeficientbothinmilitarypowerandinglobalideologicalappeal.IfeconomicreformsreverseSovietde-cline,ifJapandevelopsafull-fledgednuclearandconventionalmilitarycapability,orifEu-ropebecomesdramaticallymoreunified,theremaybeareturntoclassicalmultipolarityinthetwenty-firstcentury.Butbarringsuchchanges,theUnitedStatesislikelytoretainabroaderrangeofpowerresources-military,economic,scientific,cultural,andideological-thanothercountries,andtheSovietUnionmayloseitssuperpowerstatus.TheGreatPowerShiftThecomingcenturymayseecontinuedAmericanpreeminence,butthesourcesofpowerinworldpoliticsarelikelytoundergomajorchangesthatwillcreatenewdifficultiesforallcountriesinachievingtheirgoals.Proofofpowerliesnotinresourcesbutintheabilitytochangethebehaviorofstates.Thus,thecriticalquestionfortheUnitedStatesisnotwhetheritwillstartthenextcenturyasthesuperpowerwiththelargestsupplyofre-sources,buttowhatextentitwillbeabletocontrolthepoliticalenvironmentandgetothercountriestodowhatitwants.Sometrendsinworldpoliticssuggestthatitwillbemorediffi-cultinthefutureforanygreatpowertocontrolthepoliticalenvironment.TheproblemfortheUnitedStateswillbelesstherisingchallengeofanothermajorpowerthanageneraldiffu-sionofpower.Whereasnineteenth-centuryBritainfacednewchallengers,thetwenty-firstcenturyUnitedStateswillfacenewchallenges.Asworldpoliticsbecomesmorecomplex,thepowerofallmajorstatestogaintheirobjec-155.FOREIGNPOLICYtiveswillbediminished.TounderstandwhatishappeningtotheUnitedStatestoday,thedistinctionbetweenpoweroverothercountriesandpoweroveroutcomesmustbeclear.Al-thoughtheUnitedStatesstillhasleverageoverparticularcountries,ithasfarlessleverageoverthesystemasawhole.Itislesswell-placedtoattainitsendsunilaterally,butitisnotaloneinthissituation.Allmajorstateswillhavetoconfrontthechangingnatureofpowerinworldpolitics.Suchchanges,ofcourse,arenotentirelynew.Forexample,therapidgrowthofprivateactorsoperatingacrossinternationalborders,whetherlargecorporationsorpoliticalgroups,waswidelyrecognizedintheearly1970s.EvenHenryKissinger,withhisdeeplyrootedbeliefinclassicalbalance-of-powerpolitics,concededina1975speechthat"weareenteringanewera.Oldinternationalpatternsarecrumbling....Theworldhasbecomeinterdependentineconomics,incommunications,inhumanaspi-rations."Bythelate1970s,however,theAmericanpoliticalmoodhadshifted.Iran'sseizureoftheU.S.embassyinTehranandtheSovietinva-sionofAfghanistanseemedtoreaffirmtheroleofmilitaryforceandtheprimacyofthetradi-tionalsecurityagenda.RonaldReagan'spresi-dencyaccentuatedthesetrendsintheearly1980s.TheU.S.defensebudgetincreasedinrealtermsforfivestraightyears,armscontrolwasdowngraded,andpublicoppositiontonu-clearforcesanddeterrencegrew.Conventionalmilitaryforcewasusedsuccessfully,albeitagainsttheextremelyweakstatesofGrenadaandLibya.Theshiftingagendaofworldpoli-ticsdiscreditedthe1970s'concernwithinter-dependenceandrestoredthetraditionalem-phasisonmilitarypower.Butinterdependencecontinuedtogrow,andtheworldofthe1980swasnotthesameasthatofthe1950s.Theappropriateresponsetothechangesoc-curringinworldpoliticstodayisnottoaban-donthetraditionalconcernforthemilitarybalanceofpower,buttoacceptitslimitationsandtosupplementitwithinsightsaboutinter-dependence.Inthetraditionalview,statesaretheonlysignificantactorsinworldpoliticsandonlyafewlargestatesreallymatter.Buttoday156.Nyeotheractorsarebecomingincreasinglyimpor-tant.Althoughtheylackmilitarypower,trans-nationalcorporationshaveenormouseconomicresources.Thirtycorporationstodayeachhaveannualsalesgreaterthanthegrossnationalproducts(GNPs)of90countries.Inthe1980s,theannualprofitsofIBMandRoyalDutch/ShellGroupwereeachlargerthanthecentralgovernmentbudgetsofColombia,Kenya,orYugoslavia.Multinationalcorporationsaresometimesmorerelevanttoachievingacoun-try'sgoalsthanareotherstates.Theannualoverseasproductionbysuchcorporationsex-ceedsthetotalvalueofinternationaltrade.Inaregionalcontext,aportraitoftheMiddleEastconflictthatdidnotincludethesuperpowerswouldbewoefullyinadequate,butsowouldadescriptionthatdidnottelloftransnationalreligiousgroups,oilcompanies,andterroristorganizations.Theissueisnotwhetherstateornonstateactorsaremoreimportant-statesusuallyare.Thepointisthatinmoderntimes,morecomplexcoalitionsaffectoutcomes.Withchangingactorsinworldpoliticscomechanginggoals.Inthetraditionalview,statesgiveprioritytomilitarysecuritytoensuretheirsurvival.Today,however,statesmustconsidernewdimensionsofsecurity.Nationalsecurityhasbecomemorecomplicatedasthreatsshiftfromthemilitary(thatis,threatsagainstterri-torialintegrity)totheeconomicandecological.Forexample,CanadianstodayarenotafraidthatU.S.soldierswillburnTorontoforasec-ondtime(asin1813);rathertheyfearthatTorontowillbeprogrammedintoabackwaterbyaTexascomputer.Theformsofvulnerabil-ityhaveincreased,andtrade-offsamongpoli-ciesaredesignedtodealwithdifferentvulnera-bilities.TheUnitedStates,forinstance,mightenhanceitsenergysecuritybysendingnavalforcestothePersianGulf;butitcouldaccom-plishthesamegoalbyenlargingitsstrategicpetroleumreserve,byimposingagasolinetaxtoencourageconservationathome,andbyimprovingcooperationininstitutionsliketheInternationalEnergyAgency.Whilemilitaryforceremainstheultimateformofpowerinaself-helpsystem,theuseofforcehasbecomemorecostlyformoderngreatpowersthanitwasinearliercenturies.Other157.FOREIGNPOLICYinstrumentssuchascommunications,organi-zationalandinstitutionalskills,andmanipula-tionofinterdependencehavebecomeimpor-tant.Contrarytosomerhetoricalflourishes,interdependencedoesnotmeanharmony.Rather,itoftenmeansunevenlybalancedmu-tualdependence.Justasthelessenamoredoftwoloversmaymanipulatetheother,thelessvulnerableoftwostatesmayusesubtlethreatstotheirrelationshipasasourceofpower.Fur-ther,interdependenceisoftenbalanceddiffer-entlyindifferentspheressuchassecurity,trade,andfinance.Thus,creatingandresist-inglinkagesbetweenissueswhenastateiseitherlessormorevulnerablethananotherbecomestheartofthepowergame.Politicalleadersuseinternationalinstitutionstodis-courageorpromotesuchlinkages;theyshopfortheforumthatdefinesthescopeofanissueinthemannerbestsuitingtheirinterests.Astheinstrumentsofpowerchange,sodostrategies.Traditionalistsconsiderthegoalofsecurityandtheinstrumentofmilitaryforcetobelinkedbyastrategyofbalancingpower.Stateswishingtopreservetheirindependencefrommilitaryintimidationfollowabalancingstrategytolimittherelativepowerofotherstates.Today,however,economicandecologi-calissuesinvolvelargeelementsofmutualad-vantagethatcanbeachievedonlythroughco-operation.Theseissuesareoftencriticaltothereelectionofpoliticalleaders.AFrenchpresi-denttodaywouldnotinterferewithGermany'sincreasedeconomicgrowthbecauseGermangrowthiscriticaltoFrencheconomicgrowth.TheFrenchdecisiontoforegoanindependenteconomicpolicyandremainintheEuropeanmonetarysystemintheearly1980sisoneex-ampleofsuchinterdependence.Traditionalistaccountsofworldpoliticsoftenspeakofaninternationalsystemthatre-sultsfromthebalancingstrategiesofstates.Althoughbipolarityandmultipolarityareuse-fulterms,todaydifferentspheresofworldpoliticshavedifferentdistributionsofpower-thatis,differentpowerstructures.Militarypower,particularlynuclear,remainslargelybipolarinitsdistribution.Butintrade,wheretheEuropeanCommunityactsasaunit,powerismultipolar.Oceanresources,money,space,158.Nyeshipping,andairlineseachhavesomewhatdif-ferentdistributionsofpower.Thepowerofstatesvariesaswell,asdoesthesignificanceofnonstateactorsindifferentspheres.Forexam-ple,thepoliticsofinternationaldebtcannotbeunderstoodwithoutconsideringthepowerofprivatebanks.Ifmilitarypowercouldbetransferredfreelyintotherealmsofeconomicsandtheenviron-ment,thedifferentstructureswouldnotmat-ter;andtheoverallhierarchydeterminedbymilitarystrengthwouldaccuratelypredictout-comesinworldpolitics.Butmilitarypowerismorecostlyandlesstransferabletodaythaninearliertimes.Thus,thehierarchiesthatcharac-terizedifferentissuesaremorediverse.Thegamesofworldpoliticsencompassdifferentplayersatdifferenttableswithdifferentpilesofchips.Theycantransferwinningsamongtables,butoftenonlyataconsiderabledis-count.Themilitarygameandtheoverallstructureofthebalanceofpowerdominatewhenthesurvivalofstatesisclearlyatstake,butinmuchofmodernworldpolitics,physicalsurvivalisnotthemostpressingissue.ConvertingPowerThefragmentationofworldpoliticsintomanydifferentsphereshasmadepowerre-sourceslessfungible,thatis,lesstransferablefromspheretosphere.Moneyisfungible,inthatitcanbeeasilyconvertedfromonecur-rencytoanother.Powerhasalwaysbeenlessfungiblethanmoney,butitisevenlesssotodaythaninearlierperiods.Intheeighteenthcentury,amonarchwithafulltreasurycouldpurchaseinfantrytoconquernewprovinces,which,inturn,couldenrichthetreasury.ThiswasessentiallythestrategyofFrederickIIofPrussia,forexample,whenin1740heseizedAustria'sprovinceofSilesia.Today,however,thedirectuseofforceforeconomicgainisgenerallytoocostlyanddan-gerousformoderngreatpowers.Evenshortofaggression,thetranslationofeconomicintomilitarypowerresourcesmaybeverycostly.Forinstance,thereisnoeconomicobstacletoJapan'sdevelopingamajornuclearorconven-tionalforce,butthepoliticalcostbothathomeandinthereactionofothercountrieswouldbe159.FOREIGNPOLICYconsiderable.MilitarizationmightthenreduceratherthanincreaseJapan'sabilitytoachieveitsends.Becausepowerisarelationship,bydefini-tionitimpliessomecontext.Diminishedfun-gibilitymeansthatspecifyingthecontextisincreasinglyimportantinestimatingtheactualpowerthatcanbederivedfrompowerre-sources.Morethanever,onemustaskthequestion,"Powerforwhat?"Yetatthesametime,becauseworldpoliticshasonlypartlychangedandthetraditionalgeopoliticalagendaisstillrelevant,somefungibilityofmilitarypowerremains.Theprotectiveroleofmilitaryforceisarelevantassetinbargainingamongstates.Thedependenceofconservativeoil-pro-ducingstatesontheUnitedStatesfortheirsecurity,forexample,limitedtheirleverageontheUnitedStatesduringthe1973oilcrisis.TheUnitedStatesisstilltheultimateguaran-torofthemilitarysecurityofEuropeandJapan,andthatroleisasourceofbargainingpowerinnegotiationswithitsallies.Ingeneral,theallies'needforprotectionstrengthensAmericaninfluence,andmaycontinuetodosoevenwithareducedSovietthreat.DuringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatesoftenworriedaboutthefrailtyofitsalliesandtendedtosacrificesomeeconomicinterestsinitsefforttocontaintheperceivedSovietmenace.Despitethewaningofthatthreat,iftheUnitedStatesworrieslessthanitsalliesdo,itmaybeabletodemandmoreofthem.Toevaluatepowerinapost-ColdWarworld,itisnecessarytorecognizeinstrumentsandbalance-of-powerstrategiesnecessaryforasuccessfulpolicy.Butnewelementsinthemodernworldarediffusingpowerawayfromallthegreatpowers.Thus,anysuccessfulstrategymustincorporatebothcontinuityandchange.Thegreatpowersoftodayarelessabletousetheirtraditionalpowerresourcestoachievetheirpurposesthaninthepast.Onmanyissues,privateactorsandsmallstateshavebe-comemorepowerful.Atleastfivetrendshavecontributedtothisdiffusionofpower:eco-nomicinterdependence,transnationalactors,nationalisminweakstates,thespreadoftech-nology,andchangingpoliticalissues.160.NyeNewformsofcommunicationsandtrans-portationhavehadarevolutionaryeffectoneconomicinterdependence.Acenturyago,ittooktwoweekstocrosstheAtlantic;in1927,CharlesLindberghdiditin33hours;today,theConcordefliesacrossinthreeandahalfhours.Moderntelecommunicationsareinstan-taneous,andsatellitesandfiber-opticcableshaveledtoatenfoldincreaseinoverseastele-phonecallsinthelastdecade.Thedecliningcostsoftransportationandcommunicationhaverevolutionizedglobalmarketsandacceler-atedthedevelopmentoftransnationalcorpora-tionsthattransfereconomicactivityacrossborders.Worldtradehasgrownmorerapidlythanworldproduct,becomingmoreimportantinallmajoreconomies.TradehasmorethandoubleditsroleintheU.S.economyoverthepasttwodecades.Changesinfinancialmarketsareevenmoredramatic.Internationalmone-taryflowsaresome25timestheworld'saver-agedailytradeingoods.TherapidexpansionofEurocurrencyandEurobondmarkets(thatis,currenciesheldoutsidetheirhomecountry)haserodedtheabilityofnationalauthoritiestocontroltheircapitalmarkets.In1975,foreignexchangemarketshandledsome$10-15billiondaily;by1986,theyhandled$200billion.Governmentscaninterveneinsuchmarkets;butiftheydosowithaheavyhand,theywillincurenormouscostsintheirowneconomicgrowthandriskunintendedeffects.Forin-stance,effortsbytheU.S.governmentinthe1960stoslowtheexportofcapitalbyU.S.-basedmultinationalfirmsencouragedthosefirmstokeepandborrowdollarsoutsidetheUnitedStates.Theresultwastherapidbur-geoningofEurocurrencymarketsoutsideU.S.controls.Inadditiontoconstrainingthewaystatespursuetheirnationalinterests,transnationalactorsaffectthewaysuchinterestsareinitiallydefined.Transnationalinvestmentcreatesnewinterestsandcomplicatescoalitionsinworldpolitics.Forexample,HondaofAmericaissteadilyturningintoanAmericancarmaker.Itplanstoexport50,000carsannuallytoJapanintheearly1990s.AmericanofficialsarenowpressingEuropeanstoopentheirmarkettoJapaneseautomobilesproducedintheUnited161.FOREIGNPOLICYStates.Inotherwords,transnationalinvest-mentshavechangedanAmericaninterest.TheAmericancaseisnotunique.Foryears,FrancerestrictedJapaneseautomobilesto3percentoftheFrenchmarketandrestrictedin-vestmentbyJapanesecompaniesinFrance.WhenJapaneseautomakersbegantoestablishplantsinotherEuropeancountriesthatcouldexporttoFrance,theFrenchgovernmentdroppeditsrestrictions.Transnationalinvest-mentschangedalong-standingFrenchpolicy.Thediffusionofpowertoprivatetransnationalactorsandtheresultingcomplicationofna-tionalinterestsislikelytocontinueeventhoughitisnotrecognizedinmanycompari-sonsofthepowerresourcesofmajorstates.Morethanever,onemustaskthequestion,"Powerforwhat?"Modernization,urbanization,andincreasedcommunicationindevelopingcountrieshavealsodiffusedpowerfromgovernmenttopri-vateactors.Militarypowerismoredifficulttoapplytodaythaninthepastbecauseasocialawakeninghasstirrednationalisminotherwisepoororweakstates.Thisincreasedsocialmo-bilizationmakesmilitaryinterventionandex-ternalrulemorecostly.Thenineteenth-cen-turygreatpowerscarvedoutandruledcolonialempireswithahandfuloftroops.In1953,theUnitedStateswasabletorestoretheShahofIrantohisthronethroughaminorcovertac-tion.Itishardtoimagine,however,howmanytroopswouldhavebeenneededtorestoretheShahinthesociallymobilizedandnationalisticIranof1979.TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionfoundthecostsofmaintainingtroopsinVietnamandAfghanistanunsupportable.Ineachcase,thecausewaslessanincreaseinthepowerofaweakerstatethanthecostlinessforoutsidersofrulingactivelyantagonisticpopu-lations.Anothertrendinthediffusionofpoweristhespreadofmoderntechnology,whichhasenhancedthecapabilitiesofbackwardstates.Whilethesuperpowershavekeptalargeleadinmilitarytechnology,t