2013年 12月 6日
Issue No: 13/45
亚洲经济分析
研究
2014年及之后的中国展望:道路虽有颠簸,但望稳步前行(摘要)
增速平稳、信贷增长放缓、通胀温和
我们预计中国明年经济增速平稳、接近趋势水平,因为出口走强和消费提升有助
于抵消投资因金融状况收紧而走软的影响。在投资领域,最依赖杠杆的固定资产
投资和房地产行业的投资减速幅度较为明显,但制造业投资将因为盈利提高且周
期性需求复苏而有所增长。平稳增长与信贷降温的组合会令经济增长轨迹较 2012
年年底时更具可持续性。整体通胀率应该保持温和、产出缺口处于低位。
改革规划提振对中期前景的信心;道路将因外部环境和诸多调整而更显
颠簸
三中全会绘制的改革蓝图应该有助于中国实现更均衡高效的经济增长。我们认
为,地方政府融资、农村改革、国企改革、民营资本进入市场以及利率/汇率改革
是短期内的工作重点。风险包括:外需、对美国 QE退出政策的响应/流动性管
理、改革的先后顺序以及房地产领域政策。
来自改革的冲击较为均衡,可能倾向于平稳增长
短期内来自改革的冲击大体均衡,因为改革的目标是将资源配置朝向更具生产力的
领域倾斜。举例来说,放松服务业的民营资本投资限制将有助于提振增长,同时土
地#管理
#改革和提高环保成本应该有助于限制非生产性投资。我们重申,受周期
性利好因素推动的平稳经济增长将为改革带来更有利的背景环境。这加大了明年经
济增速目标不做调整的可能性。
利率和汇率改革
我们预计央行将继续保持偏紧立场,而且未来几年无风险长期利率将朝向均衡水
平逐渐升高 100-200基点。利率上升有助于提高消费、遏制投资浪费。我们预计
短期利率将在短期内有所放松而在中期内逐步攀升。仅银行间利率走高一项对于
经济增长的影响将较为有限,除非货币和信贷增速较我们的预期明显放缓。不
过,流动资金贷款和高风险借款人将承受更大压力。利率市场化的进程将受到处
于低位的全球利率影响,而且需要辅以汇率灵活性的提高、以此遏制热钱流入。
我们预计短期内人民币汇率将小幅走强。
Andrew Tilton
+852-2978-1802 andrew.tilton@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司
Goohoon Kwon, CFA
+82(2)3788-1775 goohoon.kwon@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司首尔分公司
Tushar Poddar
+91(22)6616-9042 tushar.poddar@gs.com
高盛(印度)证券私人有限公司
崔历
+852-2978-0784 li.cui@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司
宋宇
+86(10)6627-3111 yu.song@ghsl.cn
北京高华证券有限责任公司
Mark Tan
+65-6889-2472 mark.tan@gs.com
高盛(新加坡)私人公司
Chiwoong Lee
+82(2)3788-1722 chiwoong.lee@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司首尔分公司
邓敏强
+852-2978-6634 mk.tang@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司
Jonathan Sequeira
+852-2978-0698 jonathan.sequeira@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司
魏静娴
+852-2978-0106 maggie.wei@gs.com
高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司
Vishal Vaibhaw
(212) 934-9792 vishal.vaibhaw@gs.com
高盛(印度)证券私人有限公司
Hui Ying Chan
+65-6654-5459 huiying.chan@gs.com
高盛(新加坡)私人公司
投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。 有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息,见信息披露附录,或参阅
www.gs.com/research/hedge.html。
高盛集团 全球投资研究
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 2
China outlook for 2014 and beyond: Steady drive on a bumpier road
2013 started out soft but growth strengthened in the second half, broadly consistent with our
expectations at the end of 2012. The weak consumption (dented by the government’s anti-graft
measures) and exports surprised to the downside in the first half of the year. A side benefit of the
soft consumption has been the modest inflation, avoiding overheating pressure historically
associated with the first year of China's leadership transition. Meanwhile, infrastructure
investment on the back of accommodative macro policies supported cyclical growth at the cost of
fast leverage growth, as we cautioned earlier. The strong credit growth was fueled by flush
liquidity and strong capital flows, prompting an earlier-than-expected monetary tightening in June.
Capital inflows dropped following the State Administration of Foreign Exchange’s (SAFE)
measures to curb hot money inflows and discussion on the US Fed tapering, and the People’s
Bank of China’s (PBOC) hawkish signal at end-June—warning that banks need to manage
liquidity risks better—sent the interbank rates to top 20% temporarily. Interbank rates have eased
since then, but remained well above the very accommodative level of around 3.5% during the first
half of the year.
The growth and credit combination reversed in the second half of the year. Overall total social
financing (TSF) decelerated from 20% yoy to about 18½% yoy, on the back of the higher
interbank rates and prudential regulation to curb the excessive growth of non-loan financing.
Meanwhile, our Current Activity Indicator (CAI) accelerated from its trough of 7.4% qoq ann. in
June to 10.1% qoq ann. in October, supported by stronger consumption and exports (Exhibit 1).
A more positive sentiment also helped, following the government’s assurance of stable policies,
prompting solid inventory restocking in Q3. The divergent trends of leverage and growth makes
this recovery different from the past few cycles; for instance, the recovery in late 2012 was
accompanied by the relaxation of financial conditions, as easy credit was used as a policy tool to
manage the downturn. This made the central banks’ task of controlling credit while supporting
growth inherently conflicted at the time. In contrast, growth recovery is now driven by stronger
exports and consumption (generally unleveraged in the case of China), leaving scope for tighter
monetary policy.
图表1: Growth improved in the second half, notwithstanding tighter financial conditions
资料来源: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CAI qoq ann
FCI (RHS)
percent Index
FCI tightening
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 3
For 2014, we expect exports and consumption to improve further, providing a more favorable
backdrop to keep monetary policy stance relatively tight. As such the benign combination of
stable growth and credit deceleration will continue. We discuss this in greater detail in the first
section below. We then analyze the likely impact and focus of interest and exchange rate reforms
in the second section. The reform agenda unveiled in the Third Plenum bolsters a positive
outlook for the Chinese economy, and we discuss the key medium-term growth issues in the third
section.
In our view, the latest reform agenda tackles the critical issues facing the Chinese economy.
Sequencing of reform plans will be important for the growth trajectory and risk management. We
argued earlier1 that the government is likely to pursue a steady path, aiming for a stable growth to
anchor market expectations and support job creation, while promoting structural adjustment
through institutional reforms. We maintain this view, and believe cyclical tailwinds should make it
easier to balance the reform and growth objectives next year. In our view, the government will be
more likely to communicate an unchanged growth target in that light.
Though our base case is positive, the road in the next few years could still be bumpy. First, the
exit from the easy global monetary environment could involve volatile capital flows, putting to test
the central bank’s ability to manage domestic liquidity and communicate policy intentions.
Recovery of external demand may also be affected. Second, the near-term growth and market
impact of reforms could be uncertain, although these measures should be positive for the medium
term. For instance, market expectations of interest rate liberalization could imply higher interest
rate to last longer. Last but not least, the property sector has been heating up, yet the policy
response appears vague. Policy steps in this area remain a source of uncertainty. Thus, we see
risks in both sides of our projection, which we will discuss in the last section.
Stable growth and moderate inflation
Cyclical tailwinds including exports and consumption, a more active fiscal policy, and broadly
balanced reform impact point to a steady if not improving growth outlook next year.
Exhibit 2 demonstrates the impact of various cyclical and policy factors on growth. Exhibits 3 and
4 contain our key macro forecasts, as well as our quarterly growth and inflation trajectories.
1 See EM Macro Daily - Tapering, Chinese style, July 8, 2013 and EM Macro Daily -
China: Liconomics: Not just about reform and not just about Premier Li, July 22, 2013.
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 4
图表2: Improved consumption and exports to offset the impact of tighter financial
conditions next year*
*This is estimated based on a model that includes China’s FCI component that corresponds to the domestic funding condition, China’s
external demand, and retail sales. The framework is similar to that used to estimate China FCI, see Asia Economics Analyst: 13/21 -
China’s growth headwinds through the lens of a new FCI, June 21, 2013. The framework here identifies the impact of domestic policy
cycles more explicitly.
资料来源: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
图表3: GDP from demand side, and money and fiscal forecasts
资料来源: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
图表4: Quarterly growth and GDP
资料来源: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2012 H2 2013 H1 2013 H2 2014 H1 2014 H2
Contribution of consumption
Contribution of external demand
Contribution of dometic funding condition
Net effect of the above
Headline GDP and forecast
ppt
Change in yoy GDP growth over a year and contributions
GDP from demand side
2010 2011 2012 2013F 2014F
GDP by expenditure % yoy 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.8
Consumption % yoy 7.9 11.5 8.2 7.7 8.2
Investment % yoy 9.7 9.2 7.8 8.2 7.4
Net exports PPT 2.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 0.2
Exports % yoy 19.2 10.7 -4.6 3.0 5.0
Imports % yoy 13.6 14.9 -4.4 4.0 4.9
GDP by expenditure PPT 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.8
Consumption PPT 3.8 5.6 4.0 3.8 4.1
Investment PPT 4.6 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.4
Net exports PPT 2.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 0.2
Exports PPT 5.0 3.1 -1.3 0.7 1.2
Imports PPT 3.0 3.8 -1.2 0.9 1.0
Fiscal 2010 2011 2012 2013F 2014F
Fiscal Balance % of GDP % -1.7 -1.1 -1.7 -1.8 -2.0
Monetary 2010 2011 2012 2013F 2014F
M2 growth % 19.7 13.6 13.8 14.0 13.0
Total social financing (amount
outstanding , yoy%) % 25.4 18.5 19.2 17.8 15.0
2013 2014 Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Dec-14
GDP (yoy) 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.9 8.2 7.7 7.6
GDP (qoq ann.) 8.4 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.8
CPI (yoy) 2.6 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0
CPI (qoq ann.) 3.6 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
growth rate (%) Annual Quarterly
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 5
More specifically, there are several factors supporting a stable growth next year.
First, a stronger global backdrop should help. Our Global Economics team forecasts the US
economy to accelerate from 1.7% in 2013E to 2.9% next year, and the Euro area to turn a
1.1% growth, compared to the contraction of 0.4% in 2013E. For China’s exports, the
external demand pickup would feature the first improvement in global demand condition in
over 5 years (Exhibit 5). We estimate that external demand will add around 0.4-0.5
percentage points (ppt) to growth next year, reflecting the now smaller but still meaningful
impact of positive external demand on exports and manufacturing investment.
Second, consumption should improve next year, as the impact of the anti-graft measures
wane (we estimate this to trim 0.3 ppt off GDP growth in 2013). Indeed, sequential retail
sales have improved in recent months. Fiscal policies will likely be more expansionary in the
next few years with slightly higher deficit as the government provides more social services
including those to migrant workers. Besides a larger deficit, the government could also
compress other spending and resort to SOE dividend payment to fund the higher social
expenditure. This will support consumption, although we expect the near-term impact to be
small. We also expect fiscal policy to play a more active role in case of downside risks,
enabled by the flexibility introduced through fiscal reforms.
Third, investment will slow, as tighter financial conditions combined with policies to trim
overcapacity accelerates the growth transition, but manufacturing investment should hold up.
Our Financial Conditions Index (FCI) has tightened by over 150bp so far in 2013, initially
driven by exchange rate appreciation, and then by domestic tightening since Q3. This tends
to affect the economy with a 2-3 quarter lag, and we estimate the tightening in 2013 could
shave around 0.6-0.7 ppt off GDP growth next year. Within investment, we expect
infrastructure and property to slow as these sectors benefited the most from easy financial
conditions. Manufacturing investment accelerated in the last few months, mostly driven by
equipment investment. We expect manufacturing investment to be slightly softer in 2014
than 2013, but to still hold up strong. The improvement of exports and consumption are
supportive cyclical drivers and the economic transition towards services and higher value-
added requires new investment. These, in our view, will offset the sluggish investment
growth in overcapacity sectors, which account for about 20-30% of overall manufacturing
investment (Exhibit 6).
The increase in leverage in the last few years has concentrated in heavy industries, local
government financing vehicles (LGFV), and to a lesser extent, property sectors, and Chinese
corporate debt/GDP ratio is relatively high. As we argued before,2 tail risks arising from
heavy industries have increased and LGFV debt burden has risen significantly. Meanwhile,
the balance sheet of listed corporates (measured as the average net debt/EBITA) still
compares favorably to most Asian countries, as many companies have accumulated
significant cash. In fact, part of the corporate sector—in particular smaller companies—
generally de-levered in the last few years. This supports the expansion of the corporate
sector (such as those more exposed to exports and consumption) when cyclical conditions
turn and market access is relaxed. Risks in the heavy industries and LGFV debt will need to
be managed through industrial policies to trim overcapacity and fiscal reforms to improve
transparency and address moral hazards.
Fourth, economic restructuring doesn’t need to be growth negative. In fact, the slowdown in
economic growth has gone hand-in-hand with the worsening of economic imbalances post
2 See China: Portfolio Strategy Research: The China credit conundrum: Risks, paths
and implications, July 26, 2013.
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 6
the global financial crisis, environmental issues, and local debt built up, suggesting slower
growth in itself does little to sort out domestic imbalances. Neither will structural reforms to
rebalance resources towards more productive areas necessarily be growth negative. For
instance, reforms to relax private sector access broaden the scope of investment and can be
significant, boosting both near-term growth and medium-term potential, and faster steps in
hukou reforms could stimulate consumption. This could offset the negative cyclical impact on
unproductive investment from other reforms such as land reforms and higher environmental
costs. We lay out the growth impact of reforms in Exhibit 7.
For the economy as a whole, we expect the growth to be within trend and the output gap to be
close to zero.3 This implies modest inflationary pressure. Part of the recent rise in headline yoy
inflation is due to low-base effects and some spikes in food prices, while sequential non-food
inflation has remained moderate (at 2% qoq ann. s.a.). In the near term, we think headline
inflation may ease slightly, as the base effect dissipates and, according to high-frequency data,
vegetable prices have recently been stable at a low level.
Looking ahead the next year, with activity growth expected to be steady, we see largely stable
demand pressure on non-food prices. Meanwhile, while pork prices have bottomed and risen
quite sharply since June, we think further upside risk to pork inflation is contained, given the soft
key input (soybean and corn) prices. Our Global Commodities team expects these input prices to
fall significantly further over the next 12 months, which should continue to bolster pork farmers’
profitability and their potential supply response to the recent spikes in pork prices.
图表5: We expect the DM recovery to continue
图表6: We also expect infrastructure and property
investment to slow but manufacturing investment to hold
up
资料来源: Haver, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 资料来源: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
3 See EM Macro Daily - Using secondary industry GDP to gauge inflation pressures in
China, December 2, 2013.
-6
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6
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
* Weights adjusted to reflect re-exports.
Percent change, year ago Percent change, year ago
China External Demand Indices*:
Forecast
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Mar-12 Sep-12 Mar-13 Sep-13 Mar-14 Sep-14
yoy %yoy %
FAI growth:
Headline
Infrastructure
Manufacturing
Real estate
Forecast
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 7
图表7: Reform impact mixed on near-term growth but positive on long-term growth
Note: “+” indicates positive impact. “-“ indicates negative impact. “0” indicates low or zero impact. “?” indicates uncertainties
on the direction.
资料来源: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
Interest and exchange rate reforms
We expect the PBOC to continue with its tightening bias, and move the interest rate higher
towards its equilibrium in the next few years. The immediate growth impact from higher interbank
interest rates will likely be limited, and partly offset by the structural rebalancing of resources from
banks/corporate sectors to households. Bond yields and corporate credit spread will be the most
directly hit by the higher interbank rates. Though a faster adjustment would help the economy to
rebalance, in practice, we expect the steps to be affected by the consideration of sectoral impact,
and the impact on capital inflows. We believe steps towards greater exchange rate flexibility will
be needed to support the interest rate liberalization and curb hot money inflows. In the near term,
we expect small appreciation, continued reserve accumulation, and strengthening of macro
prudential measures.
Cyclical tightening has pushed up the interbank rates in recent months. The PBOC
tightened its policy stance earlier in this cycle to guard against excessive credit growth, and kept
interbank rates higher than what the market had expected in similar cyclical conditions in the past.
Given the directional moves towards non-loan financing, which is largely benchmarked off
interbank rates, and the on-going liberalization of the retail interest rates, we believe retail rates
such as lending rates should no longer be considered as policy benchmarks (this includes the
deposit rate, which hasn’t changed in the last 18 months despite the shift in the monetary policy
stance). Instead, we have started to forecast the short-end interbank rates, which are more
accurate at reflecting the monetary policy stance, in our view.
Consumption Investment Domestic demand Potential growth rate
Sustainability
(financial, fiscal,
and resources)
Certification of
rural land + - - + +
Hukou reform + 0 + ? +
Improving city
infrastructure + + + + ?
Increase private
sector participation 0 + + + +
Strengthening
spending controls
at the local level;
municipal bonds
0 - - 0 +
Resource and
property taxes 0 - - - +
Improving social
safety nets + 0 + 0 +
Capital account
opening and
exchange rate
liberalization
+ + + ? +
Interest rate
liberalization + - 0 + +
Urbanization
The role of government
Fiscal/resource price reforms
Financial and external reforms
2013年 12月 6日 亚洲经济分析
全球投资研究 8
图表8: Bond yield, working capital loans, and WMP rates have risen, while the bank
lending rate has been steady
*Credit spread is measured as 1-year corporate rate bond yield minus risk-free rate (represented by 1-year government bond
yield).
资料来源: Haver, CEIC, Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
However, the impact of interbank rates on growth is still limited at this stage, given the
excess liquidity, dominance of large banks in retail lending, and indeed the dominance of banks in
overall financial intermediation notwithstanding the liberalization in recent years. 4 As we
estimated befo